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Preface  
 
This book comes timely.  The Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework 
Convention for Climate Change, and the good spirits and intentions that made it possible, have 
put the option of a decarbonised global economy within the realm of the thinkable options. While 
goals and targets on global decarbonisation are necessary, they require a follow up with novel 
instrumentation for the substantial tasks ahead.  
 
The EU is in a special position in this respect: on the one hand, it can build on more than two 
decades of climate policy, reflected in a number of short- and long-term targets for climate and 
energy policy, and a suite of climate policy instruments intended to achieve them. On the other 
hand, there is a gap between the level of ambition expressed in the long-run targets, and the 
effectiveness of the instruments currently in place. This is confounded by the fact that neither the 
targets nor the instrument mix are free from inconsistencies, especially when considering 
interactions with neighbouring policy areas, such as energy or the internal market. And last not 
least, the EU itself is not a unified actor: between the EU and its 28 Member States, but also 
between the EU institutions, there are diverging visions on the low-carbon future for the EU 
economy and the policies and instrumentation leading towards it. 
 
Against this background, this volume presents strategic lines of instrumentation for the future 
climate policy instrumentation in the EU, both for the short and the long term, closely related to 
energy policy and other policy domains like transport and housing. The volume consists of three 
parts. Part 1 provides orientation for the medium to long term evolution of the EU climate policy 
instrument mix towards 2050. Part 2 focuses on short to medium term reform options for the 
current climate policy instrument mix toward 2030. The intricate link of EU-level policies to 
internationalisation and globalisation is deepened in Part 3.  
 
For the long-run perspective in Part 1, different climate policy instrumentations were designed 
and analyzed in a strategic context. The analysis was based on different directions of how EU 
climate governance could evolve, which in turn determine which types of instruments can be 
considered as feasible, and how well the resulting policy mix could be expected to perform. 
Whereas this first part is intended to provide long-run strategic orientation for the evolution of 
EU climate policy instrumentation, the second part takes the existing EU instrument mix as its 
point of departure. Acknowledging the various political, legal, administrative, social and economic 
constraints that have shaped EU climate policy, it investigates which reforms could reduce or 
overcome some of the identified constraints, in order to render the EU mix of climate policy 
instrument more consistent, more effective, and more efficient. Finally, the third part of this 
volume provides a kind of sensitivity analysis. It varies key assumptions on the long term 
development of EU climate governance, in terms of whether EU governance is assumed to 
become more centralised or more decentralised, and in terms of the assumed developments of 
climate policy, towards a more aligned and binding system or towards more fragmented and 
voluntary efforts. The consequences for optimal short term and long term EU climate policy 
instrumentation are investigated under these deviating assumptions.  
  
 
The results presented in this volume embody the overall approach of the CECILIA2050 project: on 
the quest for an optimal EU climate policy, the research was guided by a broad notion of 
optimality, which combines overall effectiveness, cost-effectiveness in the short and long run, as 
well as the political, legal and administrative feasibility of policy options. To structure the analysis, 
it focused on ten key challenges for EU climate policy, documented in an annex to this book. Five 
of these challenges relate to tackling the five main emitting sectors in society, namely energy; 
industry; buildings and households; transport; and agriculture. Next there are challenges of a 
more systemic nature: the overarching challenge of establishing a meaningful carbon price; rolling 
out physical infrastructure; reforming electricity markets; mobilising finance and investment; 
triggering innovation; and encouraging changes in life styles.  
 
This volume evolves from the work in the CECILIA2050 project, which ran from 2012 to 2015, and 
was funded in the EU FP7 programme in call ENV.2012.6.1-4 Exploiting the full potential of 
economic instruments to contribute to achieving the EU's greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
objectives for 2050. This volume contains the results of the final work package in content, tasked 
with integration and synthesis of results. As such, it builds on the research conducted in the 
preceding work packages, the results of which are documented on the project website 
http://cecilia2050.eu/ . The results of work package 6 are documented in three deliverables, 
corresponding to the three parts of this volume. By combining them into a single document, this 
constitutes the fourth deliverable. In addition, many key results and insights from the 
CECILIA2050 project will be presented in a special issue of the Journal Climate Policy comprised 
of about 10 papers, due for publication in 2016.  
 
Next to the results of the research conducted in CECILIA2050, the analysis in this volume also 
builds on a number of project meetings, workshops and conferences, as well as regular and 
ongoing exchange with the Science and Policy Advisory Board of the CECILIA2050 projects. The 
authors of this volume are indebted to the colleagues at the ten institutions that together formed 
the CECILIA2050 research consortium, to the members of the Advisory Board, and to all 
participants at the workshops and conferences, where the approach and preliminary results were 
discussed and developed further. 
 
The seminal message of the book is that there are different routes towards deep emission 
reduction, here as two main routes, one in a more planning mode and one in a more incentivizing 
direction, linked to different views on governance. The instrument sets developed in response to 
these distinct views have very different implications, are not necessarily consistent yet, and hence 
require discussion and choice. This book is to contribute to that important discussion. Its intended 
audience is both in the scientific community, in the public policy domain, and broader in the 
private sector and civil society.  
 
Leiden & Berlin, October 2015      Gjalt Huppes & Benjamin Görlach 
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Abstract 
 
The 2-degrees climate goal, with around 90% CO2 emission reduction for the EU by 2050, can be 
achieved with different sets of instruments. The two sets developed here are internally consistent 
and they are mostly mutually exclusive. They link to specific views on governance. Current 
instrumentation is partial and is internally inconsistent, with mutually conflicting instruments. 
Most basically, current instrumentation lacks a clear long term strategy based on design thinking. 
It seems improbable that the current piecemeal approach will be able to reach the deep reduction 
target: it is not single instruments but the full mix which is to be considered.  
 
Strategy development for instrumentation starts at a governance level: how will the deep 
transformation required be set up, fitting into broader governance approaches and into broader 
socio-economic and cultural developments? There is no single answer, as strategies require 
choices. Two main strategies can be discerned in industrialized democracies, and for the EU: a 
planning & control strategy with a project and targets orientation and an institutionalist strategy 
with an incentive and enabling orientation. Their long term instrumentation, starting from now, 
is the main subject of this study. The planning & control school links to welfare theory and 
optimization, with broad integration of several policy goals in instrumentation. The institutionalist 
school links to institutionalism in history, economics, sociology and political science, developing 
institutions for incentives and opportunity creation.  
 
Design of long term climate policy instrumentation has a starting point in the deep transformation 
required for the 2-degrees goal, as opposed to short term satisficing and medium term optimizing 
approaches. All activities in society will have to adapt to that goal, both in production and 
consumption, requiring deep innovation. For any instrumentation strategy, sparseness and 
encompassingness are starting points for design, while avoiding overlap of instruments as much 
as possible. More generic instruments are preferred, following a seven-type instrument typology 
with increasing specificness and bindingness. Taken together these abstract lines of reasoning 
constitute the design thinking for strategy development. 
 
Currently, the core instrument of carbon pricing, the ETS cap-and-trade system, covers less than 
half of all CO2 emissions and does not apply systematically to all sources, not even covering all 
electricity production and only part of industrial emissions. In transport, fleet standards cover 
light transport in different ways, leaving out most heavy transport, while aviation is part of ETS 
pricing. The most successful instruments, feed-in tariffs and other renewables subsidies, have 
been implemented at the national level. They undermine the ETS, and are at variance with an 
open EU electricity market. The ETS itself is a mixture of concepts now, without a clear strategy 
orientation. It is intended to be a pure cap-and-trade system but is now reducing volumes of 
emission permits to create a higher more relevant price. The pure cap-and-trade system, when 
functioning at relevant prices as intended, makes decentral initiatives senseless as these only 
make emissions for others cheaper. 
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The planning & control strategy builds substantially on current instrumentation, improving it. It 
focuses on technology specific measures, using subsidies and standards as prime instruments. 
Core are feed-in tariffs, with proven success, and other subsidies for renewables; subsidies for 
battery development and employment; emission standards for fossil combustion and 
incineration; insulation and heating standards in buildings; reduction of energy use, as by 
refurbishing building insulation and product standards; subsidies and standards for heat and 
electricity storage systems; dynamic standards in industry, etc. Electricity markets remain 
national markets internationally linked, with national transmission grid operators, partly private, 
owning the international linkages. In this planning & control strategy the ETS is undermined and 
fades. There is a tendency towards centralization, as when member states don’t act according to 
the stated yearly emission reduction targets. The international agreement aspired is stated 
emission reduction targets for as many countries as possible, in the Kyoto-Copenhagen-Paris line 
of negotiations. 
 
The institutionalist strategy takes the ETS as a starting point, mends its current deficiencies and 
strengthens it. Firstly, the domain of application is expanded so as to cover all fossil carbon. For 
all smaller emitters without adequate administration this is possible only through upstream 
carbon measurement, at least at gas, coal and fuel providers who have adequate administrations, 
then also covering all transport, building emissions and industrial emissions. The simplest and 
most systematic level of administration is at primary production of all fossil fuels, their imports 
and the imports of energy products, mirrored by a refund upon export and CCS. Secondly, the 
opposition between ETS and national and local initiatives is resolved by adapting volumes to price 
development, reducing cap volumes when local actions are successful. This may first be done 
through rising price floors and ceilings. As a bandwidth has no function with price related variable 
volumes, a fully stabilized predictably rising price path is established, without the complexity of 
trading. The administration can further be simplified by shifting from a permit system to an excise 
system, as a tax.  
 
With an emission tax in place, the second main instrument task is to make the price signal work 
effectively, requiring an open and equal for all, real time electricity market. In EU electricity 
transmission, pricing is congestion pricing, not for covering costs let alone proceeds maximation. 
This market design goes one step beyond the Single European Electricity Market and Supergrid 
ideas. These two EU instruments together create the long term incentives for the institutionalist 
strategy. Public funding of research is for basic funding, with exceptionally important and large 
projects implemented directly like, in a different domain, the set-up of the internet once was. 
Technology specific instruments are hardly used and then temporarily only, mainly at member 
state level. EU level instruments are restricted to incentive and opportunity creation, leaving all 
other instrumentation to member state level and below and to firms and civil society; instruments 
like fleet standards and renewables standards are abolished. The international agreement aspired 
specifies equal emission taxes for a core group starting, open to joining by all countries on equal 
footing, with all proceeds national. 
 
Both instrumentation strategies require further instruments as for spatial planning and 
infrastructure and for research and development, but filled in differently. For planning & control, 
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joint public-private infrastructure development is key as is active engagement in RD&D, to create 
and know what can and should be forced into the market, ‘picking winners’ by necessity. There 
are further similar elements in both strategies, like spatial planning allowing for slower types of 
transport, including a reduction in air transport, and temporary subsidies to create learning curves 
for novel technologies.  
 
Comparing long term instrumentation strategies on effectiveness, efficiency and feasibility is a 
non-quantified endeavor, as the long term future is substantially unknown. Comparison of 
instrument mixes shows soft, only qualitative differences, with maybe slight advantages for 
medium term emission reduction in the planning & control strategy and longer term effectiveness 
and efficiency in the institutionalist strategy. Strategy choices are ultimately based however on 
generic governance considerations, also relevant broader in society. An explicit strategy choice is 
required for setting out consistent instrumentation in main lines, thus preparing for well-
reasoned and well-informed choices, and contributing to legitimacy, the ultimate basis for the 
feasibility of effective climate policy. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Ch1 Towards instrumentation for long term climate policy 
How may effective long term climate policy instrumentation evolve? Basic options for 
instrumentation have been developed and analyzed for well-founded decisions on EU climate 
policy. The long term instrumentation is to realize a 90% CO2 emission reduction by 2050, in line 
with the global 2-degrees climate stabilization goal. Effectiveness is assumed here. How to fit 
successful policy into the broader fabric of society is the more detailed question. The 
instrumentation is to realize emission reductions cost-effectively, at low administrative effort and 
low regulatory costs in society, and in a manner acceptable to society at large. Also, the steps 
towards the instrument mixes are to be feasible, avoiding jumps of a too difficult political nature. 
Assumed is further that the EU constitutional constraints as specified in the Lisbon Treaty will 
remain operant mainly. Also, other countries, at least major trade partners are assumed to reduce 
emissions similarly, making the EU effort worthwhile from a global perspective. The time frame 
for analysis plays a key role in instrumentation design. The long term is open in many respects - 
technical-economic, political and administrative - as opposed to short term satisficing within 
current constraints and medium term optimization within known options space. There are many 
options for long term instrumentation, ultimately to be fitted into a few clear strategies, linked 
to major governance views in society. The design methodology first builds on a basic instrument 
typology; secondly has a bottom up starting point, indicating directions for the instrument 
evolution in four main sectors; and thirdly, top down, uses strategic views on governance, one 
more in a planning direction and one more in an incentivizing direction. 
 
Ch2 Imagining 2-degrees futures domains 
How can we imagine the long term domain of a low carbon society? It has technical aspects, like 
the use of solar and wind power in electricity production and the increased use of electricity and 
possibly hydrogen in intermediate and final energy use. Long term technology development is 
partly determined already as fundamentally new technologies cannot have a dominant position 
by 2050 due to stickiness in their large scale introduction. However, current and new technologies 
certainly will evolve. Which role specific technologies will play is hard to predict however, unless 
by planned implementation. How a low carbon society may look like in a broader sense is very 
open as well. There is deep uncertainty on economic development, as in the speed of productivity 
growth and how low marginal cost technologies may lead to changes in the coordination 
mechanisms in the economy. However, the globalized market economy will continue in some 
form, so is the assumption, with monopolistic tendencies somehow checked. In a broader social 
and political sense, a substantial civil society will remain a core European asset, with a 
multilayered political system leaving room for decentralized initiatives, also in the climate 
domain. Cultural development, only very indirectly influenced by central governments, may move 
away somewhat from consumerism, with however earning income and spending income 
remaining core activities. 
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Ch3 Bottom-up development and top down design of instrument mixes 
Development of climate policy instrumentation by necessity has current instrumentation as its 
starting point. What is there already, like ETS and Fleet Standards, may be transformed but cannot 
be exchanged for totally different instrumentation on short notice: there is path dependency also 
regarding policy instruments. With a longer time horizon however, development may move from 
slight short term improvements, to medium term major additions and optimizations, to stepwise 
and ultimately deep transformations in the long term. Deep transformations will not come about 
bottom-up however. The strategic choice to develop into a certain direction gives guidance to 
short/medium term smaller steps in development. The current ETS may wither, with other 
instruments being more attractive; it may be expanded; it may be transformed into a price 
stabilized instrument; and then next may develop stepwise into an emission tax, see Section 4.3 
for details. Top down strategic views determine long term development of emission pricing. 
Similarly, the currently fragmented electricity markets in Europe may develop in different 
directions, all with increased international trade. The set-up of carbon pricing and electricity 
market design constitute two core framework conditions at an institutional level. They are 
however part of a broader set of adjoining climate policy instruments.  
Such broader sets may first relate to four main sectors: Electricity, Industry, Buildings & 
Appliances, and Transport. These constitute four instrument challenges: how to decarbonize each 
substantially so as to reach the overall emission reduction target for 2050, see Chapter 5, 
substantially different between strategies.  
 
Ch4 Main types of instrument building blocks 
Instruments may be specified in many different ways. The classification used here first splits them 
in two groups, one regarding public actions and one regarding private actors and actions. Public 
actions create the background for private behavior. The first level refers to institutional 
framework conditions, with as main examples emission pricing and the set-up of electricity 
markets. The second level is Public Infrastructure, also for private use, like EU high tension grids 
and public hydrogen storage, and spatial plans as for low emission transport. The third level is 
public funding of Research, R&D and Demonstration. The order of public instruments is towards 
greater specificity regarding technologies and behavior. Most generic instruments at the 
institutions level, like emission pricing, exert broadest influence, on private parties but also on 
decisions regarding infrastructure and research and R&D. These three levels of public actions 
incentivize and enable by creating options. 
The fourth type of public action regards private actors, by stimulating and forcing technologies 
and behavior. The least binding is information, allowing better informed choices on production 
technologies and products, here including information on climate effects. Stronger guidance is 
given with financial incentives, like taxes on coal fired power stations and subsidies on solar 
panels. Strongest influence is by standards and regulations, relatively open to technologies with 
performance standards, like EU Fleet Standards, and most technology binding by prescriptions 
and prohibitions, like in BAT specifications. The order of instruments directing private actors is 
towards increasing bindingness. 
Four main emission pricing options are distinguished: pure cap-and-trade, vulnerable due to more 
specific instruments reducing its price to irrelevant levels; price stabilized cap-and-trade, with a 
price floor and ceiling collar, where price variation has lost its function mainly; fully price stabilized 
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permits; and emission taxes as administratively simplified fully price stabilized permit system, 
administered upstream at fossils primary production and import, mirrored with refund upon CCS 
and export. The encompassing upstream emission tax is administratively simplest and gives 
clearest guidance on long term decisions like on infrastructure, research, R&D and investments. 
Electricity markets, increasingly important, will have to deal with large numbers of primary and 
secondary producers and with internet of things. They may be designed to increase the share of 
renewables, as with feed-in tariffs and adjoining capacity payments to cover peak demand. Or 
they may be designed as a single priced EU wide market, with real time equal prices for all and 
with market based grid stabilization. Smart grids will strongly depend on market design. 
Instruments may be opposed or may fit together. Feed-in tariffs don’t reduce emissions under an 
effective pure cap-and-trade system, but align with an emission tax. Fragmented mainly national 
oligopolistic electricity markets hardly translate emission pricing to users.  
 
Ch5 Instrument mixes for four emission pricing options and four main sectors 
Four options for emission pricing are starting points for bottom up creation of instrument mixes, 
these options relate softly to strategy choices as yet; strategy based instrumentation design is in 
chapters 6 and 7. The four pricing options are: no generic emission pricing but Technology 
Stimulation and Forcing; Pure cap-and-trade; Price Stabilized Cap-and-Trade; and Emission tax. 
The second element in the mix is the corresponding set-up of the electricity market, with also 
four types. They range from primarily national markets fragmented as by renewables support, 
capacity payment, to an EU-wide single price real time electricity market. Detailing covers four 
sectors: Electricity; Industry; Buildings & Appliances; and Transport. Instrument sets for sixteen 
combinations are sketched. 
The Technology Stimulation and Forcing Instrument Mix has no generic emission pricing. It has 
substantial planning in the electricity sector using renewables subsidies, emission standards and 
capacity payments, mostly at a national level. In Industry it uses dynamically developed and 
implemented BAT standards. In Housing & Appliances there is a mix of subsidies as for insulation 
and renewables application and a shift to electricity, backed up by increasingly stringent 
standards. In Transport, Fleet Standards are simplified to emissions only, with a sales volume 
element added, and covering all road transport. 
The Pure Cap-and-Trade Mix covers all sectors with upstream administrative implementation, as 
do the other emission pricing instruments. This mix sets the ETS reduction rate in the electricity 
sector high enough to become the dominant instrument, and avoids renewables subsidies. The 
electricity market is open or fully open. The Price Stabilized Cap-and-Trade Mix sets a rising price 
floor and ceiling, with the cap volume adjusted to remain between these values. All the 
encompassing emission pricing systems have fewer technology specific instruments, leaving 
actions to lower administrative levels and more spontaneous bottom-up actions, most so with 
the pure cap-and-trade system.  
On average the emission price will be highest in the pure cap system. This is due to the uncertain 
level of the long term price of emission permits; limited use of adjoining instruments; and due to 
disincentivizing bottom up initiatives, also in civil society. The price difference will be most 
substantial during high growth periods, when the permit price rises due to the inelasticity of 
supply and demand. The price level set in the other two options will be quite similar. The more 
extensive use of adjoining instruments in the price stabilized cap-and-trade mix will allow for 
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setting the price level lower than for the emission tax. The more clear market development in the 
pure emission tax mix may deliver the same results more smoothly, allowing for a somewhat 
lower overall costs of emission reduction. Of course the price comparison cannot be made 
empirically. 
 
Chapter 6 Towards full sets of instruments for long term climate policy 
Combining sector options is not by permutation and then choice. It is not possible to have 
different emission pricing systems in different sectors. It may technically be possible to some 
extent to differentiate the domain of application of cap-and-trade systems between sectors, as 
now is the case for aviation. In general this is not part of strategic design as it creates difficult to 
resolve boundary issues. An example is natural gas, paid for in electricity production and hence 
indirectly when used in buildings. If it not paid for when delivered to buildings as natural gas, 
there is a climate policy induced inefficiency. And worse, there then is an incentive to replace 
emissions-paid-for clean electricity by decentral gas based power generation with emissions, as 
in using the - now often subsidized - Sterling engine. Also the option of leaving the transport 
sector out of carbon pricing will encounter difficulties as when transport, especially heavy 
transport, starts using natural gas large scale. This is the intention currently of large LNG 
producers and traders. Similar market distortions may be created by such partial climate policies 
when leaving hydrogen out of the system. 
In strategic design the number of pricing options is reduced to two: Not pricing or not pricing 
relevantly by using other instruments effectively, as currently is the case, or pricing most clearly, 
using the encompassing upstream emission tax. This tax can evolve by stepwise repairing the 
deficiencies of the current near pure cap-and-trade system: move administration upstream; make 
it encompassing, stabilize prices ultimately to zero variation; simplify the administrative set-up 
from paid for emission permit to emission tax set up as an excise.  
These two remaining options link directly to the Planning & Control Strategy, with ETS fading to 
insignificance; and the Institutionalist Strategy, with ETS transformed to full-fledged emission tax. 
The electricity market design remains mainly national in Planning & Control with mainly bilateral 
trade between member states and is a fully European real time single priced market in the 
Institutionalist mode. Infrastructure and Research have overlap but different emphasis, as is the 
case with creating learning curves. Planning & Control has substantial technology specific 
regulation of private parties (Level 4), directly at EU instruments or controlled by the EU ultimately 
by member state caps to be realized. The Institutionalist approach has no EU policy instruments 
at all at level 4, but has a more purely public role in infrastructure and large scale high risk projects.  
 
Ch7 Pathways towards Planning & Control and Institutionalist Instrumentation 
Reasoning in climate policy instrumentation may go two directions, in all stages of development: 
the detailed design of instruments, the selection of instruments for the mix, and the pathways of 
introduction of specific instrument mixes.  
In the Planning & Control Strategy the practical starting point is: How can we improve 
performance? If coal emits high amounts of CO2, how can we resolve that? Quite directly the 
answer here is to reduce coal use and shift to other energy sources, or apply CCS. Focusing on 
major emission sources, one answer is to stimulate alternatives and the other to press the high 
emission sources out of the market, by special taxes and standards. The strategic choice for 
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planning & control implies a choice for Technology Stimulation and Forcing. Core instruments are 
first standards for the forcing part of instrumentation, in many instances equivalent to high taxes 
on these activities. They are: Emission standards in electricity production; expanded Fleet 
Standards in all road transport; Energy & Emission standards in buildings heating and cooling, 
with forced refurbishing of existing stock; Energy standards in apparatus; and minimum standards 
for emissions in industry linked to BATs. Improving industrial dynamics (BATs refer to existing 
technologies) is through public funding of technology development and public-private 
partnerships in market introduction. The other core instruments refer to Stimulation of 
technologies replacing fossil based energy cycles, mainly by subsidies and information. As 
subsidies cannot cover all energy related activities long term, most subsidies are restricted in 
time, like with investment subsidies and production premiums.  
In the electricity domain, all renewable technologies have a start-up feed-in-premium (or the 
similar UK Contracts for Difference) plus investment subsidy till they can survive in the market. 
Intermittency is resolved by subsidized storage, at micro and sector level, again till the 
technologies can survive in the market or are replaced by other technologies. 
In the Institutionalist Strategy, the ETS domain is expanded, first to all gas and coal and next to 
all oil, and price stabilized, with zero bandwidth. It ultimately evolves into an emission tax, 
administered as an excise on carbon in primary fossils production and imports of fossil energy 
products, with a refund upon export and authorized CCS. It functions as a carbon deposit: not 
returned, no money back. The second main element is the development of an adequate pan-
European electricity market. This market development is essential for low emission development 
as electricity will become more central in primary energy production and throughout the use 
chain. As the number of producers for the electric grid, both primary and secondary, will rise from 
a few hundred a decade ago to a few hundred million by 2050, a fully new market design is 
required, also reckoning with the near zero short term marginal cost of most renewables. The 
solution is a real time variable price market structure, open to all primary and secondary 
producers at equal prices and to all users at equal prices, for them including payment for 
transmission and distribution based on congestion prices. As electricity grids are monopolistic, 
they are publicly owned and managed, at the EU international level the DC-HVTG (Direct Current 
High Voltage Transmission Grid). Development of this pan-European electricity market has a high 
priority, including the building of the required grid infrastructure. National grids, also publicly 
owned, are left to the discretion of member states. There is substantial research and R&D, limited 
demonstration projects, and limited use of technology specific instruments, with Fleet Standards 
phased out. There is temporary financial support for creating learning curves for few high 
potential technologies coming on the market. 
 
Ch8 Evaluating strategic instrument mixes 
Customary evaluation concepts for policies are effectiveness and efficiency, as cost-effectiveness. 
Such concepts may be applied quantitatively on the short and medium term optimization but not 
long term when transformative change is to be induced with as yet uncertain technologies. In the 
CECILIA2050 project the concept of feasibility has been introduced as part of the mainly 
qualitative ‘optimality’ analysis.  
Comparing the strategies on effectiveness does not differentiate: they both are capable of 
reaching the reduction target for 2-degrees stabilization. However, planning & control will start 
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faster and will have more difficulty in sticking to the targets, while the institutionalist mode will 
start slower but may reach deeper transformations.  
Feasibility may refer to different aspects: legal, economic, administrative, and social and political 
feasibility of instrumentation. An encompassing feasibility aspect is the overall legitimacy of 
climate policy, as part of total policy. These aspects function in the realm of successful climate 
policy in a comparative way, stating relative feasibility of overall instrument mixes. 
Legal feasibility does not pose a problem in either strategy, remaining within the confines of the 
Lisbon treaty and not requiring substantial centralization. The required administrative capacity, 
and concomitant private administrative burdens, will be higher in the planning & control strategy. 
Also economic feasibility, with as a core issue the required speed of transformation, seems 
resolvable in both strategies, slightly differently. Administrative feasibility seems simple, as all 
instruments are part of well-developed experience, and major problems can be resolved in 
advance by design, like shifting lab tests in fleet standards to representative real life 
measurement. Social and political feasibility are assesses under the assumption of effectiveness. 
Expected slightly lower costs of the institutionalist strategy might constitute a long term 
advantage. Overall the feasibility analysis may show a slight advantage for the institutionalist 
mode, but not decisive in any way. 
A more fundamental difference may be in terms of long term legitimacy. The detailed regulatory 
activities in the planning & control mode are annoying and open to continuous complaints by 
those specifically targeted. Also, when member states are not active enough in emission 
reduction, a centralization with more stringent EU actions may have to follow. The institutionalist 
mode does not have specific regulatees targeted and functions through more abstract market 
mechanisms. This leaves the political system available for other subjects, and other subjects, like 
economic growth (and now refugees and violence) don’t press out the climate subject; decentral 
and private climate action remains within domain of adapted functioning of markets, and 
activities by civil society.  
 
Ch9 Key outcomes and general recommendations 
The two governance directions developed can be recognized in many strategy documents of the 
EU, being part of core discussions in the liberal market economy we are in. When developed 
strategically and systematically they lead to very different instrumentation for climate policy.  
Climate policy instrumentation is part of broader governance with overlap on other policy 
domains like energy policy, transport policy, air quality policy, and income distribution policy. 
However, before integrating, it is better to develop climate policy first independently. 
The current near pure cap ETS system is instable. Emission pricing may develop towards no 
emission pricing, being taken over by technology specific instrumentation, or towards a price 
specified system, ultimately as an emission tax covering all fossil emissions on a predictably rising 
price path in an administratively most simple way.  
Electricity markets play an increasingly important role as the number of primary and secondary 
producers explodes towards 2050 and demand shaving by all users becomes a core issue due to 
intermittency of most renewables. Technology specific instrumentation in a planning mode leads 
to a somewhat restricted market development, barely in line with the Energy Union strategy. The 
institutionalist incentive mode leads to a market stabilized single open electricity market with 
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equal prices for all producers and all consumers, with public transmission and distribution, with 
congestion pricing. 
The Institutionalist mode focuses on Research with some R&D and few high risk Demonstration 
projects, while the Planning & Control mode of governance has its focus on R&D and linked 
Demonstration projects, also to create dynamics in BATs to be implemented in standards. 
Stimulation and forcing of specific technologies and behaviors is limited in the Institutionalist 
mode and constitutes the core in the Planning & Control mode.  
One most practical recommendation is to specify reduction targets not in percent points relative to 1990 
or other base year but in the more usual compound interest rates per year, then comparable to economic 
growth, population growth and efficiency improvements. For example: GDP growth multiplied by climate 
efficiency improvement equals emission reduction.  
The core recommendation for the EU is to actively develop explicit governance strategies for climate 
policy instrumentation, not one but several to allow for better public discussion and more long term 
views on policy development and its instrumentation. The strategic directions as developed here can 
form a starting point. 
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INSTRUMENTATION STRATEGIES AND INSTRUMENT MIXES 
FOR LONG TERM CLIMATE POLICY  
 
“A different voice may be particularly 
effective in disturbing the existing 
participants into re-examining matters 
they had come to take for granted.”  
 Stefan Collini1 
 
1. Towards instrumentation for long term climate policy  
1.1. Goals, means and tasks 
How may effective long term climate policy instrumentation evolve? Basic options for 
instrumentation can be developed and analyzed for well-founded decisions on EU climate policy. 
This analysis is to open up discussion on strategic choices in climate policy instrumentation, the 
ultimate goal of this study. The more focused goal of this analysis is to investigate how effective 
climate policy instrumentations may be developed for the long term. In the long term what now 
may seem fixed becomes malleable, with different options and directions coming up, several 
being substantially incompatible. One cannot have a pure cap-and-trade system reducing 
emissions the coming decades predictably, as the EU-ETS intends to do, and simultaneously have 
a clear long term price signal. The cap price is difficult to predict not just for technical and 
economic reasons but also depending on other climate policy instruments, like feed-in tariffs and 
the forced closing of coal fired power stations. It is unpredictable long term, probably being 
volatile over years and decades. Similarly, extensive feed-in tariffs on renewables, the workhorse 
in climate policy till now, and maybe coming for nuclear energy, are incompatible with an open 
real time electricity market. The essence of feed-in tariffs is price differentiation between 
producers, using fixed prices. And one cannot have EU inter-member state cap-and-trade and also 
clear national emission responsibility fixed in national targets. Reducing coal fired power stations 
in one country frees emission permits, allowing others to expand in other countries; that is the 
essence of tradable permits. Such contradictions might be resolved somewhat in a practical short 
term way, based on satisficing reasoning (Grubb, Hourcade et al. 2014) following (Simon 1956) 
and in economics (Cyert and March 1963), like national governments then buying up the permits 
coming on the market due to their national policies. Grubb’s medium term optimizing may 
improve on satisficing in terms of long term effectiveness and efficiency, like somehow trading 
national targets between countries. Also broader optimization will however remain within known 
constraints and options, giving limited guidance for basic choices in policy and economy. Long 
term transformations for the 2-degrees climate goal require long term strategic choices on 
instrumentation. There is no single road: different strategy options lead to different designs, 
requiring basic choices. Short term remedies and medium optimization will return, then as tactical 
parts of an explicit strategy being implemented. 
                                                          
1 Collini, S. (2012). What are universities for?, Penguin UK. Ch. III 
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Room for maneuvering in instrumentation requires design strategies for the reasoned 
development of the climate policy instrumentation. It is not a permutation of instrument variants 
and for each one choosing the best, and then adding the best to the best. It is a reasoned design 
process towards overall instrumentation, with specific instruments having a well-defined place in 
each instrument mix, adapted to the functioning of the mix, and fitting in the broader governance 
of EU and member states. The reasoning is a general one, based on coverage of relevant 
instruments, consistency in design; and intricately linked to strategic approaches to governance, 
of which climate policy instrumentation is an increasingly important part. It has its starting point 
in the here-and-now however. 
The goal translates to tasks at a more concrete level, to design instrument mixes capable for an 
emission reduction with over 80% by 2050. Where emissions are very difficult to reduce, as from 
agriculture, some basic industries and probably aviation, other activities will have to reduce their 
emissions with substantially more than 80% relative to 1990, in the order of 90%. How this 
reduction may be distributed over sectors is open yet, depending on instrumentation and 
technology development. For the hard kernel of energy supply however, the electricity sector 
becoming so, an emission reduction by around 95% seems required.  
Whatever the precise direction of instrumentation development may be, there are general 
considerations of optimality which apply to any mix. These relate to effectiveness and costs, 
combined into cost-effectiveness, and to the feasibility of the instruments, of single instruments 
and ultimately of the full set of instruments to be effectively developed and implemented, see in 
this CECILIA2050 project (Görlach 2013). For long term instrumentation development here, the 
base requirement is that each mix should be capable of reaching the 2-degrees goal, as the EU 
part in that global endeavor. Cost-effectiveness of the mix, or equivalent: its efficiency, then is 
determined by the expected costs. In the long term, costs of technologies and also their relative 
costs are substantially unknown. Emission standards for power stations function differently under 
cap-and-trade, emission taxes, or with no emission pricing system. Their functioning also depends 
on the broader domain they are functioning in. Subsidies on insulation to owners, even if high 
and costly, are hardly effective in older houses if tenants may have to move out temporary at 
substantial costs and will next have to pay a higher rent for the improvements to their dwelling. 
In assessing expected future costs, reasoning on how a mix may induce innovation plays a core 
role. Long term expected cost assessments of single instruments and full instrument mixes can 
hardly be quantified, making this cost and efficiency criterion a mainly qualitative one, based on 
more general knowledge and assumptions. Next to the long term cost assessment there are 
feasibility issues, including political feasibility as acceptability and administrative feasibility as 
volume and complexity of the implementation task. The political feasibility must be considered 
under the general requirement of effectiveness of climate policy. The burdens of climate policy 
then are unavoidable, of course different for different instrumentation options. Explicit 
statements on individual instruments may be possible: people prefer subsidies over taxes. But 
subsidies are to be paid for and hence then taxes are part of the broader instrument mix. The 
political feasibility of a full and effective instrument mix therefor can be established only in terms 
of general considerations, including political vulnerability, see the survey by (Rey, Markandya et 
al. 2013), Chapter 6. Administrative feasibility may be the most operational criterion. Fleet 
standards, adapted ones, and emission taxes can be implemented quite simply. Emission permits 
per emitter require a very substantial and capable administrative staff and adjoining capabilities 
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in the firms involved. The transformation to a low emission society will be conditional on the 
broader functioning of society, and will have impacts on society, positive and negative. So flanking 
policies may be required, see (Görlach 2013). Examples are better functioning markets for funding 
and implementation of energy efficiency improvements in housing and measures to reduce 
income inequality effects.  
Climate policies are intricately related to other policy domains and goals, ranging from energy 
security and income distribution; to air quality & health and fiscal policies; and to economic 
growth and innovation, general innovation. Co-benefits and co-costs may play an important 
political role. How to integrate policies is a subject of clear governance importance. But before 
entering the discussion on relations with goals and means in other domains, first climate policy 
instrumentation is to be developed, avoiding the most adverse effects if easily possible but 
neglecting them if non-climate policies may more easily deal with them. If such domains of policy 
have been developed independently already, these subjects need not be part of climate policy. 
So the core question on the table is which strategies to follow in the development of long term 
effective climate policy instrumentation, softly reckoning with expected costs; with political and 
administrative feasibility; and with relations to broader goals and functioning of society. 
 
1.2. Long term instrument strategies 
The reasoning for long term instrumentation is substantially different from short and medium 
term development of instrumentation, where empirical predictions may play a substantial role 
still. There, more direct goals and targets may be involved, in principle leading to expanding the 
set of instruments, to cover what was not covered yet, fine-tuning on what was too coarse, and 
more generally to improve on the instruments that were there already. This medium term is 
governed by optimality considerations, making policy, here climate policy, more effective and 
efficient, and maybe also more just. Such short to medium term tactical development will then 
lead to a rising number of instruments, with increasing complexity and overlap, also in the 
relations between the administrative levels of the EU and its Member States.  
Ultimately, long term considerations on instrumentation are to guide short and medium term 
development, pruning and focusing, based on more general governance views, and reasoned 
from the deep transitions required for the long term climate goal. The current discussions on 
reducing EU regulations, though not having an explicit governance view yet, can be placed in this 
longer term perspective. For the climate aspect this discussion is not yet linked to the dramatically 
increased effectiveness which is required. To reach an 80% reduction goal only, a shift is required 
from emission reductions of less than 1% per year2 in the last thirty years to over 5% per year in 
the next three decades toward 2050. The yearly reduction rate is to be substantially higher for 
reaching the 90% and 95% reduction targets, and starting later increases the required reduction 
rate further. The deep emission reduction goal requires also deep transitions in governance, going 
beyond pruning and efficiency and optimizing. Efficiency of course remains important in the long 
term as well but cannot be established in a concrete sense now as future technologies are too 
unspecified to allow for such an analysis. Some conditions conducive to efficiency can be built 
into instrumentation, different per strategy. 
 
                                                          
2 Here yearly compound reduction rates are used; not percent points relative to a base year like 1990. 
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1.3. Strategic views on governance 
There are divergent views and options for societal coordination, not only in different cultures like 
the European, the Chinese and the Indian, but also within the EU and individual countries, and 
spread over the political specter.  
More vertical - more horizontal; more planning - more incentivizing; more goal oriented - more 
value oriented; more top down instrumental - more bottom up consensual; more contractual - 
more market based; more blueprint - more reflexive & evolutionary; etc. These dichotomies may 
seem highly abstract but translate quite directly in different policy approaches and different 
policy instrumentations. A central characteristic is that they indicate mutually exclusive 
directions. One cannot go for two directions at the same time. These dichotomies can be 
generalized in terms of mutually exclusive governance directions, linked to strategic views on 
policy and instrumentation. Though seemingly far away from climate policy instrumentation, 
deep transformations for 2-degrees link to basic discussions in Western society on how power 
relations are organized, balancing control and centralized power and more diffuse and 
decentralized power. Athenian and Greek constitutional developments were analyzed along such 
lines by Aristotle in Politics, 4th Century BC, with modern development starting with Magna Carta 
(1215); Bill of Rights (England 1689; USA 1789) and the constitutions following the French 
Revolution, all with substantive procedures to reduce direct hierarchical power. The Treaty of 
Lisbon (2007) forms one current background condition for developing climate policy 
instrumentation. 
The options are not just technical-neutral. Industrialized market based society has not come 
about spontaneously; it has involved political clashes, ranging from the Corn Laws in the UK to 
the liberal, socialist and communist versions for industrial society in the 20th Century. In the 
current political domain they are represented in and between all shades of liberal, Christian-
democratic and socio-democratic ideologies. In the pluralist market based democratic society we 
are in, these distinctions may be summarized as Autonomy versus Control, see (Dahl 1982). The 
strategic views on governance distinguished in this study relate to these basic dichotomies on 
how society can be governed, with a deep transformation for climate reasons in mind. Broader 
views, as on leaving capitalism, may be investigated. Climate change is too urgent however to bet 
on fundamental change within decades.  
A first governance strategy links to control. It is the usual mode of reasoning for short term 
improvements and medium term optimization in policies, in indicating specific targets in specific 
domains to be reached with specific instruments, see the nice summary on these time frames in 
the next section building on (Grubb, Hourcade et al. 2014). But that practical approach may be 
applied long term as well, with instrument development on the go, always having short to 
medium term targets. Of course there then is the task to envisage how the long term future may 
be actively created. Some abstraction from specific future instruments and technologies and 
behavior is required however; there also must be substantial new regulation on the go, with 
future technologies and markets as may come up. Main target groups are in electricity 
production; heavy industry; buildings and related consumption and expenditures in households 
and offices; and all modes of transport. Getting to effective results includes controlling the 
dynamics required to some extent, with time paths specified as concrete as possible as with 
emission caps and emission standards. This is a Planning & Control Strategy, tending to a vertical; 
planning; goal oriented; top down instrumental; contractual; blueprint mode of governance. The 
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more integrated concrete views link to broader principles like justice and equity, not just climate 
issues. There is substantial literature representing this mode of governance, see Chapter 3.  
The second mode of governance puts most emphasis on long term incentives for emission 
reduction, basically linked to changes in the institutional framework of society. It does not matter 
where emissions are reduced and which technologies are used, as long as they are reduced. Civil 
society plays an autonomous reflexive role, generating ideas and options bottom up.  Generic 
instrumentation is key, with additional more specific instrumentation only where generic 
incentives cannot function or cannot function well enough. In our globalized market economy this 
includes: where markets are lacking and where they cannot function adequately enough, as with 
some small lenders markets and markets tending to oligopoly and monopoly. But also in other 
domains it is not markets determining what is set in motion as clearly is the case with 
infrastructure and research. Also long term technology system development is substantially 
public government based, exemplified by the development of nuclear power, most IT, internet, 
and GPS. See on this public role (Mazzucato 2011). Central EU level control on technologies is very 
limited here, but a substantial amount of basic research, as opposed to development and 
demonstration, is part of this strategy. At EU level, there are a few core uniform institutions: 
internalization of climate effects through carbon pricing and an open real time electricity market. 
This is the Institutionalist Strategy, tending to a more horizontal; incentivizing; bottom up 
consensual; market based; and reflexive-evolutionary mode of governance. There is also 
substantial literature representing this mode of governance, see Chapter 3. 
This strategy choice on climate policy instrumentation might be reasoned from customary aspects 
like effectiveness, efficiency and feasibility. Though there are differences along these lines, the 
ultimate choice on strategies derives from broader views on how society is to be governed. Only 
for given strategy choices tactics become guided. 
 
1.4. Short term, medium term and long term domains 
Following (Grubb, Hourcade et al. 2014) the reasoning for climate policy on the short, medium 
and long term domain is substantially different. In the short term, most options are given, with 
incidental improvement options to be introduced on a case by case level, as in improving test 
procedures for fleet standards in automotive regulations. Satisficing, a term coined by Herbert 
Simon (Simon 1956) and used broadly in micro-economics (Cyert and March 1963), indicates what 
one can practically achieve now, accepting all other as given. The improvement realized is ‘good 
enough’ in the given context, not considering a range of options for broader optimization. In the 
medium term more options are designed and considered, allowing for a more systematic 
approach to improvements. System aspects come to the foreground, requiring coordination 
towards optimization, with a focus on effective least cost options for emission reduction, 
reckoning also with other value domains. This is a mode of reasoning linked to welfare economics 
as the dominant discipline, starting early in the Enlightenment with ‘the greatest happiness for 
the greatest numbers’ with (Bentham 1776). Such optimization will now also include broader 
welfare relevant aspects like distributional and justice issues. This broadened welfare theoretical 
approach has developed after 1970, with Sen as a major author, building on the more economist 
welfare theory of (Samuelson 1977). This approach has recently most eloquently been described 
in (Stiglitz, Sen et al. 2009), with policy instrumentation based on ‘doing what is necessary, in the 
most efficient way’. The intention is to make the welfare function as operational as possible and 
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then do the best to improve society. More detail in specification gives a better basis for 
optimization. More specifics in all variables covered may well lead to a short to medium term 
focus in Grubb terms. However, with some generalization this approach may also be applied for 
the long term. The welfare theoretical framework covers aspects beyond only climate policy, 
indicating for example that increased energy prices due to climate policy may also have energy 
policy effects and distributional effects to reckon with. Redressing such non-climate issues then 
may be part of climate policy instrumentation but may also part of other policy domains and then 
part of broader overall instrumentation. The relation to energy policy is physically quite direct, as 
the current fossils based system will have to be substantially replaced by non-fossil sources. In 
the original proposal by the Commission in 1991 (COM 1991), the carbon tax was half carbon half 
energy, see the assessment by (Pearson and Smith 1991). In ETS and Fleet Standards, the focus 
has been reduced to greenhouse gas emissions. Distributional effects of climate policy will be 
limited as compared to the role of other policies and instruments. The distributional effects of tax 
systems and public spending may be quantitatively of a very different order than what climate 
policy might induce, but climate policy is part of the distributional policy domain. Long term 
climate policy then links to income distribution mechanisms  as due to globalization and other 
mechanisms see (Piketty 2014). However, the tendency to the concrete will tend to link issues at 
the action level in the climate policy domain, then combining with energy policy, clean air policy, 
development policy and distributional policies, as is well visible now in the global climate 
discussions.  
For the long term, reasoning may start at this more practical and operational  level, looking for 
transitions and transformations in the climate domain first, for long term climate policy, but may 
be differently for the medium term, see (Bausch, Roberts et al. 2014). Looking at the energy 
system in Figure 1, the climate transitions can be indicated as a full transition of the electricity 
system, a full transition of the heavy industry system, a full transition of the building energy 
system and a full transition of the transport systems, together implying a substantial 
transformation of economy and society, see the diverging outcomes of modelling exercises in the 
CECILIA2050 project as by (Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014, Solano and Drummond 2014, De Koning, 
Huppes et al. 2015). It is however not possible to say in advance what will be the new system in 
any technology detail, let alone if it may the most efficient and broader optimal system, by then. 
Of course, by then, the more short-to-medium term efficiency considerations will play a role, as 
they do now for current and nearby policies and technologies. But efficiency considerations 
should not hamper transformations; society should not get stuck at an efficiently reached and 
efficiently functioning still too high emission level. On the other hand, getting from now to the 
low emission future also requires the continuous functioning of economy and society, not just a 
climate transformation. So the long term deep emission reduction with deep societal 
transformations is the goal. But on the way towards it society is to remain functioning, open to 
transitions and transformations required, and geared to them somehow. Closing down all fossil 
power stations in the next decade is a highly effective policy measure. But it is not a feasible 
measure as the economic and social costs would be enormous. The path is to be acceptable with 
required emission reductions possible only in the longer term. Scenarios for a 2-degrees future, 
RCP2.6 scenarios in the IPCC jargon, therefor tend to allow emissions to be reduced gradually, 
several with negative emissions in the second half of the century, see (IPCC-AR5-WGIII 2014), 
Figure 6.7. 
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1.5. EU constitutional constraints and international developments 
The future is open in many respects, also regarding supranational government structures 
evolving. However some developments are more probable than others. It seems not so probable 
that the EU will move much towards supranationality beyond what the Lisbon Treaty provides, 
but it is not impossible. From a climate policy point of view such a move would facilitate easier 
decision making, a majority vote in EU parliament and Council to support what the Commission 
proposes, and a more direct say in what now is Member States’ domain in climate policy. The 
current tendency towards decentralization in climate policy, as in using different national 
subsidies for renewable energy systems in the ETS domain, similarly may not hold long term. Such 
a decentralization may be seen as temporary, as deep transformations ultimately cannot be 
subsidy based, and certainly not at a level of individual member states. Some supranational EU 
level coordination of subsidies would be required at least, as feasible in the Lisbon Treaty level of 
supranationality. Though other options exist, see on options and their evaluation (Bausch, 
Roberts et al. 2014) and (Markandya, Rey et al. 2015), the base assumption here is the roughly 
current level of centralization. 
Similarly, a binding UN climate agreement would make EU policy easier as adverse competition 
effects would be reduced. Such a ‘universal, legally binding agreement’, as is the aim of COP21, is 
not probable however. This is due to several factors combined, like the lack of central authority 
in enforcement; the large number of countries involved; the high uncertainty on outcomes; the 
unequal distribution of cost and benefits; and the complexity of climate technical and broader 
ethical issues as are involved in establishing emission shares for countries for the coming decades. 
On the other hand however, it is difficult to imagine that major players will not come to some 
form of emission reduction agreement, in the medium and long term. The full or no agreement 
and the middle of the road with some agreement correspond to the three levels distinguished in 
(Zelljadt 2014), but with options for instrumentation filled in slightly different under the 
governance strategies considered here. 
So for both issues we assume modest development. The EU will mainly remain within the Lisbon 
Treaty realm but will be as capable in policy development as it used to be in other domains. This 
does not mean fast decision making but means that effective political processes are ongoing and 
that countries cooperate in the end, in a process of give and take. Similarly, though a binding 
climate agreement may not evolve, several countries – the EU taken as one here - will advance 
their climate policies and reduce their emissions, under some form of agreement. So our 
background assumptions here are middle of the road: no disasters and no political revolutions 
towards internationalization in the EU and globally. In a parallel CECILIA2050 report D6.3 
(Markandya, Rey et al. 2015) deviating assumptions on these international developments are 
investigated, with their possible consequences for EU climate policy instrumentation. 
 
1.6. Design methodology and document organization 
There are different entries to the design process for climate policy instrumentation. One, the 
bottom up approach, is to start with what is there, and see how this instrument mix may evolve, 
improving effectiveness and efficiency, and broader optimality, in the process, see (Görlach 
2013). In terms of (Grubb, Hourcade et al. 2014) this approach is most fit for the medium term 
however, easily overlooking the requirements and options for deep long term transformations as 
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are required for deep emission reductions with effective climate policy. Applied to long term 
climate policy, the concreteness of actions as required will fade. Optimality relates to 
effectiveness and costs, to feasibility and to broader functioning of society, but in a soft more 
strategic way of reasoning. The second approach is analytic. What instruments are there, how can 
they be set up individually and how may they consistently be combined? As there are many 
instrument types with ever more sub-variants, the guidance on selecting relevant options is to 
come from additional criteria, first like effectiveness and optimality.  
The third approach, top down and strategic, states general principles for governance, here applied 
in the climate policy domain for development of long term instrumentation. All designs here 
require a view on the future domain in which each climate instrument mix is to function. This 
domain analysis, see (Grubb, Hourcade et al. 2014), is in Chapter 2, giving the context in which 
the instruments are to function. As the future is substantially open, the domain analysis is about 
possible futures in which the low carbon society is to come about and function.  
Next, in Chapter 3, is the more detailed analysis of how bottom up development and top down 
design may be filled in. The bottom up development has main current EU instruments as a starting 
point: ETS and Fleet standards, and looks to how to adapt and expand instrumentation so as to 
effectively cover and reduce emissions in all sectors. The top down design has governance 
strategies as a starting point, either in a more technology specific Planning & Control direction, or 
in a more generic incentivizing Institutionalist direction. These governance oriented strategies 
require explanation here, as ultimately, in Chapter 6 and 7, they determine how instrument mixes 
may be developed, and how their possible numbers may strategically be reduced. The analytic 
approach to instruments is prepared in Chapter 4, covering main types, in a typology and filling 
these in with substantial detail for main instruments: emission pricing, electricity markets, and 
fleet standards. Next, the triple design methodology is applied at sector level for four main 
sectors, in a primarily bottom up vein. Together they cover the full chains of energy use and 
emissions in the EU, see Chapter 5. These sectoral instrument designs may be combined into four 
full sets of instruments, taking together what fits. What fits is analyzed from a strategic 
perspective, see Chapters 6 and 7, reducing to what is fit in either of the two long term strategies 
distinguished. Chapter 7 adds detail while also indicating pathways for instrument development, 
linking to medium term instrument development options as specified in a parallel study (D6.2). 
The two instrument mixes are analyzed in Chapter 8 as to potential effectiveness, political and 
administrative feasibility and vulnerability, and as to some further feasibility aspects of optimality, 
with legitimacy as one overarching result. This volume ends in Chapter 9 with a number of 
concluding outcomes and recommendations. 
 
2. Imagining 2-degrees futures domains 
2.1. Focus on fossil CO2 
The instrumentation developed here concerns only fossil CO2, for a number of reasons, the first 
being that it is the major source of greenhouse gas emissions. Other major greenhouse gases are 
methane, nitrous oxide (N2O) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and non-fossil CO2 from calcium 
carbonate processing as in cement production, and from land use change. From an 
instrumentation point of view these non-fossil GHGs differ in that emission measurement mostly 
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is not possible, also not indirectly, as is well possible with fossil carbon. The instrumentation for 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture can only be quite indirect through 
technology and behavior regulation, including demand shifts (Kuik and Kalfagianni 2013). Land 
use change emissions can hardly be linked to specific actions on specific locations. Where 
emission measurement is possible, as with nitrous oxide (N2O) from industrial chemicals 
production and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) from aluminium production, these emissions may be 
included similar to the instrumentation options for CO2. They are included in the current ETS 
already. However, they can only be administered at the firm level, not upstream as is possible 
with fossil CO2 emissions based on their carbon content. Options for instrumentation for non- CO2 
emissions will not be investigated systematically. Starting point now is the fossils dominated 
energy system, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Energy input, transformation and final use EU-28 in 2012, in Mtoe 
 
    Source (EEA 2015) version September, downloaded 07Sep15 
 
2.2. Starting from now: options in the energy chain 
The current energy system is dominated by oil, gas and coal, with nuclear and the old renewables 
following, especially hydro power, with new renewables coming in in small amounts as yet. Apart 
from the Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS, also as ‘Sequestration’) route, deep emission 
reductions can only be based on weaning from fossil energy, shifting to a new energy supply and 
use system. Non-fossil primary energy may be from a large variety of sources, all with constraints. 
Modeling in CECILIA2050 in WP3 (Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014, Solano and Drummond 2014) has 
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shown the strong dependence of expected costs of technologies on the shares that may evolve, 
while social constraints, like on nuclear, on land wind power and CCS are not amenable to 
empirical modelling and are mostly assumption based.  
Least constrained in a technical sense is solar, with wind following, both highly intermittent 
however, with intermittency also being variable, and being fully non-dispatchable as yet. IEA 
estimates/predictions on the global share of solar PV in 2050 have proven unstable, as rising from 
11% in 2010 publications to 16% in 2014 (IEA 2014). Nuclear is fully non-intermittent but has 
limited production flexibility (but see (IEA 2014). It has risks and it has as yet unresolved waste 
disposal problems, creating economic and societal unknowns on its potential. Geothermal has 
high capacity at limited locations and with unknown costs. Biofuels compete with other land use, 
for food and materials, and for nature, while intensifying agriculture may well lead to rising 
nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions. Some further technologies have more limited capacity for 
development. Hydro has severe limitations for expansion in the EU; wave energy has limited total 
capacity and is probably inherently expensive, and is also intermittent, with a moon rhythm. 
Extreme options, like beaming in solar energy from space or the moon (Valinia, Moe et al. 2013) 
may be interesting but can hardly play a role next half century. The main sources of primary 
energy with capacity to produce a main share of total societal energy requirement at no too 
extreme costs are solar and wind. A wide variety of technologies for them exists already and will 
develop further. Especially solar energy is in rapid development, in many directions. See (IEA 
2015) for a survey of technologies and their potential. Conclusion on this short survey is that most 
probable sources for rapid expansion of non-fossil primary energy are either highly intermittent 
(solar PV, wind, wave, tidal) or can be adapted to demand variation to a limited extent only 
(nuclear with some delay, solar heat-to-electricity only for daily variations).  
The next domains of technology, energy transformation, energy storage, and energy use systems 
again have a number of relative certainties and at a more detailed level ever more uncertainty on 
which technologies can be available. The near certainty is that the technology system to evolve is 
to be resilient to the sum of intermittent and constant base load supply and substantial demand 
variations partly regular over days, weeks and seasons, and partly incidental, as with heat waves. 
Options to create such resilience exist already technically and are extremely diverse, ranging from 
micro heat storage using peak electricity with heat pumps; to chemical storage in oxidized-
reduced metal systems; to pumped hydro; to electric battery systems; and to storable chemical 
energy like hydrogen and aluminium; and to physical storage like compressed nitrogen or CO2 
and flywheels, and ultimately also to final demand variation, with smart grids and internet-of-
things. On each of these, and more, substantial literature exist and all of them can be developed 
further; and all have their uncertainties and capacity constraints. 
The diverse final use systems are to align with the diverse intermediate energy transformations, 
and both are to be aligned to diverse options for primary energy production. But certainly there 
are no certainties at a more detailed level. One may expect electricity to take over in near final 
and final use systems, including for heat and transportation. But other options may prove more 
viable at least partly, like the hydrogen route with easy decentralized distribution and storage 
feeding into ever more efficient fuel cells. 
There is substantial uncertainty on the role of energy efficiency. The industrial revolution was 
based on extreme increases in energy efficiency, leading however to extreme increases in energy 
use, the Jevons Paradox, in the energy and environment domain now covered under the term 
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‘rebound’. The long term volume of final energy use may be linked to specific technologies like 
insulation, efficiency increases on propulsion systems, etcetera. However, several rebound 
mechanisms may decrease the net effect of technical improvements, a major one being the 
income effect of efficiency increases. See (Font Vivanco and van der Voet 2014a, Font Vivanco, 
Freire-González et al. 2014b) on mechanisms involved and main empirical examples. Also the 
often encountered assumption that added renewables replace fossils to the same amount does 
not generally hold: they add to the total supply of energy and through market mechanisms press 
out only a part of fossil supply. ‘Energy conservation’ and ‘energy savings’ may therefore be 
misleading terms. For an assessment of medium term options and their net effectiveness the 
energy efficiency discussion is however highly relevant, see (Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014, Solano 
and Drummond 2014). In the long term a mainly emission free energy system is to evolve 
however. Then the volume aspect becomes less important, see the discussion below (after Table 
1).  
The combination of technology uncertainty in primary production; in transformation and storage 
systems; and in (near) final use systems leads to extreme uncertainty on the precise nature of the 
low emission energy system which may develop. This holds even more for the specific technology-
volume combinations and total volumes which may be involved in all energy flows concerned. 
This extreme technologies and volumes uncertainty is to be matched to the full certainty of a low 
carbon energy system to exist by 2050, under the novel design of an effective climate policy 
instrumentation. For a potentially successful innovator, exceptions are the goal, setting you apart 
from the pack. This is to be kept in mind: the unusual and unexpected may be the most beautiful 
and effective.  
 
2.3. Technology and behavior options screened 
There is substantial modelling available on how a low emission future might be accomplished. In 
the IPCC scenario systematics these are the Relevant Concentration Pathways for a 2-degrees 
world: the RCP2.6 scenarios, see the extensive analysis and survey of scenario studies by (van 
Vuuren, Stehfest et al. 2011). These scenarios are peak-and-decline scenarios, first over-emitting 
relative to the 2-degrees climate goal till around 2050, requiring negative emissions thereafter. 
The models used are global integrated assessment models with feedback between economy and 
environment and with regional disaggregation, and they include non-CO2 emissions and effects 
of land use change (LULUCF: Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry). For the instrument 
discussion on Europe with focus on non-LULUCF CO2 emissions, three types of simpler models 
have been developed in CECILIA2050, giving more insight in mechanisms involved. They are an 
energy optimization model (Solano and Drummond 2014), the ETM-UCL Model; an instrument 
rich macro-economic model (Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014) the GINFORS Model; and a technology 
specific input-output scenario for 2050 (Koning, Huppes et al. 2014, De Koning, Huppes et al. 
2015), the EXIOBASE Input-Output Model. The two economic modelling approches have a 
predictive element, assuming (abstract) technologies with certain characteristics and costs. With 
adequate input assumptionis the ETM-UCL can produce the desired emission reductions by 2050, 
with the Ginfors model coming only close, and the EXIOBASE Input-Output model not even 
coming close. The input-output scenario is free of dynamic mechanisms but looks at consistent 
future in the year 2050. The latter assumes high increases in efficiency and adds substantial 
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emission reducing technologies. But deeper changes are required. The outcomes of these three 
complementary approaches are analyzed in (Drummond 2014). 
Emission reductions will have to come mainly from weaning off of fossil fuels. The other option is 
CCS, which is difficult to apply in mobile and small scale sources but may be applied to larger scale 
fixed installations. There it may play a role but seems not capable even at the micro level to reach 
the 95% emission reduction in electricity production as investigated here, see Table 1, indicating 
reduction options there in the order of 65% (in terms of greenhouse gases but referring mainly 
to CO2). The IPCC numbers in that table include upstream emissions.  
 
Table 1 Global warming potential (GWP) per MWh of primary electricity sources  
Technology Min Median Max 
Currently commercially available technologies 
Coal – PC 740 820 910 
Gas – combined cycle 410 490 650 
Solar PV – utility scale 18 48 180 
Solar PV – rooftop 26 41 60 
Concentrated solar power  8.8 27 63 
Geothermal  6.0 38 79 
Hydropower  1.0 24 2200 
Wind offshore 8.0 12 35 
Wind onshore 7.0 11 56 
Nuclear  3.7 12 110 
Pre‐commercial technologies 
CCS – Coal – PC 190 220 250 
CCS – Coal – IGCC 170 200 230 
CCS – Gas- combined cycle 94 170 340 
CCS – Coal-oxyfuel 100 160 200 
Ocean (tidal and wave)) 5.6 17 28 
Source (IPCC-WG3 (2014) Annex 3, p10) 
 
These upstream emissions will become lower by 2050 as then also many of these emissions will 
have been reduced, see on this point the conceptually innovative paper by (Hertwich, Gibon et 
al. 2015). However, upstream infrastructure involves steel and cement, where emission 
reductions will be limited. So the role of CCS may be supplementary, for difficult cases where 
weaning off is not an acceptable option, like with steel. Also, the public perception of CCS is mixed, 
see the survey of the extensive literature by (L׳Orange Seigo, Dohle et al. 2014) and the underlying 
problem of where long term storage may be proven safe.  
So, apart from the quite uncertain nuclear expansion, see the balanced view by (Lévêque 2014)it 
is only the renewables that can transform the energy domain towards deep emission reductions: 
solar, wind, tidal, geothermal and hydro, and maybe a few more. Hydro-energy can be expanded 
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only to a limited extent in Europe, tidal has limited and unproven capacity, and geothermal may 
be restricted to hot beds close to the surface, so the resilience bet is on wind and solar, which 
have proven to be expandable at industrial scale. Rolling them out with adequate speed is one of 
the great challenges. Quantifications based on optimization models, see for a detailed example 
(Solano and Drummond 2014), tend to  be  bounded, with all technologies each playing a 
moderate role. Such outcomes are roughly indicative of options, as they assume cost prices which 
long term are not well known and market mechanisms which are highly conditional on policy 
instrumentation.  
The IEA gives prospective costs of electricity supply in terms of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), 
for 2020. The levelized cost concept has been developed for (US-type) highly regulated fossils 
based monopolistic electricity sector and has limited meaning in an open market situation with 
low short term variable costs of most renewables. In that old situation electricity prices are an 
input rather than an output of investors’ profitability calculations. To assess whether the cash 
flow of a new project is sufficient to reimburse the investment and capital costs the net present 
value (NPV) or internal rate of return is used, based on expected exogenous electricity prices, see 
(IEA 2015) Chapter 11 for a discussion. More relevant measures include system costs, always to 
be borne somehow, and take into account expected price developments, their variability, and 
their uncertainty over time, including policy induced effects though all sorts of market 
mechanisms. Predicting technologies long term therefore seems not well feasible, unless induced 
by assumed effective technology specific policies. 
Reduction of energy use through energy efficiency increases plays a limited role in deep emission 
reduction in the long term, as opposed to the short and medium term, for structural reasons and 
due to policy limitations. By then all energy flows will mainly be emission free. Then using 40% 
less solar PV hardly reduces emissions. With 5% of emissions left in the electricity system by 2050, 
an extreme energy reduction of 40% will help reduce emissions from 5% to 3%. That is a hardly 
relevant reduction but with a severe burden on society: energy is an essential ingredient in 
virtually all economic processes. There is a Herculean task ahead in climate policy. Confounding 
this task with an as yet not well-defined task in energy policy seems overcharging the political and 
economic system. Some have argued that energy efficiency improvement is a main technology 
entry for emission reduction. There is the ‘huge potential for improving energy efficiency’ (Grubb, 
Hourcade et al. 2014) p160 and similar (Hood 2011) Ch2 on ‘unused energy efficiency’. However, 
there is also is a huge potential to increase the energy intensity of production and consumption, 
partly fed by the rebound mechanisms of lowered costs of final energy use due efficiency 
increases. Faster transport alone can accommodate near endless increases in energy 
consumption, from fast trains and long haul normal aviation to supersonic flight and space 
tourism. That is a matter of energy prices and energy policy guiding technology, while the focus 
here is on having an economy with substantially reduced CO2 emissions. If supersonic flight is 
possible with near zero emissions, that reduction then is enough for climate policy. If climate 
policy kills off that option, tant pis for supersonic flight. But from a climate point of view there is 
nothing against supersonic flight as such.  
Of course in the short and medium term, the overlap between energy and climate policy is 
environmentally and politically highly relevant, see (Hood 2011, Bausch, Roberts et al. 2014). 
There are conflicting elements however. For supply security reasons diversification of fossils 
supply may create a barrier for effective climate policy. Also, adding energy efficiency 
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requirements as through standards may substantially increase the cost of emission reduction as 
compared to generic emission reduction policy, see the survey paper by (Parry, Evans et al. 2014) 
on the transport domain, and may help create lock-ins on long term detrimental technologies, 
like efficient combustion cars. If rising energy prices due to climate policy lead to a reduction of 
energy use, inducing somewhat lower emissions due to the volume effect, such an effect is of 
course fine from a climate policy point of view. But reducing specific fossil energy technologies 
will also lead to lower fossils prices, see (Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014), stimulating fossil energy use 
diffusely in all applications. Energy efficiency increases are always part of technology 
development but tend to be slow. They have proven to be difficult to speed up with policy 
measures, see (Tietenberg 2009), with emission pricing emerging as a major policy instrument. 
Whatever the precise role of energy efficiency may be, also in a medium term instrument mix for 
climate policy, it is not part of the long term strategy delivering 90% emission reduction. 
So for climate reasons, some mix of renewables, unknown as yet as to composition and volume, 
will have to take over, together with an also unknown volume of nuclear energy (with limited 
dispatchability) and some biobased energy as from agriculture. Biofuels are widely disputed as to 
their net effects on climate emissions, a discussion we will not go into, also related to land-use 
change. Their overall role will be limited, due to competition with food and materials for an 
increasingly wealthy global population. Solar and wind seem to have the option for the extreme 
capacity increase required, solar especially if printable-like mass production becomes available, 
integrated in infrastructure as in wall cladding and roof constructions and other surfaces that are 
to be built and cladded anyway. Somehow their intermittency is to be resolved, not only per day 
and week but also over the seasons, if heating and cooling would be substantially electricity 
based. Another option might be solar hydrogen or other solar fuel.  We cannot know that in 
advance but policy instrumentation is to reckon with such options: by actively creating one 
option, or several, or by incentivizing any of them, including the provision of the required 
infrastructure. 
The bottleneck for increasing renewables production hardly seems technical. A back-of-the-
envelope quantification may indicate the size of the task. EU final energy use currently is around 
8 petawatt-hour, of which now 3PWh is electric. Efficiency of electricity use as for heating can be 
a factor 3 higher than for natural gas, and similar efficiency gains are possible in person transport 
when shifting from fossil to electric drives. Primary electricity production in 2050 may be 
estimated at around 3TWh. At 300kWh per m2 per year an area of solar cells then is required of 
10 000km2, with required land a factor of two higher at 20 000km2, around 0.5% of the EU28 land 
surface, with North Africa waiting. So the land requirement for shifting even to full only-PV 
production hardly seems a problem. The area of solar cells to be produced per year, assuming 5% 
of the installed capacity in 2050, is 500km2 per year3. Assuming some sort of printable or coating 
process to emerge, that surface can be compared to car coating. This PV surface is less than the 
surface for car coating. At 12.5 million cars per year with a multi-layered coated surface of on 
average 80m2 each (EGTEI 2005), the total coating surface is around 1000km2 per year4. Again, 
the amount of solar cells to be produced would hardly pose a problem, certainly not if also 
                                                          
3 At 300kWh/m2/year a PV surface of 10 000km2 delivers 3PWh/year. This requires a solar cell production rising to 
500km2/year, assuming a life time of 20 years. 
4 Current sales of 12.5 million cars at 80m2 per car is 1000 million square meters, which is 1000km2. 
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reckoning with wind, hydro, nuclear power, etc. Even this extreme PV-only option seems feasible. 
Also the intermittency problem does not seem basic, as it might be solved using the capacity of 
the transport fleet alone, see BOX 1.  
Whatever the exact role of PV and other sources may be, a major part of long term new electricity 
production will be highly intermittent, not linked to intermittency of demand. There are many 
ways in which supply and demand can be matched, real time clearance being a strict requirement 
in the electricity market. Shifting demand, storage and secondary production are the solutions, 
with many options available. Current swing producers, who now match supply to varying demand, 
will have left the market well before 2050, so the full problem is at the table. Again, however, 
even current technologies can already take care of market clearance over days at least: battery 
storage, hydro storage, secondary production as with fuel cells together can do so, and certainly 
in combination with smart grid developments to shave demand peaks, including with heat pumps 
with heat storage creating substantial flexibility over days, weeks and seasons. The IEA assumes 
in a highly assumption based study that a number of such technologies together may reduce peak 
demand by in the order of 30%, see (Heinen, Elzinga et al. 2011). At the peak supply side, just the 
electric drive passenger car park of 2050, with battery storage or with hydrogen storage with fuel 
cells, is more than enough to produce for any total daily peak demand, see BOX 1. This of course 
is not a prediction but goes to show that several technical solutions for load balancing are 
available in required quantities in principle. Climate policy instrumentation will determine which 
ones may come up, with innovation playing a key role, intermingled.  
 
BOX 1 Integrating passenger vehicles in the electricity system 
Beware: This is not a prediction but an investigation of one corner of feasible technology options relevant 
for climate policy instrumentation. 
 
Peak load supply by passenger car fuel cells or car batteries 
With primary electricity coming substantially from wind, solar PV and other intermittent sources there will 
be a regular non-match with peak demand for electricity, and a severe one at exceptional times, as when 
the sun does not shine (at night), solar PV is covered with snow, and when wind power is at a fraction of 
its installed capacity (stable high pressure over Europe) while electricity use is high due to extreme cold or 
extreme heat with high air conditioner use. Meeting peak demand is a key issue, to be always resolved. 
There are several ways to resolve this problem as by centralized peak shaving, also as by using stronger 
East-West connections, and by decentralized peak shaving using the options of the internet of things as 
one line in smart grid development.  The highly decentralized electricity system which may develop under 
the umbrella of an open real time electricity market can go many directions, not yet to be predicted. So 
there are solutions possible in many directions. But can they be sufficient? A simple technology scenario 
can help grasp the magnitude of feasible change, by picking out just one arbitrary but feasible option: 
hydrogen fuel cells of cars connected to the grid when standing idle. Transport vehicles tend to be used 
more hours per day, but may have a similar role when idle. 
Current peak demand in the EU is in the order of 800GW (Brauner, D’Haeseleer et al. 2013). With shifts 
towards electricity use in heating and transport this may rise to in the order of 3000GW, a very high 
estimate according to (Brauner, D’Haeseleer et al. 2013). Now imagine, exemplary, that all person cars 
and similar will be hydrogen fuel cell driven5. This is hardly probable but some form of non-fossil onboard 
                                                          
5 Hydrogen refilling stations are being rolled out by Shell in Germany now, 400 planned, with other countries 
following, see http://www.ft.com/intl/fastft/406871/shell-aims-boost-hydrogen-vehicles-germany. Toyota is 
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stored energy will be present in transport to drive the electromotors for the wheels. An average car will 
have a fuel cell power of at least 50kW, with some additional battery power for peak acceleration. (Tesla 
Model S has 310kW peak power now.) Assume there is an incentive to connect the fuel cell car to the grid, 
when the price is high enough to make this attractive for the individual car owner, or for the private fleet 
owner. This price must cover the cost of the hydrogen to be acquired, the additional cost of running the 
fuel cell, the cost of connecting to the grid, and the cost of the nuisance to go to this effort. Assume that 
half of all cars are connected at peak times. And assume there are only 100 million fuel cell vehicles, a very 
low estimate for the total number of passenger cars in the EU. Their combined power then is: 0.5 x 100.106 
x 50kW = 2500GW, roughly the total peak power demand for 2050, the high estimate. Overall, the 
efficiency of this hydrogen route would be relatively low, assuming the hydrogen is produced from 
renewable electricity. With a to-and-fro efficiency rising to 80% by then this would lead to an overall 
efficiency of 60%, to be paid for by the temporary high electricity price. However, there may be more 
attractive options for hydrogen production by then, like directly from solar (research for different 
technologies ongoing). Full electric cars would have a higher overall efficiency in delivering to the grid. But 
they can deliver a smaller amount if the gap between primary production and demand lasts. Many more 
options for secondary peak delivery exist, like pumped hydro, diverse static battery systems, and more 
esoteric systems like fly wheels, chemical storage, pressurized gases, etc. And of course there will not just 
be primary production with non-dispatchable renewables. 
With relevant markets installed, covering the daily peak power problem of intermittent sources might be 
resolved with the car hydrogen fuel cell technology route alone, or by the battery car alone. Of course the 
future will be different, including as yet unknown options. The longer term mismatch between supply and 
demand - over weeks and seasons and in exceptional circumstances - may also be covered by the fuel cell 
car with hydrogen storage; not by the battery electric vehicle. 
 
With the energy supply system mainly electrified, the next technical problem is how the 
electrification of the energy system is to work downstream, in applications formerly served by 
fossil electricity or fossil heat as with district heat from fossil fired power stations or dedicates 
fossil heating systems. For heating purposes, including hot water use, electricity based heat 
pumps with heat storage seem a most relevant option now available already. There is substantial 
experience with such systems. However, especially the seasonal energy storage may not have the 
right total capacity yet. Underground heat and cold storage in aquifers, for example, uses a larger 
underground area than the building area served above ground. Also ownership of the 
underground capacity is not well established yet, with first come first get a permit currently being 
the situation in the Netherlands. If such systems don’t develop, heat pumps may lack seasonal 
storage capacity and then may revert to air based heat pumps, as is the most used heating system 
now in Japan already. Substantial R&D and Demonstration seems due. 
In industry, there is much diversity in energy use. With low temperature heat use the solutions 
are similar or even the same as for space heating and hot tap water. For higher temperature 
furnaces deeper adaptations may be required, requiring redesign and new investment in capital 
goods. The instrument mix will have to give the right impulses for such changes.  
 
                                                          
currently marketing its Mirai fuel cell car. How this will work out long term is unknown but learning curves will 
certainly be created.  
CECILIA2050 D6.1   Instrumentation Strategies and Instrument Mixes for Long Term Climate Policy  PART 1 
17  
2.4. Economic options 
The speed of economic development may be modelled by international bodies but remains 
substantially uncertain, and will certainly vary in time as well. The current downward trend in 
productivity growth in developed countries is not well explained, but ways to increase economic 
growth are very actively searched for. Climate policy does not have a strong relation with 
economic growth probably, see (Meyer and Meyer 2013), as other factors dominate. It will reduce 
growth somewhat due to somewhat higher energy costs. Conversely, the investment induced by 
climate policy as by renewables subsidies may have a macro-economic impact. This impact will 
be limited however as generic macro-economic policies will reckon with these impacts as part of 
broader macro-economic policy. The net effect therefore may well be close to zero. 
The trend towards reduced income differences between countries may well continue due to 
industrialization of nearly all now poor countries in the globalizing world. Globalization again 
means that fundamental national differences will be reduced, as based on available national 
resources, minerals and soils/climate combinations. Overall these sectors have a limited share in 
total production however. So the general development will be determined more by the capacities 
of the labor force and the institutions regulating the dynamics in society. International 
specialization may well change towards ‘the first one with economies of scale’, a variant of the 
prime mover motive, not based on any basic national relative production advantage. Cultural 
developments in the economic domain are also governed by global issues; the globalization of 
consumption patterns continues given the increasing role of global scale production and 
advertising, and internet based marketing. 
More specific developments relate to shifts in economic structure and economic mechanisms. 
Economic structure in Europe may revert back to more material production, as in the aspired 
renaissance of manufacturing. This reindustrialization would lead to higher European emissions, 
reversing the deindustrialization of the last decades which helped reduce EU emissions, see for 
empirical analysis  (Wiebe, Bruckner et al. 2012)see for the method of analysis involved (Kokoni 
and Skea 2014). It seems difficult to predict such structural developments, apart from what is 
needed for the renewable energy supply and the electrification of energy use. 
There is one substantial macro-economic mechanism involved in effective climate policy. The rent 
incomes earned by coal, oil and gas producing companies and countries will be replaced by more 
competitive lower rent production domains, as for wind and solar installations. From a global 
point of view this may be a substantial effect, especially in oil producing regions. But as primary 
fossils production in the EU is limited, this mechanism will play a limited role in Europe. 
Also the share of the working age population in the total population is going down. The working 
age population in Europe will diminish substantially by 2050, especially if immigration is halted. 
This is not just a European issue. Japanese labor force is diminishing even faster, with China 
following closely after. Economic growth as production per head, is on a downward trend as well, 
without clear causes as yet. Overall EU emissions therefore are on a downward trend, but by far 
not fast enough for the extreme reductions required. This will have consequences for saving and 
investments and for the economic organization dealing with such developments. The share of 
savings will have to rise for capital fund based pensions, or taxes will have to rise to fund publicly 
paid pensions. There is a weak link to climate policy. Savings and investments will rise, creating 
room for investment also in climate technologies.  
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One element to be analyzed is the combination of intermittent production of renewables, a 
market-technical issue, and their mostly very low level of short term marginal costs, possibly 
leading to different types of societal organization, see next section and especially section 4.4.4.  
Summarizing, the main outcomes of this long term domain analysis are the following. There is no 
hard predictions possible on general economic development; low growth may contribute to 
emission reduction but is not a development to bet on. Climate policy will have limited effects on 
general economic development, partly dependent on the instrumentation chosen. Globalization 
will reduce differences between countries, with prime mover advantages probably becoming 
more important in international specialization. Loss of rent income from fossils production will 
play a relatively limited role in Europe. The main economic factor to reckon with is the emergence 
of low marginal cost production systems in the energy domain, and beyond.  
 
2.5. Societal options 
The global move to market economies may lose momentum but can hardly be reversed. 
Globalization is ongoing still. The WTO is one of the strong international institutions, with the US 
and China accepting court rules on conflicts, as with the export restrictions on neodymium by 
China. There are some long term views on a move away from globalized market economies. One 
is ideological, relate to local development ideologies as in the DeGrowth movement (see 
www.degrowth.org), linked to anarchist and communist ideals. It seems not probable that such 
movements towards a different society will become a dominant factor in the next half century. 
Another more system analytic approach is by (Rifkin 2014), based on structural change in 
production technologies, especially their low marginal cost at relevant production volumes. He 
sees low marginal cost society as heralding the end of capitalism. This certainly has a link to 
climate policy as many renewable technologies have near zero marginal costs. Before being taken 
over by his stream of ideas converging to the collapse of capitalism some basics first on what 
exactly constitutes zero marginal costs. The reasoning of Rifkin is that the old mechanism of firms 
expanding their volumes of production till marginal cost equal average cost at its lowest point no 
longer applies: there are economies of scale, with marginal cost remaining very much below 
average cost in the feasible domain of production. If markets are priced at marginal costs prices 
will tend to near zero. However, it then is essential to be clear on the meaning of marginal cost, 
differentiating between short term and long term marginal cost.  
Long term, not short term, marginal costs are relevant when considering investment decisions. 
There are many industries where short term marginal costs are low. Hotels and air lines are old 
examples, and in the energy domain oil and gas production, nuclear electricity and solar PV, 
hydro, and wind power have very low marginal cost. Short term decisions are based on short term 
marginal costs. But long term decisions like investments are based on long term marginal costs, 
including the cost of capital, to be more than balanced by expected long term proceeds. The 
industry as a whole will not overinvest, in that way keeping prices high enough for covering long 
term marginal cost. Of course overinvestment is possible, depressing prices substantially. Airline 
companies are a main historical example: they have had long term losses due to overinvestment 
in national flagships, funded by taxpayers. This reasoning reduces the strength of Rifkin’s 
arguments. Very low short term marginal costs are not dominant in the economy as a whole, and 
where they exist they mostly do not lead to very low prices long term, as investments are based 
on long term marginal costs, not their short term cousin. 
CECILIA2050 D6.1   Instrumentation Strategies and Instrument Mixes for Long Term Climate Policy  PART 1 
19  
However, though not heralding the end of capitalism, Rifkin’s reasoning might be important for 
other reasons.  Operations with decreasing costs due to low marginal costs can be expanded so 
at to reach near monopolist positions, as is a trend in many IT based firms with global coverage. 
The solutions to be investigated there, like detailed pricing rules; reduced domain of intellectual 
property rights to increase competition; open access on data carrying infrastructure, managed as 
public utilities and maybe publicly owned; and breaking up firms linking related domains of 
activities. It must be remembered however that main sectors of the economy do not exhibit low 
short term marginal costs, from heavy industry and mining, to the building industry; and to car 
manufacturing. The issue of private monopoly prevention is important, also in the energy domain, 
but seems to have no special bearing on climate policy; monopolistic tendencies as in fossil 
electricity production will be reversed with the reduced role of fossils. There is another reason 
why the tendency towards monopoly does not seem to be linked specifically to low emission 
energy. Most renewables based electricity production like solar and wind is decentralized and 
therefor hardly amenable to monopolistic development. Their emergence will even be counter to 
the old oligopolistic structure in the fossil energy sector.  
The conclusion on long term societal development is again middle of the road. There are many 
potential developments, most of them remaining within the mainly capitalist social order, with 
market based globalized economies remaining dominant, barring disasters. Deviations from that 
pattern, as in Rifkin and cultural developments like the DeGrowth movement, don’t yet sketch a 
feasible future with enough detail to link to European Union climate policy instrumentation.  
Monopolistic tendencies will come up and must be countered and low short term marginal cost 
production systems require attention in terms of their integration in electricity markets. 
 
2.6. Cultural developments and life styles 
Life styles are a basic cultural phenomenon, where direct public intervention is problematic. 
Governments can be paternalistic to a limited degree only, and being effective in that seems not 
easy. Examples where life style changes have resulted with a clear role of governments tend to 
specific domains, as opposes to the all permeating climate issue. Examples are seat belts, smoking 
in public, gender equality and gay marriage. Ultimately public policy has made seat belts and non-
smoking areas compulsory, and has created the administrative option for gay marriage. What 
governments can do regarding more generic life style issues is to facilitate developments, 
including by changing incentives. One general cultural direction for instrumentation might be to 
confer climate responsibility to private parties. This relates to climate governance strategies 
directly and from there to climate policy instrumentation. Responsibility and legal liability are 
close cousins, with liability rules adapted to such cultural developments. Facilitating and 
stimulating low carbon life styles may connect to other climate policy instruments quite directly, 
like emission pricing, spatial planning and infrastructure, and enabling part time work and making 
lower life time working times more attractive. This last option links to a most basic cultural 
development: produce and consume less, as advocated by the DeGrowth movement (see: 
http://www.degrowth.org/) and analyzed more reflectively by (Jackson 2011) and discussed 
more critically by (van den Bergh 2011). Reduced growth may have a substantial long term effect: 
reducing growth by 1% halves national income over 70 years. Most institutions are geared to 
growth however, with few openings for reduction.  
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The provisional conclusion here is that broad cultural development is important but difficult to 
steer other than by enabling and soft incentivizing.  
 
2.7. Materials constraints 
The Club of Rome published Limits to Growth (Meadows, Meadows et al. 1972) indicating that 
economic growth would be halted by input constraints in terms of resources and by the 
consequences of waste and emissions, like climate changing emissions. Climate policy deals with 
emissions but might be constrained, or be superfluous by a lack of resources. Certainly there is 
not a shortage of fossils as was expected till recently; proven reserves will have to remain 
underground even with more modest climate policy than implied in the 2-degrees goal. However, 
the transformation to a low carbon society implies a new energy infrastructure, new production 
processes and new products. Such low carbon technologies mostly are more materials intensive 
than their current fossil equivalents, of course only if leaving the fossils themselves out of 
account. Several constraints may come up, as has been the case with rare metals before, as when 
platinum catalysts were required in the catalytic converters in cars. Prices exploded but since then 
have stabilized mainly. The neodymium experience has shown the risk of monopolistic supply, as 
when China effectively halted exports, hurting Toyota’s hybrid electric car, using neodymium 
permanent magnets and hurting wind turbine builders all over the world, while favoring those in 
China. However, Tesla’s full electric car and the turbines of some producers don’t use neodymium 
but copper variable strength magnets. When such substitutes don’t exist one should be careful 
to rely on such supply, and avoid relying on its use. In general the limits to increased production, 
increasing with higher prices, can roughly be known, including estimates for recycling when stocks 
have been built up. Lithium is in near endless supply and has a relatively short time horizon for 
expanding production See: (Riley and Tongudai 1964, Yaksic and Tilton 2009). Copper is not in 
short supply, but expanding production with new mines requires a time horizon of well over 20 
years, expecting markets to be there by then. Gold is in short supply and also requires substantial 
time for opening up new mines. Golden houses will never be built for the masses, though golden 
rings are perfectly possible. Research into supply options and more certainty on the climate policy 
to come can guide developments, avoiding the price peaks as occurred with platinum and 
neodymium. See for an extensive prospective analysis Kleijn et al. (2014). 
The conclusion here is that with experience and knowledge built up in the resource domain 
materials shortages in terms of extreme price variations can be avoided, not specifically for 
climate reasons. Constraints in materials supply are there but not different from those in other 
domains.  
 
2.8. Conclusions on domain analysis 
The overall picture that emerges from this domain analysis is that reducing CO2 emissions as the 
core of climate policy can be managed starting from now and does not have basic limitations in 
terms of the technologies required. Most are there already and can be improved further, though 
predicting specific technologies towards 2050 remains impossible. The economic and social 
conditions in which the deep transformation towards near zero emission society are to take place 
will remain roughly as they are, while also cultural developments will not have an autonomous 
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deep development on emission reducing behavior. Also from a materials supply point of view, 
climate policy has no special constraints above what society can manage normally in principle.  
Coherent story lines on futures are to integrate the long term domain analysis, covering feasible 
options, relevant for climate policy and its instrumentation. There are many potential 
developments, most of them remaining within the mainly capitalist social order, in a globalized 
market economy. Deviations from that pattern, as in Rifkin and cultural developments like the 
DeGrowth movement, don’t yet sketch a feasible future with enough detail to link to European 
Union climate policy instrumentation. Story lines in climate scenarios don’t start with a domain 
analysis. They all tend to a market economy, with more or less regionalization and more or less 
emphasis on sustainability, see the surveys in (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000, van Vuuren, Riahi et 
al. 2012, Nakicenovic, Lempert et al. 2014). Also economic models covering climate policy rely 
heavily on market mechanisms and optimization tendencies, also in the CECILIA2050 project. The 
two instrument strategies developed here both align with these broad story lines, but differ quite 
substantially.  
Taken together the picture emerges that the deep transformations required require substantial 
effort, but along lines as are usual in our Western societal development. The overall integration 
of the different entries to long term climate policy would require coherent story lines. This is 
required both for developing consistent instrumentation and for discussing climate policy and its 
instrumentational broader in society. Strategic governance choices then precede more specific 
instrumentation choices.  
 
3. Bottom up development and top down design of 
instrumentation  
3.1. From incremental improvement to strategic design 
The Grubb distinction between short term satisficing, medium term optimization and long term 
transformation can be placed in a general governance framework as has been developed after 
WWII in political and administrative sciences for pluralist liberal democracies, as opposed to 
autocratic fascist and communist regimes. Policy develops in an interactive process between 
several actors involved in negotiation processes. Big changes are the exception: small steps as 
incremental improvements are the norm. This view on the political process has been developed 
by Lindblom and Dahl, see their influential (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). A main question arising 
directly then is how more aligned policies can come about from negotiations, reckoning with the 
complex interrelations in modern societies. The political process itself has obvious limitations in 
this respect. Coordination and alignment between specific policies becomes a role for policy 
specialist and especially for public administrations, in the preparatory phase of the policy 
development process. The first step is to coordinate policies and instruments and manage their 
overlap. More general principles then start to play a role, like efficiency and optimization, helping 
create a better society for all. Such broadly accepted principles then permeate the somewhat 
longer term view on development of policies and their instrumentation. Striving for tactical 
alignment in instrumentation is already stronger based on such broadly accepted more general 
principles and views. Welfare theory gives the underpinning of what is better integration and 
alignment, based on linking what is important to all in society. Basically this is the Bentham 
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principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, but then in a more operational 
version, as for example involving cost-benefit analysis as developed in that period. The theoretical 
level is that of the Bergson-Samuelson welfare function, see (Samuelson 1977), with distributional 
issues resolved by the hypothetical Pareto improvement. In the following decades this 
coordinating governance view broadened from the initially somewhat narrow economic domain 
to broader welfare issues, with Sen and later Stiglitz as core contributors, see (Sen 1970). A 
snapshot on the broadened discussion is by (Nussbaum and Sen 1993), and recently (Stiglitz, Sen 
et al. 2009) with emphasis on the climate problem. In the political domain the issue of 
simplification through better coordination and alignment is recurrent due to increasing rule 
density and complexity (see (Simões, Huppes et al. 2015) for a detailed case analysis), and the 
resulting lack of legitimacy. In the US Sunstein had that explicit role of simplification in the Obama 
administration, see (Sunstein 2014) and in the EU Commission there now is a Vice-President on 
Better Regulation and Inter-Institutional Relations (currently Timmermans), followed by 
initiatives like  the setting up of High Level Group on Simplification by domain commissioners. 
That line of coordination and alignment still lacks direction, as strategic design. Such explicit 
direction by necessity moves away from reasonable agreement, to some extent at least. What 
might be reasonable directions to investigate, reasonable meaning substantially accepted in 
principle, and what might be more daring directions, investigated and supported by smaller 
groups in society? The reasonable approach was surveyed by (Dahl 1982), indicating two basic 
directions for policy development, autonomy versus control, roughly linked to the two strategic 
directions for climate policy distinguished here, a Planning & Control mode and an Institutionalist 
mode of governance incentivizing autonomous parts of society. What is added here to the Dahl 
distinction is a clear climate policy goal: arriving at the 2-degrees Celsius stabilization target. 
Autonomy then means establishing generic incentives for emission reduction, including the de-
blocking of obstacles for this bottom-up process like lacking electricity markets. The planning and 
control mode is linked to more specific targets setting and specifying the means of 
implementation, ultimately in terms of specification of technologies and linked behavior. 
Summarizing, there are four different ways how the mix of EU climate policy instruments could 
evolve. 
 Incremental improvements to individual instruments, for instance moving from feed-in tariffs 
to feed-in premiums or improving vehicle performance measurements for CO2 standards. This 
development links to Grubb’s short term Satisficing. 
 Better coordination of instruments and management of overlaps as in eliminating gaps and 
imbalances in the coverage of instruments that lead to market distortions, for example 
emission pricing as applied differently now to different modes of transport. This development 
links to a first part of Grubb’s medium term Optimizing. 
 Tactical alignment as in removing tensions between instruments, as in better aligning 
country-level and EU level instruments; top-down and bottom up initiatives; phasing out of 
overlapping instruments without convincing justification. This constitutes a second part of 
Grubb’s medium term Optimization. 
 Strategic design of instrument mixes, based on different regulatory philosophies, like 
technology-specific measures and top-down planning versus more incentive based 
instruments changing framework conditions and allowing for bottom-up developments rather 
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than pursuing specific particular (technological) solutions. This links to Grubb’s long term 
Transformation. 
These steps from incremental improvement to strategic design are not mutually exclusive. The 
types of reasoning can all four be seen as steps towards long term development of the 
instrument mix for EU climate policy. If a grand idea is to develop effectively, it is to start now, 
giving direction to incremental improvement, better coordination, and tactical alignment, as 
steps aligned to long term strategic design. Some improvements on specific instruments may fit 
into any strategy, like better measurement of climate performance of vehicles, be they used for 
fleet standards or consumer information. And some improvements may be temporary 
important, till other instruments take over, like the weeding out of multiple purpose elements 
out of Fleet Standards, till emission pricing is strong enough to take over, if that emission pricing 
line is followed. But overall the ultimate strategy will determine or at least color the other three 
steps. In a technologically specific planning mode it does not make sense now to repair the ETS 
and establish a trading authority as currently proposed (Kettner, Köppl et al. 2012, Edenhofer 
2014). 
The descriptive and normative improvement paths may be used for empirical analysis as well. In 
one strategic direction, it is highly improbable that certain developments will take place, like 
detailed fleet standards for all road transport vehicles in an institutionalist mode, or sticking to a 
pure cap-and-trade system in a planning & control mode. Also in the institutionalist mode, there 
is no logic to link to a pure cap-and-trade instrument for carbon pricing. Decentral initiatives by 
cities and countries and private parties would become less relevant. 
 
3.2. From practical instrument development to strategic design 
Developing instrumentation by necessity starts at current instrumentation, with the short term, 
medium term and long term domains leading to different approaches for development, with 
satisficing, optimizing and transformation as main lines of change. Satisficing and optimizing take 
the current situation as a prime basis. However, also long term transformations, though possibly 
guided by overarching and new considerations, cannot avoid the constraints of current 
instrumentation. It is not possible to have a tabula rasa in instrumentation design, starting from 
scratch. This is the case for several reasons. Instruments as have been implemented give rights to 
those regulated, though usually limited in time. Feed-in tariffs have a time to expiration. ETS and 
Fleet Standards have a fixed period towards revision. Revising instruments takes time both for 
procedural and political reasons. Different instrumentation may require different organizations 
and rules for their implementation. However, such constraints are never fully rigid and are softer 
in the long term. An analogy with innovation is the Schumpeterian creative destruction 
(Schumpeter 1947 (1942)): overruling existing instrumentation by novel instruments. In the 
electricity sector renewables are destroying the existing market structure creating losses for fossil 
producers, based on novel instruments like feed-in tariffs and fossil electricity emission standards, 
these overruling the pure cap-and-trade system of the ETS. Destruction will not always be 
required if the old instrument can remain in a niche application, as with 19th century regulations 
still apply to steam engines in many countries.  
By adapting, replacing or destructing the old instrumentation, fundamental changes are well 
possible in the long term. Such changes will however not come about by incrementalist piecemeal 
decision making alone as seen and advocated by (Dahl and Lindblom 1953, Lindblom 1959) as the 
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main mode of policy development. A strategic guiding element then has to be added here, as 
strategic governance views for climate policy. These in turn will be based on the broader views 
on societal governance of which they are part. The bottom up strategy starting from now will 
therefore be matched somehow with long term strategies, top down. The bottom up strategy 
also has an element of specificity as to domains of application: fleet standards apply to the road 
transport sector and feed-in tariffs to electricity production. In the longer term transformative 
development such sectoral domains may be a starting point. However, it is overall effectiveness 
of climate policy determining choices substantially, not necessarily linked to any sectoral 
delineation.  
The instrument development process starting from now and passing by short term satisficing and 
medium term optimizing is basically different from the strategic approach to long term 
instrument development starting from general views and principles, condensed in strategies. In 
a most general way the long term analysis has a focus on coherency and simplicity. Why have two 
instruments if one can cover the actions involved adequately already? Certainly multiplicity is to 
be avoided if instruments are not mutually supportive, as with long term feed-in tariffs 
functioning in a pure cap-an-trade domain. That means distributing subsidies without climate 
effect, which may at best be useful for non-climate reasons. The discussion on improving the ETS 
functioning by temporary reducing the amount of permits brought in the market as by the 
Strategic Market Reserve typically is satisficing, not strategic, focused at one instrument only. The 
pure cap-and-trade system then is abandoned a bit, in order to create a higher, more relevant 
emission price. In a strategic approach the reasoning is reversed. How can a relevant emission 
price be brought about, to guide long term decision making? How can emissions be reduced 
predictably?  What is the role of emission permit trading? What is the role of price fluctuations in 
a trading system? What is the role of a mixed quantity-and-price based system, relative to their 
pure extremes, the pure cap-and-trade and the pure emission tax? Might it that the mix has 
disadvantages only, with the volume of emissions not specified anymore and the price not 
predictable yet? Can the variants of emission pricing be implemented effectively? Already at this 
level answers cannot be given in proven way: they depend on strategic views and priorities. With 
emphasis on predictable results, the answer goes towards the pure cap-and-trade system, with 
permits to control total volume of emissions and permit trade to help reduce cost of the specified 
emission reduction, accepting the reduced long predictability of the emission price and hence 
reduced dynamic efficiency. Adjoining instruments then should also focus at creating dynamic 
incentives. With emphasis on also long term incentivizing, the fixed price system comes up as a 
predictably rising emission tax, accepting uncertainty in emission reductions but focusing on 
dynamics, with maybe some price adaptation long term. Adjoining instruments would be directed 
mainly at domains not guided by markets or where markets are limited and deficient, first 
improving them where possible. The in-between options seem not to be part of a strategic design. 
Why have trade if price stabilization is the goal and why have price variability? They don’t have a 
function themselves but were functional in the pure cap-and-trade system. Strategically therefore 
only two types of emission pricing remain, linked to two more general strategic choices. Also in 
expanding emission pricing with other instruments towards a full set of instruments, the more 
general strategic choice is guiding. With a cap system domain expanded, it does not seem logical 
in a strategy sense to add economic instruments in the same domain, like carbon taxes on fuels. 
Again, there may be non-climate reasons for such taxes. With an emission tax in place, it does not 
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seem logical in a strategy sense to reduce emission of fossil power stations by CO2 emission 
standards for climate reasons. There might be non-climate reasons again like air quality issues, 
though these might be better served with more focused instruments. The central methodology 
issue to keep in mind in developing long term climate instrumentation is that is strategy driven, 
top down, and only then linked to the practical question on what to do now. 
 
Table 2 Dimensions and layers in governance, after (Voss and Bornemann 2011) 
Dimensions: 
Levels: 
Policy  
problems and solutions 
Polity  
rules and structure 
Politics 
interaction and process 
Micro  
focal 
interaction 
Problems and goals of a 
specific governance 
process 
Rules of procedure for a 
specific governance process 
Struggle for dominance among 
participants of a governance 
process 
Meso  
policy  
domain 
Problem definitions and 
policy approaches 
dominant within a policy 
domain 
Institutional arrangements 
within a policy domain 
Struggle of organized political 
actors for dominant positions 
within a policy domain 
Macro  
political 
system 
Discourse on fundamental 
political values and beliefs 
Constitutional rules and 
political culture 
Struggle for dominance among 
broad social groups, sectors, 
classes, or regions 
 
The strategy domain can be viewed specifically for climate policy instrumentation but is 
unavoidably part of broader views on governance. A recent analytic approach to governance 
directions is in (Voss and Bornemann 2011). The political policy domain is analyzed by 
distinguishing between levels of generality in the discourse, ranging from micro, to meso and 
macro, and the subject of discourse related to: policy domains; the polity with its procedures; and 
politics with power elements, all three connected to the three levels of domains. The climate 
governance discussion does not touch the Politics domain directly (but decisions are based on 
power) and it is connected to the meso and macro level only, not the micro level of governance, 
see the four emphasized cells in the table. Of course the micro level plays a role in filling in daily 
operations of public policy. However, a long term strategy development reckoning with all 
possible details will falter in complexity. This is contrary to the view that all options have to be 
taken into account in detail; that focus on one level without consideration of the others leads to 
inconsistency, friction, inefficiency and / or deadlock. This links to the optimization ideal of the 
medium term. In the economics domain this passion for control has been linked to reality by 
(Cyert and March 1963) long time ago. Even the best efforts to optimization fall short of the 
information required for doing so. Of course the development of generic approaches has to deal 
with micro options in a general sense, building on administrative experience. So strategic 
development of long term policy instrumentation deals with governance at the meso and macro 
level, filled in at the micro level in due time. The strategies chosen depend on inclusion of political 
values and beliefs here implies that the strategy development is a legitimate subject of public 
discourse, a major starting point. For which class of vehicles which test norms will be applied and 
when is a matter of micro level politics, not for strategic policy development. However, reckoning 
with administrative problems of test procedures is part of generic considerations. 
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3.3. Planning & Control and Institutionalist Strategies for long term 
instrumentation  
The Planning & Control Strategy may first be linked to broad optimization approaches, looking for 
welfare improvements wherever possible, with improved climate performance as the entry 
variable, but linked to all other relevant dimensions. Any option increasing overall welfare in 
society is useful, with priority on the most useful ones, while taking a long term perspective in the 
analysis. Quantification of climate damage per unit of emission is required for placing climate 
policy in the overall welfare perspective. Though historically linked to somewhat restricted 
economic reasoning, the definitions on collective welfare have broadened since the Seventies and 
now include fully distributional and justice issues and environmental issues, including global 
public goods like climate stability. See for an eloquent presentation (Stiglitz, Sen et al. 2009). The 
medium term domain has to deal with institutional issues as well, but in a slightly more practical 
manner. The issue of emission pricing is also highly relevant for medium term instrumentation, 
like expanding the ETS. Still, the Planning & Control Strategy links easiest to the concrete, 
improving on what is there already, in a quantified way. In a governance sense it links to a 
stepwise incrementalist approach, focusing on political and administrative feasibility, and 
avoiding big mistakes. This governance tradition first was described by (Dahl and Lindblom 1953, 
Lindblom 1959), with more strategic aspects added later. The European Commission has its 
Strategic Planning and Programming Cycle (akin to the US PPBS system starting in the Sixties), 
with yearly checks on achieving objectives. Also longer term issues tend to be stated in terms of 
targets, with instruments adapted on the go; not explicitly as strategic planning of long term 
instrumentation development. The focus on optimization leads to placing climate policy in a 
broader context, linked to broader policy domains like economic growth, energy supply, housing 
and income distribution. Optimization cannot just be a climate affair. Applied welfare functions 
have been at the start of this approach, developing theoretically and empirically after WWII. A 
few big names are Bergson, Samuelson, Arrow, Sen and Stiglitz, mostly Nobel Prize winners, and 
Arrow, Sen and Stiglitz active in climate policy. The core reasoning, generalizing Bentham, is: What 
is best collectively is to be realized. For easy familiarization the Planning & Control governance 
strategy may be thought of as the Stiglitz strategy. In the climate policy domain this governance 
approach is dominant now. (Wiseman, Edwards et al. 2013) survey eighteen post-carbon 
strategies. Most have an incremental approach, all in a planning & control mode of governance, 
also when indicating transformational change. 
The other approach is from the more empirical oriented institutionalist school studying long term 
societal development, with (Acemoglu, Johnson et al. 2005), (Mokyr 2004) and (North 1990) as 
main history oriented representatives; see (Coase 1999) for a survey on institutional economics; 
see (Immergut and Anderson 2008, Munck af Rosenschöld, Rozema et al. 2014) for a social 
science entry; and (Chang 2002) for political science oriented views on institutionalism, and 
(Carrigan and Coglianese 2011), linking to soft instrument options Ha-Joon Chang argued against 
the simplistic non-institutional neo-liberal view of “the” market, which erroneously abstracts 
from the institutions which can create and regulate markets in very different ways (Chang 2002). 
Institutions constitute the basic relatively stable fabric of society, including constitutional 
arrangements, the legal system, the judicial system, the educational set-up, public-private 
delineations, and more or less fixed normative and ethical principles. Many of these are vested in 
specific organizations like ministries and universities. Here institutions are taken as the more 
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abstract rules. The patent system is an example of a more specific legal rule system, with fast 
domain expansion in recent decades. Thinking about the role of the patent system belongs to 
governance, with developments part of strategic governance development, by necessity open to 
discussion and hence contested. See (Boldrin and Levine 2008) for a dissenting discussion on the 
patent issue, not a subject directly of climate policy but directly related to long term innovative 
developments relevant for climate policy. In the institutionalist school, stable long term change 
comes from creating the right institutions, of course in their stream also using shorter term 
instruments additionally, but modestly, and not counteracting main incentives. The generic non-
planning structure allows for bottom up developments both in the private and the public domain, 
the power of which has been shown by (Ostrom 2010). This is the Institutionalist Governance 
Strategy, as second governance approach used in this study. For easy familiarization this 
institutionalist strategy may be thought of as the Ostrom strategy. Here their names are the 
Planning & Control Strategy and the Institutionalist Strategy. 
In both strategies there is planning involved, but at different levels. In the words of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower: Plans are nothing. Planning is everything, referring to higher levels of still concrete 
planning. Similarly Mintzberg advocates a more abstract and creative approach to strategic 
planning, somewhat disconnected from the single concrete plan, see (Mintzberg 1994, Mintzberg 
1994b). The concept of design thinking may go fully beyond the specific plan, see (Buchanan 
1992), who cites Dewey (1929) on open design as ‘…not fixed and complete, but which is capable 
of direction to new and different results through the mediation of intentional operations.’ (p6). 
There is a direct link to bottom up processes in (Ostrom 2010), guided by institutions, but not 
determined. 
Institutions will play a role in any strategy; the choice is on specific in institutions. Planning and 
control creates fragmented electricity markets at the EU institutional level, but not as a climate 
policy instrument. Conversely, in the institutionalist strategy an open real time electricity market 
is a key climate policy instrument. Similarly, institutions for emission pricing can be set up very 
different, as pure cap-and-trade; price-stabilized hybrid cap-and-trade; or emission tax, mutually 
exclusive, see (Goulder and Schein 2013). Choice is based on their expected general functioning, 
also reckoning with broader environmental policy instrumentation. Pure cap-and-trade is fully 
competing with technology specific regulation; closing a coal fired power station reduces cap 
prices so others can emit cheaper. Hybrid cap-and-trade and emission tax don’t have this 
incompatibility. They also give more guidance on long term emission price levels, these guiding 
long term investment decisions, including in research and R&D. The hybrid cap has price 
variability without function; that function exists in the pure cap system only. Long term strategic 
considerations then lead to full price stabilization, without trade and banking. With simplified 
administrative implementation the emission tax results. Reasoned strategic choice is reduced to 
the pure-cap or the emission tax. 
 
3.4. Climate goals and sector targets 
The EU climate target to be achieved is an over 80% reduction by 2050. For CO2 emissions from 
fossils use and cement production this would involve a CO2 emission reduction by close to 90%, 
as most non- CO2 emissions are more difficult to reduce. The CO2 emission reduction rate then 
would have to rise from minus 0.65% per year from 1990 to 2012, see (Olivier, Janssens-
Maenhout et al. 2014) based on the EDGAR database, to minus 5.5% per year from 2012 to 2050 
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in order to reach EU 2-degrees target of over 80% reduction relative to 1990. Of course the jump 
to such high reduction rates is not possible on short notice, implying still higher reduction rates 
later. Also, if economic growth picks up to maybe years of 4%, the decrease in CO2 emission 
intensity would have to rise to nearly 10%, a virtual impossibility. As indicated previously for 
specific domains, the overall reduction can be translated into minimum CO2 targets for the four 
main sector domains distinguished here, roughly. 
 Electricity production   -95% 
 Industry    -80% 
 Buildings & Consumption -90% 
 Transport    -80% 
But of course if solar fuel develops for aviation and heating of buildings these indicative targets 
would change; only the overall target of around 90% reduction relative to 1990 is assumed given 
here.  
Electricity production can be nearly fully decarbonized, with current technologies already, and is 
indicatively set at minus 95%. Industrial emissions are difficult to reduce by 90% for some 
industries, like iron and steel and cement production, and in the chemicals industry. In the iron & 
steel and cement production hardly any emission reduction could be seen due to the ETS in which 
they are covered, see (Branger and Quirion 2013). The sector target is set indicatively at 80% 
reduction, but must be substantially higher for the non-steel & cement industries. In transport, 
aviation emissions may be difficult to reduce, also as flight volumes are rising substantially still, 
setting reduction for transport overall at 80% and for non-aviation transport at 95 % as well. So 
electricity production and fossil use in buildings have a relatively high reduction task, at 95% and 
90% respectively, with the non-steel & cement industries and surface transport having similarly 
high reductions to achieve. 
The remaining fossils based CO2 emissions should be well below the 80% reduction target set as 
a minimum overall climate target, as non- CO2 emissions mostly are difficult to reduce, especially 
from agriculture. Current non- CO2 emissions from agriculture have a share of around 10% in total 
EU emissions (Kuik and Kalfagianni 2013). The reductions in the last decade seem not related to 
climate policy but to the reduction of production, especially meat production. Some emissions 
can be reduced by technology changes, like methane from agriculture and PFCs in industry. 
However, diffuse N2O emissions from agriculture may well increase due to increases in the 
intensity of agriculture as for long term rising food production and aggravated by bioenergy 
production. If non- CO2 emissions from agriculture would remain at current levels, an 80% overall 
reduction would imply a reduction of all other emissions by aro0und 90%. 
In terms of technologies to be used by then, the options basically are there, but may be overtaken 
by other more attractive options not yet available now. There is some certainty but also deep 
uncertainty. The certainties are few. Electricity will play a major role, in primary production, 
transformations and storage, and in final use. In primary production, wind and solar will have a 
major share, with their intermittency to be resolved. Only hydro and geothermal energy are 
flexible, over days and seasons, while solar heat can be flexible diurnally. Hydro is however not 
stable over years, implying years with limited availability. Especially solar tends towards 
decentralized production. For energy storage and demand variation many options exist, ranging 
from large scale hydro and battery systems and chemical storage as in hydrogen, to highly 
decentralized storage as in batteries, and decentralized secondary production is with hydrogen 
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based fuel cells. Heat pumps with heat and cold storage may well take a main role in space heating 
and air conditioning, as low carbon alternatives are not yet available. All these technologies are 
available in some form already, but with uncertain capacity and uncertain long term cost profiles. 
Other technologies may come up, like ocean farming, artificial algae and space solar, with as yet 
even more uncertain capacities and cost profiles. Innovation remains basically uncertain.  
Whatever will come will depend substantially on the regulatory framework as may be developed 
for climate policy, the core task in this study, with a key connecting role for electricity markets, 
and other energy markets, as are to be developed not only for reasons of climate policy. 
 
 
4. Main types of instrument building blocks 
4.1. A brief history of environmental policy instruments: what we have and 
need 
Environmental policy has extensively used the operating permit since the start of the industrial 
Revolution in the 17th Century, with broad discretion of authorities on what was allowed and what 
not. At the start of the post-War growth spurt in the 1960s, new instruments came up. Liability 
rules were used in Japan, starting with the mercury tragedy and then expanded to SOx emissions 
and collectivized through government emission taxes from which health damages were paid. They 
induced deep emission reductions there. In the Netherlands a water pollution tax led to extreme 
reductions in emissions to water (Huppes and Kagan 1989). These financial instruments were 
exceptions however, with the operating permit remaining the core environmental policy 
instrument. The static nature of such permits led to new developments in the Seventies, shifting 
from technology specification to performance specification, requiring improved and novel 
emission measurement. The emission permit was born. To reduce acidification, toxicity and water 
pollution, emissions were regulated per installation. The allowable emission level was not linked 
to specific production volumes or production values but to local and regional environmental 
quality standards. With quality below standards newcomers were blocked, reducing economic 
growth. Somehow dynamics had to be built into regulation to accommodate economic growth. 
With larger numbers of polluters the problem of equal treatment came up: how to justify the 
distribution of allowable emission levels over specific economic activities? One solution was to 
cover several polluters with an overall emission cap, not yet formally traded, but internally looking 
for lowest cost solutions between the regulated companies involved, in that sense looking for 
equal marginal reduction costs. This flexible form of agreement was used in the Netherlands, as 
in the NOGEPA covenant (Huppes, Davidson et al. 2007). The first broad cap-and-trade system 
was introduced for SOx emissions from power stations in the US, covering a limited number of 
publicly regulated facilities, see (Schmalensee and Stavins 2013). This was the muster for the EU 
ETS cap-and-trade system 15 years later. The other solution to the lack of dynamics had been 
ready conceptually since the 1920s: internalizing damage costs, as through Pigovian emission 
taxes (Pigou 1932 (1920)), again also in a sense solving the equality problem, as an equal emission 
price for all in the case of climate emissions. Every polluter pays for the damages he causes. Two 
issues made broad application of this internalizing tax cumbersome: precise emission 
measurement and the exact value of damages caused by these emissions. In the climate domain, 
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emission measurement has been resolved administratively: carbon inputs can be measured 
relatively well and leave as CO2 output at incineration or combustion. The uncertainty in 
establishing damage value has not been resolved (against some outliers like (Tol 2008)) but has 
practically been resolved as by (Baumol and Oates 1971, Baumol 1972). Following their argument, 
the total amount of emissions is specified politically, based on some rough idea on the level of 
damages to be realized or reduced, reckoning with estimated emission reduction cost. The 
emission price required to get to the corresponding emission reduction then is set, politically, 
with the volume following. That same amount can also be used to politically set a cap, with a 
market price following. These two options for more pricing of emissions, any, are now at the heart 
of climate policy instrumentation. Being fully technology independent in principle, they belong to 
the institutional framework of society.  
However, the deep entrenchment of climate emissions in society, and the need for fast emission 
reduction may well keep the older policy instruments at the table, standards and technology 
specific taxes and subsidies, and bring in new instruments, focusing on the broader role of 
government in the economic functioning of society: broader institutional instruments, especially 
market reforms; infrastructure;  public research; research & development and demonstration, R, 
R&D and RD&D; and emission price independent market dynamics as by creating learning curves 
and overcoming lock-ins for promising technologies. 
 
4.2. Main instrument types  
There are many ways to typify instruments for climate policy and broader environmental policy: 
legal status (law, permit), result specification (emission standard), primary working mechanism 
(emission pricing), main working mechanism (internalization of external effects), sanction 
mechanism (fine, liability, jail), and more, all with their relevance. Here the prime characteristic 
of instruments is their instrumentality: what they set in motion is what they do, regardless of 
intentions, targets or goals, and legal status. Emission pricing, from taxes to fines, incentivizes 
emission reduction; an emission standard allows actions not exceeding the standard; a public 
road opens the option to drive on it; and product information allows for better informed choices.   
The bewildering amount of instrument options can be reduced to seven main types, see Table 3. 
They are in two groups: operations of government, nr. 1-4, and number 4 further subdivided as 
to how regulatees are influenced, by the prime working mechanism of the instrument, see Table 
3. The operations of government go from generic to more technology specific. Institutions in 
principle are generic, as generic as possible, but also involving spatial planning and development 
of more specific markets, like for electricity. Infrastructure is by necessity specific, but in many 
ways it is more option creating for others in society, allowing for different technologies in their 
use, than binding them. You may use the road, or the railway, or neither of them as a behavioral 
choice, and you may drive a Diesel or an electric car on that road. Next, research, R&D and 
demonstration projects are one step more concrete, but again in principle open to all others if 
they want to use the specific results coming out of projects. When influencing the behavior of 
private actors, type nr. 4, there is an increasing level of bindingness from 4.1 to 4.3, related to the 
prime working mechanism involved. Generic taxes belong to the institutional domain as in 
internalizing external effects according to the polluter pays principle, type 1, while specific taxes, 
like a prohibitive tax on high emitting coal fired power stations, is technology specific and belongs 
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to type 4.2. The ETS extension to aviation is partly separate from the broader application in 
industry and electricity production, them moving in the direction of type 4.2. 
Institutions, public infrastructure and public RD&D have long term effects on society beyond 
specific costs and benefits, though of course their effects will also be specific and then different 
for different groups in society. Regulating private actors has a closer connection to inducing costs 
and benefits, with distributional consequences. Effective climate policies shift prices and volumes 
in markets in our mixed market economy, unavoidably and intentionally. This is visible most 
directly where instruments apply, but also indirectly, and regardless mainly of their prime 
inducing mechanisms. The Japanese Top Runner Program, an informational instrument, has 
induced new technologies and has next driven laggards out of the market. Emission standards as 
in electricity production and for cars create markets directly and have a deep influence on prices 
in their upstream and downstream economic connections, and for substitutes. Public 
procurement has a subsidy element in paying more than otherwise would be the case, but may 
also have a specified quantity aspect, and of course the subsidy is to be paid for somehow, by 
others, and then some others don’t sell their product. 
 
Table 3 Typology of instruments for climate policy 
Types/Levels Examples Current applications 
1. Public Institutional 
    Framework 
Generic emission pricing;  
electricity markets; climate liability; etc. 
EU ETS; Unbundling Directive; … 
2. Public Infrastructure Hydrogen storage and transmission; EU-
wide electricity transmission grid; etc. 
Electricity grids; roads; harbors; ... [as exists] 
3. Publicly funded 
     Research and RD&D 
Research programs; R&D subsidy 
schemes; etc. 
NER300: Basic PV research; planned exemplary CCS; 
climate relevant parts of H2020; etc. 
4. Public Regulation of  
    Private Actors: 
  
   4.1 Informational  
         Instruments 
Labelling schemes; BAT information; etc. Energy labelling schemes electric appliances; NEDC 
based standards car performance; etc. 
   4.2 Financial  
         Instruments 
Subsidies & Taxes (including tax 
deductions; price guarantees; etc) 
Feed-in-Tariffs non-fossils; investment subsidies heat 
pumps, solar, wind parks; etc. 
   4.3 Standards &  
         Regulations 
Prescriptions; prohibitions  EU Fleet Standards; standards utilities on CO2 per 
kWh; maximum speed; operating permit; etc. 
 
The core issue of instruments is their instrumentality: what they set in motion is what they do, 
regardless of intentions, targets or goals. At the level of Institutional Framework, for example, an 
extension of class action options in liability rules is just that. They may be introduced and used to 
tackle large climate emitters. But they may also be used to effectively oppose wind turbines, or 
they may make NGOs liable for their actions, reducing long term policy dynamics. Fleet standards 
set standards for car producing firms determining the composition of the fleet. How that is done 
is up to them. Decreasing prices of low emitting smaller cars is a most direct option, then also 
leading to a larger number of cars sold. Increasing fuel efficiency of larger cars, or all cars, also are 
options to comply, in line with normal longer term technology development, but speeding up. 
Getting sales out of the domain of the fleet standards also is an option as was the case with SUVs 
quite successfully. What will happen? That will differ between producers and countries. With 
cheap gasoline it is an interesting option to get out of the fleet standards domain with heavy cars, 
as is happening now in the US, and maybe also in the EU with longer term low oil prices. Such 
developments may have global cultural effects as was the case with the wave of SUVs styled cars 
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conquering the world. Pick-up trucks are the main profit maker in the US market currently, with 
all global firms joining in, including the biggest: Volkswagen and Toyota. Did the EU Fleet 
Standards work? That is not an easy to answer question. The fact that the 2015 compliance was 
realized ahead of time suggests they did not: other instruments, including national subsidy 
programs may have been instrumental, and more generally other factors, including virtual ones 
like special lab tests on performance. See on the causality issue regarding current instrumentation 
the survey by (Drummond 2014) and the analysis by (Meyer and Meyer 2013), focused at three 
(groups of) instruments: EU-ETS, renewables subsidies and environmental tax reforms, with a 
prime role for renewables subsidies. How markets will function dynamically and long term is 
difficult to predict, as culture, technology and overall economic development interact. This makes 
it quite impossible to specify the long term impact of individual instruments in advance. It also 
points to the problem of what exactly constitutes climate policy instruments. 
The options for Regulating Private Actors mostly lead to mixed systems, also directly. Feed-in 
tariffs are a specific form of subsidy for producing electricity with a specific technology. They may 
be linked to a second instrument, like a tax to fund the subsidy, for example as a surcharge on the 
electricity price for some users. But funding may also be from general taxes, as with electric car 
subsidies in many countries. Fleet Standards have a fine system for non-compliance which may 
perfectly function as a quite indirect emission tax. Publicly funded RD&D may also function as a 
subsidy to specific technologies and market parties, detrimental to other market parties. Emission 
permits may be exchanged between emitters if emission location is not relevant, with the trade 
next regulated, as in the EU-ETS. The emphasis of the combined instrument then may shift from 
a permit system to a pricing system. 
The emission reducing effects of an instrument cannot be seen directly, nor can costs effects be 
specified so easily, making cost-effectiveness (here taken to be equal to efficiency) a somewhat 
hypothetical issue. There is an element involved of counterfactual analysis: what would have been 
the case with some alternative situation, with other instruments or none, see (Meyer and Meyer 
2013) on this counterfactual issue and on this relative nature of cost-effectiveness (Mehling, 
Bausch et al. 2013), Table 2, based on (Görlach 2013). 
 
4.2.1. Institutional framework: elements 
Institutions, as the general principles and rules adhered to in society, are fixed but malleable. 
Ownership rules are most basic and well developed in a market based society, ultimately 
depending also on court rules and their implementation. Liability rules are a core part of them 
and have been developed to also cover environmental liability, with efforts to also apply them for 
climate liability, see the survey of options and constraints analyzed by (Faure and Peeters 2011). 
Though applicable in principle, the practice is difficult as yet: there are billions of emitters, at a 
global level, with effects at a global level, with a substantial delay in time of effects coming up, 
and with many options for adaptation to avoid damages. Strict and several liability has widened 
the legal options, making major actors in the chain responsible, but have effectively been applied 
only in clean-up of toxic waste sites, especially in the US (Superfund) and the Netherlands, and 
play an important supporting role in toxic emissions. Though already relevant in the insurance 
domain these options will not be analyzed further here. 
Ownership and liability rules create markets, with additional rules on specific markets. Also these 
are mainly fixed but malleable in time. They are of central importance for markets where new 
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low emission technologies are to function. Electricity markets belong to the most strictly 
regulated markets, also after privatization in most OECD countries, due to the monopolistic 
nature of transmission and distribution. The EU Unbundling Directive sets a more or less binding 
principle for national regulations in the electricity market domain, reducing the monopolistic and 
oligopolistic power of large fossil electricity producers. The specifics of renewables in terms of 
intermittency and dischargeability may lead to market adaptations as being detailed below, see 
Section 4.4. Markets may be designed in different ways and their domains may be restricted. 
Slaves cannot be traded anymore, and international trade in toxic waste is prohibited mostly. 
Most economic activities in the market domain have a direct bearing on climate emissions. 
Restricting the market domain seems hardly possible; ordering the market domain through 
climate relevant markets design seems a core of long term climate policy, involving both opening 
up of markets, like for electricity in the EU, and restricting markets, as in allowing only air 
conditioners on the market with a certain minimum energy efficiency, depending on strategies 
followed. 
The principles-based detailing of institutional rules is the normal way of adapting the institutional 
framework of society, reckoning with economic and social developments and re-interpreting 
principles and stating new ones. When environmental policy came up in the Seventies of last 
century, some order as to instrumentation was created internationally by establishing the 
Polluter Pays Principle, supported by all OECD countries (OECD 1972). That principle has two 
elements: the polluter should pay for emission reduction and he should pay for the damages 
remaining, according to Pigovian or Baumol-type reasoning.  Emission standards make the 
polluter pay for emission reduction but not for the damages remaining, as do freely allocated 
emission permits. Auctioned permits and emission taxes cover the Polluter Pays Principle fully. 
Internalization of External Cost is another way of stating the Polluter Pays Principle, with a slightly 
broader domain, as it may cover other effects than emissions. For principles to be valid 
operationally, they need to be filled in with more detailed rules, as on what the costs are the 
polluter should pay and what the external costs are, and how they should be internalized.  
One option for partial internalization, not reckoning with damages remaining, is to reckon with 
an assumed environmental damage price, equal in all environmental policy, in public investment 
in infrastructure and regulations regarding private actors. This implicit emission price may be 
attributed to specific policies or private actions. Some estimates of implicit emission prices 
reflected in the Great Britain feed-in tariffs for some solar PV technologies were in the range of 
800 Euro per tonne of CO2, with German feed-in tariffs slightly lower (OECD 2013). These subsidies 
might be seen as subsidies not-to-pollute, hardly in line with the Polluter Pays Principle. However, 
the reasoning behind these subsidies was of a different nature, making the implicit price not so 
relevant. These subsidies were temporary to create learning curves, allowing for future lower cost 
prices of these technologies. This dynamic aspect makes this implicit emission price mostly 
irrelevant for long term considerations. Such instruments may be relevant for short term 
considerations, reducing emission levels next years. Feed-in tariffs of several decades of duration, 
as considered for the new nuclear installations in the UK, of course are not learning curve 
payments but part of long term climate (and energy) policy. Furthermore, an implicit price might 
be established for technology-specific regulations intended to reduce climate emissions, then 
amongst other emissions however, as with coal fired power stations. This is mostly difficult as 
other emissions and other external effects will then have to be valuated as well, which mostly is 
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not well possible, and certainly not in a dynamic way. For long term transitions such implicit 
emissions prices give limited guidance to policy makers and to society. The principles are to be 
more firmly embedded in general rules to effectively hold. So more generic pricing rules are to 
come to the aid in redirecting market activities dynamically. 
Innovation is a key long term issue for climate policy. However, the innovative capacity of society 
is not specific for climate policy and its instrumentation. Innovative capacity substantially 
depends on culture, including local culture and broader institutions, not related to climate policy. 
See (Mazzanti and Antonioli 2013), also on the issue of broader embedding of climate policy, as 
in using techno-organizational training efforts, and (Mazzanti, Antonioli et al. 2014) on the 
financing of innovation, with generic financing institutions the main route, while bottlenecks to 
be resolved maybe, like related to the exceptionally long term nature of some climate 
investments. What climate policy can do is to shift the direction of innovation, with generic 
incentives dominant in the long run and technology-specific incentives in the short and medium 
term, the latter to avoid crowding out of other innovative actions and developments.  
Pricing instruments in the form of taxes and subsidies tend to be technology-specific, from a long 
term perspective mostly relevant for temporary inducing innovation but not for normal 
functioning from then on, then preferably being subject of long term dynamic incentives. Main 
examples of such temporary support are publicly funded demonstration projects and feed-in 
tariffs and premiums and investment subsidies to create learning curves. Subsidies require some 
sort of funding which then cannot be spent otherwise. There are many taxes with climate 
relevance, more distant like differentiated value added taxes and more direct like fuel excises for 
transport fuels. Fuel excises have a serious volume effect, as shown in the extreme differences in 
gasoline and Diesel use between roughly twice as high excises in countries like Europe and Japan 
as compared to low excise countries like the USA (with China following suit), leading to roughly 
half the fuel use per person. These excises had been set up however for reasons of funding and 
traffic reduction and hence are difficult to interpret in terms of transport based emission tax. They 
might be set up that way, as a complement to a cap or carbon tax in non-transport domain. In 
terms of strategic design the logic would then be to apply the generic pricing principle to transport 
fossils as well and leave the fuel excises to the national domain with country specific reasoning 
for their functioning and with substantial differences in what they are intended to finance. 
Subsidies tend to be technology specific, also the relatively open tax reduction mechanisms. Also 
taxes can be technology-specific, as in taxing specific types of coal fired power stations, for 
example only the least efficient ones. Such instruments belong to the domain of directing private 
actions, instrument type 4.2. There are gradations towards more generic mechanisms. The tax on 
coal fired power stations may be based on actual CO2 emissions. It may cover all coal fired power 
stations, and also all gas fired power stations, and all oil fired power generation. A next step may 
be to also cover non-electricity related emissions from fossil combustion processes, also for 
heating. At a certain level of uniform encompassingness, the CO2 emission pricing rules become 
so general that they become part of the institutional framework. Then the general rule is emission 
pricing, with maybe some exceptions, like combustion of fossils in heavy non-road going 
transport, for practical reasons. This then would be a temporary exception with also covering such 
heavy transport emissions under emission pricing rules when circumstances allow. There then is 
no technology-specific relation with emission pricing any more. This would be a major step in 
practically implementing the polluter pays principle, and in a way internalizing external climate 
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effects. The current ETS is in the middle domain, applied nearly fully on electricity production and 
energy intensive industry, but not on smaller industrial emissions and not on heating of buildings, 
and not on transport, with the exception of inland aviation. Its overall GHG emission coverage is 
now around 45% and will decline if CO2 emissions in its domain are reduced and other emissions 
not. 
One further institutional domain concerns the financing of the very substantial investments in 
low emission energy production and energy use systems. The institutional framework for 
financing is there, evolving dynamically for its own reasons. Lifting out the domain of low carbon 
energy by creating a generic energy related institutional structure for funding would require 
specific reasons: issues not solved by the general financial institutions regarding investments. 
There are specific domains where financing does not work properly, as in household investments 
in low emission systems. When financial markets fail on such issues, specific measures, like 
combined subsidies and financing for insulation programs would be appropriate, not changing 
general framework conditions in the financial system. Changing these general framework 
conditions of course may be urgent for non-climate reasons, like improved transparency and 
stability, and better serving small borrowers. 
The two major institutional framework conditions, emission pricing and electricity markets will 
be detailed, surveying a number of variants, in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
4.2.2. Public Infrastructure 
Public built infrastructure may have a direct climate relevance as when supplying primary energy 
(like tidal energy systems and wind parks); transporting energy (like electricity, heat and 
hydrogen); and transporting CO2 for CCS. Infrastructure construction itself relates to energy 
consumption directly. The built infrastructure as is already near saturation in the EU and other 
developed countries. There is no strict delineation between public and private infrastructure in 
terms of their nature. Nuclear power installations and transmission grids may be purely public or 
purely private or have mixed ownership, and various forms of markets and management. Wind 
and solar may be community owned in the EU6 and state owned in other countries. Focus here is 
on public infrastructure development as a policy instrument, while influencing private 
infrastructure development with other instruments. Views on ownership and public supply rules 
differ substantially in a political sense, with conservative type neoliberal policies privatizing 
formerly public infrastructure, even if monopolistic in nature. 
Infrastructure requires activities with emissions in construction and maintenance but the main 
contribution is that it generates use, with direct emissions, and more complex effects indirectly. 
Expanding roads, railway lines and airports allows for more traffic. Modal shifts from aviation to 
rail transport may reduce emissions overall. Infrastructure requirements depend substantially on 
other policies and developments. Improving the transport infrastructure to reduce congestion is 
one option. Capacity pricing of road infrastructure is another option however, now used in several 
countries. It reduces congestion and reduces the need for additional infrastructure. Reducing 
subsidies, these including tax exemptions (see (IEA-OECD 2015) for the strong adverse role of 
                                                          
6 The largest community owned solar facility now is in the UK:  http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-
11/06/community-solar-park . 
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such subsidies), as with air transport, and increasing taxes, as possible with all transport, reduces 
the need for infrastructure as well. 
Built infrastructure has a long life time, often extending to a century, so a long term view is due. 
Does the system fit into a low carbon society? Can it function with (near) zero emission energy 
input? Does it fit with other developments in society? Improving transport infrastructure for 
efficiency reasons will nearly always backfire through rebound mechanism. Total transport 
volumes tend to be restricted by maximum travelling times per day, with higher speeds then 
leading to higher travel volumes (Hupkes 1982 (1977), Metz 2010). There is one domain where 
design of infrastructure can more directly contribute to a low emission society; the urban 
infrastructure. Cities with pleasant low speed zero emission transport, like walking and biking, are 
there already and may become more attractive, as with options for driverless cars, integrated 
(clean) workplaces and improved leisure facilities. 
With electricity dominant in the energy domain, a substantial EU transmission grid would have to 
evolve for effectively making electricity a European product. A central role for hydrogen would 
require a hydrogen distribution system. A central role for heat (solar, nuclear, geo) would require 
a substantial heat transport and distribution system. The volumes of final energy use in general 
would not need to be subject of specific limitations through energy curbing instruments, other 
than through general market mechanisms. Reasons for reducing or increasing volumes of specific 
transport infrastructure are beyond climate policy if transport is near zero emission. Aviation then 
might be an exception, avoiding investment in airports. The current investment in warm water 
transport for district heating may lose importance without fossil electricity but might then be 
used in combination with solar heat, geothermal heat, and stored heat and cold systems.  A more 
detailed analysis is per sector in Chapter 5, reckoning with climate strategies which will lead to 
different developments of public infrastructure. 
 
4.2.3. Research, R&D, and Demonstration 
The option creating research and demonstration instruments are mostly well developed, in 
research programs for research institutes and subsidy schemes for private partners, with EU 
Horizon2020 as a major program now. What then is to be specified is the programming of specific 
subjects. The place of public funded research can be more fundamental or more applied. In basic 
research the high potential is often not clear until research success comes, not proving 
commercial success but proving potential, as with graphene and high temperature near zero 
electrical resistance materials. Such research has long term relevance mainly, and will hardly 
overlap with privately funded research. Also the social science domain is relevant, as for better 
insight in behavioral mechanisms, options for market designs and strategic issues related to long 
term policy development.  
Research and Development (R&D) is closer to the market and may already involve private parties. 
The focus may already be on market -technology combinations with high long term potential, 
avoiding lock-ins on short term attractive developments as might be the case with high efficiency 
Sterling external combustion engines. One issue with this type of research is how to avoid 
crowding out of similar research in the private domain. If competitors are substantially funded 
publicly it is wise not to invest in R&D in that domain. Waiting for public money options may be a 
most relevant tactical approach. Public research funding may then have clear project results but 
limited overall results. Avoiding this trap is difficult as the crowded out research is not visible. One 
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route might be to focus on projects where there are no competitors in the field, or where all 
competitors are funded more or less equally. Advanced research projects (ARPA_E in the US, 
following DARPA) might be set up with a focus on single originators, hardly with competitors. 
Avoiding crowding out in the R&D domain has always been a challenge, more difficult for long 
term projects as insight in competitive issues there is even more limited. Generic research 
support, also for other policy goals including economic growth, might be a solution, albeit maybe 
an expensive one. 
Demonstration, the second ‘D’ in RD&D, is bringing developed products and technologies in the 
operational domain. The role of demonstration is to show their practical feasibility, ranging from 
CCS to the production of graphene. That function is to convince others of the usefulness of such 
products and technologies, implying that results should be open to scrutiny by other interested 
parties. Both examples may show shortcomings in reasoning. CCS is fully operational in several 
places in the world already, for decades already close-by in the Sleipner field in Norway. Funding 
projects then might be more an act of climate policy implementation than RD&D. As to graphene, 
there are several research groups competing in the development of potential technologies, with 
outsiders coming in. Again, choosing winners now may well cut off the ingenuity and creativity 
still possible in this domain, including private developments. Again, that crowding out cannot be 
made visible as unknown developments just will not happen. Dealing with crowding out is a not 
well resolved issue here, a subject of research itself.  
There is one subject at the boundary of demonstration and full implementation: public 
development, as advocated eloquently by (Mazzucato 2011). A major example, development of 
the Internet, combines two characteristics: the technology development itself as a science and 
technology public research issue and the key role of public infrastructure in its implementation. 
That role is not a research role but a public role infrastructure development, similar to heat 
transport, underground low resistance train systems and underground hydrogen storage. If such 
potentially monopolistic infrastructure starts and remains public or can privately be developed 
depends on broader institutional arrangements, beyond climate policy. Public research funding 
for climate reasons is to reckon with such refinements, related to strategic governance choices in 
climate policy. 
For long term development it would be wise to keep the research instrument clean, not linking 
inherently with other instruments, as now is the case for example in NER300/400, where ETS 
permits are used as a subsidy ingredient.  
 
4.2.4. Directing Private Technologies & Behavior 
The main types of instrument regarding private actors are based on the prime working 
mechanisms set in motion, thus defining the instrument. In order of bindingness, they are 
Information; Financial Incentives; and Standards & Regulations, including prescriptions and 
prohibitions. The legal status may vary, from a contractual relation with one party; covenants 
with several parties, rules binding all concerned and operating permits with conditions specified. 
For the long term, the goal of also these instruments directing private actors is to help induce the 
deep innovations and transformations required for 2-degrees. The instruments at Level 4 roughly 
coincide with (Grubb, Hourcade et al. 2014) Pillar I, p79ff, including the specific pricing 
instruments from Pillar II.  
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Informational instruments, to stimulate and clarify markets, leave all decisions to the then better 
informed private parties. Labels on energy use of electric appliances and Best Available 
Technology (BAT) specifications are examples for consumers and producers, information, with 
standards setting possibly following. The information instrument is difficult to fill in for long term 
development, but may be relevant only for creating shorter term dynamics. The Japanese Top 
Runner program might be an example where such dynamics are created. The Top Runner in the 
market receives broad public attention and an exclusive label for a limited period. This leads to a 
price premium (Nishitani and Itoh 2014), creating an effective incentive for R&D for the firms in 
the market for electric appliances, see (Hamamoto 2011). The regulatory follow up is to set 
standards following the top runner, pressing laggards out of the market. The very differentiated 
top runner structure for cars, in many weight classes showed an adverse effect in statistical 
analysis according to (Hamamoto 2011). It is not sure for cultural reasons if such programs can 
effectively be introduced in the EU. 
The issue of educating the public towards environmental and climate values is politically laden. 
With values belonging to the private domain and from there feeding also public policy, they 
should be left to the private domain. Public education will however have a value element included 
next to informational aspects and may be directed at value creation conducive to climate friendly 
behavior. This active cultural development does not find a right place yet in the instrument 
typology developed and applied here. 
Financial instruments, of any legal status, influence actors in markets, changing trade-offs. Taxes, 
duties, excises, charges and product surcharges, and even fines, all mean: payment. To view an 
extreme: the EU Fleet Standards fines on non-compliance are set up as a regulatory instrument, 
related to the volume of emissions above a standard. They start at around 20€/tonne CO2 and 
rise to around 380€ per tonne7. They might be used as an emission tax, setting the fines at levels 
corresponding to carbon pricing in other domains. Whether they are a fine, tax, duty or excise 
does not make a difference in their functioning. Subsidies are there in many forms as well, all 
meaning: receiving. Subsidies may be direct, or they may be as tax deduction or exception, or as 
a product price guarantee, and more. Their effectiveness depends on their specific nature, their 
level and on the nature of the markets involved. Both taxes and subsidies need to be linked to 
some object or behavior as a condition for their payment, either some physical or technical aspect 
indirectly relevant, like home insulation and road payment, or directly relevant, like a carbon 
based fuel tax. Then an upstream administered emission tax would however be simpler. Indirect 
effects of financial instruments relate to broader market effects than their specific domain of 
application. Subsidies on non-fossils increase total energy supply, pressing out some fossil use 
only, while taxes on fossils use, including reduced subsidies, reduce total supply, see (Hood 2011).  
Standards & Regulations, including prescriptions and prohibitions, remain as a main instrument 
also in climate policy. The may refer to a specific climate performance, as in CO2 emission 
standards for cars per km or for electricity per kWh; to a variable related to emissions, like energy 
standards in electric appliances; or to specific technologies prescriptions like minimum insulation 
standards in building, only indirectly related to emissions, in a binary way: yes/no. 
                                                          
7 The fine is expressed per gram CO2 over the fleet standard, in the average car in the fleet per km. The figure per 
tonne emitted is based on life time driving distance of a car set at 250.000km. A fine of 95€/g then corresponds to a 
tax of 380€/tonne CO2. 
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They may act directly, as in limiting CO2 emissions per kWh electricity produced or per km driven 
in a car, or indirectly, like in prohibiting new coal fired power stations to be built. A fine may be 
used for non-adherence to a standard, as now considered by the EPA for Volkswagen. This is 
different from the emission volume related fine as currently in the EU Fleet Standards and the 
ETS. 
For all instruments the legal status may vary from international agreement or legally specified 
rules to contractual relations between groups as in covenants, or with single parties, or as permit 
or license granted to a single firm. National agreements may be used to engage parties more 
voluntarily, important for dynamics and functioning most effective ‘in the shadow of the law’: 
regulators then must have broad discretion to enforce stringent compliance, as by building in 
financial instruments or strict standards to fall back on, see (Vogel 1986, Meidinger 1987) on such 
regulatory culture based differences between countries. 
In principle the choice of technology specific measures may be based on their implicit costs of 
emission reduction, which may be linked to static efficiency. The costs and amount of emission 
reduction are based on modelling mechanisms and assumptions. Current instruments may lead 
to large differences in implicit costs, between countries and technologies, ranging from near zero 
to above 1000 Euro per tonne of CO2 reduced, see (Rey, Markandya et al. 2013), Chapter 5. 
Though static efficiency is important for overall costs of climate policy it is not decisive in specific 
cases. The high costs of photovoltaics have been justified by the substantial price decreases 
induced by learning curves as created by their subsidized introduction. It is the expected long 
term cost of emission reduction which may guide the choice of technologies to be brought into 
the market. Dynamic efficiency cannot easily be linked to technology and behavior specific 
instrumentation however, depending more on direct innovation and incentives created. In a most 
extreme way of reasoning, subsidies filling the gap between current costs and current market 
prices for renewables may reduce incentives for innovation. Actual developments in fast 
decreasing costs of photovoltaics and wind power have shown the opposite however. Technology 
choices now cannot be based on substantiated predictions however. In some instances the 
potential may be established. The Sterling engine has the highest efficiency of all combustion 
motors in principle. In spite of substantial investments that potential has not been realized in the 
last two centuries. Still, if such an option would come up in the low emission domain, it may well 
be worth the try. A choice may be due between further public RD&D for possible later 
introduction, and forced or induced market introduction now. In the consideration the avoidance 
of lock-ins possibly created relative to long term more interesting options play a role. Current 
forced improvements in fuel efficiency of combustion engines through Fleet Standards certainly 
are useful in the short to medium term but may be judged also involving this long term 
perspective. The inherent uncertainty of longer term technology development shifts 
instrumentation to generic dynamic incentives, as intended with the ETS.  A link between ETS and 
development of emission reducing technologies has not been established however, see (Rey, 
Markandya et al. 2013) Section 5.2, also due to low and varying price of its emission permit price 
and the still short period of its functioning. They indicate the positive role of more technology-
specific instruments, slightly different for different technologies, see their survey of literature 
there.  
A special challenge is in the instrumentation for CCS technologies, not for enhanced fossil 
recovery but for pure final storage. CCS requires capital outlays and substantial amounts of 
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energy. With generic emission taxes, a refund upon is due CCS, wherever it takes place in the tax 
jurisdiction. With tradable emission permits, there is a direct emission reduction with lower 
permit requirements if the CO2 producing firm takes care of CCS itself.  With independent CCS 
operators they would receive tradable emission permits for what they store. Price stabilized 
permit prices would easier induce the long term investments required for CCS. The permits 
granted are to be subtracted from the cap volume brought on the permit market.  Without 
emission pricing, technology specific instruments are due quite unavoidably.  
Standards and regulations are most technology binding, like emission standards for power 
stations and maximum speed for person cars. They have been, and still are, the workhorse of 
environmental policy, and climate policy. They are mostly seen as stifling technological progress, 
and hence not fit for long term climate policy. They also require a substantial and reliable public 
and private administrative system not always present, as for fleet standards. Performance 
specification allows for more technology dynamics than technology specification. However, even 
the most restrictive regulations might induce innovation, see the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and 
Van der Linde 1995). This can result from a prime-mover mechanism or by forcing change in firms, 
just any to get them moving, see the literature review by (Ambec, Cohen et al. 2013). The speed 
of emission reduction through these mechanisms may be limited however. Setting dynamic 
standards has been the main thrust towards technology specific dynamic emission reduction, 
which however requires a strong political and administrative involvement, continuously. 
 
4.2.5. Internal consistency in instrument mixes 
In designing instrument mixes, some instruments go well together while others don’t. Examples 
abound. 
Feed-in tariffs for renewables and nuclear violate open market principles essential for inducing 
decentral energy storage systems. Subsidies on low emission cars are not sensible under effective 
fleet standards; they waste public money without climate effect. Under a strict and pure cap-and-
trade system, measures to reduce emissions, like closing old coal fire power stations, don’t reduce 
emissions, also not by creating learning curves and inducing innovation. They only make emissions 
cheaper for others by reducing the emission permit price.  
In general when several instruments are in place in the same production-consumption chain, they 
will overlap, being either mutually supportive, with possible overacting, they may be 
unconnected, they may be neutral, or they may be counteracting. With more instruments in place 
it becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle these relations, see (Simões, Huppes et al. 2015). 
Avoiding both over-instrumentation and counteracting mechanisms seems most directly 
approached by having the lowest possible number of instruments covering CO2 emission sources 
fully and enough. This relates to the discussion started by Tinbergen in 1952, indicating that in a 
policy domain the number of instruments should equal the number of policy targets (Tinbergen 
1970). A larger number of instruments will usually lead to inconsistency. However, adding more 
instruments may be desirable implying a broader point of view, when there “are other targets, 
implicitly assumed” ((Tinbergen 1970), p137. More targets require more instruments. This 
analysis holds for quantitative targets in a given structure and foundations of society. Moving to 
changing structure and changing foundations will lead to a new situation where this consistency 
restriction holds. Also, by detailing targets and government organizations, one may then increase 
the number of allowable instruments, related to targets at different levels, see (Rio and Howlett 
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2013). The consistency analysis then is more complex but would basically remain the same. The 
most basic point however is that in the instrumentation analysis here the structure and even 
foundations of society are somewhat malleable; there is a substantial divide between the 
Planning and Control and the Institutionalist governance strategies. Concluding, for both 
strategies, it seems wise to keep the number of instruments as low as possible, while covering all 
sources and avoiding overlap as much as possible. The qualitative guidance then is to go for 
Sparseness, Completeness and Non-Overlap. 
 
4.3. Institutions: Generic emission pricing options 
4.3.1. Pricing concepts 
The long term quantitative climate policy target, above 80% emission reduction8, allows for 
different approaches to pricing, from emission tax and different versions of cap and trade, to 
using in reference price in using other instruments. Emission pricing by whatever means may 
relate to very different pricing concepts, though there is some correspondence with specific 
instruments. Behind all is a relation between emissions and some damage concept, fully 
quantified or not.  
Putting a price on emissions may be done in different ways. One is to specify the social cost of 
carbon, indicating the value of damages a unit of emissions induces. There is a rich literature on 
this subject. In the domain of economics, see (Tol 2008) for a somewhat limited view, and (Stern 
2008) taking a broader view, also on discounting options. There is not a clear outcome, for quite 
basic reasons: the damages are uncertain (Heal and Millner 2014) and spread out in time; the 
methods of discounting are varied and disputed and will remain so, see the survey by (Portney 
and Weyant 1999); and catastrophic effects are not amenable to the usual economic valuation 
methods (Weitzman 2009). Solutions are sought for but don’t give single outcomes, see for 
example (Dasgupta and Maskin 2005, Tol 2008, Hof, van Vuuren et al. 2010, van den Bergh and 
Botzen 2014). This pricing approach links to (Pigou 1932 (1920)), who advocated taxes as a policy 
instrument to internalize external costs into market considerations. The lack of consensus on the 
social cost of carbon is one reason why this version of emission tax has not clearly emerged. 
Quantification is arbitrary, given the very substantial spread in outcomes. A second price concept 
involves a practical solution to the quantification problem, by setting a price required to arrive at 
an intended emission level, first proposed by (Baumol and Oates 1971, Baumol 1972). This takes 
the social cost issue to the political domain, when emission (reduction) targets are set. This 
approach is behind the caps set for tradable emission permits and also for setting emission tax 
levels, as discussed below. Both the Pigovian and the Baumol approach are in line with the OECD 
Polluter Pays Principle (OECD 1972), repeated in the Rio Declaration 1992. The Baumol line links 
with the major options, cap-and-trade and emission tax.  
The analytics for different options for emission pricing are surveyed in Table 4. Pricing systems 
may be set up in covering fossil CO2 emissions only partly, in the sense of not covering all fossils, 
and for the fossils covered not covering all sectors and all firms, as now is the case with the EU 
ETS. Both cap-and-trade and tax can be expended to cover all fossils in all sector domains, 
including consumption and other final demand. In a long term strategy there are no good reasons 
for partial application of emission pricing so the full coverage is applied in both pricing systems. 
                                                          
8 The 2020 and 2030 targets of the EU are here for the short and medium term. 
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This position is reinforced by the administrative characteristic of CO2 emissions: They can hardly 
be measured at actual source and can be most easily measured fully at source, then covering all 
fossil carbon.  The administrative level may vary. An early survey of options is in (OECD 1992) by 
(Victor 1992), p.244. Victor distinguishes four possible loci of administrative application, with 
points of carbon taxation at primary production; at key transport locations; at processing 
(refineries, power plants); at final sale to end-users (fuel sales and electricity delivery). The direct 
option, of pricing at source of emission, has been left out, as direct emission measurement was 
deemed too complex. Though lacking a full system perspective, main corresponding elements as 
specified here are visible, see Table 4. The option of taxing at end-use has been extensively 
discussed but falters at the lack of an accepted method of allocation of upstream emissions. 
Allocating refinery emissions over all its products; power station emissions over heat and power; 
and dairy emissions over meat, milk, butter and cheese is done in very different ways in different 
studies, with ISO 14040ff retreating from a choice. See (Guinée 2002) for a deep treatment of this 
allocation issue and (Guinee, Heijungs et al. 2004) for details and examples on the most generally 
applicable method, economic allocation. Lack of agreement on methods makes emission pricing 
at the final product level not feasible. Tools for carbon footprint specification as have been 
developed give a rough indication, not accepted facts to base pricing on.  
Current ETS applies at the level of installations, based on the administration of the firm owning 
or operating them. It is the firm administration of inputs of fossil carbon, excluding biogenic 
carbon, not actual emissions. There is a double relation with sectoral domain. Smaller firms and 
households lack an administration of the fossil inputs into their actually emitting installations and 
it would require a disproportionate private and public administrative effort to cover them. Going 
up at least one level, to their suppliers, shifts the administrative application to different firms and 
sectors. At that level at least that of the suppliers, all downstream installations are covered 
implicitly. But why should it stay there, if a move higher up the supply chain would resolve the 
intricacies of overlapping flows, like coal used for electricity administered at a different place than 
coal used in industry and households? The move to upstream application has its logical end at 
primary production in the EU and imports of fossil energy products, reducing the number of 
regulatees very substantially, even as compared to the currently limited application of the ETS, 
covering only 45% of emissions by larger firms only, already in the tens of thousands. The move 
upwards in administrative level is applicable to both cap-and-trade and emission tax. The third 
dimension is how prices are set. The situation for CO2 is very different from that of SOx and later 
NOx, where the US EPA set up a price direct emission measurement system9 for larger emitters, 
who then had to purchase the corresponding emission allowances. The current ETS is a near pure 
cap-and-trade system, with the cap volume of emission allowances (see on the term 
(Schmalensee and Stavins 2013)10) adjusted only incidentally to keep the price up to more 
relevant levels. The Market Stability Reserve does not refer to price levels but only to oversupply. 
However in the discussions in the EU Parliament the motive for accepting the MSR was “in order 
to support the price” (EP-PressOffice 2015). From a long term perspective it seems a curious 
position to not explicitly state the price goal when adjusting the system to that effect. A clear 
                                                          
9 CEM: Continuous Emission Measurement system. 
10 The term allowance was introduced in the US SO2 trading system because in US administrative-legal text the 
more common term permit had a different meaning already. The term permit is used here, as is common in 
economic and regulatory literature. 
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choice is due: stabilize the price, or not. If not, there is the pure cap-and-trade system, with 
advantages and disadvantages as discussed below. If the price is stabilized, with a floor and a 
ceiling, there is a clear cap-and-trade system as well, a hybrid one, also with its advantages and 
disadvantages. For the emission tax system the price is fully fixed, determined exogenously. 
 
Table 4 Sectoral domain, administrative level and price stability of emission pricing instruments 
Sectoral Domain Administrative Level Price Stability/Predictability 
1. ETS now: electricity 
production, larger industries 
(+ some non-CO2) 
1. ETS now: level of emitting 
firms and installations 
1. ETS now: price dependent on 
volume, MSR to increase price 
coming 2019 
2. Also natural gas in small 
firms and households 
heating 
2. With electricity producers 
and energy distributors (for 
gas, possibly also some coal) 
2. Price floor indicated (rising) 
floor, by reducing permit 
volumes in the market 
3. Also all other natural gas 3. With primary producers and 
wholesale traders, firm level 
3. Bandwidth specified, 
indicative midlevel, permit 
volume following 
4. Also all other coal  4. With primary producers coal 
and gas and importers, firm 
level 
4. Bandwidth zero, long term 
specified permit price level, 
volume following 
5. All coal, oil products and 
natural gas 
        All fossils 
5. With primary producers and 
importers, product flow basis 
5. Bandwidth not an item, fully 
specified rising excise/tax 
level 
 
The three dimensions distinguished in Table 4 are not fully independent. As indicated, moving 
upstream in the administrative level will by near necessity correspond to an upward shift the 
sectoral domains covered. The step to include all coal seems trivial, as most coal is covered under 
the ETS already. However, with a rising price of alternatives coal becomes attractive, with multi-
fuel stoves also for coal coming in the woodstove market now already, next to wood pallets, etc. 
The third dimension is more independent. One might try to implement a fixed price system at an 
intermediate administrative level to some but not all firms. There certainly is no good strategic 
reason for that, creating partial implementation, creating unnecessary cumbersome 
administrative implementation, and requiring other instruments to fill the gaps left. The pure cap 
at level 1 and the pure encompassing emission tax at level 5 are clear options. Price floors and 
bandwidth by adding ceilings may keep the price at deemed relevant levels. But if relevant price 
levels are the aim, not the emission level, then a move to a fixed (rising) price level, bandwidth 
zero, is the logical next step.  
The current near pure cap-and-trade ETS system - fully applied to all fossil emissions on the road 
to 2050 - could first be transformed into a price stabilized system, then narrowing the collar 
between floor and ceiling in next steps. When floor and ceiling touch, the cap system comes close 
to an emission tax in pricing but not yet in administrative set up. In a last step the permit system 
can be replaced with an excise/tax system, functionally the same but with a much simplified 
administration. For all systems the administrative implementation can be by member states and 
the revenues of emission pricing may go to the member states. This is not fully the case now with 
the ETS, where auctioning is centralized, controls are decentral, and revenues remain partly at 
the EU level.  
In a long term design of instrumentation a mechanism is preferably built in administratively, 
where the controlling body has the clear interest to get in what is due, and the paying bodies have 
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an interest in not paying more than is due. If an administrator has no disadvantage in overlooking 
emissions, and the firm involved deserves support, not seeing is a reasonable mode of operation, 
to be kept in check with forceful internal administrative procedures, backed up politically as they 
are unpleasant and costly.  With opposed interests between regulatee and the tax-type receiving 
administrator they can come to terms on the best established carbon flow specification. Such a 
mechanism is not present in the current EU ETS, making that pricing system vulnerable in its 
administrative controls. See for such administrative issues for example  (Künze 2012). The US 
experience in the cap-and-trade for SOx indicated that trust in others’ emission reporting was an 
important factor for success, see (Stone and Zaelke 2005) and (Kruger and Egenhofer 2005) on 
the essential role of reliable compliance in the SOx case. The development by the EPA of the CEM 
(Continuous Emission Measurement) system played an important role there, showing to all 
parties involved, a few hundred only, what the others emitted. In the US that cap system was 
halted due to political-administrative problems, see (Schmalensee and Stavins 2013).  
Administrative implementation remains always open to limitations, fraud and misuse, requiring 
permanent controls and adaptations. Moving the administration upstream eases 
implementation. The ETS also has shown options for fraudulent tax evasion, for the years 2009-
2010 estimated by Interpol to be in the order of five billion (5*109) Euro see (Interpol 2013). Those 
options have been reduced, and perpetrators punished, also the banks that allowed the fraud to 
come up. However, with a non-mass product with different legal surroundings in different 
countries fraud remains possible see (Interpol 2013) for some insights, and will become more 
attractive with rising emission permit prices. Non-fraudulent tax evasion (like tax routing) will 
always remain an option. This is inherent in the trading system, including derivatives trading. Zero 
bandwidth cap and emission tax don’t share this characteristic. 
 
4.3.2. Emission tax 
The emission tax resulting can be quite straightforward in the case of CO2 emissions. Direct 
emission measurement is mostly not possible of feasible but indirect measurement is possible 
with reasonable precision based on input measurement of carbon. The further upstream 
administrative measurement is placed, the more reliable the measurement becomes, avoiding 
transformations and losses as in refineries. The ultimate measurement level is at primary 
production and imports, with exemption or refund upon export, very similar to alcohol excises. 
Also at CCS the refund then is due, the carbon not being emitted as CO2. All emissions are covered 
this way, the CO2 emission tax being set up as a carbon deposit. Such deposit system to burden 
emissions with a ‘tax’ was earlier proposed for climate emissions by (Huppes 1993), Chapters 4 
and 5, and for hazardous substances, especially toxic metals by (Huppes 1993, van der Voet, van 
Egmond et al. 1994) and more recently specifically for carbon by (Huppes 2011) and similar by 
(Mignone 2010). The level of the tax is to be set ‘to reach the target’. There is substantial 
discussion on the reasons for having a rising, decreasing or rising and then decreasing structure 
of the tax in time, see BOX 2. Assumed here is a starting point with a linearly rising level, for 
example starting at 25€ per tonne in 2020 and then rising with 5€ per tonne each year, see Table 
5, similar to the mechanisms in the UK Price Floor tax and the British Columbia (Canada BC) 
emission tax (BC 2014). 
Setting the price level towards 2050 is not a straightforward issue. Econometric and economic 
modelling (see for example (Solano and Drummond 2014); (Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014); (Vuuren, 
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Stehfest et al. 2011); and (Deetman, Hof et al. 2014) come to prices per ton rising from $300; to 
up to $500; $600; and up to $1000 respectively11. Volume effects, based on elasticities of supply 
and demand, can be analyzed from the past, and based on investment rules for given 
technologies, prices and markets. But the past certainly is not a guarantee for the future during 
transformative change.  It is also extremely difficult to estimate substitution mechanisms when 
relative prices will certainly be changing, and now products and technologies will be coming up.  
At which emission price level electric drives may take over is not so easily established, being 
fundamentally dependent on innovations to come, not just for electric cars but in the full 
electricity system, including demand stabilization and storage innovations, and substantially 
depending on developments in the electricity market structure. Such important elements are 
difficult to include in modelling and are lacking in the models indicated. See for an example on 
the potential of current technologies for combustion drives and battery-electric drives BOX 4. 
There may be some back-of-the-envelope anchor points, related to price levels as are considered. 
From a certain level of emission price, coal fired power stations certainly will lose out against 
natural gas. And under reasonable assumptions regarding cost price of batteries, and with 
functioning of open markets, electric cars will outcompete gasoline cars. Similarly, installing 
natural gas based installations for the heating of buildings will be a loss making investment. This 
gives an indication of the level of the emission tax required, not a prediction of the technologies 
coming up. These may well be fully different, and then more attractive. 
The administrative set-up is according to the constraints of the Lisbon treaty. The EU sets the 
framework while administrative implementation are at the national level and proceeds are at the 
national level according to the share of each member state in total EU emissions. This is similar 
to current ETS procedures, where however a share of total proceeds is now falling, tax-like, to the 
central EU budget. An international agreement on the level of emission pricing would strengthen 
the price signal by making the price level less prone to political pressures, see in this sense 
(MacKay, Cramton et al. 2015) and (Nordhaus 2015).  
 
4.3.3. Cap-and-trade systems 
For cap-and-trade systems, there are more options, starting from current ETS. The domain is 
expanded long term so as to cover all fossil CO2 emissions as there are no strategic reasons to get 
stuck halfway, and the IPCC stresses “that that a consistent carbon pricing, covering all sectors of 
the economy, is a defining feature of the 2 °C scenarios” ((IPCC-AR5-WGIII 2014), Annex III, 
paragraphs 183, 184 and 187), quoted approvingly by the expert group preparing for COP21 
(UNFCCC-Experts 2015). All emission permits are auctioned. The pure volume based cap system 
sets emission levels and leaves prices as they come through market mechanisms. It has the 
advantage of a predetermined maximum emission level, if administered properly and if politically 
feasible if prices explode. It will include a national administration directly linked to national 
proceeds, to create the incentives for proper public administrative implementation, and from 
there the privately adequate administration. It has the disadvantage of unknown long term price 
                                                          
11 McDermott’s “Managed Carbon Price Act’ introduced in the US House of Representatives in 2014, starts at 
$12.50 per metric ton of CO2, increasing yearly with that same amount. In 35 years’ time this amounts comes close 
to 450$/tonne. 
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levels. From a long term perspective, the predictability of the price level is an important issue for 
long term investment decisions, and for helping to direct research and R&D in climate relevant 
directions. Heat pumps with seasonal storage require high capital investments, returned only if 
there is an operating cost differential with low-capital natural gas based heating systems. The 
emission price is one key factor then, of course operant only if that price signal is translated into 
decentral market prices. Also for medium term investments emission pricing may be decisive, see 
the car example based on current technologies, in BOX 4. Such cost considerations are due in any 
investment decision. The long term trajectory of pure cap based permit prices may be estimated 
based on past prices and trends therein. These shorter term trends are made less clear because 
of price volatility, see the survey paper by (Dinan and Stocking 2012) and the assessment by  
(Schmalensee and Stavins 2013) on the US experience with carbon trading for SOx. With future 
emission prices uncertain, decisions cannot be based on reasonably expected future prices. There 
is some certainty however, as long as it is not other instruments taking over from the cap-and-
trade system: permit prices will rise substantially. Their overall expected level will be higher than 
the level deemed relevant for the carbon tax, due to inherent price uncertainty. The expected 
long term price also carries a subjective uncertainty as there is no carbon tax price given as a 
reference. Investors will therefor reckon with a lower price than actually would evolve with 
perfect foresight. This underinvestment in emission reducing measures bites back: it also raises 
the long term permit prices as will actually evolve.  
There are several options to deviate from the fixed volume pure cap system, moving permit prices 
to an aspired higher level, or lower level as well. Adapting the volume of permits brought on the 
market is the main option, involving other instruments in the same domain the other. Currently 
there is an agreement to take non-used permits temporary but substantially out of the market, 
in the Market Stability Reserve, to be introduced by 2019. Such a fix on-the-go measure may be 
a perfect solution in the current situation, but is belongs to satisficing, not optimizing and is 
certainly not part of strategic planning. If too low prices are a problem in not guiding long term 
private R&D and Investment, the strategic solution is to stabilize the price at relevant levels, rising 
similar to the emission tax case to avoid unnecessary costs. Two cap options will thus be taken 
into account in the bottom up instrumentation development for the four sectors, in Chapter 5: 
the Pure Cap-and-Trade option and the price stabilized cap version, as Hybrid Cap-and-Trade. 
(The term is coined after (Goulder and Schein 2013)12). The pros and cons of these cap options 
will be analyzed in turn. 
 
BOX 2 Rising emission prices in time? Theoretical positions 
 
There are different positions on the most relevant dynamics of emission pricing. A strict economic-Pigovian 
type of reasoning is that the damage cost of emissions at time t should be reflected in the price level, as is 
advocated for example by (Tol 2008) who is a strong believer in a single and precise outcome of emission 
damage specification. With emissions going down to the optimum level, and adaptive measures being 
implemented, damages go down and the Pigovian tax is to be going down. The price starts high, directly, 
and then goes down as also advocated by Tol. This is the most clear and simple economic optimality 
reasoning, assuming markets to function and technologies to be there, the better ones replacing the 
                                                          
12 They mention as an advantage of price stabilization a reduction in the rent income of oil producing countries, a 
subject left out of discussion here. 
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existing ones. Start now at the relevant highest pricing level and things will only become easier, as marginal 
damages will go down. The implementation would be direct in the carbon tax and in the tradable cap 
system could be realized by moving from a fixed yearly reduction rate to a variable one inducing the 
required decreasing prices with volumes long term fixed in the Pure Cap system or more regular in the 
Hybrid Cap system. Politically this seems hardly feasible, certainly not if the EU would take a lead in policy. 
The second position in reasoning is close but makes technology variable in time. Several low carbon 
technologies to be introduced are still to be developed. As the EU Commission states: ´The effort would 
become greater over time as a wider set of cost-effective technologies becomes available.” (COM 2011). 
The emission price should be high enough by the time these cost-effective technologies have become 
available for investment. A first step in reasoning is to see which emission price level would make a 
renewable competitive, assuming all costs for all technologies as constant. See (IEA 2015) on the diversity 
of cost concepts, with levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) then including the cost of emission pricing. Also, 
a high speed of shifting to the new technologies implies a faster write off of existing capital. Furthermore, 
the speed of technology change is always restricted by many factors to be adapted, from adjoining 
technologies to norms and regulations, see (Kramer and Haigh 2009) with empirical data on energy and 
the more general ’35 years’ rule by (Hirooka 2006), stating that it takes 35 years for substantially new 
technologies to reach their maximum expansion rate, the fuller penetration rate following. Thirdly, with 
rising income, the value of damages will increase because of higher physical damage like by extreme 
weather events, with higher valuation. Finally, emissions are not falling for some time to come, but rising, 
with damages increasing, also due to delay effects. This is a similar type of optimality reasoning as in 
position number one, but with more factors made variable and hence more apt for longer term 
optimization. This version of optimality reasoning leads to a slowly rising emission price to start with, like 
rising to relevant levels in the next two decades, and later possibly leveling off and decreasing, if policies 
are successful. Implementation in the Hybrid Cap system and in the Emission tax seems possible. 
The third type of reasoning is of the backcasting type, the Baumol type of reasoning. Targets are set, with 
the required prices to get there following. The target is not a specific path but the time integrated volume 
of emissions, like here the ‘1 teratonne CO2’ for the aspired level of 2-degrees climate stabilization. Within 
that target, the timing is somewhat open again, linking reasoning towards the second position. The 
abstract version of optimality, not technically specified, is guiding the path. One factor is added here: the 
last 10% of emission reductions may well be more difficult to realize than then first 90%, as low hanging 
fruits will have been picked in 25 years’ time. This would lead to a steadier rise in emission prices. The 
option of slowing down the rise in emission price can maybe be evaluated based on performance in 2040, 
mirrored by the requirement of raising the price faster. The (UNFCCC-Experts 2015) meeting in Bonn 
advocates fast reductions, for climate risks reasons, as later negative emissions are uncertain in their 
feasibility. 
A fourth type of reasoning leaves the realm of integrated optimality reasoning. Targets are set, as in the 
Commission Roadmap, and the emission price is following, whatever that price may be. This position is 
linked to the pure and strict version of tradable emission permits, with a yearly specified immutable cap. 
That pure position has been left somewhat by the Commission, reducing permit volumes in the market 
somewhat to raise their price. This then links to the third type of reasoning. It has been the position in the 
UNFCCC, with substantial literature on how to set the targets per year to remain within the climate budget, 
following RCP2.6 modelling. Later emission reductions require larger negative emissions later this century.  
Finally, a fully different type of reasoning of a much more tax-practical type may be applied: what would 
be the proceeds of emission pricing, see Table 5, to help development of a green the tax system? From a 
tax office point of view, stable proceeds then are to be preferred. Ideally, then the price of emissions would 
be inversely proportional to the volume of emissions. This again links to a rising emission price, extreme 
in the end, with steadily decreasing emissions.  
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For all carbon pricing a consideration of primary producers is to reduce the risk of future very low product 
prices, bringing their resources on the market at higher volumes, and hence - collectively - lower prices 
now, see (Sinn 2012) for the reasoning involved in this paradox. (Edenhofer and Kalkuhl 2011) expand 
outcomes of the paradox to more precise assumptions and (Michaelowa 2012) gives a critical review 
indicating that the base assumption of equal cost for all production is highly unrealistic. Investment in 
most expensive new production capacity will be reduced by emission pricing, reducing the incentive to 
increase production now. (Harstad 2012) sees this leakage as undermining climate coalition efforts and 
proposes that the coalition buys all fossil resources to keep them in the ground, globally. This seems fully 
impossible, given the undefined nature of what constitutes resources and the extreme prices and related 
transfer payments that would be involved. More realistic leakage modelling methods have been 
developed by (Hoel 2011a, Hoel 2012) with more diverse outcomes. In their review on the subject (Fischer 
and Salant 2013) conclude that the paradox effect will be limited, if present at all. Other mechanisms 
induced by lower prices also due to climate policy may play a role however. The OPEC (Saudi) reaction to 
low oil prices, hardly induced by effective climate policy, has been to increase production to press US 
fracking production out of the market, accepting even lower prices. Such imperfect market mechanisms 
will remain. 
Overall conclusion is that slowly but predictably rising prices reduce the cost of emission reduction, with a 
revision of the level after maybe two decades, to avoid underperformance or too substantial 
overperformance. Starting low and rising predictably has proven politically feasible in the UK price floor 
tax on CO2 emissions linked to ETS and the Canadian emission tax in British Columbia. 
 
Table 5 Proceeds of emission pricing: emission price starting at 100€/ton in 2020 rising by 10€ per year  
 
 
 
4.3.4. Pure Cap-and-Trade 
How to allocate caps to countries in time has been a core discussion, reasoning backward from a 
given carbon budget. Most detailed proposals specify emission caps per country per year for the 
next decades, as by (Frankel 2008), also as Chapter 2 in (Aldy and Stavins 2009) and similar in 
(Bosetti and Frankel 2009). For EU climate policy a global specification per country is not required 
however. Without global agreement, a front runner climate coalition, like EU and China, could 
start with mutually agreed voluntary caps, with others coming in later, at then higher costs, see 
(Kriegler, Riahi et al. 2014) on such dynamics. Costs for the EU are comparatively low, due to 
limited amount of fossil resources and an already well developed infrastructure. The EU cap in 
EU
Emissions 
Mton 
CO2* 
EU GDP 
+1.5% pa 
B€ **
Emissions 
% relative 
to 1990***
Emission 
price 
€/ton 
Pricing 
proceeds 
B€
Proceeds 
as % of 
GDP
2010 3771 11964 85 10 38 0.32%
2020 3106 13897 70 100 311 2.23%
2030 2662 16128 60 200 532 3.30%
2035 2219 17375 50 250 555 3.19%
2040 1775 18718 40 300 532 2.84%
2050 887 21723 20 400 355 1.63%
2060 444 25210 10 500 222 0.88%
      *EEA 2014 **IMF 2014 ***Roadmap 2011
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the pure-cap carbon pricing option is reduced by a fixed amount per year, legally established and 
binding for the total of the member states. 
In the ETS (intended) pure cap-and-trade system the cap is fixed, with a fixed yearly percent point 
reduction relative to the base year 1990. It is now set at 1.74% per year and intends to rise to 
2.2% per year in 2021. The long term reduction rate of 2.2% implies a rising reduction rate on a 
per annum percentage basis, extremely high towards 2050, rising to well over 10% reduction per 
year on a compound rate basis. As some emission domains are difficult to reduce very 
substantially, like iron and steel and aviation, most other activities would have to reduce even 
faster. A more modest reduction rate when the goal is near might be a better option. The current 
compound reduction rate of around 1.5% per year would have to rise to roughly 5% within the 
next decade to arrive the same 2050 target13. A reduction rate of 5% at a growth rate of 1.5% 
would imply a reduced emission intensity of 6.5% per year or, formulated as the inverse, an eco-
efficiency improvement by 6.5%.  
For guiding long term decisions on decarbonization, the core question to answer is what the 
permit price will be in the near and far future, that is what price development might reasonably 
be expected. Answering that question must be based on estimating the factors determining 
demand for permits, as the supply is purely inelastic. The main factors determining demand are 
economic growth; the price development of fossil energy sources; cost development for low 
carbon production technologies; the system costs induced, substantially depending on market 
structure and the cost and market development in other sectors; the role demand spreading can 
take in the internet of things; the costs to be induced for decarbonizing the energy use chain and 
its speed of implementation; and the cost for energy storage systems, both for electricity and 
heat and other options; the volumes of iron and steel use and of aviation, and a few more. Most 
of these factors are highly uncertain, and can be brought under policy control to a very limited 
extent only, with the exception of the development of electricity markets. When explaining the 
price drop in the EU ETS, is a bit of everything (Feng, Zou et al. 2011) (Koch, Fuss et al. 2014), a 
difficult to disentangle mix of low economic growth; shift of material production to Asia, 
especially China; substantial CDM,; the upcoming of national climate policies like widely used 
feed-in tariffs; and technology development also induced by Chinese and US renewables policies. 
Overall however, permit demand development is highly unpredictable. One thing is for sure: not 
only is supply fully inelastic in a pure cap system, also demand is highly inelastic in nature. On 
short and medium notice technologies are mostly given, so only market volumes can adapt to 
price changes of emission permits, with highly uncertain developments. This implies that also 
price development is highly unpredictable, not the one on short notice due to trading effects, but 
the longer one, over years and decades However, short term price fluctuations will also blur the 
long term picture somewhat, increasing at least subjective uncertainty. 
Empirical analysis is available on substantial also longer term price volatility of the US SOx, and 
later also NOx cap on utilities, the major example for the EU ETS. There is some analysis on factors 
behind EU ETS price volatility, but hardly linked to time frames, see (Meng 2013) for the analysis 
of some factors, and on broader references. For energy, the long term elasticity of demand has 
been in the order of minus one, see (Lowe 2003), who analyses also long term expected 
                                                          
13 The cap reduction rate set by the Commission is now at 1.74% (of 2005 emissions), rising to 2.2% (of 2005 
emissions) in 2020. This implies a rising compound emission reduction rate. 
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development of price elasticity of energy demand under effective climate policy. The emission 
permit price elasticity is different from energy price elasticity, more elastic long term as then shifts 
in technology use can be realized. Long term predictions of price elasticity of permit demand seem 
quite difficult however, and no predictions seem available. The more inelastic range (long term) 
might go to minus 0.2, let us assume as an option. This is not a prediction but an option a pure 
cap system would have to reckon with. Combining fully inelastic supply with this range in 
elasticities of demand indicates what the price effect of a disturbance could be. With a 10% 
increase in demand, the unitary elasticity we mostly are used to in other domains would lead to 
a 10% increase in price. The same demand increase with a price elasticity of -0.2 would lead to a 
50% price increase, see Figure 2. The figure conveys the mechanism but cannot be based on 
empirical data for the basic reasons mentioned. The converse would be true for a demand 
decrease by 10% leading to price decrease by 50%. Of course elasticities are not known or even 
fixed, depending on the time horizon and certainly are curves, not straight lines. But the message 
is clear, non-predictable factors can lead to very substantial price changes over a period of years.  
Figure 2. Demand and supply for emission permits under pure cap-and-trade: graphical analysis. 
The elasticities not only are hardly known, they will not be stable. 
Substitution as a major factor depends strongly on the time horizon. Shifts of demand to other 
technologies and sectors are easier in the long term, as when investing in heat pump based 
heating systems to better use intermittent renewables. Such mechanisms in turn are also highly 
dependent on the future market structure in the electricity domain. In the long term elasticity 
then will be higher than on the short term. However, other mechanisms work towards reduced 
elasticity in the longer term. Picking low hanging fruit can only be done once; options for changing 
technologies tend towards increasing costs; and shifts in demand are limited as by given 
infrastructure and given tastes. The net effect on long term price elasticity of demand may 
therefore be in a broad range, with expected volatility in a broad range as well. 
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This is the main long term weakness of the pure cap-and-trade system: there is no good basis to 
predict the long term price development of permits. This implies that there is no good price 
expectation possible for guiding public and private R&D and neither for long term investments 
towards a low emission society. ‘The permit price has collapsed before, so be careful.’ 
Substitution effects depend strongly on the time horizon. Shifts of demand to other technologies 
and sectors are easier in the long term, as when investing in heat pump based heating systems to 
better use intermittent renewables. Such mechanisms are also highly dependent on the future 
market structure in the electricity domain, see Section 4.4. In the long term elasticity then will be 
higher than on the short term. However, other mechanisms work towards reduced elasticity in 
the longer term. Picking low hanging fruit can only be done once; options for changing 
technologies tend towards increasing costs; and shifts in demand are limited as by given 
infrastructure and given tastes. The net effect on long term price elasticity of demand for emission 
permits may therefore be in a broad range, with expected volatility in a broad range as well. Price 
predictions can only be highly uncertain.  
The pure cap-and-trade system is to be a major instrument in an instrument mix. Other 
instruments in the same domain, like national policies, local initiatives, and private contributions 
and innovations may seem interesting from their micro levels but don’t contribute to emission 
reductions, see (Sorrell and Sijm 2003, Sijm 2005) for an early  convincing analysis of this relation 
with other instruments, and (Agnolucci and Drummond 2014) Chapter 5 for a recent literature 
survey with the same conclusions. The demand for permits is reduced, the demand curve shifting 
down along the vertical permit supply curve, see Figure 2. The lower price of permits just makes 
it cheaper for others to emit, these then emitting more. The relation also holds with other EU 
instrumentation. If a well-functioning electricity market is introduced to allow for easier 
introduction of renewables, that effect may occur, but the emission reduction not. Lower 
emission prices will make fossils so much more attractive that the cap is filled. This is an 
unavoidable characteristic of the cap-and-trade system being pure, and is not based on any 
empirical analysis or experience. This makes ingenuity and creativity in emission reduction 
superfluous from an emission reduction point of view. If, for climate reasons, you introduce an 
automat to lower your thermostat already before leaving your house, you just are silly. This 
demotivating characteristic is a main obstacle for the long term functioning of a pure cap-and-
trade system. If all other instruments together are effective enough for to create the emission 
reduction of the cap, the permit price will collapse, making the pure cap scheme superfluous. 
 
4.3.5. Price stabilized cap-and-trade 
The first step towards price stabilization as taken in the ETS is a shift in volume of permits brought 
on the market, without an explicit price reference, in discussions indicated as a more relevant 
price level. See for the importance to have a specified permit price (Goulder and Schein 2013), 
who name that cap variant “hybrid”. Long term instrument development would make this hybrid 
cap option explicit in the intended price level, specifying explicitly what is relevant. There is 
national legislation in the UK indicating what is relevant, in the price floor tax. That tax is 
complementary to the EU ETS. Its level is the difference between the actual price level in the ETS 
and the price deemed relevant, see (Revenue&Customs 2012 (2010)). At its introduction, the 
price path was specified at 16 per tonne of CO2 in 2012 and follow a linear path to maximum £30 
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per tonne in 2020, rising to £70 in 203014. By 2050 this price rise would lead to an emission price 
in the order of 200€ per tonne CO2, see similarly Table 5. The UK price floor is a tax. Setting a price 
floor for the EU ETS would not be a tax, but a volume adjustment. At auctioning, no more permits 
would be auctioned if the price would fall under a certain level; if no one bids at that price, the 
auction is cancelled. That pricing element would override the indicated cap volume. In current 
circumstances this would mean that the auctioned part of the cap would be restricted, not the 
emission permits distributed for free, see (Burtraw, Löfgren et al. 2013) for detailed proposals 
and literature not focused at the long term. For the long term the price floor would be specified 
along a time path towards 2050. Discussions now focus on the price floor as the price of now in 
the order of €5 per tonne is too low to have any impact on economic decision making. The price 
of 1000km air travel is raised by at most €0.50.  During periods of high economic growth and 
stagnating innovation and cost reductions, the price may explode however, bankrupting sensitive 
industries, with undesirable capital losses resulting, and unavoidable political reactions. The 
mirror then is the price ceiling to avoid such effects, together forming a price band or collar, see 
proposals as by (Edenhofer 2014). There is substantial support for such an adaptation in the grey 
literature, see for example (Borenstein 2013) and (Fell, Burtraw et al. 2011), but without specifics 
on the time path of floor and ceiling and without reasoning towards the width of the band. These 
considerations are essential for a long term view on the hybrid cap instrument. A study by the US 
Congressional Budget Office (Dinan and Stocking 2012) warns that for hybrid cap systems clear 
and detailed choices are required with relevant market controls established to avoid market 
manipulation.  
The larger the bandwidth is, the more market price variation there might be. If there is however 
public-administrative discretion to steer the price into the upper, middle or lower level of the 
band, a more stable price path would result. If there is a volume basis as a reference, like 
cumulative exceedance or underperformance relative to the formally established cap volumes, 
the price would also stabilize, at least for periods, but then either at the floor level with over-
performance and at the ceiling level with underperformance. The reasoning for having the 
bandwidth remains open however. In the high price and low price version of the stabilized price 
path trading would become superfluous. Only during the shift between floor and ceiling, trading 
would play a role. Reducing the band to near zero would make all trading superfluous, then 
reducing control requirements on undue trade manipulation as well. The cap system then would 
come close to the emission tax in pricing though not yet in its administrative set-up. The full step 
towards the administratively simplified emission tax would reduce transaction costs also 
privately, see (Coria and Jaraitė 2015).  
The four options for emission pricing, No Pricing; Pure Cap; Hybrid Cap; and Emission Tax, are 
starting point for the bottom up development of instrument mixes per sector in the next Chapter. 
 
Product prices and emission prices 
When starting at that endeavor, it is good to have some idea on product price effects of different 
levels of emission price, be it formed by either cap system or the emission tax. The price effect 
here is purely the direct effect, without market mechanisms which certainly will result. 
                                                          
14 Due to international competitiveness, the UK going it alone, and to reduce energy cost the price floor has been 
frozen at £18 per tonne, see http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05927. 
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Substantially reduced demand for fossils will certainly depress their market prices substantially, 
see (Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014). A price of for example 20 Euro per barrel of oil equivalent is 
feasible with reduced fossil use and will be a lure for getting it into the market, directly or 
indirectly. However, an all fossils covering carbon price of 300€/tonne of CO2 in 2050, by cap or 
tax, would add 135€ to the barrel of oil price, bringing it up to that price even at near zero 
production prices. By then, emission free alternatives would be competing out oil and gas at such 
emission prices, even if having been brought into the market by standards and regulations. And 
if not, the emission price could be raised, to avoid a fall back to fossils. Assume an emission price 
of 300€, not as a choice but as a long term benchmark, roughly in line with the intended rising UK 
price floor tax and the rising British Columbia emission tax. The price of a barrel of crude oil would 
initially increase with 134€. This would certainly reduce demand even on the short term. Natural 
gas would outcompete coal in electricity production, having around half the carbon content per 
unit of energy. A one thousand kilometer airline city trip (return) in Europe would become around 
64€ more expensive, before taxes. The substitution to near zero emission technologies would be 
more attractive with higher emission prices. But substitution of course depends also on the costs 
of the alternative and on more complex mechanisms. But certainly, renewable electricity would 
become much more competitive. Of course the advantage increases with the emission price. 
 
Table 6 Effects of emission pricing on exemplary product prices  
  Emission price €/tonne CO2   
 € 0 25 50 100 200 300 400 
Crude oil (producer) €/barrel 60 71 82 105 149 194 238 
Natural gas (consumer) €/m3 0,65 0,70 0,74 0,83 1,02 1,20 1,38 
Electricity price coal (producer) €/MWh 45 66 87 129 224 308 392 
Electricity price gas (producer) €/MWh 55 65 75 95 141 181 221 
Gasoline price (consumer) €/liter 1,40 1,46 1,52 1,63 1,86 2,09 2,32 
Diesel price (consumer) €/liter 1,40 1,47 1,60 1,74 2,00 2,27 2,54 
Diesel car, 20km/L; 20.000km/year €/year 1400 1467 1534 1668 1936 2204 2472 
Air transport, CO2 costs only €/1000km - 3 5 11 21 32 43 
 
 
4.4. Institutions: Electricity market designs 
4.4.1. Extreme numbers coming up in production and consumption markets  
There are many options to create electricity markets, highly relevant for climate policy. Each has 
different infrastructure requirements, both public and private, and each has different shares of 
more public and more private infrastructure elements. There is a direct relation with other 
climate policy instrumentation, with some instruments fragmenting markets and well-functioning 
markets supporting other climate policy instruments. 
Long term developments will lead to substantial shifts in terms of actors linked to the grid, both 
for climate reasons, supply security reasons and energy efficiency reasons, with climate reasons 
focused on here.  The number of primary producers may well increase from a few hundred not 
so long ago to several tens of millions in the next decades. The number of storage facilities will 
grow from a few hundred to several tens of millions. Transformation technologies with storage, 
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as to heat and hydrogen, will increase from a few hundred to maybe up to tens of millions. Final 
users will become active market participants as in smart grids and the internet of things in the 
hundreds of millions. See Figure 3 for the actors involved and their potential numbers. Key 
characteristic of the transition is an extreme shift towards decentralization, and mostly a shift 
towards dispatchable technologies with fast reaction time options, and also in the use phase 
extremely short reactions time. This structural change in number and type of actors will require 
development of new electricity markets, and related energy markets, and new infrastructure for 
transmission and storage. The EU market will also be connected to other electricity markets, 
certainly including Norway and Switzerland but with high potential also for Iceland and possibly 
Eastern Europe, non-EU Balkan countries and North African countries.  
Currently, the European grid consists of a set of mainly national transmission grids, with 
substantial differences between them, and with limited connections, and a high number of 
distribution grids, with various ownership. Most countries have unbundled substantially following 
the Unbundling Directive, with operation of grids by mostly public Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs), and details as on their independence further worked out, see (EC 2013). Pricing systems 
differ between all of them. Swing producers (larger producers who adapt the volume of 
production for load balancing) and grid operators work closely together at wholesale markets to 
maintain grid balance and stability, also at international markets for swing producers. Sometimes 
these actors are fully independent, sometimes they are closely connected and sometimes they 
are combined in one organization, as a quasi-public near monopolist. There are some high tension 
international connections, both AC and DC, based on mainly bilateral agreements. Some grid 
operators have gone international as traders, and some operate in more than one country. 
Differentiated prices for producers and for users are common, different between different 
countries, as based on feed-in tariffs and similar with cost distributed uneven over different users, 
and also by differentiated tax regimes. The Commission is pressing for wider international trade 
options, requiring national public interventions to be better mutually aligned (COM 2013) and 
setting quantitative targets (COM 2015), and adjoining rules how international trade is to be 
organized, as in relation to load balancing (COM 2015b). At a technical level the alignment has 
been evolving in cooperation with ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System 
Operators - Electricity), who also are involved in development of EU market rules (“network 
codes”). Though clearly opening up to European market development, no clear pan-European 
market design is yet involved. 
What could be long term development options, reckoning with the challenge of the coming power 
system without fuel (Taylor and Dhople 2015). Intermittent, non-dispatchable, decentralized 
primary production becomes dominant, with much primary production having close to zero short 
term marginal costs. Secondary production and active demand reaction will play a key role in 
market stabilization, under adequate market design. North-south and East West linkages can also 
flatten out production and consumption somewhat. One line jumps out now: With high voltage 
direct current (HVDC) transmission becoming the long distance mode of transport, national and 
subnational grids can be adequately linked with high efficiency. They also can function more 
independently, without rising faults levels due to intermittency and related fast shifts in flows.  
For the 2-degrees climate stabilization target CO2 emissions in electricity production are to be 
reduced by over 95% by 2050, see section 3.4. CCS may become up to 80% effective only, see (IEA 
2015), where applicable. It may only play a supporting role therefor regarding fossils. The 
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conclusion is that future energy supply systems, long term, will have to be dominated by non-
fossil production, that is renewables and nuclear. The expansion of renewables in the next half 
century will probably be based on wind and solar electricity, both with high intermittency, limited 
predictability and non-dispatchability. One fine Christmas day the wind has not blown for days 
over a week and snow had covered all solar panels. Most emission free is not or only limited 
dispatchable in relation to demand. 
• Wind/wave  Intermittent and non-dispatchable 
• Solar    Intermittent and non-dispatchable 
• Concentrated solar Intermittent with some heat storage dispatchable 
• Tidal    Intermittent and non-dispatchable 
• Nuclear    Stable and only slightly dispatchable 
• Geothermal  Stable and somewhat dispatchable 
• Biomass with CCS  Substantially variable and dispatchable 
 
Figure 3. Actors potentially involved in market clearing in the long term electricity market 
 
 
Matching final demand with varying primary supply just is not possible most of the time. Final 
demand can be spread out in time and can be timed in relation to supply to some extent only. 
Larger grids can even out demand, like over East-West time zones and can link hotspots in supply 
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(like Scottish wind) to areas of demand.  Flexible supply options like with cheap natural gas 
installations with CCS, expensive due to their very small load factor, may be incorporated to help 
cover low renewables supply periods and also for some special peak demand. But primary supply 
will have to be stored substantially as well for secondary supply. Technical options are there. But 
how can the vast number of primary and secondary producers be linked to the vast number of to 
be variable energy users, and all their internet-linked apparatus? The number of primary and 
secondary grid producers in Europe will rise from a few hundred at the turn of the century to tens 
of millions in the next decades, see Figure 1. 
Coordination is a most demanding issue for electricity, as supply and demand are to match real 
time, always. Heat, chemical energy like hydrogen, and power as in pumped hydro can be stored 
more easily, over days and sometimes even seasons and years. Electricity can be stored in battery 
systems for more frequent use and hence shorter periods. Many options are there in a technical 
sense now already and can certainly be improved in the course of time. But what will develop in 
a technical sense, and what will be implemented in practice cannot easily be predicted. It very 
much depends on incentives created, by climate policies and other policies, but also on the 
serendipity of invention and innovation. It is for example not possible now to predict the long 
term role of hydrogen fuel cells in transport and next in grid stabilization. The design of electricity 
markets will play a key role in the transformation towards a near zero emission electricity system. 
There are different views on how this market could be designed, leading to different options. 
 
4.4.2. Design requirements 
For the large numbers of actors involved the set-up of energy markets, in particular electricity 
markets plays a key role. Their long term design and their short and medium term development, 
are always in relation to adjoining policies. The low carbon future is to be bright. The path to that 
future must be well lighted as well. There are two main requirements to be met also in renewables 
dominated electricity markets, and linked to other energy markets. 
1. Short-term supply adequacy, matching primary and secondary supply and demand real time, 
as supply and demand must match real time in electricity markets. 
2. Long-term supply adequacy, based on investment in primary production, including flexible 
production; in storage and secondary production15; and in spreading out of demand to higher 
production periods. 
Supply adequacy is closely related to supply security, including the prevention of brown-outs. The 
traditional role of large fossil suppliers in load balancing in wholesale markets will vanish with 
vanishing fossil shares in production. With the large numbers of small scale primary and 
secondary producers involved also the concept of wholesale markets becomes obsolete. New 
market designs are required, quite unavoidably. 
Short-term markets set prices. In energy only markets, see (Hogan 2005), these market prices 
have to cover the average cost of production for all primary producers in order to finance their 
long-term investments in capacity, then involves scarcity rents Otherwise additional payment is 
required like capacity payment. In the energy-only market the scarcity rent prices have to be 
                                                          
15 Secondary production is electricity production from stored energy derived from primary electricity production, as 
with stationary batteries, mobile batteries, pumped hydro, fuel cells using electricity based hydrogen, flywheels, 
compressed gases, etc. 
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predictably enough to create the necessary expectations for inducing market based investment, 
overcoming unavoidable uncertainty as well. The prices have also to be variable enough to finance 
secondary production and to cover the cost of shifting demand away from peaks towards high 
supply periods. These two requirements are the overarching ones, for any governance direction. 
Any design has to fulfill these requirements, with funding based on markets only or also on other 
payment like capacity payment. 
More detailed requirements follow depending somewhat on ‘circumstances’. Technologies 
determine the adequacy of markets. Without short-term flexible decentral secondary production, 
central facilities will have to be developed, with different market requirements, especially 
different roles for system operators in matching supply and demand So how markets will function 
in a technical sense cannot be predicted. Their design is to allow for a broad range of possible 
technology combinations. If hydrogen fuel cell drives would dominate in transport, their flexible 
supply of electricity to the grid may solve all intermittency problems in primary electricity 
production, see BOX 1. Their low efficiency, if remaining so, then would require markets with high 
enough price fluctuations to pay for their higher cost, in a market development mode. In a 
planning mode, a different type of market would be designed and developed, as for example 
involving capacity payment to assure the availability of enough hydrogen fuel cells. Of course, the 
hydrogen fuel cell would be acquired primarily for car driving reasons: electricity grid stabilization 
is a co-product16. 
The issue of capacity and flexibility has been investigated by (Baron 2015) as chapter 7 in 
(OECD/IEA/NEA/ITF 2015). There it is assumed that adequate low carbon supply cannot be solely 
organised on the basis of variable-cost pricing combined with carbon pricing. One solution coming 
up then is based on some form of capacity payment, as a capital subsidy for being available, 
replacing production subsidies like feed-in tariffs. Tendering procedures based on average prices 
then may be required, leading to a market design based on feed-in premiums or Contract-for-
Difference arrangements. Such subsidies are to be funded by surcharges or more general taxes.  
However, when going in the direction of capacity payment, the market based option effectively 
is closed off as the price variability is reduced and average price levels are depressed. But is it 
indeed impossible to have markets cleared and funded based on usual market mechanisms? 
There is not much research on this subject, but see for some key aspects (Taylor, Mathieu et al. 
2015), who however start from current US circumstances; (Koliou, Eid et al. 2014) who analyze 
current restrictions on effective trading; (Verzijlbergh, De Vries et al. 2014), who analyze the need 
for grid congestion pricing;  (Verzijlbergh, Grond et al. 2012) analyze the importance of linking 
electrical vehicles to the grid; and (Brancucci Martinez-Anido, De Vries et al. 2012), who analyze 
the importance of enlarging EU internal international markets with increasing renewables 
penetration.  
Lifting the assumption that electricity only markets cannot function adequately then requires a 
view how well-functioning markets might be developed, without the brown-outs and 
unacceptably extreme market prices as envisaged by (Baron 2015). One most extreme situation 
to imagine is that there is only intermittent non-dispatchable primary production, disregarding 
                                                          
16 Toyota delivers a separately sold AC power supply unit to its Mirai hydrogen fuel cell car. The drive battery is 
short term dispatchable and may then cover also short term extreme demand peaks. It cannot yet be connected to 
the grid directly, as Tesla can. 
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hydropower and options for other low carbon production like based on nuclear power and fossils 
with CCS. In this hypothetical extreme, there will be peak final demand with hardly any primary 
production for several hours during some days, and with production well below daily demand for 
several days: the White Christmas example. The requirement then is that after flattening out 
demand, short term demand peaks must be covered by flexible secondary supply with stored 
electricity and other stored energy like pumped hydro and hydrogen fed fuel cells electricity. In a 
technical sense this is perfectly possible with current technologies, see BOX 1. Of course there is 
wide variety of technical options for timely dispatched secondary production. Predicting which 
ones will emerge is not possible, not just for technical-economic reasons. The design itself of 
electricity markets will also determine which secondary supply options may come up, and which 
not. In a feed-in tariffs dominated market heat pumps based heat storage will hardly develop, see 
BOX 3. With such technical options available, markets may be designed to make use of these 
options, inducing their technical development, including techniques for real time price reactions. 
Such long term market development would have prices fluctuating enough to activate the 
secondary production technologies. At peak production time with low demand all storage and 
transformation options would be used, and at peak demand with low supply the price would peak 
and they would deliver. Waiting too long for the really high price would mean running the risk of 
earning nothing in trade.  
 
4.4.3. Four main electricity market designs 
With the implementation of the unbundling directive (EC 2013) a clear difference between 
production, transmission and distribution has evolved and is evolving still. Additional policies are 
developed as regarding ownership of the transmission grids (EC 2013)and international trade 
(COM 2015). Although the direction envisaged is clear, there is a wide variety of options to fill in 
market functioning, regarding the legal set-up of market coordination; the ownership of 
production and storage facilities; the ownership of the grid; the clearance responsibility (load 
balancing); and the spatial scale level of transmission grid and also distribution grid. All these 
dimensions can be filled in in different ways, with three main options specified for each of them, 
see Table 7. For each of them there is a line from roughly current centralized electricity markets, 
based on a limited number of main producers for only slightly linked mainly national markets; to 
a pan-European fully integrated public central market structure with decentral private production 
and storage and market participation by users; and with some in between options. Real time 
clearing markets have developed in currency markets, metals and resource markets, some 
financial markets. They use IT systems for fast decision making, while maintaining a (near) single 
price for all parties involved. Futures markets might evolve in the case of electricity, to transfer 
the risk of price fluctuations to risk taking parties. As this opens the route to price manipulation 
maybe, this is an issue to investigate. If futures trading would be part of the market as created, 
then also there the question is how to regulate that part of the market to avoid fraudulent 
manipulation, see (Taylor, Mathieu et al. 2015).  
The issue of capacity payment or market based investment funding is left open here. The 
requirement of capacity payment depends very much on the market design and, not 
independently, on the development of technologies and their costs. With cheap pan-European 
long distance high tension DC transport lines; low cost batteries like stored fluid; shared cost 
batteries as in homes and cars; some additional pumped hydro; more flexible nuclear; and a 
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substantial amount of hydrogen fuel cell cars with hydrogen storage; and with flexible use 
systems as with heat-pump-heat-storage systems, there will hardly be a need for capacity 
payment. The market incentives as required don’t link to one market design specifically by 
necessity. Without real time equal pricing for all it seems difficult to have such broad 
development incentivized however, then requiring additional policy instrumentation maybe, like 
subsidizing heat storage systems. Without substantial variable pricing it seems near impossible to 
create relevant incentives for primary supply flexibility, secondary supply, and demand variation. 
The relation of capacity payment to the two governance strategies might seem obvious at first 
sight. The institutionalist mode goes for electricity only market and the planning and control 
mode for capacity payment. That is not the case however. There is no strategic reason to go for 
capacity payment, only a practical-tactical one. Both modes go for the electricity only option, as 
the most basic and simple solution, in line with other product markets. However, in the Planning 
& Control mode the incentives are weaker and then the shift to capacity payment may be more 
probable than in the Institutionalist mode. The possible short term role of capacity payment is 
left out of discussion here. 
 
Table 7 Design variables for electricity markets 
 
 A. OWNERSHIP OF 
GRIDS 
B. OWNERSHIP  OF 
PRODUCTION & 
STORAGE 
C. MARKET 
COORDINATION & 
CAPACITY 
D. CLEARANCE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
E. SPATIAL  
SCALE LEVEL 
1. Main producers (co-
)own distribution 
grid; Others own 
transmission  grid, 
public or private 
Few main 
producers own all 
large scale 
installations 
Contractual with 
central suppliers 
market; also 
distribution grid 
funded 
Main swing 
producer(s), 
with 
transmission 
grid owners 
Regional 
transmission and 
distribution; 
bilateral 
international trade 
2. Transmission grid 
as public utility;  
distribution grids 
public utility, mixed 
ownership 
Grid owners own 
large scale storage, 
possibly also 
private producers 
Mixed contractual, 
and short term 
open markets; also 
distribution grid 
funded  
TSOs, 
coordinating  
main producers 
Some 
international 
transmission; 
national/ regional 
distribution 
3. Transmission grids 
publicly owned; 
distribution grids 
publicly owned. 
Double unbundling 
Fully decentral 
private ownership 
of primary and 
secondary 
production 
Mixed contractual, 
and short term 
open markets 
TSOs, 
coordinating  
main producers 
Supranational 
main transmission; 
national/regional 
transmission and 
distribution   
4. Transmission grids 
publicly owned; 
distribution grids 
publicly owned. 
Double unbundling 
Fully decentral 
private ownership 
of primary and 
secondary 
production 
Pure real time 
market; as public 
good exceptional 
swing capacity 
TSO(s), through 
market 
mechanism 
Supranational 
main transmission; 
national/regional 
transmission and 
distribution   
 
The market coordination can be mainly contractual, between main producers, but contracts may 
also leave some room for short term market mechanisms, and contracts may be fully abandoned, 
the relation between supply and demand being a matter of market mechanism only, as in many 
spot markets now. The market structure in production and storage may be privately oligopolistic, 
with a few main producers; may involve grid owners for large scale storage; or all ownership in 
primary and secondary production may be purely private. Similar structures pertain to the 
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transmission and distribution grids, ranging from private ownership of the distribution grid and, 
separated, the transmission grid; to operating these grids privately as public utilities; to publicly 
owned transmissions and distribution grids. The way grid use is priced will differ fundamentally 
between these options, ranging from profit and funding to congestion pricing. The special 
characteristic of the electricity market is real time clearance at any moment in time, to be 
somehow organized. Main swing producers can have that responsibility, coordinated by the 
transmission system operator (TSO); or the responsibility is fully with the TSO per region, actively 
trading in capacity; or the TSO is a market follower, facilitating the working of the market only. 
Finally, the market evolving may be national with international bilateral linkages; may be 
organized internationally between regional TSOs; or it may be a fully international market, based 
on the public international transmission infrastructure.  
Spatial scale level and uniformity are main dimensions for designing electricity markets, closely 
related. Without uniformity higher spatial scale levels are difficult to effectuate. And with 
uniformity there are still additional requirements for establishing EU level markets. The extremes 
are low spatial scale level and differentiated markets and high spatial scale level with uniform 
markets. Similarly, a substantial role for large swing producers seems difficult to reconcile with a 
pan-European electricity market. So permutations along the dimensions don’t deliver feasible 
options; a typology of roughly matching combinations is most useful, spanning the space from 
current national/regional fragmented markets to a real time integrated European market. Four 
market types may cover this field: wholesale markets dominated by swing producers; fully 
unbundled national markets with bilateral international relations; full unbundling with a public 
EU international transmission grid; to a single priced European electricity market, with real time 
equal prices for all primary and secondary producers and for all users on the same conditions. 
From a climate perspective, main differences relate to how decentralized renewables production; 
centralized and decentralized storage; and final use load shaving can be incorporated; and to how 
long distance grid balancing can be incorporated in the future mostly fossil free electricity system. 
The four market designs may also be seen as consecutive steps towards the Single European 
Electricity Market. The publicly also EU owned international grid, number 4, allows for an open to 
all real time single priced European electricity market, with congestion pricing of all grids. 
General preparatory work for developing electricity markets in technical sense is well under way, 
especially by ENTSO-E and in a more political sense in the European Electricity Regulatory Forum, 
relevant for all four market designs.  
 
Table 8 Four main types of electricity markets  
1. Swing Producers Market, limited links bi-nationally 
2. National Unbundled Markets, public Transmission grids, linked bi-nationally  
3. Unbundled Markets with EU High Tension Grid, EU/multi-nationally owned 
4. Single Priced European Electricity Market,  real time, market balanced 
 
The market designs are linked to the long term. However, with the limited amount of renewables 
currently on the European market, there already are periods in regional markets where producer 
prices are near zero, making the operation of gas and coal fired power stations less attractive and 
reducing investment in capacity.  Emission pricing, high enough and long term predictable, would 
create an incentive for investment in renewables. These renewables have periods of limited 
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capacity however, somehow to be supplanted then with other production sources, primary or 
secondary, for balancing market real time. The different market designs may deal differently with 
this basic problem for the long term. The low marginal cost issue will be discussed in a separately, 
in section 4.4.4. 
 
1. Swing Producers Market 
This is roughly the situation the EU is currently in, after implementation of the Unbundling 
Directive. This market design may be adequate in a planning and control mode of climate policy. 
1.a Ownership of grids 
The national distribution grids are owned and operated in close cooperation between major 
swing producers and the national grid operators, with room for traders and local authorities.  
The national transmission grids are publicly operated by transmission system operators. They may 
be fully or partly publicly owned. 
The international transmission grids may have substantial mixed ownership by transmission 
system operators (TSOs), main producers and main storage providers, and may include partners 
like capital providers and public bodies.  
Physical grid capacity at all three spatial levels is based on cost minimization within regulatory 
boundaries as also regarding security of electricity supply. Grid pricing is based on cost recovery, 
and preferably more than that.  
1.b Ownership of production and storage 
Primary and secondary electricity production is mostly private, but not necessarily so, as with 
(partial) public ownership of producers as by communities. Large scale storage capacity is partly 
with main producers and partly with transmission system operators, and with combinations also 
involving other parties. 
1.c Market coordination and capacity 
Trading rules 
Pricing is controlled by grid operators based on public rules and public contracts, as on feed-in 
tariffs and premiums and payment of surcharges differentiated as to users. There is substantial 
market price differentiation between sellers, as with supported renewables and secondary 
delivery to the grid, and between buyers, with some firms paying lower prices, as being exempted 
from surcharges. As such systems differ between member states international trade is restricted, 
with hence limited trade between member states.  
With price signals not equal for all producers and end users, several market mechanisms function 
to a limited extent only, as with heat pumps for heat production and storage, see BOX 3. 
International trade is between large producers, swing producers and balancing service providers, 
and national grid operators, linked internationally in mostly binational European transmission 
markets.  
Electricity transport pricing 
Pricing of national electricity transport infrastructure is implicit in the wholesale and retail price 
received by main producers involved in distribution networks. All producers are connected to the 
grid at the site of production. For international transport it depends on the contract form, with 
pricing invisible for actively trading international grid operators and implicit in prices with time 
specific capacity sold in such capacity use prices. 
The electricity transport price is part of the buyers’ price, implicit or not.  
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Capacity availability 
Owning distribution grids, with some control on prices, provides some of the funding for the 
capacity requirements. However, direct capacity payment will also be required for maintaining 
long term total capacity and balancing capacity. 
Capacity availability depends on investments, these in turn depending on the average price a 
producer may expect to receive. There are permanent subsidies for all technologies, as capacity 
payment or other investment or production subsidy. Additionally, there are temporary subsidies 
for creating new technologies’ learning curves. These subsidies to be unified as much as possible. 
Also, they are to shift away from on-market-price support as much as possible; and are less to be 
funded by surcharges differentiated between user types for markets to become more integrated. 
This requires some EU level regulation. 
1.d Clearance responsibility 
Grid balancing is the combined responsibility of the grid operators and the central swing 
producers. Swing producers accommodate to market demand real time, with wholesale markets 
organized by grid operators. Based on response time, markets with different time horizons are 
organized. Swing production is mainly by natural gas fired power stations, and shifting to large 
scale storage like hydro, and to a limited extent to other production like solar heat electricity and 
(made more flexible) nuclear.  
There are open contractual relations with larger users for demand peak shaving. Demand peak 
shaving with smaller end users is based on standard contractual relations, with price 
differentiation based on day time and season, and obligatory smart meters as required for this 
purpose. Decentral production, as for example with fuel cell electricity from cars, cannot be 
combined with return delivery to the grid at fixed/standard consumer prices, and certainly not 
with feed-in tariffs. Aggregation of users, like fleet owners of electric vehicles, may lead to 
contractual price differentiation to support market clearing.    With such instruments in place grid 
delivery based on decentral production is to be specifically regulated and measured, or capped, 
or forbidden, depending on circumstances. 
1.e Spatial scale level 
Distribution grids are regional, nearly fully dependent on regional/national transmission grids. 
International transmission grids are operated mostly bilaterally between two transmission system 
operators and their partners.  The operators earn on market equilibration either by trading 
directly or by selling peak capacity on the transmission lines. 
1.f Emission pricing 
EU emission pricing - if present - reaches main fossil producers in a clear form, as in the current 
ETS. Contractual electricity prices for users don’t differentiate between higher and lower emission 
production sources and so reduce the emission price signal for down-stream actors, even if the 
cost of emission pricing are passed on in the aggregate. 
 
2. National Unbundled Markets, public TSO, linked internationally  
This may roughly be the situation the EU is in after implementing the ideas of the Energy Union. 
2.a Ownership of grids 
Distribution grids are regulated as a public utility, with substantial but not exclusive public 
ownership by lower level governmental organizations.  
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National/regional transmission grids are operated as public utilities, mostly publicly owned and 
not involving producers, also not indirectly.  
International transmission grids are publicly owned by one or more transmission system 
operators, excluding co-ownership of producers of private parties but possibly involving other 
public organizations. 
2.b Ownership of production and storage 
Primary production is fully private. Secondary production is private mostly, large scale facilities 
also owned by larger primary producers. Exceptions relate to grid balancing activities of TSOs in 
an international context. Public bodies may be involved in production and storage, then acting 
similar to private producers. 
2.c Market coordination and capacity availability 
Trading rules 
Pricing systems depend on regulations substantially, with wholesale markets playing a key role 
not so much in price setting for users but for load balancing. Main producers and organizations 
of smaller producers operate on markets with different time horizons to allow for volume 
planning, guided by the TSO operant in the region.  
Pricing is market based within substantial constraints of public regulations, as on feed-in tariffs 
and premiums and payment of surcharges differentiated as to users. There is substantial market 
price differentiation between sellers, as with supported renewables and rules for secondary 
delivery to the grid, and between buyers, with sensitive firms paying lower prices, as being 
exempted from surcharges. As such systems differ between member states international trade is 
restricted. With price signals not equal for all producers and end users, several market 
mechanisms function to a limited extent only, as with heat pumps for heat production and 
storage, see BOX 3. 
Electricity transport pricing 
Pricing of transport is diverse, as capacity pricing and other pricing are not integrated.  
Capacity availability 
Capacity payment is required to keep enough capacity available in periods of low renewables 
production. Renewables also receive subsidies. But due to their low marginal cost they will 
produce whenever they are allowed to and cannot function as back-up.  
2.d Clearance responsibility 
Grid balancing is organized by transmission system operators in wholesale producer markets and 
by direct regulation in renewables markets to prevent overloading of the grid. Clearance involves 
international trade, partly controlled directly by TSOs, and partly in the bidding procedures similar 
to the national clearance procedures. 
There are open contractual relations with larger users for demand peak shaving. Demand peak 
shaving with smaller end users is based on standard contractual relations, with price 
differentiation based on day time and season, and obligatory smart meters as required for this 
purpose. Decentral production, as for example with fuel cells from cars, cannot be combined with 
return delivery to the grid at fixed/standard consumer prices, and certainly not with even higher 
feed-in tariffs on renewables. With such instruments as part of the market, grid delivery based on 
decentral secondary production is to be specifically regulated and measured. At times decentral 
production will be capped or forbidden. 
2.e Spatial scale level 
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International grids are mostly operated bilateral, except possibly for some long term base load 
contracts. Multinational market clearance is not possible in this market set-up. 
2.f Emission pricing 
EU emission pricing - if present - reaches all fossil producers in a clear form. Contractual and 
regulated prices diminish the working of the price signal to users as very low renewables prices 
and very high fossil prices as also due to emission pricing are not or not fully conveyed to them.  
 
3. Unbundled Markets with EU High Tension Grid 
This may be the situation required for effectively implementing the ideas of the Energy Union. 
3.a Ownership of grids 
The ownership of grids is fully public. Lower levels of government own the distribution grid in 
their area. Transmission grids are mostly nationally owned, with possibly regional splits within 
countries and co-owned bi-national transmission grids. The multi-lateral international grid is 
publicly owned by EU and possibly co-owned by a consortium of national public bodies, like TSOs 
3.b Ownership of production and storage 
Primary production is fully private, with no market power for large primary and secondary 
producers in the regionally enlarged market. 
3.c Market coordination and capacity availability 
Trading rules 
Pricing is based on uniform codes to allow for similar market conditions concerning all TSOs and 
all bidding procedures.  The market size is substantially expanded in a multi-country (or better 
multi-TSO) trading context. The responsibility for grid balancing remains with single TSOs, who 
use the same techniques as in option 2 National Unbundled Markets. However, the broader 
trading options bring in more parties and the link between larger producers and distribution 
ownership is severed. This makes producers more equal in the supply market, including smaller 
ones.  
Electricity transport pricing 
Pricing of the EU wide HT grid (mostly DC) is based on congestion avoidance, to avoid the perverse 
incentive of creating congestion to raise revenue. High priced grid nodes are the ones where 
investment is due. High tension grids administered by single TSOs, mostly concerning one country, 
are based on congestion pricing or similar. Whatever the national choice is, it should be 
implemented real time.  
For the distribution grids under the national high tension grid(s) similar congestion pricing is 
involved, not just for downloading but also for uploading. Transport pricing is explicit, as opposed 
to pricing in type 1 and 2. 
Details of this real time congestion pricing arrangement are to be developed.  
Capacity availability 
Capacity payment may start substantial but is phased out long term. When private fossil 
producers have mostly left the market (with full CCS for the remainder), market clearance may 
become a serious problem in periods of very low renewables production, as with the Long White 
Christmas. Secondary production capacity then is required at a very substantial scale. This might 
develop privately, as for example with hydrogen fuel cell cars, but then not for electricity market 
reasons but for car driving reasons. Getting enough reserve capacity on line for such exceptional 
situations then remains as a public task, like having enough near mothballed gas fired power 
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stations available. The distribution of mainly mothballed capacity over countries, and linked to 
that the funding of such infrastructure, is to be resolved at EU level.  
3.d Clearance responsibility 
Grid balancing remains the task of individual TSOs, through dealing contractually with many 
producers and users, with short term markets becoming more dominant and some direct price 
volume mechanisms being implemented with specific users and groups of users.  Deployment of 
the public backstop capacity is the responsibility of each TSO.  
3.e Spatial scale level 
International grids link all TSOs. Long distance DC transport allows for also economically relevant 
long distance transport volumes, between different time zones east - west and climate zones 
mainly north - south, and both focused at major use centers. The international grid is operated 
collectively by a body formed of TSOs and EU public organizations. 
The national grids are operated by public TSOs and the distribution grids by local public bodies or 
also by the TSO.  
3.f Emission pricing 
EU emission pricing would reach all fossil producers in a clear form. Contractual and regulated 
prices, though limited in importance, diminish the working of the price signal to users as very low 
renewables prices and very high fossil prices as also due to emission pricing are not or not fully 
conveyed to them. At periods of close to zero market prices, the emission price could lead to a 
negative proceed for fossil producers, who then may decide not to produce. 
 
 
4. Single Price European Electricity Market, open, real time 
This pan-European market creates equal access to all primary and secondary producers and to all 
intermediate and final users, and plays a key role in the functioning of other energy markets, see 
Figure 3.  
4.a Ownership of grids 
As in market version 3, the grids are fully publicly owned. The international EU grid is owned by a 
consortium of primarily EU and all participating national TSOs. The (mostly) national HT grids are 
publicly owned and operated by TSOs as public bodies. The distribution grids may be owned by 
more local governments but may be made part of the national grid system, under the national 
TSO (or TSOs).  
4.b Ownership of production and storage 
Primary and secondary production are fully private, apart from public reserve capacity for 
calamity type of exceptional situations, like the Long White Christmas.  
4.c Market coordination and capacity availability 
Trading rules 
Pricing is fundamentally different from the three other market types, being fully based on real 
time open market pricing. There is no difference in pricing and access between small and large 
producers, nor between primary and secondary producers, and neither between national and 
foreign (EU) producers. In terms of climate policy there is no price support for specific producers 
or production technologies, and only incidental short term investment subsidies for novel 
technologies to create learning curves. There is no price differentiation between different user 
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groups, be they firms of private consumers. At a certain very high price point public backstop 
capacity is brought in, leveling off the price peak. 
Electricity transport pricing 
Transport pricing is congestion based. Investment in transport capacity is in the highest priced 
nodes, as public infrastructure investment. Details of pricing methods are to be developed. This 
is similar to congestion pricing in road transport. Transport pricing is explicit, as opposed to pricing 
in type 1 and 2. 
Capacity availability 
Capacity payment would bring down prices so much that capacity payment is required as a 
permanent subsidy. This is to be avoided fully in this self-financing market version; capacity 
payment is to be reduced to zero on short to medium term notice, to allow for the build-up of the 
long term open market. 
4.d Clearance responsibility 
Grid balancing is purely market based, except for the calamity type of backstop capacity brought 
in every few years or so. Market stabilization under exceptional circumstances can be considered 
a public good, see (Finon and Pignon 2008), with provision of that capacity as a public 
infrastructure investment. Clearance responsibility is basically in terms of orderly market 
provision however, including checks on fraudulent market participation. The clearance 
responsibility is in terms of the single price at the international grid and at the national grids. 
Clearance may be uniform for the whole EU. Detailed market design is required.  
4.e Spatial scale level 
The international transmission grid, with adequate capacity, allows for a single European market 
at uniform conditions. Combined with market rules this is a centerpiece for European climate 
policy in the Institutionalist Strategy for climate policy instrumentation.  
4.f Emission pricing 
EU emission pricing, here certainly present, is fully incorporated in all pricing, as far as open 
markets may go. At very low price periods fossil producers may have negative proceeds and may 
then decide not to produce. 
 
These four designs for the electricity market may first be seen as independent from climate policy 
instrumentation, for example as part of European market unification. There are a few strong 
linkages with instrumentation however. Technology specific instrumentation with instruments 
like feed-in tariffs for renewables, and other subsidies like production premiums and capital 
subsidies lead to further capacity payments and make market functioning as in type 4 Single Price 
European Electricity Market impossible. As most of such subsidy schemes are national, they 
increase international transport complexities. The link of the Planning and Control strategy is 
therefore is with type 1 Swing Producers Market, with the option to move to type 2, and maybe 
to type 3 if there is pressure from other domains, but never to type 4. Conversely, in the 
Institutionalist strategy, the logic is to link to Type 4, which stimulates all options for technology 
development with national and lower government levels, with firms and broader with civil 
society. Type 3, Unbundled Markets with EU High Tension Grid, might also be somewhat 
adequate but second choice. Type 1 and type 2 would substantially prevent broad emission 
reducing incentives in downstream activities, requiring additional technology specific measures, 
then moving from the Institutionalist to the Planning & Control mode of governance.   
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Smart meters would function very differently in the different market set-ups. In type 1 and 2, and 
maybe also type 3, they may be introduced obligatory, to force some flexibility into the market. 
Functioning would be based on contractual price differentiation over fixed periods of the day and 
with maybe some further differentiation over seasons and holidays. Contractual relations with 
large users would allow for a differentiated reaction related to actual supply - demand 
mismatches. In a single variable price for all market design, type 4, users and producers want to 
know the actual price, to avoid use at peak prices and increase production at peak price times. 
They will go for the best smart meters, best linked to their wishes in the internet of things, and 
with a specific form of smart grid resulting. 
 
4.4.4. Zero marginal cost considerations 
With a high share of renewables zero short term marginal cost, in any of the market types 
distinguished the producer price may fall to close to zero. With price support for small scale 
secondary production the primary producers will be driven out of the market. If this occurs 
regularly, some form of payment will have to compensate for the subsidized secondary 
production and the more so if part of primary production is subsidizes as well. Such detailed 
market correction, probably involving capacity payment, may be the consequence of choosing for 
market type 1 or 2. The question here is how a well-designed pan European market, type 4, can 
deal with the characteristics of relevant renewables, solar, wind, tidal and wave. In that market 
form there is no difference between wholesale and small scale markets: there is only one market. 
The problematic characteristic of these renewables is that they have near zero short term 
marginal costs, and also are non-dispatchable; and are unpredictably intermittent on different 
time scales. Substantial secondary production may be required for balancing the grid, next to 
flexible primary production and demand reaction to prices.  
The overall market price cannot lead to zero cost market prices however, as these market prices 
involve transport costs and scarcity rents due capacity restrictions while secondary production 
will also be above zero short term marginal cost as first primary production is to be acquired. Long 
term marginal costs involve the capital outlays involved and cannot be negative. The assumption 
by (Rifkin 2014) that zero marginal costs will lead to zero prices, heralding the end of capitalism, 
seems exaggerated at least. The experience with near zero marginal cost systems is substantial. 
Hotels, airplanes, oil and gas production, etc. all have near zero short term marginal costs. Similar 
holds for secondary production. Battery charging and de-charging and pumped hydro have near 
zero short term marginal costs but substantial opportunity costs: you can discharge only once and 
then have to charge again, at expected market price. They also have substantial capital costs, to 
be repaid from the difference in charging and discharging prices. Decisions on entering markets 
and investment decisions for existing firms are not based on short term marginal costs but on 
long term marginal costs, which include the costs of capital and its maintenance, and on long term 
expected proceeds. For the producers involved there is market supply matched with market 
demand, with expected price profiles coming out. If these expected prices do not cover expected 
long term marginal costs, investments will not take place. The capacity will not rise or go down 
and the price will go up. There are of course other considerations determining investments, but 
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going for a loss is certainly quite seldom for private firms. Levelized cost are not relevant in this 
context, see (IEA/OECD 2015)17.  
The price structure is to be high enough on average for justifying investment. This requirement 
holds for any producer in the market, from nuclear to wind.  In dark times with no wind electricity 
prices will jump, with other primary but also all secondary coming in. Though secondary 
production as from batteries has zero short term marginal costs, battery owners will not dispatch 
if they expect prices to rise further; there are opportunity costs involved. The scarcity price may 
substantially be above the short term marginal cost price of the marginal producers. 
There is not limit on the volumes of electricity involved, no limits to the share of renewables and 
there are hence no boundaries on emission reduction as related to short term zero cost nature 
of most renewables. The issue is to be resolved through capacity payment leading to some sort 
of production planning or through market mechanisms leading to a scarcity rent also for marginal 
producers. The speed of emission reduction will of course depend very much on the effective 
emission price as may be realistically expected. 
 
4.4.5. Energy storage and market stabilization: the heat pump example 
The low to zero marginal cost systems in primary production do not react to price shifts, unless 
the price becomes near zero. With shut-down and start-up costs, producers may even produce 
for negative prices. In a more developed situation, however, spread-out use, storage and 
secondary supply will stabilize prices. If at peak production and low demand the price becomes 
very low, heat pumps will start up to store heat, transformation processes as to hydrogen will 
speed up, all battery systems will start loading and delayed machines will start again like 
washing machines and dryers. This will happen well before the price is zero and hence the price 
will not drop to zero. Of course overinvestment with overcapacity will have a downward 
pressure on prices with low marginal cost systems. This has structurally been the case in 
aviation where governments tend to pay for losses of their flagship airlines.  
Heat pumps based heat storage systems 
Heat pumps with seasonal heat and cold storage are one option to decarbonize heating and 
cooling of buildings, if based on emission free electricity. Heat pump heat storage systems can 
help stabilize the grid over periods ranging from hours and days to seasons. It does not matter 
when exactly they are fed. They avoid the efficiency loss of electricity storage systems like battery 
and pumped hydro, which are in the order of 15 to 30%. 
In the Swing Producers Market, with solar PV electricity delivered to the grid at feed-in tariff prices 
or only tax and surcharges raised end-user prices, heat pumps face that price competition. As long 
as natural gas and also oil and butane/propane are available for heating of buildings, these fossils 
also compete with heat pumps, the more so the lower taxes and emission pricing are. Non-
predictable emission pricing makes investment in heat pump systems less attractive.  
Heat pump based heating and cooling systems can come substantially into the market by 
technology specific policy instrumentation. Options are to subsidize them or to force them into 
                                                          
17 See their statement in Chapter 2: “… LCOE is closer to the real cost of investment in electricity production in 
regulated monopoly electricity markets with regulated prices rather than to the real costs of generators in 
competitive markets with variable prices.” This situation does not exist anymore, also not in the US where this 
method of pricing was near universal. 
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the market. This then can be measures like forbidding natural gas and other fossils based heating, 
(as has been done in Denmark for countryside gas use), or more stringently, by prescribing heat 
pumps, for new buildings, for renovated buildings, or also when renovating the heating system. 
The situation is still similar in the National Unbundled Market, with contractually differentiated 
user prices combined with user-price based prices for delivery to the grid. 
 
 
BOX 3 Heat pump investment under different electricity market regimes and CO2 emission prices 
Beware: This is not a prediction but an investigation of one corner of feasible technologies relevant for 
climate policy instrumentation. 
 
An investment decision on heating and cooling systems for apartments is between heat pumps and 
underground storage and gas heating plus optional air conditioning. The heat pump would be driven by 
solar PV electricity. What will a wise investor do? That depends on the electricity market and on emission 
pricing, given the technologies as are available. (Roughly current situation in the Netherlands.) Market 
situation one is a fixed price for delivery back to the grid of €0.25. With a feed-in tariff the delivery back 
price would be higher. The second market situation is when producers of electricity receive producer 
prices, real time market based. That price will vary substantially but will be low for a substantial share of 
PV production, then used for driving the heat pump. The low electricity price is not influenced by emission 
pricing; the highest price levels might be. For the natural gas based system the price per cube is influenced 
substantially by the high emission price of €300 per tonne CO2, creating a price rise from €0.60 to €1.15 
per kWh. Induced market mechanisms would reduce that price somewhat.  
The investor would compare the costs and proceeds, as in Table 9. The outcome is that with the high 
delivery back price the investor will always choose for gas heating, even with the high emission price of 
300 Euro per tonne CO2. Yearly cost are €1580 for the gas system against €1755 for the heat pump system. 
With the low price for delivery to the grid (and similar for a low variable price from the grid) the choice is 
clearly for the heat-pump with heat and cold storage, even without any emission pricing. It would be €831 
for heat pump system against €920 for the gas system without emission pricing, and €1580 with the high 
emission pricing.  
The reasoning is based on decentral solar PV, funded by a partially high grid price, see the table. Grid 
connected renewables systems would favor heat pumps in the same way, with renewables based 
electricity production possibly at lower real costs than on apartment blocks. This holds however only under 
adequate market arrangements: real time variable market prices, equal for all. 
Current electricity market arrangements as with net metering and more severe with feed-in tariffs, 
intended to incentivize solar PV, imply that building heating gets stuck to fossils for decades to come. 
Additionally some air conditioning can be expected for cooling, which is covered in the heat and cold 
storage system already. A variable market price equal for all producers and users would not only fund the 
solar PV installation but also the zero emission heat pump with heat and cold storage system. Of course a 
carbon tax would make that option even more attractive. Having the zero emission heat pump system 
under currently usual electricity market arrangements could be induced by very extreme emission pricing, 
well over 300 Euro, required on short notice. A second option is to subsidize not only the solar PV but also 
the heat pump with storage system. A third option is to regulate heating systems, as advocated by the (IEA 
2015) in its analysis of energy using and producing products. This IEA approach would fit in an extreme 
technology specific governance mode. 
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Table 9 Heat pump with heat storage under different electricity market designs and emission prices 
 
 
Moving to the Single European Electricity Market, or the Unbundled Market with EU DCHV Grid, 
will change the situation substantially in favor of heat pumps. Producer prices, both primary and 
secondary, are becoming equal for all producers, net of transport cost and taxes and (expiring) 
feed-in-tariffs and their surcharges. Heat pumps operate when prices are low, not just because of 
own solar production but because of all peak production at low demand times. Heat pump use 
receives competition from all other storage systems, be they own storage of own production, 
other decentralized storage or central storage. Together they reduce price volatility and reduce 
very low price periods, linked through the energy markets as created. 
 
4.5. EU instruments, EU induced instruments and Member State instruments 
The focus here is on EU climate policy. The total of instruments covers EU level of instrumentation 
and Member State level instrumentation, the national level induced by EU requirements and also 
based on national and subnational initiatives without direct EU influence. Indirectly, the EU also 
has an influence through the setting of national targets. The most visible and substantial 
movement towards emission reduction have been implemented by independent nationally 
developed instruments. Feed-in tariffs have been developed in Germany, with a leading role by 
Scheer, and are applied widely in the EU, and beyond. Investment in wind power is based on 
national subsidies, including feed-in tariffs, feed in premiums and similar, and investment 
subsidies. Tax advantages and other subsidies for electric and hybrid electric cars at national level 
have played a major role in their introduction, with EU Fleet Standards becoming effective only 
Electricity costs per kWh: Gas costs per m3:
Per year: 
Capital 
& 
mainte-
nance
Electricity 
kWh 
(efficien-
cy 300%)
Deliver-
back 
price 
Variable 
market 
price (also 
if  CO2 
300€/t)
Gas m3 
(efficien-
cy 105%)
Current 
price; no 
emision 
pricing
€300 / 
tonne 
CO2
Energy prices 0.25 0.05 0.60 1.15
Natural gas heating 200 1200 720 1380
Fixed cost delivery 50 50
Total yearly cost (€) 920 1580
kWh/m3: 11
Heat pump & storage 600 4620 1155 231
Total yearly cost (€) 1755 831
 
Solar Panels kW: €: kWh per year/Wpeak 900
40 panels of 250Wpeak 10 kWh: Costs pa: 1100 Installing 40 panels 16000 €
kWh per year total 9000 To grid: 4380 0.25 1095 Converter replace 2000 €
Own use: 4620 0.00 0 Maintenance / year 380 €
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recently, with improvements in performance measurement upcoming18. The EU instrument flag 
ship, the ETS, has been hampered by an ineffectively low price, partly due to the successful 
national programs in renewable energy. 
Current instruments and their interrelations have been investigated for the EU in (Drummond 
2013), with country level studies adjoining in separate studies. That analysis shows in detail how 
instruments interrelate but at a more detailed level than is applicable for the grand design in 
instrumentation developed here. Specifically, the interaction of the Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED) and the EU ETS are cost-inefficient regarding centralized electricity production as emission 
permits can shift to other member states and other sectors (Drummond 2013), p91. However, 
the redesign of emission pricing towards price stabilization would reduce the opposition, as in the 
market Stability Reserve where the amount of permits is reduced if there are too many in the 
market. The line of development towards price stabilization is followed here. Also, EU climate 
policy has mainly left the multiple target set-up with separate renewable energy targets (COM 
2015), as it does not matter so much how emissions are reduced; GHG emission reduction is the 
overall goal. Long term instrumentation strategies should reckon with interrelations and avoid 
counteracting and cost increasing instrumentation in the design stage as much as possible. 
Stabilized emission pricing and avoiding all emission pricing are basic strategic solutions to 
incompatibility, with both options having been developed here in some detail in Section 4.3. 
The four main approaches to emission pricing as distinguished differ in how the EU and national 
levels interact. Without emission pricing, most instruments will function nationally, partly induced 
by EU policy frameworks. All emission pricing schemes are encompassing over all fossil CO2 
emissions, and possibly also covering some non- CO2 emissions. Emission trading systems have as 
a consequence that national targets become somewhat unspecified. Countries, that is the owners 
of the permits in a country, may sell emission permits to other legal entities in other countries for 
permitting installations there, shifting emissions to these other countries. Administratively these 
shifts may be noted but long term policies will not reckon with such past shifts, making national 
targets at least less easy to determine with simple criteria. With increased international trade in 
electricity and base industrial products shifts in hidden flows may also become substantial. These 
transboundary shifts mean that governments effectively lose control over what were “their” 
domestic emissions. Of course their national climate policy instruments apply to their remaining 
national emissions only.  
The pure cap-and-trade system, encompassing all CO2 emissions long term and being the effective 
instrument, makes national policies and other decentral actions quite irrelevant. They cannot 
influence emissions at EU level, as these are determined by the fixed cap. If the cap is adapted if 
prices are deemed too low or too high, the pure cap system becomes a hybrid cap. The hybrid 
cap system and the emission tax have a converse effect; they stimulate national actions, by 
making them economically more attractive. These differences are so substantial that they are laid 
down in some detail in the sector specification of policy mixes, starting from these pricing options. 
In specifying EU instrumentation it is not possible to go into detail of what national policies might 
be, different between countries. The specifications of instrument mixes are made based on 
                                                          
18 The NEDC (New European Driving Cycle) has a rising difference between norm measurement and actual 
emissions and may be replaced by WLTP (Worldwide harmonized Light vehicles Test Procedures), initiated by the 
EU in UN context. Optimizing for test results would then start anew. Real life measurement comes up in discussions 
now as an alternative. 
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covering most emission sources, with some instruments clearly operant at EU level, and others in 
a general sense assumed operant at member state level. Adjoining instruments may be set up at 
EU level, may be induced from an EU level, or may be thought of as bottom-up developments. 
Such option on centralization and decentralization are analyzed in a parallel project report, D6.3 
(Markandya, Rey et al. 2015). 
 
 
5. Instrument mixes for four emission pricing options and four 
main sectors 
 
The four broad sectors distinguished cover the total of fossil based CO2 emissions, very similar to 
the four main sectors distinguished in (IPCC-AR5-WGIII 2014). There is current climate policy 
instrumentation in these four main sectoral domains, which is to be adapted and expanded for 
the future deep emission reduction task. Options for instrumentation development include a mix 
of the main instrument types. 
 Institutional framework as the fabric of society, including internalization of external effects, 
like in emission pricing with cap or tax systems, and organization of markets like for electricity 
and more generally for energy. 
 Public and public-private infrastructure, ranging from transport infrastructure and energy 
infrastructure to city infrastructure, covering also spatial planning and implementation. 
 Options creation as through research, R&D and demonstration projects. 
 Instruments regarding private parties include information instruments to clarify markets; 
financial incentives including specific subsidies and taxes and surcharges of all forms to 
incentivize specific technologies and behavior; and regulations, like standards involving 
prescriptions and prohibitions. 
Design of future instrument mixes may be approached as a permutation exercise, adding all 
mutually exclusive variants per instrument type to one starting instrument, and then choose the 
best based on an evaluation procedure. There are for example many options for emission pricing 
(at least 20 in Table 4); many options for technology support, difficult to count even; many options 
for introducing specific technologies; and many options for market development as for electricity 
markets. Hundreds and more of possible mixes would emerge. A more reasoned and focused 
design approach is due, connecting instruments which in some sense belong together, like 
emission pricing options with some electricity market development options. Instrumentation may 
be more focused at specific technologies, as with feed-in subsidies per renewable technology, 
fleet standards per car vehicle category; and insulation standards for small and large houses and 
offices. Or they may be less planning oriented and more incentive oriented, using generic 
emission pricing systems and market development.  
The overlap in domain of application with superfluous or counteracting instruments is relatively 
clear when relating to two instruments. In a broader mix the linkages and the analysis become 
more complex, see (Simões, Huppes et al. 2015), with difficult to disentangle webs of instruments 
having been formed. It then becomes very difficult to even assess consistency, especially in a 
dynamic context.  
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The consistency criterion cannot be applied strictly as other considerations may play a role. Feed-
in tariffs have opened up new markets. Even if not being effective for emission reduction under 
a strict cap, they may dynamically be the reason to leave the pure cap and adapt the volumes 
under the cap based on price considerations. Also in instrumentation such evolutionary 
mechanisms may play a role and such mechanisms may be actively introduced. Again, that 
reasoning then should be explicit and clear. The intellectual challenge is to realize simplicity and 
encompassingness while avoiding overlap, powerful design principles to be fitted in any 
instrumentation strategy. They are not to be absolutized: instrument design is an art involving 
many considerations, at many levels. It is not a mechanical process. More practical issues will 
always play a role, always assuming effective climate policy instrumentation overall.  
There will always be technological and economic uncertainty, preferably avoiding picking 
winners. For some instruments, like informational ones, norms and values play a key role, b bur 
while certainly not being constant in time. There will be imperfect implementation, of any 
instrument, but with more robust and more vulnerable instruments and instrument mixes. 
Different instruments and mixes will function differently within administrative and legal 
constraints, these in turn becoming more flexible in the long run.  
For all mixes a first requirement is internal consistency, closely related to avoiding overlap while 
being encompassing. In a mix involving a pure cap-and-trade system, for example, it does not 
seem logical to add substantial feed-in tariffs and emission standards in the same domain, though 
it is possible in an administrative-technical sense. In a price stabilized (not pure) cap-and-trade 
system or emission tax system these technology oriented instruments would work in addition. 
Such general criteria for combining some instruments and not others are fluid; they are not hard 
and dichotomous. A few hard oppositions exist however, where instruments just cannot be 
combined. Price subsidies for delivering to the grid, user differentiated surcharges, and main 
producers made responsible for market clearing make the functioning of a uniformly priced, real 
time Single European Electricity Market quite impossible. However, there are also many in 
between electricity markets options where instrument combinations may be seen as somewhat 
less ‘logical’ but not impossible.  
In developing mixes preliminary choices will be made based on generic before detailed ones to 
avoid administrative and political overload, and based on first going for what fits well together 
and adding only where some conflict may be expected if otherwise coverage would be lacking. 
Ultimate evaluation criteria are also to be kept in mind. Lower administrative capacity and lower 
public and private cost of regulation are preferred, guiding choices towards simple instruments 
with broad innovative incentives. The prohibition of natural gas heating in new housing is an 
example of a simple technology specific instrument in the Standards domain; the uniform 
upstream emission tax an example of an also simple encompassing instrument from the 
Institutional framework domain. 
The four main sectors will roughly be typified as to current instrumentation, next with new 
instruments added so as to enable the deep emission reductions required. Between sectors there 
are diverging options for instrumentation, leading to typical alternatives. The number of 
instrument sets per sector is limited to four, following the four main options for emission pricing. 
With the pure cap-and-trade system, the electricity sector is certainly covered, the other sectors 
in principle as well, but possibly with exceptions which then lead to measures to avoid as shift of 
fossils use to these sectors. Exceptions may be in transport and buildings. Similar holds for the 
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price stabilized cap system: in principle all covering but not a full necessity, with transport maybe 
an exception. The emission tax is always encompassing, being applied fully upstream on all inflows 
of fossils. In their first description, regarding the electricity sector, some general aspects of these 
three versions of emission pricing come up. 
When linking the sectoral approaches into overall instrument mixes for climate policy, these 
alternatives are grouped and adapted, again in a most consistent way, creating full sets of 
instruments, in Chapter 6 and 7. These mixes are reasoned top down, from the two basic 
governance strategies, Planning & Control and Interventionist. Such governance considerations 
play a limited role only in the sectoral instrumentation development here. 
Issues like legality under Lisbon treaty constraints, political vulnerability, leakage problem, and 
administrative implementation are not treated here for the four bottom up instrumentation 
designs for four sectors, avoiding substantial repetition. They have partly been treated Chapter 1 
and in other chapters for example for the emission tax in Section 4.3.2, and for leakage in BOX 2. 
They will be revisited in the assessment of the two strategic instrument mixes, in Chapter 7. Also 
issues like induced energy efficiency increases due to emission pricing are left out of the 
discussion here. They will play a contributing role in emission reduction, in all four sectors, 
diminishing in time when fossils are substantially reduced to near zero. The core question here is 
how instrumentation may develop.  
 
 
5.1. Climate Policy Instruments in the Electricity Production Sector 
Currently, the main EU instrument is the ETS cap-and-trade system, with a fixed supply of permits. 
It operates at EU level fully covering electricity sector emissions (with regional exceptions), and a 
main part of industrial emissions, currently together around 45% of greenhouse gas emissions. It 
has not yet been investigated how strict the enforcement of the ETS is with its implementation at 
the firm and installation level in different countries. Technology-specific instruments are mainly 
implemented at the member state level. The main instrument there is feed-in tariffs, with feed-
in premiums coming up. These feed-in tariffs differ substantially between technologies and also 
between EU countries. Second instrument is investment subsidies as for wind parks, in many 
forms. Feed-in tariffs and most other subsidies on renewables are mostly funded by a surcharge 
on the electricity price, differentiated per user group. In some countries there also are emission 
standards limiting emissions per kWh. CCS has not been applied.   
The tasks from now are substantial.  The EC (2015) Energy Union Package states: “….. to meet the 
increased ambition decided in the 2030 framework, the EU Emissions Trading System will deliver 
a meaningful price on carbon emissions and stimulate cost-efficient greenhouse gas emission 
reductions.” (p14). The overall EU emission reduction goal is given; at least minus 80%.  For 2050, 
the EU emission reduction target for the electricity domain is assumed here to be a 95% relative 
to 1990, 25% of which is assumed to be realized by 2020. From 2020 onwards this corresponds 
to an average emission reduction rate in the electricity sector of 8.5% per year19. 
                                                          
19 Beginning value at 75 percent point, end value at 5 percent point, and 30 periods of 1 year implies a compound 
emission reduction rate of 8.5% per year. Reducing not by 95% but by 90% (relative to 1990) corresponds to minus 
6.5% per year. The yearly reduction rate of CO2 from 1990 to 2012 has been 0.65% UNFCCC (2014). National 
greenhouse gas inventory data for the period 1990–2012. FCCC. Lima, FCCC/SBI/2014/20.. 
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In the electricity sector, fossil production installations tend to last technically for several decades, 
typically to half a century, while economic life time will become much shorter, also due to lower 
average proceeds with rising shares of renewables. A substantial part of currently installed fossil 
power plants will have to be closed down before the end of the economic life time as it was 
envisaged when they were built, for some occurring now already20. Current instruments for 
renewables expansion are mainly at member state level and are substantially based on subsidies. 
Wind and solar have a share in primary renewables energy production now of around 15%21, 
while renewables have a share in total energy input of around 12% (Eurostat 2015). The share of 
wind and solar in total energy input hence was around 1.5% in 2013. To produce the volume for 
total energy use in 2050 it is mainly wind and solar which have the capacity to expand in principle, 
while other sources may be included, like geothermal, wave etc, with however a less clear scaling 
up potential. Such renewables production would have to expand by 2050 to around 90% of a 
substantially growing overall energy use, by at least a factor of two (Brauner, D’Haeseleer et al. 
2013). Their estimate includes a substantial rise in energy efficiency use, see for details also the 
CECILAI2050 reports by (Koning, Huppes et al. 2014, Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014) and externally (De 
Koning, Huppes et al. 2015). Energy use will be dominated by electricity, so this is the order of 
magnitude to be reckoned with. This implies a growth rate of new renewables as from 2020 to 
2050 of 18% per year, rising from the current around 10% per year since 2000, also depending on 
an uncertain level of nuclear and probably a limited role for CCS. At the same time the 
intermittency issue of wind and solar has to be resolved, partly by energy market reform, an 
instrument entailing hardly any costs itself, and partly by storage technologies, requiring very 
substantial amounts of investments. In a technical sense the task is clear: renewables are to be 
built and fossils based installations closed.  
There are four main instrumentation options for the task of reducing emissions towards 2050 by 
8.5% per year. For each sector they have emission pricing as a starting point: None; Pure Cap-and-
Trade; Hybrid Cap-and-Trade; and Emission Tax, with adjoining instruments added. These 
instrument mixes include how electricity markets may be developed, see the four main options 
distinguished in Section 4.4.  
 
5.1.1. Technology Stimulation and Forcing in private markets 
Increased technology subsidies, both for creating more learning curves and as renewables 
capacity payment, are first instrument. The role of EU is to stimulate such subsidy schemes and 
to harmonize them in order to reduce barriers to international trade in electricity. There is a shift 
from feed-in tariffs to feed-in premiums to allow for more integrated national markets. The 
subsidy schemes are set in a way to have emission reduction targets in electricity production met, 
combined with restrictive instruments. Next to these carrots there are the sticks: surcharges on 
electricity to fund subsidies, increasingly stringent CO2 emission standards on fossil electricity 
production, and special taxes on installations to be closed down before their expected economic 
end of life at time of investment. Such instrumentation is part of current policy instrumentation 
in the UK and the US, and similar in Germany. The emission standards are first only coordinated 
                                                          
20 The price ratio coal/gas determines which will be closed down first, with cheap coal now leading to the closing 
down of even newly built natural gas fired power stations. This ratio is hard to predict long term. 
21 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics, accessed 26 July 2015 
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by the EU. Towards 2030 they are made obligatory at the EU level to avoid misinvestment in fossil 
production which would make it impossible to reach the climate target. Existing fossil electricity 
production facilities are forced out of the market. First this is done by setting emission taxes on 
the worst performing installations. Later, the strict standards as for new installations, going to 
zero in 2050, are also applied to existing electricity production, reducing their emission to near 
zero, with few exceptions.  
As other instruments effectively take over, the EU ETS price remains low and irrelevant for long 
term decisions. Proceeds will also be negligible. The EU ETS will therefore be phased out. 
The intermittency in production of the new renewables is resolved by creating enough reserve 
capacity, medium term in mainly natural gas based installations and pumped hydro. Later, gas is 
phased out with intermittency resolved with large scale in batteries, more pumped hydro, and 
later in hydrogen storage for fuel cells and in decentralized multifunctional battery systems and 
fuel cells in households and cars. The introduction and the use of these technologies are 
subsidized, as standards and prescriptions mostly are not possible. Subsidies are in diverse forms, 
like demonstration subsidies, learning curve creation and investment subsidies to create the 
capacity for balancing the renewables dominated grid. Hydrogen for fuel cells is to be produced 
fossils free, using strict emission standards. 
The high tension grid infrastructure is mainly nationally developed and owned, with unbundling 
leading to private ownership of the distribution grid with substantial public regulation or public-
private partnerships, see the Swing Producer Market described in Section 4.4. 
Electricity markets remain substantially national, with bilateral international trade between major 
producers and system operators, using international high tension grids as made obligatory by the 
EU. Decentral producers, with mostly low marginal costs, are allowed to deliver to the grid at 
contractual prices, with limited variability, not real time. The international connections are 
constructed and owned bilaterally by the national grid operators, major producers and investors. 
They also control transnational transport, setting the conditions for this transport based on their 
commercial interests.  
 
Summary (1): Technology Stimulation and Forcing Instruments in Electricity Production 
 Renewables are brought in with subsidies, especially feed-in premiums and capacity 
payment 
 Large scale storage capacity is brought in purely commercially and partly with subsidies, 
 Small scale storage is brought in with subsidies 
 Coal and later gas are phased out with emission standards 
 ETS is phased out 
 Electricity markets are Swing Producers Market, type 1, or with stricter unbundling, type 2 
 
5.1.2. ETS pure-cap with renewables subsidies 
The ETS pure cap is domain expanded in principle and then does not just cover the electricity 
domain but also the other three sectors. We here take the general emission reduction path to 
hold for the electricity domain specifically as well. If not applied in the other sectors, additional 
measures are required to avoid a shift of fossils use to these other sectors, see the treatment below 
of these other sectors. The permit lake problem is assumed to have been resolved, avoiding short 
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term discussions on repair mechanisms here. The ETS emission cap for the electricity domain thus 
is set at a fixed reduction path of minus 8.5% per year22, with permit prices following. The 
substantial increase in yearly emission reduction, rising from less than 1% per year the last 30 
years to a cap reduction of 8.5% as from 2030, leads to very substantial price rises, with 
substantial price variation over the years based on more structural fluctuations in demand. 
Proceeds, fully national according to cap volume, are fluctuating similarly. Extreme permit prices 
will lead to undesirable short term economic consequences, to be politically contained somehow. 
If not, as by introducing a ceiling, the pure cap-and-trade system will be transformed into a price 
stabilized one, the next option. The expected (not set) path of price development in time can 
hardly be predicted, as predicting economic growth and economic cycles is notoriously difficult 
and breakthroughs in technologies and their implementation are even more unpredictable. 
Compared to the rising emission tax, for example rising linearly to 300 Euro per tonne in 2050, 
the average price level will have to be somewhat higher to achieve the same emission reduction. 
This is because limited price predictability makes long term decision making less focused on 
emission reduction. Econometric modelling (see report D3.2) may indicate how high the price will 
be or must be, replacing uncertainty with assumptions. Such models may tend to overestimate 
effectiveness of instrument implementation and underestimate the effects of innovation with 
related substitutions and broader market shifts.  
The limited price predictability increases uncertainty on investment paths for the mainly 
intermittent renewables and for investment in grid stabilizing options in storage, transformation 
and spread of peak in final use. This uncertainty can be counteracted by planning of technology 
deployment for stabilizing the electricity market, as in subsidizing stabilization technologies. 
However, developing an open electricity market partly is an alternative to subsidies. Specific ways 
of technology support in this instrumentation alternative could make setting up of open real time 
electricity market cumbersome, like price guarantees for secondary delivery to the grid during 
peak hours. However, with an open electricity market in mind, technology support may shift to 
using instruments like investment subsidies, leaving at least short term electricity markets 
unaffected. In this variant generic investment subsidies (as opposed to technology specific) are 
used for all market equilibration installations, including for example fuel cells and heat pumps. 
The basis for subsidizing is the contribution these technologies can make to real time market 
equilibrium. If they actually will do so then next depends on how exactly the electricity market 
will be organized. The problem of very low short term marginal costs, see Section 4.4.4, can be 
resolved in two directions: capacity payment or scarcity rent payment. In a technical sense the 
intermittency of renewables can be solved, quite independent from exact volumes of electricity 
production, with the possible exception of the long White Christmas situation.  
How electricity markets and infrastructure will develop is quite open in this fixed-cap option. 
There is some logic in this control oriented pure cap system to see capacity payment coming up, 
requiring long term subsidies in main parts of the primary and secondary electricity production 
system. However, the generic nature of the cap-and-trade system points to a market orientation.  
With the choice in technology support made to allow for open market functioning, the real time 
                                                          
22 These percentages are the compound percentages as usual in (de)growth quantifications. They are not to be 
confused with the percent points relative to a base year (1990, or 2005) as are used in the EU climate domain. We 
stick to the usual growth rate convention. This makes relating to economic growth possible for example. 
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open market is the connected choice, see for a more extensive description in Section 4.4. Core in 
its design is one real time price for all producers, including all decentralized primary and 
secondary producers, and one singe price for all users, reckoning with transmission and 
distribution costs. The internet of things as an active ingredient for market equilibration will 
develop autonomously within this market structure, but might also be planned. 
If the pure emission cap system has a leading role, that is if its permit price is consistently high, 
the adjoining national policies, like emission standards and technology subsidies, lose their 
meaning. They would create national costs without overall emission reduction23. However, if the 
national policies are more successful, as has been the case in the last decade, the cap price will 
become so low as to become irrelevant, as now is the case. If emission reduction slows down, 
zero emission technologies for primary and secondary production might then be forced into the 
market, and the CO2 emitting ones pushed out. This then would further erode the role of the pure 
cap system, shifting this variant in the direction of alternative 1, Technology Stimulation and 
Forcing, but with a different electricity market. Another option might be to raise the price to a 
relevant level by reducing the cap volume. That would lead to alternative 3 with a price stabilized 
cap, the Hybrid Cap-and-Trade system. 
 
Summary (2): Pure Cap-and-Trade Instruments in Electricity Production 
 ETS transformed into strict cap (no MSR), implementation with electricity producers 
 R&D funding for electricity storage systems, including transformation heat/chemical 
 Electricity markets, preferably Single EU, possibly Unbundled EU grid (types 4 and 3)  
 Learning curves subsidies for some new renewables (possibly) 
 National technology subsidies for resolving intermittency, especially for electricity storage, 
both large scale and small scale 
 
5.1.3. Price Stabilized Cap-and-Trade with national technology support 
The current price support actions in the Market Stability Reserve are replaced by active market 
operation, keeping permit prices between a floor and a ceiling, both rising along an explicitly 
indicated price path. This is a shift from a volume based cap system to a price based cap system. 
All floor and ceiling and collar systems in the literature have this price orientation, with volumes 
following. The price stabilization is realized by the EU purchasing permits when the price gets 
close to the floor and selling permits when the price is close to the upper limit. There is one single 
EU permit market on which the EU operates. Net proceeds from auctioning are distributed to the 
member states first according to their stated share in the total EU cap. The cap volume has 
become somewhat variable here, with stated shares in the cap later being established as based 
on a criterion like share in EU GDP.  
The wedge between floor and ceiling may accommodate shorter term fluctuations in demand for 
emission permits within the specified emission reduction pathway. The floor and ceiling 
operations would use the same mechanism, quantity adaptation through sale and purchase of 
permits by government. A wedge in the order of 10% would accommodate changes within a one 
to a few years period.  
                                                          
23 National subsidies and other regulations based on prime mover motives remain relevant for such non-climate 
reasons, but then only for some countries, for some technologies. Being prime is a positional good. 
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The price path set for the price stabilized cap system is slightly lower than the pure-cap price 
would be because of higher long term predictability by fixing the floor and ceiling path. The price 
would be somewhat higher than the emission tax price, to compensate for the slightly lower long 
term predictability.  
With the price stabilized cap system functioning, the emission price signal is to be effectively 
delivered to all actors in the electricity market. The logic in this pricing system is for open 
electricity market design, possibly with Unbundling plus EU transmission grid market version 
(market type 3), but most effectively with the Single EU Electricity Market, Type 4. The logic also 
is to avoid subsidizing renewables and have investments based on scarcity rents.  
A main difference with the pure cap system related to further instrumentation is that with permit 
prices flexible, decentralized actions in the cap domain make sense, both public and private 
actions, contrary to the pure cap system. Successful decentral action will reduce the cap volume, 
automatically, as soon as the price floor is reached. More subtle arrangements are possible, like 
establishing a guiding middle price, correcting for short term deviations towards floor or ceiling. 
With lower permit prices the volume of permits brought on the market then is reduced, and 
emissions are going down faster. These further actions may overlap with those considered in 
alternative 1 and 2, with instruments inducing renewables and storage and diminishing fossils. 
With more emphasis on technology specific instruments, reduction is faster, but more expensive.  
 
Summary (3): Price Stabilized Cap-and-Trade with national technology instruments in Electricity 
Production  
 ETS transformed into variable cap with a rising price floor and ceiling, implementation with 
major fossil electricity producers 
 Electricity markets, preferably Single EU, possibly Unbundled EU grid (types 4 and 3)  
 Limited investment support for renewables and secondary production 
 R&D funding for electricity storage systems, including transformation heat/chemical 
 Learning curves subsidies for some new renewables 
 National technology subsidies for resolving regional and national intermittency  
 
5.1.4. Emission Tax with Single EU Electricity Market 
The ETS covers the electricity system nearly fully already, with only small scale producers left out. 
It is stepwise transformed into an emission tax, by first bringing the permit price to a relevant 
level, with floor and ceiling, and then fixing the price level, rising for all consecutive years towards 
2050. The administrative implementation is first with electricity producers, but then moves to 
fossil fuel producers and importers, in relation with application in other sectors, then also 
covering all small scale electricity producers. The price level is based on econometric modelling. 
The price is equal for all emissions, with focus here on the electricity domain. See the discussion 
with references on maybe or probably required emission price levels in Section 4.3.2. Simple back-
of the-envelope arithmetic indicates that an emission price of 400€ per tonne increases cost price 
of coal fired electricity by 35 cents per kWh and of gas by 17 cents per kWh, shifting primary 
production from coal, to gas, to renewables. With some optimism on the speed of technology 
development a lower price of around €300 would be relevant. With such prices certainly 
efficiency increases in production would be induced, but also downstream in all use stages. 
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However, ultimately it is the shift away from fossils, use with a slight role maybe for CCS, which is 
required for 95% emission reduction. 
The Emission Tax is set at a linearly rising rate, coming to its ceiling in 2050. The price ceiling may 
be earlier if emissions are reduced faster than necessary for the reduction target, while the rate 
may be increased and the ceiling set later if emission reductions are not high enough, with a 
revision for example in 2035. 
The emission tax is functioning most effectively in the electricity domain if combined with a Single 
European Electricity Market, see Section 4.4, market type 4. With less effectively functioning 
international markets, as in type 2 and 3, the cost of near zero emission electricity will be higher 
due to system costs related to secondary production and back-up capacity, both not induced, and 
the more limited amount of demand flexibility in relation to price changes. The tax would then 
have to be higher in order to press out the same amount of fossil emissions. It seems probable 
that in a context where the EU establishes an emission tax, the EU will also set up an EU high 
tension grid with relevant open trading. Less developed markets like market type 1 and 2 are 
therefore not considered here. 
Infrastructure is a public EU planning and implementation task for the transnational grid, due to 
its natural monopoly nature, in market type 4, and, second choice, in close combination with 
public national transmission grid owners, in market type 3. National transmission grids and 
distribution grids are not regulated at EU level, apart from the full unbundling requirement. 
Standardization plays a limited role as new HVDC lines already are introduced and make grids 
more independent. Some standardization of the transformation technologies is useful but may 
come from industrial partners. In terms of R, R&D and D, the focus is on Research and R&D 
regarding energy storage.  
Information is mostly transmitted through the price system, with private support in decentralized 
markets.  
 
Summary (4): Emission Tax with Single EU Electricity Market in Electricity Production 
 ETS transformed into fully fixed emission pricing, as an emission tax. 
 Electricity market international transmission grid publicly owned involving EU 
 Electricity national grids and distribution grids publicly owned nationally.  
 Electricity balancing by market forces, real time 
 Guiding private standardization for internet of things 
 Funding of R an R&D, not much of Demonstration 
 
5.2. Climate policy instruments in the Industry Sector 
Currently, the main instrument is the ETS cap-and-trade system, with a fixed supply of permits, 
operating at EU level. It covers CO2 emissions from larger energy using industrial firms and 
installations, with free permits for many installations. With cap systems, full auctioning is 
assumed in the medium and long term.  The ETS has a low price now as the supply is larger than 
demand, for various reasons. For 2050, the EU emission reduction target for the industry domain 
is assumed as an 80% reduction relative to 1990, 25% of which is assumed to have been realized 
by 2020. From 2020 onwards this corresponds to an average emission reduction of 4.5% per 
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year24. With substantially lower reductions in iron and steel, cement and a few more, the 
remaining firms are to reduce emissions with a much higher percentage, in the order of 6-8%, 
also depending on the overall instrument mix over all sectors. Modeling with some specifics on 
instrumentation indicates that this task is a hard one, see the modelling in the CECILIA2050 
project by (Meyer, Meyer et al. 2014) and the bottom up modelling by (Deetman, Hof et al. 2014). 
More abstract ideal market optimization models seem to reach the high emission reduction 
targets more easily, see for example (Solano and Drummond 2014). 
There are four main instrumentation options, one with a focus on emission standards and no ETS; 
one based on an encompassing pure cap-and-trade system for all industry, possibly with subsidies 
and prescriptions for emission reduction; next a price stabilized cap-and-trade system covering 
all industry; and an emission tax covering all industry, all with different adjoining instruments. 
 
5.2.1. Technology Stimulation and Forcing in the Industry Sector 
For all major emitting industries low carbon technology paths are specified, using long term 
dynamic BAT specifications developed in substantially public funded R&D and Demonstration 
projects, also reckoning with structural developments in the economy. Some crowding out is 
unavoidable, see section 4.2.3, also on directions for reducing this. Technically, a major shift will 
have to come long term from fossils based heating to electricity based heating, also for higher 
temperature applications, like now already in electro-steel furnaces. Gas and oil based power 
generation in industry will have to be replaced mainly by electric power and by hydrogen fuel 
cells also delivering some heat. Building heating is treated as a different sector, see there, of 
course technically with substantial overlaps. As generic price incentives are limited, regulating 
private actors (instrument type 4) will play a central role, with financial instruments (type 4.2) and 
with standards and regulations (type 4.3).  
Current ETS based emission pricing on industries is not implemented any more in industries 
sensitive for international leakage and with few options for emission reduction, like iron and steel, 
several other metals, and chemicals. Implementation at smaller energy users is administratively 
for them too complex. Upstream administration is difficult due to overlap then with fossil flows 
to larger energy users. With dynamic BATs being developed and implemented by subsidies and 
taxes and standards and regulations, the already only partially applied ETS is phased out in 
industry. Emission pricing may remain operational indirectly, as when electricity would still be 
covered by emission pricing, cap or tax. Electricity then will have a price disadvantage relative to 
natural gas use in industry. This price disadvantage exists more forcefully for smaller firms that 
are to pay the surcharges on electricity for funding the subsidies in electricity production. An 
industrial tax on natural gas might then be an option to avoid a move from electricity to natural 
gas, as an industry-specific carbon tax on most but not all technologies. Partial application of 
emission pricing, cap or tax, may not be part of a strategic approach; it is current reality. Efficiency 
improvements as in cascaded heat use, combined transport, etc, have always been possible, and 
may still be stimulated. Publicly arranged heat transport systems in industrial areas may be one 
                                                          
24 Beginning value at 75 percent point relative to 1990, end value at 20 percent point, and 30 periods of 1 year 
implies a compound emission reduction percentage of 4.5% per year. With industrial growth at 1.5% an eco-
efficiency / climate intensity improvement of 6% per year is required. 
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instrument, not specific for the Technology Stimulation and Forcing approach in industry 
however. 
The uptake of renewable energy in industry is more effective and efficient with a well-developed 
EU electricity markets, type 3 at least but preferably type 4, the single European electricity 
market. However, direct control in industry links to also direct control in electricity production, 
then dominated by swing producers, market type 1 or maybe 2. A clear choice for open markets 
restricts some subsidy schemes in industrial electricity and heat production. 
In terms of infrastructure, the diversity of the industries involved reduces options for generic 
instruments. One option might be the set-up of a hydrogen distribution grid. A main but very 
partial grid has developed mostly privately, especially linking refineries and nitrogen fertilizer 
production. This grid could be expanded in public-private partnerships, partially also using the 
now existing but then phased out natural gas grid. There then would be a forced move-over to 
hydrogen, with the option of adding decentralized fuel cells for combined heat and power 
production. The domain of attractive heat pump applications with heat storage would be 
enlarged, also for heating of industrial buildings. However, there then are strict regulations 
required on emission free hydrogen production. There are now a few underground hydrogen 
storage facilities in the world, one in the UK. They would have to be expanded, also replacing 
natural gas storage for hydrogen storage, see the results of the HyUnder project25, with a case 
(exemplary) on Spain (Simon, Ferriz et al. 2015). This infrastructure option may not only be 
relevant for industrial heating and building heating but also for the development of the 
infrastructure for loading hydrogen for fuel cells in transport. Fuel cells then also might play a role 
in stabilizing electricity markets, delivering electricity to the grid during peak demand. Such 
mechanisms function only if real time markets would be developed, which is not in the line of 
reasoning which leads to leaving emission pricing out in industry.  
In a very broad domain of change, RD&D is required, with a focus on Demonstration for dynamic 
BAT specification. Supporting the change to low emission requires innovation and investment, 
means supporting at least the climate financing for low emission technologies in smaller firms, in 
many regions. New standardization of low carbon technologies is required for pushing the right 
technologies into the market, based on dynamic BAT specifications, and adapted regularly. 
Driving the change in energy use towards low emission is increasingly stringent emission 
standards in many industries, supported with subsidies for the investments required in integrated 
low emission systems. The effective prohibition of coal and oil use in most industries can be 
realized well before 2050, say 2030, as will be the case with oil somewhat later. Ultimately, by 
2050, the industrial application of natural gas is to be effectively prohibited in most industries, 
also as by upholding its supply and prescribing to shift the use of the pipes to hydrogen transport. 
A shift to synthesis gas and propane and butane is prohibited; these are phased out earlier 
already, together with oil and most other refinery fuels. 
Summary (5): Technology Stimulation and Forcing for emission reduction in Industrial 
Production 
 No generic emission pricing in industry 
 Choice of electricity market open, for cost reasons open market but then restrictions on 
technology specific instrumentation 
                                                          
25 www.hyunder.eu, an FP7 project surveying storage options in several EU countries. 
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 Electricity prices raised by electricity policies relative to coal, oil and gas 
 Coal, oil and gas to industry phased out with standards 
 Hydrogen infrastructure forced in, with subsidies and prescriptions and prohibitions 
 National emission standards, based on dynamic BAT specification 
 
5.2.2. Pure cap-and-trade with BATs implement in permits and with 
subsidies/taxes 
The pure cap combined with specific industrial climate policy is in between option 1 and option 
3, industrial policy in the context of a price stabilized ETS. It is an ambivalent option, as effective 
technology specific policy instrumentation would tend to make the cap superfluous, while a high 
cap price would make most technology specific measures redundant. It is not sure if in-between 
shades of gray can be realized, requiring a complicated dynamic balancing act. The pure cap would 
be set so as to reach the climate target regardless of general economic development, and 
irrespective of breakthroughs in new technology applications, or the lack of them. This means 
that a very broad range of permit prices is to be reckoned with, from as low as in current ETS to 
maybe a short term multiple of the price level as specified in the Price Stabilized Cap-and-Trade 
and the Emission Tax. With an extreme price explosion, then adapting the volume of the cap 
would transform it into a price stabilized version of emission pricing. The first only reactive nature 
would lead to a broad and unspecified wedge between floor and ceiling, till the changeover to an 
explicit better ordered price system is made.  
Of course the broader embedding makes a difference for what industry-specific instruments can 
do. It seems quite impossible to have substantial change in industry without also having a 
substantial pricing system in electricity production, with transport playing a more modest role. 
Technology specific instrumentation can be set up in the same way as in variant 1, Stimulation 
and Forcing, but then more modestly, with a focus on BAT with permits and subsidies on emission 
reducing investments. The subsidies and maybe standards used would not lead to reduced 
emissions as these are defined by the cap. They lower the price of emission permits. The goal 
then is cost reduction, with a focus on long term issues where markets react slowly. Stabilizing 
the price might be done very indirectly by administering technology-specific emission reductions 
not full speed, as in variant 1, enforced gradually so as to keep the price within reasonable limits. 
Such price planning seems beyond what governments in market economies may be capable of 
however, and certainly goes against the spirit of a pure cap system.  
Remaining on an economically and politically not too erratic price path therefore seems difficult 
to realize. This pure-cap emission pricing based alternative for instrumentation may therefore 
easily move in due time to either the technology specific policy instrumentation as in variant 
number 1 or to the price stabilized variant with adjoining instruments, as in instrumentation 
alternative 3.  
Summary (6): ETS pure cap with BATs and subsidies in Industrial Production 
 Cap on all industrial emissions 
 EU electricity grid, at least EU grid.  
 Hydrogen infrastructure forced in, public-private 
 Substantial industrial climate policies with BATs and subsidies 
 Tension between main instruments: Possible shift towards either option 1 or option 3? 
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5.2.3. Price stabilized cap-and-trade, with specific industrial policy 
The cap is set reckoning with required overall industrial emission reductions indicatively set at 
4.5% per year, with those in the non-iron and steel industry in the order of minus 7% per year, 
and in industries like iron and steel and other metals much less, as technical options are limited 
and CCS is not well applicable in most if not all industrial installations26. The price floor and ceiling 
are set to be on the required reduction path, based on middle of the road expectations regarding 
economic and technology development, the same expectations as determining the emission tax. 
The system comprises electricity production quite unavoidably as well, and may also cover 
buildings and transport. If prices are consistently too low or too high, the cap volume is adapted 
automatically, for all in the system. With prices reaching the ceiling too often this may lead to 
long term under-accomplishment. The window on pricing then may be adapted, by raising the 
price ceiling, and vice versa for too low prices combined with over-accomplishment. This last 
option is possible with highly effective technology-specific instrument application for example, as 
might be induced by dynamic BAT development and implementation. 
For the emission price signal to reach all parties the electricity market is key, reaching all market 
parties. The single European electricity market then is required, also implying a trans-European 
high tension grid. In current market designs, type1, and also type 2, emission pricing may reach 
the electricity producer but is only partly translated into differentiated prices for the user as prices 
are substantially fixed contractually. A single European hydrogen infrastructure and market would 
be required for fast hydrogen based technology development, as when hydrogen fuel cell 
technology would replace fossil power and heating. The hydrogen transmission grid linked to 
large scale storage might be an interesting option for low cost industrial emission reduction, to 
be further investigated and then implemented with substantial public involvement in planning 
and funding of infrastructure. Combining heat and power production in larger fuel cells is one 
industrial option which then might develop commercially. As with cars, such systems may help 
stabilize the grid as well, producing for others when electricity prices are high, then requiring a 
real time electricity market open to all producers. 
Several industrial installations with high emissions have sunk costs so they can operate below 
average costs. To get them to disinvestment the carrot and the stick may be used in addition to 
the price stabilized permit incentive, to speed up emission reduction and next raise the floor price 
to prevent others from taking over these reduced emissions. The carrot can be in the form of 
subsidies for early replacement of high emission installations by near zero emission ones. The 
stick is operating permits with increasing stringency, requiring new investments. Such measures 
are to be focused at industries with high emissions and good improvement options. This has been 
the situation in the US electricity and high energy using industry under the SOx tradable emission 
permit systems in the 1990s, with individual permits taking over again at very low emission levels 
when the cap was discontinued. Planning such additional measures may allow for setting a 
somewhat lower emission ceiling price. 
For most industries, the strong price signal allows for a shift in energy use towards near zero 
emission electricity or to hydrogen (non-fossil) fuel cell based heat and power, in house or by 
specialized firms. 
                                                          
26 The cost of CCS in steel and cement production are much higher than in installations with large chimneys.  
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Summary (7): ETS price-stabilized with adjoining instruments for emission reduction in 
Industrial Production 
 Cap on all industrial emissions, with pre-indicated rising price levels 
 Single EU electricity market, type 4, or 3 
 Hydrogen infrastructure coming in, public or public-private 
 Substantial subsidies for industrial restructuring 
 Some increasingly stringent emission standards forcing disinvestment 
 With highly effective other instruments, the floor and ceiling can be raised, reaching emission 
targets faster 
 
 
5.2.4. Emission Tax with Single EU Electricity Market: Industry 
Currently part of industry is covered by the EU-ETS. This coverage is broadened to cover all 
emissions and the price is fixed at a predetermined rising level. There is upstream administration 
so as to also cover smaller firms, possible because all other sectors move to full coverage and 
upstream application as well. This effectively establishes an encompassing Emission Tax. The price 
signal is as indicated in the legislation guiding longer term technology development and 
investments. At any moment in time the emission price information is given, in terms of market 
prices. This allows also for short term optimization, which however is secondary to the long term 
transformation towards zero emission technologies. A clear market signal requires open 
electricity markets, also internationally, market type 4 and at least type 3 as more extensively 
described in Section 4.4. Similar as with the Price Stabilized Cap-and-Trade the hydrogen option 
may require long distance transmission and storage infrastructure, to be publicly provided 
(possibly with regulated private implementation). With a clear also long term price signal, 
disinvestment may occur more market based, with low emissions competitors taking over 
markets and creating new alternative markets. An example of a technology substitution 
mechanism is the production of nitrogen fertilizer, now contributing to over 1 % of CO2 emissions. 
One option for emission reduction is not using methane (or coal, etc.) as the hydrogen source; or 
replacing current processes by electrolytic processes; or making all these technologies redundant 
by having the nitrogen fixing capacity developed for major crops. Such options can hardly be 
specified and forced. In principle there is no technology specific policy involved in this variant: 
hydrogen infrastructure, electricity markets and emission pricing act as generic instruments in 
this variant. Public support may play a role, but in any of these technology directions. But 
substantial private R&D is there already, easily leading to crowding out.  
Public research and R&D might involve an extremely broad range of zero emission technologies 
as may be developed. As most R&D will have to take place in the private domain, public spending 
focuses on more basic research. In most industrial markets also demonstration can develop 
privately. In exceptional cases where market development is too risky and long term, subsidies 
may be used to start the market innovation process. Technology forcing as by emission standards 
and technology standards is to be avoided as causing unnecessary costs. 
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Summary (8): Emission Tax with Single EU Electricity Market for emission reduction in Industrial 
Production 
 Tax on all industrial emissions, rising according to set levels 
 Single EU electricity market, type 4 
 Public provision of hydrogen main transport and storage  
 Public Research and R&D focused on basic research 
 Few subsidies for high-risk high-potential technologies 
 
5.3. Climate policy instruments in the Building & Consumption Sector 
Current instrumentation and instrument options in the building sector have been surveyed by 
(Nauleau, Branger et al. 2014) indicating the difficulties in upgrading the existing building stock to 
reduce energy use, with a preference of obligatory retrofitting over financial incentives. For the 
short and medium term, energy reduction also in existing buildings may be a most important 
issue, to be resolved with a full set of instruments for retrofitting, stimulating and forcing, as 
(Nauleau, Branger et al. 2014). However, in the long term considered here emissions are to be 
reduced much beyond what can be reached with energy efficiency improvement. The use of coal, 
gas and oil will have to be reduced to near zero, also in existing buildings. This holds for new 
buildings a fortiori. The long term therefore is to focus on emission free energy use in buildings 
with energy use reduction possibly relevant in the medium term. 
Heating, cooling, cooking and warm tap water households and tertiary sector are a major 
emission source, with around two third of total energy consumption in buildings. Indirect 
emissions due to electricity use have a smaller share in energy emissions in buildings now. With 
upstream decarbonization of electricity production having been realized mainly by 2050, direct 
fossil energy use in buildings is the key issue to deal with. In city regions natural gas is the main 
source, with butane/propane and heating oil dominant where there is no natural gas. Micro-CHP 
based on natural gas is relevant in the short to medium term but cannot deliver the over 90% 
reduction required in the housing sector by 2050 and may create a costly lock-in due its life time. 
The now feasible non-fossil options for energy delivery to households are electricity, including 
decentral solar PV; hydrogen, from low carbon upstream sources; and heat, as more local solar 
heat, geothermal heat, and distributed heat as from nuclear power stations. Distributed heat 
from fossil power stations which will have been phased out mainly by then. More exotic options 
exist like local biosolar fuel, microwave irradiation and certainly more to possibly come. 
 
5.3.1. Stimulation and Forcing low Emission Buildings 
The strategies for decarbonizing buildings may follow two routes. One is the full electrification, 
with heat pumps for efficient heating for all new and refurbished buildings, and certainly also 
other technologies, while phasing out natural gas. Systems for energy storage are to be 
developed, especially for fitting into refurbished buildings. The core instrument is the phasing out 
of natural gas in new buildings based on zoning regulations and in refurbished buildings as a 
condition for subsidizing. Subsidies on heat pumps and heat storage systems complete the 
instrumentation for this group of buildings, if owners choose so. Roof top solar cells may be part 
of the system but are not a condition for its low carbon functioning. Locally produced hydrogen 
may be an (expensive) option to avoid electric cooking.  
CECILIA2050 D6.1   Instrumentation Strategies and Instrument Mixes for Long Term Climate Policy  PART 1 
87  
The other route is hydrogen delivery replacing natural gas in distribution systems. Current high 
temperature low efficiency heating systems with natural gas will need limited adaptation for the 
change-over to hydrogen. They tend to be replaced every 10 to 20 years so the stock by 2050 is 
nearly fully renewed. This may be a fall back option, requiring a hydrogen distribution grid. With 
hydrogen available locally, a changeover to hydrogen fuel cells is also possible, providing both 
heat and electricity, probably less expensive. The hydrogen may also feed fuel cars fueling stations 
and the fuel cell electricity may also directly feed electric cars. The main instrument is relatively 
simple: the forced changeover from natural gas to zero emission hydrogen in basically the same 
distribution system, as also took place in the changeover from town gas to natural gas half a 
century ago. Additionally, subsidies for fuel cells can make for a faster change to the inherently 
less expensive fuel cell systems. This would imply a very substantial increase in hydrogen 
production, then fossil free.  
The two routes to decarbonization seem mutually incompatible but may be implemented in the 
same region, starting with replacing natural gas with hydrogen. During changeover hydrogen may 
be subsidized first to avoid price differences with the still natural gas using neighbors, these 
subsidies being reduced in a decade or so. Cost developments may then determine the choices 
between the two main routes. The local costs depend substantially on how electricity markets 
are set up. Heat pumps with storage are now economically attractive already as compared to gas 
based heating, but only so if the electricity price is variable, feeding the heat storage cheaply at 
times of low demand and high supply, and natural gas is not too cheap. The easily variable 
demand for electricity then can also help keep down the cost of the zero emission electricity 
systems.  
The implementation of instruments is nearly fully at a national level. The required legislation may 
be guided by EU Directives. The international hydrogen infrastructure cannot be developed by 
changeover from natural gas to hydrogen as regionally there will be a long changeover period 
with both gases being distributed. The parallel international hydrogen grid would require the 
active support by the European Commission in planning and subsidizing but not with EU 
ownership; public-private partnerships would be an option. 
 
Summary (9): Stimulation and Forcing for emission reduction in Buildings 
 Main international hydrogen grid with large scale hydrogen storage 
 Public-private national hydrogen infrastructure replacing natural gas infrastructure 
 Phasing out of all fossils for heating, with few exceptions  
 Demonstration projects on new heat-pump & heat-storage systems 
 Demonstration projects on new multifunctional fuel cell systems  
 Subsidies on insulation refurbishing and zero emission heating, cooling & cooking systems 
 Strict insulation standards for new and for subsidized refurbishing 
 Prohibition of natural gas for heating right now (Denmark)? Not applicable in most 
countries 
 
5.3.2. Pure Cap-and-Trade on all Buildings Energy 
The pure cap system on electricity is expanded so as to cover all hydrogen production and all 
fossils use in buildings. The administration is not possible with actual emitters in buildings, moving 
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the administrative level upstream, at least to their energy suppliers. For natural gas this is the grid 
owners and traders. For heating oil and butane/propane the level is with oil companies and 
wholesale traders, if transport is left out of this pure cap system. With transport part of it, the 
administrative level can be more upstream at refineries or even more upstream to primary 
producers of gas and oil and importers. The price level depends on economic growth and 
technology development. The cap volume can be set at the start assuming well specified adjoining 
emission reducing policy instruments like used in variant 1 of instrumentation. The speed of 
introduction of such adjoining policies then determines price levels more than the cap itself, 
successful introduction reducing cap prices. Costs and hence speed of introduction and hence 
price levels depend substantially on the set-up of the electricity market. With well-functioning 
internationally linked markets these cost can be lower, with variable pricing allowing for relatively 
cheap heating-with-storage options. Assumed here is electricity markets of type 2 or 3. With 
active building specific policies being successful, the pure cap system may be confronted with a 
long price lull, as happened with the ETS. The long term price signal then is absent, as is the short 
term one. Investments then will not tend to zero emission technologies, and development of such 
technologies will halt, making the 2050 target for buildings impossible to reach without extremely 
costly final spurts. Additional measures, to be sure of results, may then be implemented, 
especially at the national level. The more such measures are successful the more the price of 
permits in the pure-cap system will drop. This instability mechanism may again lead to the cap 
system either becoming superfluous and being phased out, moving to alternative 1, or to actively 
adjusting the cap volume to maintain relevant price levels, moving to instrumentation alternative 
3. To avoid such developments, there should be no competing instruments in the pure cap 
domain, which however may well go against national considerations, like with the feed-in tariffs 
first set up in Germany. 
 
Summary (10): ETS pure-cap for emission reduction in Buildings 
 Ambivalence of pricing with technology regulation: no adjoining instruments 
 Fixed cap on all direct emissions from buildings, as part of overall pure-cap 
 International hydrogen pipe lines set-up by EU in parallel to natural gas piping 
 Hydrogen distribution grid substantially replaces natural gas 
 Price level electricity and hydrogen depending on open market structure, type 4,s or 3 
 
 
5.3.3. Hybrid Cap-and-Trade (price stabilized) on all Building Energy 
The EU Hybrid Cap-and-Trade system covers all building energy and the full electricity and 
hydrogen production system. Also at EU level there is the EU electricity grid and the open 
electricity market, type 4 or possibly type 2. There also is an international hydrogen transport 
system, publicly planned and operated as utility or in public private partnership. The rising floor 
and ceiling are specified in advance. The predictably rising price of emission permits covers all 
building energy, both direct emissions and indirectly for emissions from distributed electricity, 
hydrogen and heat. The administrative level is upstream at least to decentral energy providers 
but more upstream if the sectors Transport and Industry apply the same system. The electricity 
market is of type 3 or 4, 
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Infrastructure supply covers electricity supply and possibly hydrogen supply, with also an EU 
transmission grid and storage systems. With hydrogen from electricity and adequate storage the 
electricity market can be substantially stabilized through demand variation.  
The supply of natural gas remains an option of choice, albeit at rising costs due to emission pricing, 
and being long term phased out for economic reasons. Infrastructure development for the supply 
of hydrogen instead of gas is a local decision based on local economic considerations. It is to be 
planned well in advance to avoid misinvestment in heating systems, especially as other systems 
may have closed off the potentially interesting hydrogen fuel cell option. Several hydrogen based 
options may be interesting additionally, like using car based fuel cells for electric heat pumps with 
heat storage, and connecting the fuel cell heat to homes as well. When buildings don’t have a 
hydrogen connection such car based options might be induced, assuming supply of hydrogen for 
transport. Insulation policy plays an intermediate role in the short and medium term, with 
standards for new building protecting especially rental homes from underinvestment. 
Research and R&D are prime, less so Demonstration. It is focused at low emission building 
technologies where private research will not play a substantial role. Especially seasonal energy 
storage, including heat and cold, still is a bottleneck for low emission systems. 
The support for private technologies is mainly limited to creating some learning curves and 
overcoming lock-ins. However, national and subnational initiatives are supported by the stabilized 
but still varying permit price level. The price level of permits determines all long term choices on 
investments in energy systems, aided by information to support market functioning. Fluctuating 
prices reduce the predictability of return on investment. Conversely, the other instruments 
operant, especially at the national, and local level co-determine the permit price, as do purely 
private initiatives. All additional instruments like stimulating and forcing emission reductions of 
private parties will lower the permit price. Successful additional instrumentation, potentially the 
same as used in alternative 1, will ultimately depress the permit price to the floor price level. The 
bandwidth then does not play a role as government buys emission permits to maintain the 
minimum price, but not at a higher price. If additional instruments are not so effective, the price 
will rise to the ceiling, with permits brought on the market to avoid the price to rise further. The 
middle area, shifting between floor and ceiling, will be the exception in the cap functioning, as 
possibly when economic growth picks up or slows down. The bandwidth does not seem to have 
a function in determining behavior, including investment behavior; it either is not present, or it is 
a temporary noise factor. If the price is consistently at the floor, the ceiling can be lowered, if at 
the ceiling, the floor can be raised, reducing the bandwidth to zero. The complexity of having a 
trading system then superfluous. 
 
 
Summary (11): ETS Price stabilized with low emission heating for emission reduction in Buildings 
 ETS price level predictably rising 
 ETS covering natural gas, butane/propane oil and coal use in buildings, as part of broader 
cap 
 Single EU electricity market, or close (type 4/3) 
 Substantial RD&D on integrating seasonal energy storage for buildings 
 Financing insulation medium term 
 Insulation standards long term replaced by standardized information 
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5.3.4. Emission Tax on all Building Energy 
The emission tax functions fully similar to the Price Stabilized Cap-and-Trade, but links to a slightly 
more incentive oriented approach to emission reduction in buildings. The fuller price 
predictability allows for a slightly lower price path. In the logic behind the choice for this option, 
also the Single EU Electricity Market is established, type 4. Where long term markets don’t 
function, as might be the case in long term development of energy storage systems, public 
Research and R&D is to supply such innovation, but only very exceptionally brought to the 
Demonstration level. This seems hardly relevant for zero emission housing towards 2050 
however, as implementation may well take decades or more. Institutional aspects of such systems 
may have to be developed however, like who may own and use underground energy storage 
systems, and under what conditions they may be used. 
Infrastructure for delivering hydrogen is publicly provided, leaving use options to private parties. 
Phasing out natural gas is a public task, with hydrogen taking over according to decisions and 
arrangement not made by the EU but at member state level or well below that. With a hydrogen 
grid available, interesting options like linking to hydrogen fuel cell cars are fully left to market 
development and more broadly to civil society and lower level administrations.  
Information to improve market functioning is limited and left to private parties, based on some 
standardization as for measuring building energy requirements. Information like in BAT 
specification or the Eco-design Directive are not used beyond providing information and are not 
applied in standards and regulations, with exceptions where markets are nearly fully absent. 
There are no technology specific subsidies and taxes and no emission standards or technology 
standards for climate reasons, with few exceptions to overcome very serious lock-ins. 
Refurbishing of existing buildings is left to private parties. Public financing of them might be an 
option where small scale capital markets don’t function and cannot be developed. Such public 
funding may well prevent such markets to develop however. 
 
Summary (12): Emission Tax on all direct and indirect emissions in Buildings 
 Emission tax predictably rising 
 Emission tax also covering all fossil energy in buildings, and all indirectly 
 Single EU electricity market (type 4) 
 Substantial RD&D on integrating energy storage in buildings 
 No specific subsidies and taxes for implementing technologies. 
 Insulation standards replaced by standardized information 
 
5.4. Climate policy instruments in the Transport Sector 
Current instrumentation in the transport sector has been analyzed in (Máca, Eberle et al. 2013), 
also indicating several options for improvement. Pricing instruments are quantified as most 
efficient, linking to mostly existing technologies. Light road transport CO2 emissions from fossils 
have a share of around 20% in total EU emissions while total transport emissions contribute 
around a third. Options to reduce emissions differ strongly between transport modes. Person cars 
can become electric or hydrogen based, with other options on the horizon maybe, like 
compressed nitrogen. Similar holds for buses and trucks and for water transport, each with maybe 
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additional options. This technology development is global, with Japan betting on onboard 
hydrogen storage and the US on electricity storage. Rail transport is mainly electrified already, 
with still some Diesel and Diesel-electric. Aviation has hardly options for zero emission flight on 
the horizon now. Efficiency improvements are possible, but not as fast as volume growth. 
Technology development is costly and global, while planes remain in service for about half a 
century. Projections by the UN show an absolute rise in emissions by around a factor 4, which will 
be somewhat lower in the EU but not much lower for EU international transport. The share of 
aviation in total EU CO2 emissions will therefore rise substantially under successful climate policy, 
with other modes of transport to be reduced more strictly than the overall over 80% EU reduction. 
With developments like self-driving cars and peer to peer systems, the distinction between public 
and private modes of transport may become soft.  
Modal shifts will in the 2050 future mostly have a limited impact on emissions as all drives are 
mainly zero emission by then, including upstream for electricity and hydrogen. There is one major 
exception, if decarbonizing aviation indeed proves elusive: a shift from air transport to ground 
transport and water transport, countering the rising trend in aviation also in rich countries 
(Goodwin 2012). Even if high speed systems like maglev trains and tunnel systems would use 
similar amounts of energy, electric, they would emit a mere fraction only of still mostly fossil 
aviation emissions. There is a clear positive relation between transport speed and average daily 
transport distance. Other modal shifts to reduce traffic volume therefor are to move away from 
high speed to lower speed modes, that is from high speed trains to low speed (except for 
outcompeting aviation); from highway car driving to local car driving and from trains to metro 
and bus systems. Modal shifts towards cycling and walking constitute the ultimate reduction in 
energy use for transport. Such shifts play a limited role in emission reduction with all transport 
modes, except aviation.  
Core policy tasks therefor relate to: 
 Decarbonizing all land and water transport 
 Creating a modal shift from air transport to land transport. 
In transport there is a stocks aspect, requiring new investments and sales to be near zero emission 
well before 2050, as the older part of the stock will still be emitting. Ships and trucks last for 
decades while passenger cars have an expected life time of around 12.5 years (Nemry, Leduc et 
al. 2008). This means that combustion engine passenger cars should not be sold any more by 
2040, and that new trucks, buses and ships should be emission free substantially earlier already.  
Instrument development starts from now, see the substantial analysis in (Máca, Eberle et al. 
2013). Overall their analysis shows mostly additive relations in using price incentives (fuel pricing; 
car pricing; road pricing) and some perverse elements in the set-up of the EU Fleet Standards like 
due to different standards for overlapping partial fleets and a mass correction in the standards. 
Current policy instruments for road transport have as their core these fleet standards for person 
cars and vans. The interaction with other mostly national instruments is complex. If remaining 
long term, the fleet standards have to be adapted, removing some of the limitations. They then 
are to be purely CO2 emission based, removing premiums for low and zero emission cars and 
removing the current mass correction which allow heavier cars to emit more. They should be all 
encompassing, covering (almost) all road transport. The reduction rate (apart from aviation) 
between 2020 and 2040 is to be around 14% per year in order to reduce the fleet standard 
emissions by 95%, halving every 5 years. As fleet standard reductions overestimate actual 
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emission reduction, this is a low estimate. Data from (Mock, Tietge et al. 2014) show that between 
2011 and 2013, the difference between fleet standard use and actual use has risen with 7%. When 
coming closer to zero, this difference loses relevance however. Currently, fleet standards apply 
to passenger cars and vans (up to 2510kg empty mass). Firstly, moving from passenger cars to 
vans should lose its current attractiveness. Currently in the US the most sold car type is the pick-
up truck, some weighing already more than the EU maximum mass regulating vans27. Effectively 
this is the passenger car, with some additional functionality, developed because consumers are 
willing to pay more to get out of the constraints of the fleet standards regulated fleet even if lowly 
priced. Next, also all heavier transport will have to be covered. Additionally there now are national 
programs to favor lower emission cars, including hybrids and zero emission cars, electric cars and 
some fuel cell cars. With purified fleet standards such subsidy schemes on technologies would 
become ineffective, resulting in transfer payments to car producers. An exception might be the 
creation of learning curves for not yet widely marketed technologies, like hydrogen fuel cell cars. 
Road pricing and fuel pricing would have their influence on behavior not covered by the fleet 
standards. Their future role depends on the EU level instrumentation chosen, as there may be 
overlap with emission pricing. Modal split policies must primarily focus on fast train systems 
replacing some aviation, but also attracting longer distance driving replacing cars. In the medium 
term slower city transport systems may support volume reductions, both fleet volume and driving 
volume.  
The four variants for instrumentation are presented in turn, starting from carbon pricing options. 
 
5.4.1. Stimulation and Forcing Low Emission Transport 
Fleet standards are expanded so as to cover all major transport categories. The set-up of fleet 
standards is reduced to emissions only, taking out special premiums for very small, hybrid and full 
electric cars. Such premiums become irrelevant and even counterproductive long term when the 
fleet involves a majority of non-fossil drive vehicles. Also subsidies for low/zero emission vehicle 
may be useful on short and medium term but lose their relevance long term: there is no good 
reason to subsidize nearly all cars. To arrive at near zero emissions for land transport, all fleets 
together are decarbonized, for example on a path from current emission levels to a near zero 
emissions fleet sold in 2040, latest. The last combustion cars sold by then will still be on the road 
by 2050, as will be part of those sold several years before. The fleet standard reduction path may 
be linear, with equal percent points as from 2020, with 5 percent points down per year. A 
corresponding compound reduction rate would then rise from 5% in the first year to 24%, 33%, 
50% and 100% in the last four years. A yearly compound reduction rate going down to 95% in 
2040 from now would be 14% per year, with the last reduction by closing down the few remaining 
combustion vehicle factories in 2040. The compound rate specification seems most useful, 
allowing for comparisons with other domains and with economic growth rates. Special vehicles 
like possibly cranes and ultra-heavy trucks and some tractors may be exempted. 
The fleet standards are to better link to actual emissions than currently is the case now NEDC 
(New European Driving Cycle) tests, and from 2021 possibly the improved WLTP (Worldwide 
                                                          
27 The 2015 Chevy Silverado 3500, functioning mainly as a passenger car similar to SUVs, has a mass now of 2702kg, 
with EU vans regulated till 2510kg. 
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harmonized Light vehicles Test Procedures) being set up in the UN framework28, especially by the 
EU, Japan and India. Ultimately it is real driving emissions however which should feed the 
standards, as designs and procedures will be directed so as to better score at tests: what you 
measure is what you get. This may hold in perverse ways as when vehicles have different engine 
calibrations for real driving and test driving. The recent issues regarding Volkswagen Diesel 
emissions of NOx have been brought up in the US, indicating factors of difference between test 
drive emissions and actual emissions. These differences had been noted by the European 
Commission but accepted for economic expediency reasons, see the survey of facts in (Brunsden 
and Oliver 2015)29. Even if such issues could be resolved for CO2 emissions, fleet standards cover 
drive technology but they do not cover fleet volume sold, driving distance and driving style of 
person cars, vans and other more heavy vehicles. Indirectly their influence on spatial planning 
and consumption style development therefore is more limited than with pricing instruments. 
In terms of institutional framework, there is no EU emission pricing in transport. There may be 
emission pricing in electricity production however, as a pure cap, stabilized cap or emission tax, 
see below.  
The market option developing linked to fleet standards is that of the Swing Producers or National 
Unbundling. They lead to relatively high electricity prices, different between countries. Therefore 
electricity will become more expensive, making the change to electric drives more costly, also 
because national fuel excises will rise modestly at best. This will give a premium on the price of 
combustion cars as long as they are on the market, unless offset for example by high subsidies on 
electric cars and car drive electricity and car drive hydrogen, and by special taxes on combustion 
cars. Such overlaps may be avoided if the fleet standards are strict enough. 
The infrastructure for the supply of emission free hydrogen is stimulated by public bodies but not 
publicly owned. Distribution is supplied privately and the main grid and central hydrogen storage 
supplied in public-private partnerships and when functioning privately.  
In the medium term there is substantial investment in high speed railway infrastructure and 
efficiency improvement in road transport. Apart from reducing aviation volumes there is no 
climate advantage involved due to induced increases in traffic volumes by faster drive systems. 
This therefore does not constitute a long term climate policy option, but of course may be useful 
for several other reasons. Similarly, a shift to cycling and walking in cities is attractive for many 
reasons but has medium term climate relevance; less long so term relevance. 
Stimulating zero emission transport requires relevant refueling infrastructure, forced by national 
governments and indirectly by EU Directives.  
 
Summary (13): Emission Standards & Non-fossil drive subsidies for reducing emissions in 
Transport 
 Fleet standards for all vehicle categories, pure emission, towards zero 2040 
 Public-private partnership in hydrogen transmission + distribution grid  
o Also for industry and households) 
                                                          
28 The final UN text is at: chrome-extension://gbkeegbaiigmenfmjfclcdgdpimamgkj/views/app.html 
29 Environment Commissioner Mr Potocnik raised concerns about carmakers misleading testers as early as May 
2011, when he warned in a speech that some cars may be ‘tweaked’ to fulfil the required test cycle. The issue was 
brought up forcefully by the Danish Environment Minister Ida Auken but economic considerations led to 
postponement of action, the US EPA now overtaking and forcing the Commission to act. 
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 Air and probably  sea transport mostly left out of climate policy (but taxed normally) 
 Refueling electric and hydrogen network obligatory for member states 
 Subsidies on transport electricity and hydrogen, reduced to zero long term 
 Fuel taxes rising only modestly (otherwise better more general emission tax) 
 Subsidies on electric and H2 fuel cell drives, reduced to zero long term 
 Taxes on combustion motor vehicles, to prevent relapse to fossil 
 
5.4.2. ETS pure-cap on Transport Fuels + National Subsidies 
The pure-cap type ETS+ on transport fuels is always combined with a pure-cap on electricity 
production. Its market orientation links to well-developed electricity markets, with a fully 
developed EU transmission grid or most effectively the Single EU Electricity Market. As the market 
price of the pure cap system alone can hardly be predicted it gives little guidance on long term 
dynamics in technology development and dynamics. In addition therefor more specific policies 
are added, almost all of the ones as specified instrumentation variant 1 for transport. There is one 
major difference. Emission pricing, not on fuels but on oil, gas and coal works only indirectly on 
fuel prices, with administrative implementation behind the (often coal heated) refineries, at 
imports and primary production. These market type prices are additional to current fuel excises. 
The introduction emission pricing by the cap works out very similar to oil price fluctuations which 
mostly have no consequences for the level of fuel excises. Such excises have mostly been already 
implemented before climate policy came and hence are without clear link to it. Subsidies to make 
non-combustion drive more attractive can therefore be lower than in instrumentation variant 1. 
Heavily subsidizing non-fossil drives would undermine the price level of the pure cap, possibly 
leading to its phase out, especially if such technology specific measures would be implemented 
in electricity production, industry and buildings as well. 
 
Summary (14): ETS pure-cap on Transport Fuels + National Subsidies for reducing emissions in 
Transport 
 Domain expanded to all transport: land, water and air 
 ETS pure-cap price levels fluctuating and hardly predictably 
o Very low permit price if technology specific instruments dominant, see ETS 
experience 
o Very high permit price with cap dominant, possibly substantially higher than 
emission tax 
 Open real time electricity grid preferably (type 4, or else type 3) 
 EU transmission grid for electricity and hydrogen 
 Recharging and refueling electric and hydrogen network obligatory for member states 
 Temporary subsidies on electric and H2 fuel cell drives 
 Increased taxes on combustion motors for faster phase out? 
 
5.4.3. ETS Price Stabilized on all Transport Energy 
The Price Stabilized Cap-and-Trade on all transport fossils would cover all oil products; natural gas 
and natural gas liquids, and coal derived fluids and synthesis gas. Together with the coverage of 
emissions in electricity production, industry and buildings all fossil inflows in society then are 
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covered. This allows for the simplification by fully upstream administrative implementation, at 
primary production and imports of all fossil energy products. All fossil energy products then have 
coverage for their emission at incineration or other oxidation. Upon export of a fossil energy 
product, an amount of permits corresponding to its carbon/ CO2 content can be sold on the EU 
permit market. When the price is under the price floor, permits can be sold back to the 
government at the floor price. If it is rising high permits can be purchased from government at 
the ceiling price. The price of the stabilized permit market is specified in advance to guide long 
term technology development and investment. The market signal has some spread, so is not as 
clear as with the fully fixed emission tax. This requires a slightly higher price level on average as 
compared to the rising tax. The wedge between price floor and price ceiling may be in the order 
of 10%, not just for transport but for all fossil emissions, though there is no clear reasoning for 
choosing a wedge or collar.  
The Single EU Electricity Market is a logical complement to this method of emission pricing, or at 
least having an EU wide transmission grid.  
Public infrastructure is in addition as for electricity also for hydrogen, the international 
transmission grid publicly owned by EU and member state organizations.  
Standardization is limited, if no clear market agreement is reached for refueling systems for 
batteries and hydrogen. The EU coordinates standardization, preferably at a global level.  
There may be limited subsidies for market creation of novel technologies, and limited taxes for 
moving specific emitters faster out of the market. The market correction to have in mind by 2050 
is in the order of [400] € per tonne of CO2, which translates into a price increase of 1.15€ per liter 
of Diesel and 0.92 cents per liter of gasoline.  
 
Summary (15): ETS Price stabilized for reducing all energy related emissions in Transport  
 ETS price rising predictably  
 Domain expanded to also aviation and shipping 
 Single EU Electricity Market (type 3 or 4) 
 Public transmission grid electricity and hydrogen 
 Some spatial planning as for modal shifts 
 Limited standardization as for energy loading 
 
5.4.4. Emission Tax on all Transport Energy 
The emission tax covering all transport is part of the encompassing emission tax on all fossils. It is 
levied fully upstream at primary production of fossils in the EU and upon import of all fossil energy 
and energy products, as a product excise, and returned upon export of energy products and upon 
adequate CCS. CCS is not relevant in the transport domain directly due to the diffuse and mobile 
emissions, but is relevant indirectly, possibly playing a role in electricity and hydrogen production. 
All fossil emissions are covered this way, indirectly. Not returning the carbon makes you lose the 
deposit paid, creating an emission tax. This is the simplest form of administration for emission 
pricing, easily expanded to other countries. Proceeds of the emission tax system are distributed 
to member states according to their actual share in emissions. In the build-up stage of the 
emission tax to substantial levels the EU Fleet Standards may remain, in a revised version: purely 
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based on CO2 emissions; encompassing, at least covering person cars, vans and small trucks 
together; and linked to real fuel use.  
Infrastructure with monopolistic tendencies is public responsibility. Electricity infrastructure and 
markets have been set up for policy in the electricity domain already and deliver for transport 
(and building and industry) as well. For hydrogen, similarly, the infrastructure and markets are to 
be set up as well. This is to be done not just for making zero emission drives in transport possible 
but for reducing emissions cheaper and faster in other sectors as well. Simple options like 
connecting motor vehicle batteries to the grid for stabilization start to be implemented (recently 
in the Netherlands). For fuel cells linking their production potential to the grid would allow for 
substantial grid stabilization also for longer periods of time. Emission tax plus a single EU 
electricity market would drive this development, further based on private actions. There should 
be hardly any publicly funded RD&D in the transport domain in the long term nor technology-
specific subsidies and taxes or emission and technology standards.  
 
Summary (16): Emission Tax for reducing all energy related emissions in Transport 
 Emission tax rising predictably, same for all sectors 
 Domain expanded to also aviation and shipping 
 Single EU Electricity Market (type 4) 
 Public transmission grid electricity and hydrogen 
 Limited standardization only, as for loading 
 
 
 
 
BOX 4 Emission pricing and real time electricity markets for electric drives with grid stabilization 
Beware: This is not a prediction but an investigation of one corner of feasible technologies relevant for 
climate policy instrumentation. 
 
Some examples may give an idea of the primary price effect induced by emission pricing, by the tax or by 
the tradable cap system, see Table 6. At 300 Euro per tonne CO2, the price of Diesel would rise with 90 
cents to in the order of 2.30 Euro per liter, disregarding here their market price reducing effect. This effect 
is roughly the same as for a price rise of oil with 135€ per barrel. With electricity for recharging at 0.25€ 
per kWh, electric trip costs, already lower at current prices, would become even lower comparatively. It 
then is the high purchase price of electric cars determining outcomes in terms of total costs. A Swiss study 
on currently available cars (see http://www.e-mobile.ch/index.php?pid=de,2,138) shows roughly similar 
overall costs for comparable car types now on the market, with advantages for electric drives if the car 
drives more kilometers, as with taxies and shared cars.  
With the price of fuel raised by the emission tax there would be a clear advantage for electric drives, more 
so with further improved technologies. Using variable electricity prices would further increase the 
advantages of electric drives, using the low prices for loading and the high prices also for delivering to the 
grid, making money as secondary producer. So the attractiveness of electric cars may increase substantially 
if there is an open to all real time electricity market, helping stabilize the electricity market in the process.  
The example in Table 10 shows how a price difference between peak price and lowest price of 20 cents 
might work out on overall costs, assuming modest technological advances. Electricity market operations 
would earn the car owner around 45 000€ over the life time of the car. Depending on the number of 
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charging cycles a future battery can manage, a highly uncertain and even ill-defined number, some of the 
proceeds would have to pay part of an additional battery. If really so attractive, the price differential of 20 
cents then would be reduced by this market force alone. The example is not a prediction but is to show 
the importance of real time electricity markets in intermittent renewables dominated electricity 
production. 
Of course a choice for electric drive is not just cost based. Quality aspects, like driving range, speed of 
recharging, and availability of recharging stations are also main determinants, improving fast in the last 
decade. Public supply and public support for charging stations has already been effective in several cities 
and countries, especially Norway, see: 
 http://info.nobil.no/images/downloads/nobilbrosjyre.pdf . In combination with subsidies for electric cars 
the share of hybrid and full electric cars there has risen to 2% now, and is rising very fast, with a share in 
new registrations of 33% with the Netherlands following at 5.7% and the UK 1.2%. Other countries are 
well below 1%. (Source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/07/23/norway-leads-the-
worlds-market-for-electric-vehicles-infographic/ ) 
Similar reasoning may be set up for hydrogen fuel cell cars, with slightly different characteristics for their 
grid connection: they can only upload their locally produced electricity, but they can supply flexibly over 
longer periods using stored hydrogen. Currently hydrogen charging stations are rolled out in Europe, 
starting large scale in Germany, and Japan.  
 
 
 
 
Table 10 Electricity market operations with car battery (1 car, 10 years) 
Battery capacity in kWh 100 kWh 
De-charge at peak price hours, twice daily: 50 kWh 
 25 kWh 
Market activity nr of days per year 300  
Difference peak price - low price 0.20 € 
Proceed market operations  4500 €/year 
Proceeds of 10 year operation 45000 € 
Additional battery cycles per year 100  
Battery cycles per battery life time 1000 * 
Additional battery replacement  ??  
New cycle after 10 years, in new car PM  
*Tesla model S (2013-14) has capacity loss now 5% per 50 000km 
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6. Towards full sets of instruments for long term climate policy 
6.1. From satisficing and optimizing to deep transitions and transformations: 
timing 
The deep transformations required for deep emission reductions by 2050 first require political 
determination. That determination is presumed here in principle, and then the question is: how? 
There must be a practical choice now, as a choice for coherent instrumentation specified towards 
that accepted goal. Day-to-day improvements in instrumentation and optimization of 
instrumentation are important but lack the overall zeal required for deep transitions. The choice 
on basic directions for instrumentation may be postponed, but then essential instrumentation 
will not be specified now. Effectively, this would mean that the instrument pathway for deep 
reductions is not specified now. This seems a most realistic assumption, sadly, that the 2-degrees 
instrumentation pathway from now will be decided on later. This implies that current too slow 
pace of emission reductions will continue, with faster reductions to be implemented later. 
Continuing the current rate of CO2 emission reduction of around 1.5% till 2020 will require 
emission reductions from 2020 by -4.5%, to get at the 80% reduction by 2050, and substantially 
higher to get to 90% or 95% reduction, by -7.5% or -9.5% per year as is required in several 
domains. A most realistic route politically seems to have the transformative instrumentation 
decided by 2020, leaving 30 years for the deep emission reductions, stressing the Hirooka 35 years 
rule30 already (Hirooka 2006). A substantial part of the economic transformations has to have 
taken place well before 2050, due to stock mechanisms. For person cars stock replacement is 
substantial in a decade, requiring a fully zero emission fleet sold by 2040 latest, but for trucks and 
buses earlier. For fixed installations the life time may be much longer so to avoid misinvestment 
and guide the right investment, policy instrumentation has to be in place much earlier. Some 
intermediate technologies like gas fired power stations, may reach their end-of The long term 
horizon towards 2050 therefore requires basic instrumentation choices as soon as possible, in a 
full policy preparation sense by 2020. Fixed infrastructure has the longest life time, requiring 
infrastructure choices now already to be made with a near zero emission future in mind. 
Satisficing and optimizing towards 2020 is not compatible with the 2-degrees goal.  
 
6.2. Main entries to instrumentation, over all sectors 
The methodology for strategic instrumentation design first starts from now, and looks into 
developments required. That step has been gone through in the previous chapter 5, for the four 
main sectors distinguished there. The second line of reasoning is instrument-technical and based 
on more abstract reasoning. Instruments can be ordered as to generality of application and with 
more technology specific instruments as to their bindingness, see type 1 to type 4c in Table 3. 
Instrumentation design then is to refer to Sparseness, Completeness and Non-Overlap, see 
Chapter 4 and specifically Section 4.2.5. Consider the most generic options first and then add 
towards full coverage while avoiding overlap. The third entry to design relates to desired modes 
                                                          
30 His analysis shows that deep innovations, if successful, get to their fullest speed of market development typically 
after 35 years, slowing down to full saturation thereafter. 
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of governance, in general, and specifically for climate policy instrumentation. Two main strategic 
governance directions are distinguished, a Planning & Control Strategy and an Intuitionalist 
Strategy, see Section 3.3. Planning & Control links to a direct public task in technology and market 
development, with substantial use of technology specific instrumentation, but still: as sparse as 
possible. There is a close public-private relation for fast and controlled development, also of 
infrastructure. The Institutionalist mode links to the institutional framework primarily, creating 
long term incentives, and leaving more concrete developments mostly to lower administrative 
levels, private parties and civil society in general. There is a sharper delineation between public 
and private responsibilities. Strategic design is not about details of instruments and their 
implementation but about the main structure and set-up. Is emission pricing uniform over all 
sectors? And if not why not, as economic and administrative advantages are clear? Such strategic 
choices precede the detailing of instrumentation, which will always be substantially on-the-go. 
The why question is basic. Why go for the price stabilized cap-and-trade, as compared to the pure 
cap and the pure emission tax? In the final design strategy governance takes a prime role, 
reckoning with bottom up developments and with the logic and tactics of developing instruments 
and instrument mixes. 
The bottom up line of reasoning builds on the four instrument mixes per sector of the previous 
chapter. Starting at the four basic options of emission pricing, four instrument mixes resulted per 
sector based on the prime choice on carbon pricing: No emission pricing; pure cap-and-trade; 
price stabilized cap-and-trade; and pure emission tax. In principle the four instrument mixes 
linked to each pricing system can be added over all sectors, with not well fitting overlaps resolved. 
For example, the four sector sets with emission tax can be added. This results in: one uniform and 
upstream administered emission tax; a single real priced EU electricity market; public 
infrastructure for long distance transport of electricity and hydrogen; RD&D focused at research; 
and some more technology specific additions for speeding up transformations. This is a bottom-
up and instrument-technical approach to instrumentation, with only a sniff of governance in it. 
The open real price electricity market fits to the emission tax in a governance sense, but was also 
argued on pure efficiency considerations, as for reducing the costs in industry in reducing 
emissions. 
In the development per sector the abstract design principles were followed, starting generically 
in the institutions domain. However, the bottom-up approach with instrumentation theory then 
also included: no carbon pricing, for governance reasons. A strong focus on Planning & Control 
requires technology specific instrumentation, making the pure cap-and-trade system which was 
starting point superfluous. The instrument mixes as developed for the four main sectors are here 
combined into full sets of climate policy instruments. As there are four variants per sector sixteen 
combinations could result. This would assume independence of all elements, like having four 
different options for emission pricing in the four different sectors. However this seems to lack 
governance logic and is cumbersome administratively. It would imply to treat emission from 
natural gas, from coal, and from oil and oil products differently according to their sector of use, 
like natural gas for industrial furnaces treated differently from gas used in electricity production, 
for room heating, and for transport. So the four different options for emission pricing (no pricing; 
pure cap; price stabilized cap; emission tax) first link to four overall sets of climate policy 
instruments. Upstream applied emission pricing covering all emissions avoids boundary 
complexity and reduces administrative requirements substantially as compared to within-system 
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application. So, to start with, in any strategy there is only one type of emission pricing, cap or tax, 
equal in all sectors, or there is none.  
In the second step of the design methodology the instrument typology next main instruments 
have to match consistently. In a pure cap-and-trade system restrictive standards for coal fired 
power stations and subsidized renewables violate the sparseness and non-overlap criteria. They 
just don’t make long term sense: they are wasted policy effort and wasted public money. Coal will 
lose out anyway and renewables receive an indirect subsidy by having their competitors’ 
emissions priced. From some strategy point of view one might choose for the standards and 
subsidies instruments; but then the cap system would be superfluous. Similarly, having electricity 
markets dominated by swing producers with contractual relations with energy users does not fit 
well with an emission tax, as the price signal of the tax is not translated into the market price at 
times when fossils still are the marginal producers. A relation with governance strategies certainly 
exists but the reasoning here is purely instrument-theoretical as yet. A final issue in instrument-
technical reasoning goes against sparseness in instrumentation: Add instruments to be sure that 
the climate target is reached even if they overlap. This is different from reasoning out of 
encompassingness, which may also lead to some overlap. The example is again technology-
specific instruments as for bringing renewables and secondary electricity production in the 
market, and many more, in parallel to a pure cap-and-trade system. Would it be feasible to have 
two fully overlapping sets of instruments available, each capable of reaching the climate targets 
in its domain effectively in principle? The consequences for further instrumentation are mind 
boggling. What is the public role in developing infrastructure; which type of electricity market is 
to be developed; how to deal with public-private partnerships and with technology 
demonstration? This to-be-sure argument also is a dangerous one however as chances are that 
neither instrument set is effectively developed as the other one can take over. Would it be 
feasible to have and keep the highly complex cap system operational and updated if the 
technology specific instruments effectively do the job? And conversely; with cap high priced and 
causing hardship, as it should in reducing emissions, would additional technology-specific 
hardship be accepted? With neither system being really operational there is the danger of 
instrumentation collapse. More specific reasoning for choosing instruments into an instrument 
mix seems required, avoiding overlap as much as possible. 
The third element in the design methodology refers to governance strategies. It may technically 
be possible to have technology specific instrumentation matched with an open real time 
electricity market. But why choose this combination? The reasoning involved would have to link 
to some idea on governance, as the technical logic would link technology specific instrumentation 
to technology specific support on renewables and secondary electricity production, making open 
markets difficult if not impossible. This combination would however not fit in either of the 
governance strategies distinguished here. The Planning & Control strategy would not put main 
effort in building up an open real time electricity market, which would reduce instrument options 
for technology specific policy. The Institutionalist strategy would put emphasis on electricity 
markets and other institutions so as to have a most generic incentive effect, avoiding technology 
specific instrumentation as much as possible. Mixing just cannot lead to clear instrument 
development.  
In the next chapter the governance oriented approach is developed, screening from the sector 
mixes what is technically possible, from the perspectives of the two governance directions. This 
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screening process results in only two sets of instruments in the long term: a Planning & Control 
Mix and Institutionalist Mix. 
 
6.3. Reduced emission pricing options in long term strategies 
The instrument-technical reason to have emission pricing is to guide private actions towards 
emission reduction. In long term reasoning, pricing is to guide public and private behavioral 
choices towards the desired low emission future, regarding infrastructure development; 
research; research & development; and ultimately private investment. It is not current emission 
prices which are relevant but long term expected prices. The two main pure pricing options, cap 
and tax, differ in that the pure cap prices are uncertain long term and the pure tax is fixed long 
term. However, there are uncertainties related to political vulnerability which reduce the 
difference, as the freezing in the rise of the UK Floor price tax has shown. These political 
vulnerabilities extend to the pure cap as well: at irrelevant low prices the volume is reduced, as 
currently with the Market Stability Reserve in the ETS, and at exploding prices, the volume will be 
increased, to reduce prices and avoid short term damages to national industry. In this respect the 
difference between cap and tax is not so absolute: the Pure Cap will evolve into a Hybrid Cap, 
with an implicit price path.  
There then is a next line of more formal reasoning. Shifting from an implicit to an explicit price 
path gives more guidance for long term emission reducing behavioral choices. The next question 
then is: why have a price collar? The price variability plays a key role in the pure cap system; to 
distribute the given amount of permits over all emitters in a short term optimal way. But with 
volume adaptation the floor and ceiling of the collar clear the market by volume adjustment. The 
collar has no climate policy function, and worse, the collar obscures the long term price by 
allowing price fluctuations. Stating the mid value explicitly and reducing the price variation are 
clear improvements, ultimately leading to a fixed price system. The upstream administration, 
covering all fossil emissions was assumed already, so the fixed permit price transforms the cap 
system into a tax-like system, with conceptually and operationally simpler set up of an excise.  
This is instrument-technical reasoning. How would the reasoning from the two other entries to 
strategic design look like, the strategic governance views and how to develop from now? 
The Institutionalist Strategy directly links to the emission tax. The Planning & Control Strategy has 
a less clear link however. On the one hand, a fixed emission path, following yearly emission 
reductions, is attractive.  That does not seem feasible however due to interference with other 
more concrete instruments, like feed-in tariffs, leading to low prices and, without them, steep 
price hikes being near unavoidable. Development into a price based system is covered in the 
institutionalist approach already. So the strategic logic in Planning & Control is to go for control 
one step deeper, at the level of technology specific instrumentation, leaving the emission pricing 
domain. 
How could these two strategic options materialize, starting from now? Currently, the ETS has a 
long term (and short term) irrelevant price level, with emission reductions effectively being 
realized by bringing renewables into the market with subsidies and by emission standards in 
electricity production and transport. The two directions for development seem both feasible in 
an instrument sense. The current ETS can be domain expanded, with administrative 
implementation moving upstream. It can be stepwise price stabilized, on a rising price path, 
reducing price variability to zero, and finally administratively be simplified into an emission tax. 
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The other line of development is to bring more coherence in the EU coordination of technology 
specific instrumentation. Renewables and secondary electricity production can be subsidized in 
different ways and at different levels, also covering decentral production as in private households. 
Bringing unity in set-up and some unity in levels - similar to current treatment of national fuel 
excises - would create more options for national development. Standards have been harmonized 
at EU level for road transport in Fleet Standards and for many products in efficiency standards. 
They can be expanded. Currently emission standards in industry mostly lack climate emission 
standards. These may be introduced more actively in the BAT regulations of the Seville process, 
implemented nationally. Emission standards in electricity production are nationally diverse or 
lacking, and could benefit from unification, creating an equal playing field across Europe. 
Emissions from buildings currently are mostly regulated from an energy perspective, as in 
obligations for energy efficiency specification and more detailed national requirements. EU rule 
making could indicate more direct climate relevant requirements, as on heating and cooling 
technologies, ultimately regulating out direct fossils use, or requiring member states to do so. 
The conclusion on emission pricing development here is that current instrumentation may 
develop in the two directions coming out of instrument-technical considerations and strategic 
governance considerations. They are active EU and guided member states instrumentation in a 
technology specific direction, and an EU level specified emission tax implemented at the national 
level, with technology specific developments and instrumentation left to member states, firms 
and civil society. The four options for emission pricing investigated in the sector analysis in 
Chapter 5 are reduced to two: no generic emission pricing and the encompassing emission tax. 
 
6.4. Developing Planning & Control and Institutionalist Instrument Mixes 
6.4.1. Strategic choices on emission pricing: not pure cap-and-trade 
The pathway for the two strategies will have to start at the mixed system we are currently in. First 
we have an ETS of a near pure cap type; with a limited domain of application; applied to direct 
emitters; with a permit focused administrative implementation; and with now a too low price to 
guide long term actions. Second, it is combined with technology-specific instruments mainly at 
the member state level, currently the most successful instruments. If remaining the most effective 
instruments, the ETS would be insignificant. If the ETS would take over, decentral measures would 
be insignificant. For neither strategy this contradictory approach is an acceptable state of affairs, 
and certainly is not the basis for long term strategic instrumentation. The pure cap-and-trade 
system has two basic flaws, to be resolved.  
A first requirement relates to emission pricing. Clear explicit long term emission price guidance is 
one main option, as with the emission tax. The other is price based technology guidance to be 
realized for the long term, with indirect price considerations guiding the choices on technology 
stimulation and prescription. Secondly, the pure cap-and-trade system now makes local initiatives 
and creativity useless for emission reduction, as only making emissions for others cheaper. Only 
short term economic considerations would be relevant for emission reductions, messaging a poor 
view on a responsible society. A city creating a low emission transport system just reduces 
emission prices so others can emit more cheaply. A strategy based on this instrument would falter 
due to collapsing legitimacy.  
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Could these deficiencies be mended, keeping ETS as a pure cap-and-trade pricing system? The 
price instability seems difficult to mend, as unpredictable market forces determine price 
developments.  Aligning other instruments to keep the permit price in a certain domain is 
technically possible but lacks justification. If such other instruments are so effectively available, 
why also have a complex tradable cap system? And if the price signal is to be clear, price 
stabilization seems a most direct option available in a political sense now already, as the support 
in the EU Parliament for the Market Stability Reserve shows. But then the ETS leaves the realm of 
a pure cap-and-trade system. Also on the short term already the emission price is to be brought 
to a relevant level, see (Drummond 2015) Section 3.1, leaving the realm of pure cap-and-trade.  
The second deficiency seems more basic. In a liberal society local government bodies and civil 
society play a key role in policy development and implementation. Restricting decentral actions 
to short term market mechanisms seems a sure road to high costs of climate action as potentially 
interesting initiatives are made ineffective. Private responsible behavior, like lowering the 
thermostat in office and at home and cycling instead of car driving cannot reduce emissions under 
a well-functioning pure cap-and-trade system. Low emission cities may reduce emissions locally 
but don’t reduce emissions overall. The message that this is the case may take some time to 
arrive, but the message is there in public publications now already. Legitimacy of such climate 
policy will dwindle, killing effective climate policy in the process as long as a pure cap-and-trade 
instrument remains core. 
So though being the actual starting point in time for any strategy, the current pure-cap ETS cannot 
be the core in a long term instrumentation strategy.  
 
6.4.2. Strategic choices on emission pricing: two pathways and directions 
Governance strategies indicate desired directions and function as a filter for development of 
instrumentation. Does a development fit? In the Planning & Control line, there is no objection to 
have a pure cap system in the background as a remnant of the old; in a certain way it links to the 
planning mode, but at an institutional level only. But it is not core of that technology specific 
strategy and there is no drive to its improvement: technology specific actions are required long 
term and with quite some urgency now already. Expanding the domain of application of ETS has 
no priority. Without active maintenance of an administratively complex instrument it will 
succumb on the first hurdle or it will just fade away as when firms don’t really comply with their 
substantial administrative tasks. From an institutionalist point of view, the disadvantage of a well-
functioning pure cap system is that it reduces low emission development into a purely market 
economic process, detrimental to all bottom-up initiatives, public or private. The lack of long term 
price guidance creates unnecessary costs and bottlenecks. These disadvantages increase with the 
all-sectors application as will be developed in the emission pricing system, covering all fossils, and 
more. A first step therefor is to make the permit price stable and predictable, by setting a floor 
and ceiling price. That is a move from a Pure Cap system to Hybrid Cap system. But why have a 
difference between floor and ceiling? Price fluctuations have no function. If prices go up and down 
between floor and ceiling, the price signal is weakened without good grounds. The logic therefor 
is next to reduce that difference to zero. The permit price then is fixed, on a rising path. But is still 
is permits, with substantial administrative complexity, as in matching permits with carbon flows 
on a yearly basis for all firms involved administratively. Replacing the yearly administration per 
firm with a transaction administration as also used for value added tax is a substantial 
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simplification, bringing emission pricing in the well-developed domain of taxes and excises. The 
system then has been transformed into an emission tax.  
The choice for either governance direction in climate policy instrumentation is not one made yes-
or-no at a certain date. It is the considerations involved which may lead into the one or the other 
direction. Also, some shifts in instrumentation may be possible in special circumstances only, as 
when political blockages are alleviated following extreme climate events. Such soft considerations 
may be valid. Here a choice is assumed to be made effectively by 2020, from then going in the 
one or the other direction. 
The conclusion in this governance strategy analysis is that two clear instrument pathways evolve. 
In the Planning & Control Strategy technology specific instruments are broadened and 
strengthened, with the ETS-type pure cap system going into oblivion. In an institutionalist strategy 
the ETS-type emission pricing is actively developed towards price stabilization, ultimately into an 
emission tax with adjoining instruments. These two pathways will be detailed in Chapter 7. 
 
 
7. Pathways towards Planning & Control and Institutionalist 
Instrumentation 
 
The pathways towards covering instrument mixes require different organization for the two 
governance strategies. The bottom up analysis starting at sectors may be linked quite directly to 
the planning & control strategy for instrument development, with some general considerations 
for choices. In the institutionalist strategy this sector and technology entry is to be avoided: it 
starts it with generic instruments with only some gaps filled in with technology specific additions. 
In the planning & control mode, the active role of governments is instrumental towards private 
parties primarily, with public tasks added for effectiveness and efficiency, and often using public-
private partnerships. In the instrumentalist mode there are well-defined reasons for incentive 
creation and for purely public provisions, as with monopolistic infrastructure. It leaves the private 
domain more independent within the confines of strong institutional incentives. The instrument 
mixes for the two strategies are developed in turn. 
 
7.1. Long term Instrumentation in the Planning & Control Strategy 
7.1.1. Instruments development strategy 
The thrust of instrumentation is directed at private technologies and the corresponding behavior, 
at Level 4, with direct public tasks following, at Level 2 and 3. The most successful schemes can 
be strengthened and can be expanded so as to cover a full low-carbon electricity system using 
standards and subsidies; a nearly full low carbon transport system mainly by using standards; 
major improvements in industry by dynamic BAT based standards and transition subsidies; 
substantially reduced emissions from building, using zero emission standards for new buildings 
and subsidy and standardization programs for refurbishing of existing buildings, including 
subsidies for heat pumps and heat storage.  
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The instrumentation strategy first follows the order of generality of the instrument typology, see 
Table 3.   
Level 1 instruments first involve emission pricing. The ETS is first left in place, with limited domain 
expansion and very incidental cap adjustment. Active and effective technology specific 
instruments will further undermine its role for a substantial time to come, with very low price 
levels not relevant for long term decision making. If so, the demise may come of this 
administrative complex instrument. Maintaining a complex instrument that does not have a 
function seems highly improbable and certainly is not part of a long term strategy. The ETS either 
fade slowly or stop by an explicit decision to halt its functioning at a certain date, not going for a 
next trading period. Conversely, not with low but with exploding prices, as with limited 
effectiveness of technology specific actions and high economic growth, the logical step is to 
increase permit volumes. That would change the pure cap system into a price-based cap system, 
as a hybrid cap, preferred by (Goulder and Schein 2013). It then would shifts to ultimately 
developing into a carbon tax, key instrument in the institutionalist strategy. So in Planning & 
Control the ETS remains with a limited role or vanishes, its function taken over by more 
technology specific instruments at level 4.  
The ETS domain now involves electricity production and emissions in larger industries, with 
however technology-specific subsidies and user-specific taxes as dominant instruments in the 
electricity domain. Electricity market institutions therefore now are substantially national and 
fragmented, even if not based on feed-in tariffs but feed-in premiums and capital subsidies. 
Market functioning is limited, also requiring capacity payment to avoid breakdowns of the mainly 
national grids. Bringing all production and grids under national control is nearly unavoidable, 
according to (Finon 2013). More modestly, (Díaz-González, Hau et al. 2014) indicate detailed 
requirements on country Grid Codes to accommodate intermittent renewables. 
Instruments at Level 2 and 3 have substantial overlap and subtle differences between the 
strategies, developed together below, in Section 7.3. As instrumentation substantially involves 
national instrumentation, the EU distributes EU emission targets to the member states.  
The technical descriptions given in Chapter 5 give the starting points per sector for technology 
specific instrumentation. Standards play a core role in all four main sectors, their stringency based 
on leveling burdens between sectors, also using the subsidy instrument. 
 
7.1.2. Instrumentation in the electricity sector and large industries 
In the electricity sector emission standards for all fossil using electricity and for fossil heat 
production are set up for new installations, on short notice. They specify the allowable CO2 
emissions per kWh and megajoule of heat, going to zero on short notice, with few exceptions like 
for back-up power, remote islands and some industry integrated electricity production. With a 
time delay these standards are applied gradually to all existing installations as well, pressing out 
fossils in a clear time path. At the same time, the renewables revolution is forced in, mostly by 
subsidies on renewables, subsidies on public-private grid expansion, and subsidies on storage 
systems, both at micro level and at larger scales. To keep electricity production and demand 
balanced, capacity payment is introduced on a large scale, especially for variable fossil production 
with natural gas. Phasing out fossil capacity payment is delayed till there is enough build-up of 
other capacity, including variable secondary capacity for load balancing. Then variable fossil 
production can be closed down, with compensation payment. 
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The possible role of CCS is incorporated in the emission standards, allowing for the CCS storage 
to be deducted from actual emissions. The CCS storage is to be incorporated net of emissions 
required for that CCS, reckoning with upstream emissions as for the additional energy and the 
materials required. Similar rules apply for other large scale stationary emissions, as in iron & steel 
and cement production and refineries. For large scale centralized CCS, like in the Norwegian 
Sleipner field or depleted gas fields, a transport infrastructure would have to be developed, in 
public-private partnership with fossil electricity producers and site owners, and possibly involving 
coal and natural gas producers. 
 
7.1.3. Instrumentation in the industry sector 
 
More specific instruments will take over from the ETS, contributing to its demise. Fossil heating is 
are phased out similar to the phase out in buildings. Fossil power might be brought under a regime 
similar to road transport, if not integrated in industrial processes. In all more complex cases 
generic prohibitions and prescriptions for phasing out fossils are difficult to apply. Then detailed 
more technology specific prescriptions are used, based on dynamic BAT (Best Available 
Technology) specification, combined with subsidies to ease the change-over. These standards 
apply to new installations, and with a time delay are applied to existing installations. Dynamics 
are created by moving the Best Available Practice into a low emission direction, through joint 
public-private development of technologies, cooperating with advanced companies. Non-
compliance with the new standards does not lead to closing of the industry but to a rising fine 
related to the estimated volume of over-emission, similar to the fine in current ETS and Fleet 
Standards. The rising fines structure is set up so that by 2030 most firms adhere to the general 
BAT based standards, following the BAT specifications as have effectively been developed by 
then, and continuing that BAT development. In industries where application of these instruments 
would lead to their bankruptcy, temporary support mechanisms are set up, including subsidies 
and access to low rates capital markets for either transition or their managed close down.  
This standards based approach is not always possible however, as for large emitters in iron and 
steel production; clinker production for cement; refineries; and chemical industry. For iron and 
steel some efficiency improvement is possible using cokes based production. Public R&D on non-
cokes based production might maybe have long-term success. Clinker production will increase, 
with coal based clinker substantially decreasing. Reducing cement use can reduce clinker 
emissions, as involving green concrete options. Refineries will process a fraction of current oil 
volumes by 2050, with traffic decarbonized. They remain producing for the chemicals industry, 
including coating and plastics. For all these industries, emissions can be measured quite well. A 
rising share of subsidized CCS is prescribed for such firms with fossils derived emissions, with 
credits tradable between them.  
 
7.1.4. Instrumentation in the transport sector 
In the transport sector, there is differentiated policies regarding different transport modes. Road 
transport, including non-person transport, is most homogeneous and can be covered by relatively 
generic instrumentation, expanding on current Fleet Standards. Transport CO2 emissions come 
from oil, with as yet very small amounts of other fossils-based fuels and natural gas. Fleet 
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standards are transformed to reduce total transport emissions predictably by the total fleet sold, 
not just the average emissions per car as currently is the case. Compensation and certainly 
premiums for weight and share of non-fossil drive systems in the fleet are removed, transforming 
it to a pure emission standards system. Also, the distinctions between person cars and vans is 
removed, which is a difficult boundary in practice now. Next the instrument domain is expanded 
so as to also cover heavier transport, made possible by a further adaptation, referring to total 
expected emissions of the fleet. The expected life time emissions per vehicle type constitute a 
first element, based on expected life time in kilometers per type, times emissions per kilometer. 
Type-specific emissions are measured realistically, as by a representative set of on-road vehicles 
in the EU. These simplifications allow for full coverage of all road vehicles, then also trucks. The 
number of vehicles sold is the third element, not present in current Fleet Standards. Life time 
driving distance x average emission x number of cars sold constitutes the emission volume 
specified in the Fleet Standards, one unit per credit. As also in US CAFE standards, see (ICCT 2014), 
credits may be traded. With the expected emission volume of the fleet sold not reducing enough, 
the producer has to obtain additional credits from other producers. A fine for non-compliance 
may create some short-term flexibility, functioning as a price ceiling similar to the current fine in 
the ETS. The fine is long term rising.  Fleet standard lead to delayed emission reduction in the all-
ages full transport fleet, related to vehicle life time, in years. Standards for the new fleet sold are 
therefore advanced on the emission target for the full fleet. For near zero emissions by 2050, the 
fleet standards should be zero-emission ultimately by 2040. This implies a reduction rate of life 
time emissions in the fleet sold in a year to over 10% per year, if starting now31. 
To reduce the substantial stock delay effects, there are subsidies for scrapping older fossil 
combustion vehicles, starting roughly mid Thirties. To ease the process of decarbonization, there 
also are subsidies for new types of zero emission vehicles when they start to come on the market, 
to create learning curves and overcome lock-ins. This process has been gone through for electric 
cars by 2020 and then applies to heavier vehicles only, roughly above 3.5 tonne of mass, and may 
include hydrogen driven cars, including fuel cell drives. The hydrogen supply for fuel cell drives in 
transport is regulated to be emission free, not using the production facilities based on natural gas 
as now exist for industrial use. LPG can be phased out directly now already, being a most 
expensive way of driving, in real terms, with a transition period of maybe a decade. This is not a 
serious problem for users as they can easily switch back to gasoline. The share of Diesel may 
depend on air quality issues, but both gasoline and Diesel will be on a strong downward curve. If 
air quality issues remain, the earlier phase out of Diesel drives might simplify the transition to 
non-fossil drives. The US non-Diesel fleet may be taken as an example; there is no basic problem 
in doing so. Differences between countries in their tax and subsidy schemes are evened out 
somewhat, in the process reducing their variety, now including vehicle purchase taxes and 
exemptions; VAT differentiations vehicles; annual registration taxes and exemptions; scrappage 
taxes and subsidies; fuel duties and excises with differentiations; VAT differentiations on fuels; 
road use charges on different bases; and public parking price differentiations, all with further sub-
differentiations as to domain of use. The reasons for differentiation between countries differ but 
certainly include tax competition reasons (see (Máca, Eberle et al. 2013) p71) and creating 
advantages for own sectors relative to similar sectors in other EU countries. There may be a role 
                                                          
31 Reduction by 95% over 25 years implies compound reduction rate of 11.3% per year; over 20 years 14%. 
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for the Commission to end tax competition and industrial competition through national fuel tax 
and other transport policies. However, from a climate point of view, simplified fleet standards 
take over. Other measures may also have positive outcomes on reducing emissions but are not 
part of EU climate policy. Adaptation to non-fossil drives and using their incentives for the 
changeover is well possible, especially if the national tax competition is ended. For all these major 
transport instruments, more smaller scale instruments may be added, like preferential car parking 
for electric cars; bus lanes open to electric cars; freedom from road pricing, etc., but this is not 
part of EU policy or policy guidance, and seems useful temporary only, before non-fossil drives 
become dominant. 
Infrastructure development for modal shifts focuses on high-speed rail (and similar) transport to 
reduce aviation volume. Standards will not be able to substantially reduce emissions in aviation, 
so curbing the still rising travel volumes seems the only option. Bringing aviation in the normal 
tax domain is a priority now, including fuel taxes similar to Diesel taxes, where the Commission 
has set EU wide minimum levels already for road transport. A softer task is in reducing traffic in 
cities, by making them more amenable for slow traffic: walking and cycling. There are highly 
successful examples in Europe already, where broader adoption would reduce road traffic also in 
the longer run with reduced private car ownership and increased use of car sharing systems. Such 
developments may be attractive medium term and for other reasons but have limited long term 
impacts, when all road transport has mainly been decarbonized, like rail transport already is. 
 
7.1.5. Instrumentation in the buildings and appliances sector 
Electric appliances are difficult to cover with generic standards, but will use near-zero emission 
electricity by 2050. Appliances based on natural gas and coal, like terrace heating and some 
stoves, will be phased out, possibly replaced by electric ones. For heating in buildings, natural gas 
is dominant now. Reducing emissions on the short and medium term for existing stock can be 
through better insulation and heat recovering ventilation, reducing gas use in heating. In the long 
term strategy however, heating and cooling must be (nearly fully) electricity or clean hydrogen 
based, as is substantially the case now already in Japan. All fossil heating is phased out, including 
mixed heating with renewables. No coal is allowed in wood pallet ovens. The phasing out of 
natural gas heating is in stages. For new buildings it is very fast. Fossils-free heating and cooling 
standards are introduced as soon as possible. It is easy to implement and avoids costly 
refurbishing later. In the first years after 2020 new buildings cannot use gas heating anymore and 
have to be highly insulated including obligatory heat exchangers on ventilation. For existing 
buildings natural gas is phased out in two different ways. First there is a subsidy program 
connected to the refurbishing of existing houses, which does not allow for natural gas (or butane, 
propane, etc.) heating anymore. Secondly, city districts are systematically disconnected from the 
natural gas grid, in a planned operation, latest with the oldest housing areas, and starting with 
areas where major maintenance is due, with buildings around 30 years of age. Subsidies for all 
fossil based systems are halted directly, including micro combined heat and power (micro-CHP) 
and similar district systems at block and district level. Options for district heating with renewables 
are investigated, feeding current district heating transport systems, first as demonstration 
projects, with larger scale introduction based on the economics of these projects. Options for 
replacing natural gas distribution with clean hydrogen distribution are investigated. They allow 
for a smoother changeover to low emission heating, with electricity jointly produced when 
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advanced technologies are introduced in a building. A larger scale shift from natural gas to 
hydrogen distribution is decided on when cost considerations can be better filled in. It might be 
interesting to combine hydrogen distribution with loading of hydrogen based fuel cell cars, these 
possibly delivering electricity to the grid at peak demand, as could battery electric cars do. Larger 
hydrogen fuel cells in buildings might also play a role in electric grid equilibration, especially if 
direct solar hydrogen could outcompete non-fossil electricity based hydrogen. 
To all major instruments, smaller scale instruments may be added like minimum efficiency 
standards for specific electric apparatus; quality standards for LED lighting; non-LED lightbulbs 
phased out; smart windows installation subsidies; and hundreds more. Instruments to create 
learning curves, at Level 3, focus on promising advanced systems, like combinations of heat 
pumps; heat/cold storage; solar; geothermal heat; and more. 
 
7.1.6. Generic instrumentation 
Public financing mechanisms are set up to help transfer to the often capital intensive transitions 
to low carbon systems. The power asymmetry in landlord-tenants relations and the limited time 
horizon of tenants and households leads to underinvestment in energy efficiency and emission 
reduction. Some institutional corrections might be relevant in some countries, like that emission 
reducing investments in buildings by tenants are not a reason for raising their rent. Conversely, 
tenants should cooperate with owners who want to improve their property. The tensions 
resulting seem unavoidable. The EU can supply countries with draft legislation for this complex 
issue. 
Direct public tasks further relate to the organization of the electricity market. With many subsidy 
schemes in place, market differentiation both for producers and users will be unavoidable, also 
limiting international trade in electricity. This is especially the case for nationally implemented 
schemes, where subsidies will not be paid abroad and surcharges not paid on exports, which then 
easily become export subsidies. The task of the Commission is to create some base rules for 
national subsidy schemes and their corresponding funding mechanisms. This directly links to 
keeping intact as much parts as possible of the Single European Electricity market. Unbundling 
and forcing in the physical infrastructure for international DC high tension transport are minimum 
requirements, allowing for at least reasonable bilateral trade. Where more than two countries 
border, regional organization may emerge, especially where cables may be laid easily as now 
developing in the North Sea and the Baltic. However, markets remain national substantially. 
Adequate capacity is based on capacity payment on primary production and on subsidies for 
secondary production, with in exceptional cases standards, as on making some back-up capacity 
obligatory in firms and households, similar to obligatory back-up capacity in hospitals. The 
electricity market is of type 1 or shifting to type 2.  
In the infrastructure domain there is a further task in standardizing loading and charging stations, 
also fast ones, and in safeguarding their broad availability. After substantial shifts to electric drives 
this can further be left to the market. 
There is a major research efforts for all four main sectors, with priority for industry to actively 
develop ‘new-BATs’. Developing decarbonized technologies in industry has the highest priority 
for process integrated energy use, where decarbonization requires smaller or larger redesign, and 
then also substantial investments. For all industries dynamic BAT specifications are to be made as 
a basis for standard setting, to be based on newly developed technologies with active public 
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support at EU level. This will require substantial funding of R&D and Demonstration projects, in a 
broad industrial domain. The share of basic research will therefore be smaller. 
 
7.1.7. International aspects under Planning & Control Instrumentation 
The international agreement under planning and control specifies a binding emission cap per 
year, reducing long term by over 80%, for the EU and most countries, see (Hare, Stockwell et al. 
2010). Agreement partners must verify their emissions administratively, requiring national 
emission planning and control. The international climate agreement is not linked specifically to 
this Planning & Control instrument mix, only to its results. In the planning mode of thinking 
however, emission reductions would be specified in some detail, in line with current negotiations 
on caps per country per year. The international cap discussion now is closely linked to tradable 
caps, as tradable emission permits within and between countries, see the discussion by (Alexeeva-
Talebi, Löschel et al. 2009). Tradable emission permits are however not part of this instrument 
mix, so internationally tradable permits cannot play a role. See for example (Raupach, Davis et al. 
2014) for possible distributions of the global emission budgets in time. The volume of the national 
caps as internationally agreed may be linked to heterogeneous national approaches and 
circumstances, see (Hoel 2011)  and (González-Eguino, Iñigo et al. 2015), ultimately requiring 
negative emissions, like based on CCS of biomass energy, see (Fuss, Canadell et al. 2014). The 
nature of the international agreement on caps may differ, especially in bindingness and 
encompassingness, see the scenarios as distinguished in the CECILIA2050 report by (Zelljadt 
2014), which however are all based on national cap-and-trade systems, not linked to agreement 
versions like in (MacKay, Cramton et al. 2015).  
The border adjustments considered may refer to two very different types of cost differences, 
created by transfer payments to government as by emission pricing, or created by the real cost 
of emission reductions induced by any type of instrument. The transfer costs are easier to 
establish as proceeds are at least know in total. In this Planning & Control strategy they hardly 
play a role however, transfer payments being dominated by subsidies. The real cost differences 
remain. Whatever the nature of national policies, there will be competition effects vis-à-vis 
countries with limited or with no climate policy in place, or other policies, like taxes versus 
subsidies versus standards. Specifying such cost differences is cumbersome however, being part 
of total relative cost differences which form the basis of mutually advantageous trade. Long-term 
BTA prices cannot be specified at all, but are low according to models indicating low real costs of 
climate policy. The level of border tax adjustment (BTA, also as BCA, Border Carbon Adjustment) 
when going into real costs differences due to climate policy is based on a counterfactual: what 
would the cost have been in the two countries with, or without the cost inducing climate policy, 
but then also including the cost reducing effects of climate policy as with development of open 
electricity markets and capacity payment for electricity production technologies. That route may 
easily lead to trade conflicts, as the border tax adjustment will be disputable, see (Holmes, Reilly 
et al. 2011), and given political processes often rightfully so. That discussion has started already, 
with the EU being seen as inconsistent in its climate related actions towards China, see (Voituriez 
and Wang 2011), not as a final answer but to show the complexity of this discussion.  
There is reasoning towards the use of proceeds from border tax adjustments for funding of 
measures in poorer countries, see (Grubb 2011). This option does not pertain to proceeds from 
international trade in permits, where payments are to the owners of permits in the other country. 
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Such a supranational use of national border taxes, which would hardly come about even in the 
EU, would create a further incentive for the export tax in non-climate policy countries, to avoid 
proceeds going from national discretion to a global goal.  
The most encompassing international competition issue in the EU is at country level, see (Kuik, 
Branger et al. 2013). For the EU long term effects will be difficult to discern, as factors determining 
relative attractiveness of national goods and products are manifold. There is no accepted theory 
on the backgrounds of international specialization. Also the absolute levels of costs are not the 
most relevant issue but relative costs, linked internationally through long term adjusting 
exchange rates. There hence is not much reason to incorporate international trade aspects in 
climate policy instrumentation based on real cost differences. The capacity to grow, level three 
in the OECD framework of competitiveness analysis, see (Kuik, Branger et al. 2013) Section 3.2,  
seems most affected by the induced national costs of climate policy. For the given climate goal, 
cheaper is better. Of course with more similar climate policies beyond the EU, especially with 
major trade partners, the importance of border tax adjustment is reduced. 
 
7.2. Long term Instrumentation in the Institutionalist Strategy 
7.2.1. Instruments development strategy 
The thrust in instrumentation is directed at institutional reform, at Level 1, with substantial public 
infrastructure, Level 2, and basic research, Level 3. This generic EU wide instrumentation leaves 
further policies and actions to member states, incentivized and enabled, see (Rayner 2010) on 
bottom-up action and more general (Ostrom 2010). There is no reason to specify emission 
volumes per year per member state. Doing so would require a planning and control type of 
instrumentation at the national level. Instruments at level 2 and 3 are discussed for the two 
strategies together. Prime institution is the internalization of climate effects through adapted 
emission pricing. The ETS is actively transformed into an all emissions covering and 
administratively much simplified emission tax, section 7.2.2. Second, the internal energy market 
is substantially revised, especially the electricity market, section 7.2.3, with next a few adjoining 
institutional developments, section 7.2.4. Public infrastructure, Level 2, next plays a central role, 
as in the transmission and distribution grid and broader in the energy and transport domain 
where monopolistic tendencies are dominant, see section 7.2.5. Research, R&D and 
Development, Level 3, are focused at basic research for energy conversion and storage systems, 
see section 7.2.6. With these generic conditions installed there is limited involvement in the 
private sector, where boundary conditions and incentives create the framework for broad and 
diffuse emission reducing development, mainly by directing innovation and inducing and enabling 
substitution mechanisms. Public action in the private domain is mainly limited to short term 
market introduction of some new technologies to create learning curves. With learning curves 
established, public funding is reduced and stops, as then uncertainty for private parties has 
substantially been reduced and lock-ins overcome. Technology specific instruments regarding 
private actors are only applied where important markets are fully deficient and cannot be 
repaired. Examples would have to come up empirically. Very incidentally public provision may be 
for very high risk with very high positive climate impact projects, where private development and 
investment cannot be expected. Non-climate examples have been the development of nuclear 
power, most public health in most countries, much of IT, and fully internet and GPS. In the climate 
CECILIA2050 D6.1   Instrumentation Strategies and Instrument Mixes for Long Term Climate Policy  PART 1 
112  
domain there here are no suggestions yet, beyond infrastructure and research subjects. Binding 
CO2 from the air might become an option.  
 
7.2.2. Generic emission pricing 
Emission pricing starts at the current ETS, and develops emission pricing along the three 
dimensions as specified in Table 4: domain expansion; level of administrative implementation 
moving upstream; and variability reduced leading to predictability rising emission price levels. The 
first step is to transform the Market Stability Reserve into an explicit price floor system, with the 
price floor rising in time. As long as there is a surplus in the market the price ceiling is not relevant. 
The ceiling can however be set now already as a safeguard against a later price explosion. This 
operation is combined with a domain expansion, first covering all coal and gas and, more 
complicated, all non-transport oil and oil products use. For effective and simple implementation, 
a shift from the administration of actual emitters to their upstream primary suppliers is required. 
This can be done in one move, towards EU natural gas production and imports and coal 
production and imports. The number of regulatees then is very small as compared to the number 
of emitters: a few thousand against in the order of a hundred million, now including all small 
emitters. The rising price floor is not yet a tax, like the rising UK Price Floor Tax is, but a quantity 
measure leading to a predetermined price level. The difference in functioning is small however. 
The bandwidth between price floor and ceiling is set at zero; there is no good reason to have a 
bandwidth in a price based system: the single price indicates the scarcity of available emission 
space in society best. Price variation diffuses the price signal and increases public and private 
implementation costs. Trading systems are expensive short term already as compared with tax-
like single price systems, and the reduced long term investment guidance by price volatility 
increases real costs of emission reduction dynamically. The experience built up allows next for a 
swift expansion in the transport domain, planned in advance but maybe implemented a few years 
later, then covering all fossil resources upstream only. With fully upstream application the permit 
character remains a hindrance to administrative efficiency. Yearly sales then are to be matched 
after closing the year administratively with the required amount of permits, with the firms 
involved in primary production and with (certified) importers. The administrative implementation 
can better shift from a firm oriented yearly implementation to a direct transaction oriented 
implementation, similar to how VAT and excises on products like alcoholic beverages are 
administered. This fits into taxing experience which goes back for centuries in all countries in 
Europe and in most countries of the world. The permit system is transformed into a tax system in 
this last administrative step. Any firm importing coal, gas or oil products has to pay the emission 
tax, for each transaction, linked to the VAT-administration. As with all other taxes the 
administrative implementation is at member state level, and proceeds are distributed over 
member states according to their shares in EU CO2 emissions. 
The emission tax is implemented upstream at primary production and import of fossils and 
derived fossil energy products (as also proposed for example by (Metcalf 2008) for the US), and 
refunded upon export of such products and upon approved CCS, paid from tax proceeds. All fossil 
CO2 emissions are taxed this way. Less clear system definitions were discussed in (Victor 1992). 
The tax and refund at external borders are not border tax adjustments but administrative 
elements of the EU emission tax (confusingly named Border Carbon Adjustments by (Droege 
2011)). The administrative implementation is at member state level. The tax is not Pigovian, 
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equating it with marginal damages, but follows (Baumol 1972), set at a level to reach the climate 
goal. The tax may best be linearly rising, like the British Columbia Emission Tax (Min-Fin-BC 2014) 
and UK Price Floor Tax (Revenue&Customs 2012 (2010)), to an amount of in the order of €350 in 
2050, but see different reasoning in BOX 2. As total proceeds are distributed over member states 
according to their share in total EU emissions, there is a national incentive not to ‘forget’ 
emissions as that would mean forgoing income.  
There might be a different route from pure cap to an emission tax, by first expanding the UK Price 
Floor Tax to more countries, as a coalition of the willing. With the principle broadly implemented, 
the EU could employ a similar dynamic approach could be to have the UK Price Floor Tax model 
expanded to all other countries, avoiding the tension of specific competitive disadvantages 
between the UK and other willing countries. The volume based cap system then would evolve 
into a fully price based system, as the fixed (lowering) volume of the cap would have become 
irrelevant for the price, as long as there is oversupply. The high enough price of the price floor tax 
would make sure that the cap remains irrelevant for a long time to come. This double system 
could easily be simplified into a uniform encompassing emission tax. In developing a strategy this 
line would not come up. Introducing the emission tax in this indirect way involves the 
development of a double instrument system with substantial complexity, as the UK price floor tax 
has shown, easily leading to unexpected obstacles on this path. 
The permit proceeds transformed into tax proceeds, one way or another, are distributed between 
the member states (and countries joining in the EU system) based on their share in actual total 
EU emissions. The lower a country’s emissions are, the lower is its share. With the rising price set 
at the level required for deep reductions, the total tax proceeds will first rise, towards the mid 
Thirties roughly, and will then decrease. How these tax proceeds work out on overall economic 
activity depends mainly on how they are used, especially in terms of reducing other taxes, see 
(Meyer and Meyer 2013). 
The emission tax level is based on intended emission reductions. The empirical relation between 
rising tax level and emission reduction is soft, being conditional on electricity market institutions, 
on climate technology development and on all more general developments in society, including 
economic growth. Predictions are not well possible but some conditional cornerstones can be 
established, like a tax level where natural gas will outcompete coal in electricity production, 
where heat pumps with seasonal storage can outcompete gas heating, and where electric cars 
become competitive with combustion cars. To take the coal and gas example, assume zero (!) real 
cost for coal based electricity, and assume a carbon tax of €400. The real cost of natural gas based 
electricity production then would have to rise from current €55 per MWh to above €181 to keep 
some coal based electricity in the market, see for numbers Table 6. Such back-of-the envelope 
computations are more enlightening than modelling exercises for long term reasoning, as price 
predictions are not well possible. Coal would be out of the electricity market long before that 
€400 tax level, and natural gas probably as well, as renewable systems become more attractive 
in static considerations and more attractive to invest in longer term. Of course the outcomes will 
substantially depend on electricity market design as well, see below. There is no clear single tax 
level connected but a level rising long term to in the order of 300€ per tonne of CO2 in 2050 seems 
a reasonable middle of the road estimate, with 400€ as a high estimate on the required level. 
Setting the emission price at 50€ in 2020, rising by 5€ per year would lead to the 200€ price level 
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by 2050. Going for more safe would be a price rise by 10€ per year, leading to a price of 350€ per 
tonne by 2050.  
These emission prices may seem substantial but getting emission reductions with other means in 
principle leads to substantially higher real costs, estimated with different modelling types at a 
factor two in the transport domain (see (Anderson, Parry et al. 2011) and more generally (Parry, 
Evans et al. 2014)) and similar doubling of costs with economic modelling using technology 
specific instrumentation (Deetman, Hof et al. 2014). The tax proceeds are used for tax reductions, 
greening the tax system, see (Andersen and Ekins 2009). Preferably the most economically 
disturbing taxes are the reduced, and reductions may be used for some redistribution, to 
compensate for undesirable income effects. A review of actual emissions development towards 
2035 is built into the emission pricing regulations. If by then emissions have not been reduced 
enough, an increase in emission prices is due, and vice versa. Because of reduced volumes by then 
this emission tax is a less heavy burden on society. The place of CCS in the emission pricing system 
is similar to exports. Wherever authorized CCS takes place, the refund is paid, from the EU level 
of total emission tax proceeds, before distribution to the country level. The authorization may 
involve CCS outside EU boundaries, as in Norway in the Sleipner field. That is currently the only 
large scale CCS option in Europe with a somewhat proven safety record, with 20 years of 
controlled experience funded substantially by the Norwegian emission tax. It would require an 
extensive CO2 transport system with a monopolistic character. The base structure would therefore 
be set up through public provision, if overall cost estimates for CCS would indicate this route to 
emission reduction. (Mikunda, Kober et al. 2014) see this option as essential for long term climate 
policy, with action required now to make this option feasible, see (Scott, Gilfillan et al. 2013). 
A further adjoining pricing instrument might relate to the road transport sector, the national fuel 
taxes. Such taxes existed already before the climate problem was perceived. EU coordination of 
national fuel taxes is not an instrument of climate policy, as it now is seen as being the case a bit 
(’20 %’), assumption based only. That element is out with EU, reducing EU level policy to just a 
single-market operation, to reduce tax competition. This of course helps structurally to enable 
countries to raise fuel taxes somewhat in a less mutually adverse manner, like many other policies 
may also be relevant for emissions. In the long term effective climate policy will reduce fuel 
excises to near zero, solving this tax competition issue fully. 
There are many more climate emission relevant policies, rules and regulations, ranging from tax 
rules on company person-car use to insulation rules for buildings. These just are not part of 
climate policy in this Institutionalist Instrument Strategy. Neither are personal tastes in 
consumption and life time working hours the subject of climate policy instrumentation, though 
together constituting a most decisive single determinant of long term climate emissions. Using 
1% of productivity rise not for growth but for leisure would reduce emissions roughly by 50% in 
the next 70 years, with given technologies. However, with technologies changed by climate policy 
instruments towards near zero emission, that 50% reduction would dwarf to near zero. Reducing 
working hours therefor is not subject of long term climate policy instrumentation, how useful it 
might be if climate policy is not successful.  Through similar reasoning, with different outcome, 
the redesign of electricity markets is a key instrument in the Institutionalist strategy: without it 
key emission saving technologies will not emerge. Of course, climate considerations may play 
their role in more complex considerations involved in broader developments. Using Life Cycle 
Analysis of products in decisions on consumption and consumption style may make well make 
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sense. Calling LCA a climate policy instrument seems one step too far, certainly too far for long 
term climate policy instrumentation. Making the social security system, the pension systems, tax 
systems, health care, child care,  holiday regulations, etc. all part of climate policy instrumentation 
seems the end of climate policy, however well intended the broadening might be. Long term 
instrumentation has emission reduction as its focus. The combination of emission tax and 
corresponding electricity market may have indirect effects already relevant medium term, like 
shifting consumption culture away from high emission products and services. 
The internalization of climate emission in prices is the main dynamic influence on long term 
technology development and market development. It also works in the public level as for moving 
spatial planning and research planning in a more climate relevant direction. The influencing role 
of climate policy is there but in a limited way, being next to energy considerations, amenity 
considerations, general international competitiveness considerations, etc.  
 
7.2.3. Electricity markets 
For climate incentives to become operational the electricity market has to transmit the price 
signals adequately. Fragmented, primary national, oligopolistic markets create limits on what 
carbon pricing can do. The electricity market is to accommodate the tens of millions primary and 
secondary producers, with the price for all producers and users real time variable to spread out 
peaks and troughs in supply and demand, see (Palensky and Kupzog 2013, Yigit, Gungor et al. 
2014, Baron 2015) on requirements and options. Smart grids, smart meters and internet of things 
are purely private, avoiding privacy problems in the publicly regulated version where household 
data are gathered by energy supply firms. The real time priced open electricity market at EU level 
is set up based on an EU wide grid with an EU level super-transmission grid operator (TSO), linked 
to all regional/national publicly owned and operated TSOs. All producers receive the same market 
price at each moment, and all users pay the same price, for them including transmission costs 
based on real time congestion pricing, see (Verzijlbergh, De Vries et al. 2014) for requirements 
and NordPoolSpot.com for developments in this direction. Net-metering becomes impossible. 
Heat pumps and heat storage would outcompete natural gas without emission pricing in many 
circumstances now already. Battery electric and fuel cell cars are central in grid stabilization, see 
(Palensky and Kupzog 2013, Huppes, Huele et al. 2015), covering their cost partly by market 
operations. This design for a single EU electricity market goes well beyond the European Target 
Model for electricity market integration, see (ENTSOE 2014). 
The market has to deal with substantial intermittency in supply of major share renewables, with 
market clearance by flexible low efficiency gas fired power stations a very low frequent exception. 
With this limited role for fossils this is only possible by increasing the role of hydro power, 
electricity storage, electricity transformation (heat, chemical) with secondary production and 
shifting final use to off peak demand. Market clearance involves information related to the actions 
of sharply increased numbers of producers, hundreds of millions of primary and secondary 
producers, joined by hundred millions of users, with billions of smart apparatus, see Figure 3. This 
is hardly possible in a planning or contractual manner. The market to be created is a real time 
open market, with continuous price adaptation resulting in market clearance. Establishing the 
open EU wide electricity market is done stepwise, including both market rules and infrastructure 
development. In terms of market structure, the unbundling is to expand public ownership of 
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transmission grids and distribution grids. Congestion pricing, not proceeds, is the prime pricing 
mechanism, using the experience of for example road congestion pricing.  
A key issue the establishment of the trans-European high tension DC grid, connecting the mainly 
national high tension AC grids flexibly. Such power lines have been built bi-nationally between 
Germany and Sweden and the Netherlands and Norway, with the UK coming in with connections 
to Norway and Sweden, and later Belgium and Iceland. The current profit oriented exploitation is 
replaced by open access use, comparable to the internet, based on public ownership. All 
producers and users can use the DC grid, first connecting contract partners internationally. But 
when the infrastructure has been developed adequately, in about 15 years, real time market 
relations replace contractual relations. The rules required for open electricity trading at the 
European grid need development, avoiding the coordinating role by a limited number of large 
producers or net operators. The EU grid rules need to be the same or at least fully compatible 
with rules for national public transmission grids and distribution grids. With the extremely large 
numbers of decentral producers to also connect to the market, the difference between 
transmission and distribution fades; the same rules must apply for all producers and for all users. 
The technical implementation of high, medium and low tension grids and their connections is to 
done by the public operators of this essentially monopolistic infrastructure. 
In order to move towards the open European markets, current impediments are removed. Feed-
in tariffs, most damaging to open market functioning, are transformed into feed-in premiums and 
these are phased out, as also most investment subsidies. Surcharges for funding of renewables 
are replaced by tax funding, as is the case with most other subsidies. Capacity payment is not 
introduced. Current regulations on smart metering, like ‘at least variable per hour’, or a quarter 
of an hour, are abolished; smart meter regulations are halted and reversed. Smart meter 
introduction is not based on public regulations but on market mechanisms, by any party willing 
and able to do so, ranging from Google and a-likes to fossil energy companies looking for new 
business. The smartest meters save most money, and also contribute most to market 
stabilization. Delivery to the grid is not at prices including taxes and surcharges any more but at 
producer prices, equal for all producers and real time variable. Long term contracts between large 
producers and consumers are transformed by public regulation as present in many countries 
already, so users can shift to real time markets when they please, that is when they are ready for 
that. The core is to have the private behavioral rules in place for all one’s electricity using and 
primary or secondary electricity producing apparatus on how they react to the then variable price 
signal. The swing producer market as currently operating nationally and internationally may 
continue but will lose its role in load clearance and will then be discontinued. 
The full set of changes requires new EU policy development and quite complex national 
regulatory and ownership transformations. The build-up of the EU high voltage DC (HVDC) grid 
also takes time, involving national planning procedures. Current HVDC lines have been laid at sea 
floors to avoid planning delays. The availability of this grid, Supergrid called by some, will create 
an incentive for member states to adapt to the rules for using this EU grid to their advantage, as 
by linking to cheapest renewables and shaving peaks on East-West connections. 
 
7.2.4. Other institutional framework conditions 
Climate policy itself may be a source of deficiencies, as by breaking up markets that otherwise 
might function. Both instrumentation strategies try to avoid creating such deficiencies, with 
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substantial differences between them. Technology specific instruments, with capacity payments, 
will tend to reduce the effectiveness of electricity markets, and reduce the emission pricing signal. 
They are part of the strategic choice for planning and control. 
There are also market deficiencies broader in society which might be remedied for climate 
reasons.  They may relate to the limited time horizon and limited access to borrowing of small 
firms and private households; to the asymmetry in some contractual relations like landlord-tenant 
relations; and broader to monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures reducing innovation. 
These are relevant for example for reducing energy use in buildings and shifting to low emission 
energy systems. The solutions relate to long term institutional development and to a few specifics 
in the legal structure. Credit for small scale investment is a broader issue in society, with extreme 
overpricing in many situations due to market power asymmetry. Rules for costs to be borne by 
borrowers and on the allowable level of interest rates exist but erode easily. The uncertainty for 
the lender on repayment cannot be resolved, accept by public guarantee, which however moves 
the responsibility for knowing the borrower to governments who are not good at that (vide the 
subprime mortgages in US). In some countries such small scale lending is well developed and in 
others not. The reasons for such differences are to be studied, preparatory to possible 
institutional rearrangements for general, not climate specific reasons. The landlord-tenant issues 
also differ between countries. Similarly, competition law and antitrust regulations may be useful 
for efficiency and trade reasons but may become part of climate policy instrumentation only 
when primarily and directly relevant for emission reduction. For the design of electricity markets 
that clearly is the case. Other clear cases are lacking. Especially for financing green investments 
special lending organizations are proposed, with lower interest rates, essentially subsidies. Well 
working financing markets are part of the broader institutionalist approach but not part of climate 
policy strategies, and certainly not fragmented financial markets. Though relevant for emission 
reduction, mending of such market deficiencies is part of the overall fabric of society.  
Of course the reasons for resolving such deficiencies may also include climate considerations. One 
subject coming close to climate relevance is innovation, linked partly to funding. Limited access 
to funding for small and medium sized enterprises may impede innovation, but as part of broader 
factors determining success or lack of it in innovation, see (Mazzanti, Antonioli et al. 2014). There 
is however only a limited empirical relation between the volume of R&D and emission reducing 
development, see for example (Marin and Mazzanti 2010). Moving innovation in an emission 
reducing direction already is a main part of instrumentation here: the emission tax. Though 
innovation is of broad importance, the subject seems to be too broad to indicate development of 
specific instrumentation as part of climate policy. 
There are a few further climate technology specific institutional deficiencies which could be 
mended based on climate emission considerations directly. Geothermal heat and especially heat 
pump based subsoil energy storage may play a key long term role in the low emission energy 
system for heating and cooling. However, they now have a diffuse ownership structure, 
technically not fixed to the above-soil land-ownership. This somewhat collective good nature (no 
clear excludability and limited rivalness) constrains their development. Contractual solutions, as 
with EU developed standard contracts, are one option. This solution will be cumbersome when 
larger numbers of actors are involved, as is the case with heat and cold storage under private 
housing. Then standard contracts (as opposed to grab-as-you-can, as often the case with water 
now) may well delay development. The other option is to treat this resource as a public good, 
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with rules for access, including permits and pricing. The option for use then is to be publicly 
supplied. This seems a most feasible option, very comparable to rules on groundwater use and 
oil and gas exploitation in many EU countries (very different from the US). The role of the EU is to 
create the general legal framework, with differentiated implementation in the legal structure of 
the member states, and possibly even the sub-member state government level, see (Mehling, 
Bausch et al. 2013). Though certainly requiring substantial attention, there are no concrete long 
term impediments for such legal-administrative adaptations. 
Novel technology developments with long term implications relate for example to the internet of 
things and to decentralization tendencies in a globally integrated world (e.g. through 3D printing 
facilities); and novel automated transport systems. Such systems require some standardization to 
become effective, made or coordinated by the EU, and through the EU also at a global scale. 
Competing standardization developments, as now initiated from the US and from the EU for the 
communication standards in the internet of things should be avoided.  In this respect there is a 
clear standardization role for EU guided organizations like CENELEC (European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization) and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute), 
opening up the route towards private development of smart grids and internet of things. As longer 
term developments tend to be uncertain, wrong choices may easily be made, as with obligatory 
smart meters not being able to integrate users in variable priced electricity markets; such public 
prescriptions are not part of this strategy.  
Generally, core tasks in these domains are to initiate processes with a long term view in mind. 
This then has the role more of opening options than making choices for specific technologies and 
products, even for promising technologies, when also other interesting options may be coming 
up. Postponement of choices may be a preferred option. Even if losing out on short term 
developments this may be wise, to avoid initiating lock-ins, at high costs later. Forcing 
development of lower emission road transport now may be detrimental to long term zero 
emission transport developments. 
 
7.2.5. Infrastructure and spatial planning 
EU infrastructure for climate policy reasons first concerns the build-up of the high tension DC grid. 
Transport systems are mostly public provision, like roads, railroads, harbors, airports, and sewer 
systems. Their operation may be privatized but then under public utility type market regulations. 
Mostly this is a national affair, without a clear role for the EU, except at the general institutional 
level and for transnational transport infrastructure. There is limited reasons to incorporate such 
elements in this version of climate policy instrumentation. 
The new vehicle drive modes - certainly battery electric drive and nearly certain hydrogen fuel 
cell based electric drives, and possibly more - require a recharging and refilling infrastructure. 
With current negligible market shares in most countries, the commercial development will not 
take place. Fast battery loading stations and hydrogen refilling stations are expensive and must 
be used extensively to become commercially attractive. Also there are learning curves to be 
created. The instrument to use therefore is a bit open: public supply or subsidized introduction, 
both paths followed in Norway, where the infrastructure for electric vehicles is now in place 
already32. Slow charging stations have been introduced widely in many cities privately with public 
                                                          
32 See: http://info.nobil.no/images/downloads/nobilbrosjyre.pdf 
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support in funding and location development. They can be placed in public parking spaces, as the 
infrastructure costs are low and loading and parking can be combined. In several larger cities such 
slow charging stations have been introduced based on a cooperation between cities, electricity 
companies and the charging supply firms. Public supply of fast charging stations, one option, can 
be set for example as a task for the publicly owned distribution grids. These would not cover the 
highway system so easily. With subsidized private introduction of fast recharging stations, the 
current network of fuel stations could be at least partly expanded with fast charging connections. 
Later, the subsidy scheme could be abandoned, with the requirement to include fast charging 
stations in any new permitting of gasoline stations to also cover less densely serviced areas. 
Private hydrogen distribution can be combined with the phase out of LPG, replacing the LPG 
refilling connection with a hydrogen connection. This would however delay the introduction of 
fuel cell cars substantially. The combined option is to start public supply of hydrogen, first 
expanding the filling stations as have been created in many cities for public buses; subsidizing the 
set-up of hydrogen refilling at key gasoline stations, and later subsidize the transformation of LPG 
filling stations into hydrogen filling points.  
Summarizing:  
-Slow charging stations are set up at city level with limited subsidies, as currently already taking 
place in many cities, first Oslo and then many more like Paris and Amsterdam. 
-Fast charging stations are set up exemplary in cities as by electricity distribution companies, 
combined with subsidized introduction at private gasoline stations on highways. 
Spatial planning at EU level is focused at transboundary transport infrastructure mainly, with a 
view on interesting long term options to be facilitated and not restricted, as for very high speed 
public transport to reduce air traffic. Guidance for the national level is informational only, as with 
attractive scenario sketches for low-energy city development. There are no subsidies to guide 
national planning and related actions. 
From a climate point of view, long term spatial planning plays a role at the purely national level, 
guided by overall market structure and by a direct interest in belonging to the low-carbon future. 
Issues at national and local level relate to integrating renewables production and the 
restructuring of cities for low speed mobility, underground transport and decentralized clean 
production, for a combination of reasons at that applied level.  
 
7.2.6. Research, R&D and Demonstration  
Research, R&D, and Demonstration (the last two often combined into RD&D) with a long time 
horizon is first focused on the basic science for energy transforming systems, ranging from basic 
physics and nano and materials science, to biobased energy systems like algae and artificial trees, 
and to large scale applications, like may be still DC-AC transformation systems and energy 
beaming systems for energy transport. The focus is primary and secondary energy production. 
Apart from lucky hits this research has long term relevance.  
The second domain may be closer to private markets technologies, but where markets cannot 
operate due to high uncertainty and long duration towards return on investment, if successful. 
There then are CARPs, Climate Advanced Research Projects. The internet example indicates how 
first public research has set up the technology, with public investments making it operational, and 
only then private development following. There are no clear candidates for substantial funding, 
so some experimental open invitational research funding might be useful, similar to ARPA-E 
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projects in the US. For important technical issues beyond the grasp of specific market partners 
design contests may be attractive, to pre-develop the architecture of complex technologies.  
Contests might functioning similar to CARPs. Such non-predefined elements could be entered in 
DG-Research projects, as part of Open Projects in H2020. Prime relevance is to have some 
research on how to assess if novel technologies, assuming their successful development, are fit 
for the long term near-zero emission society. Pre-evaluation methods for such research project 
selection are mainly lacking n ow. The DARPA and ARPA-E experiences in the US may constitute 
valuable empirical material.  
The important public role as indicated here substantially overlaps with ideas of (Mazzucato 2011, 
Mazzucato 2013), who shows that almost all major technological revolutions of the last half 
century, with the internet as a main example, have evolved from public initiatives, starting with 
direct public funding. The ‘Mazzucato line’ could be set up very similar in the Planning & Control 
mode, but there more focused at public-private partnerships and more clear market relevance 
directly, while in the Institutionalist mode the public infrastructure element would have more 
emphasis, not requiring private partners at the start but opening up options. 
 
7.2.7. Regulating private actors 
In the transformation phase towards the open electricity market and relatedly the build-up of 
variable capacities some investment subsidies may play a role as financial instruments, as for 
example to create learning curves in the novel domains of storage and variable use, but then 
limited to really new options and temporary only. This is part of R&D and Demonstration 
instruments already. One might think of another reason: to speed up the reduction of the share 
of fossils. However, the more appropriate method then would be to have a faster rising generic 
emission tax at the institutional framework level, not public support of specific technologies or 
specific taxes on their competitors. Public funding of relevant infrastructure development may 
open up options for specific private developments, like the set-up of hydrogen distribution 
infrastructure for fuel cell applications. Such infrastructure activities also are not part of 
regulating private parties but are to create options for private partners.  
The result of these restrictive views is that there is a limited amount of regulations regarding 
private actors in specific technology domains. Creating dynamics and normal functioning are 
integrated mostly at the public level: institutions, infrastructure and RR&D&D. Also informational 
instruments are not set up in a technology specific way. The three types of instruments, Type 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3, Information, Financial and Standards, will be checked in turn on their possible role.  
Information instruments 
Information instruments, to stimulate and clarify markets, are limited to supporting 
standardization of information systems as through CEN and ISO. In the electricity and information 
domain there may be a role for CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization) and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute), relevant for 
standardization which opens the route towards private development of smart grids and internet 
of things. Though primary having a standardization role, there also is a communication role 
broader in industry, involving public support.   
Standards may include the way information on climate effects of products are specified, as in 
using life cycle based information. There currently are no relevant operational methods for long 
term life cycle analysis, as requiring novel methods and scenarios on future technologies replacing 
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databases on past processes currently used in LCA. First steps are there, based on usual public 
academic funding, see (Hertwich, Gibon et al. 2015) on renewable energy technologies and more 
at a systems level (De Koning, Huppes et al. 2015), based substantially on EU DG Research funding. 
Basic issues in methods and operationalization are difficult to resolve however, like allocation 
problems when processes have multiple functions and the fundamental uncertainty on future 
surrounding processes.  
Leaving the climate discussion in content to civil society seems the wise approach from an 
institutionalist point of view, as the nature of long term analysis will remain open, by necessity. 
The short term may be approached differently. 
Financial instruments, 
Financial instruments, of any legal status, may be used to induce specific low carbon technologies. 
However, these would fully overlap with domain expanded emission pricing. For stronger 
incentives a higher emission price is the solution, not adding more instruments based on short 
term reasoning. This also holds for low and zero emission road transport drives. 
Heating and cooling as main final energy use category, are fully covered by the emission tax. Some 
really new technologies might deserve public support to create learning curves, in the RD&D 
domain. 
For transport, the diverse taxes and subsidies as have historically developed mostly have only 
limited background in climate policy, with some partial exceptions like for fuel excises first in the 
UK and then Germany in the Nineties and start of the last decade. However, differences between 
countries seem hardly to relate to such public considerations, which therefor seem verbal only. 
International alignment for solving border problems and tax competition, not just for fuel taxes, 
is very useful but hardly part of climate policy. Of course generic emission taxes do also have an 
effect on fuel prices. In the transition to zero emission cars the competitive advantage of non-
combustion cars will also depend on broader socio-technical developments, like self-driving cars, 
probably used very differently from current private cars. Abstaining from the support of specific 
drive systems seems wise. However, if by 2035 combustion cars would still have a substantial 
market share, taxing schemes for combustion cars, or similarly lower taxes for zero emission 
vehicles, may be used for a smooth phasing out of combustion cars, announced well in advance. 
Supporting specific groups, as subsidizing lower income groups in zero emission heating of 
dwellings and buying zero emission cars might be a direct way to overcome income limitations. 
The generic line however is to have relevant income distributions measures, long term not just 
taxes and minimum income rules but also schooling and broader education. Such issues are highly 
important but cannot be part of climate policy and certainly not part of an institutionalist strategy. 
Standard and Regulations  
Standards and Regulations, involving prescriptions or prohibitions, play a limited role, as they 
tend to favor specific existing technologies at the cost of future ones, hence possibly creating 
lock-ins. So there is not prescriptions on smart meters, no EU building standards, no heating and 
cooling systems prescribed and no transport drives made obligatory or forbidden. Of course 
facilitating measures in terms of institutions and infrastructure are in place to allow for a broad 
range of technologies to enter the market, and press others out of the market. A major one now 
is the recharging and refilling infrastructure for electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel cell drives, 
having and being developed in some countries and regions as yet. 
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7.2.8. International aspects under Institutionalist Instrumentation 
Under the institutionalist instruments strategy for climate policy international agreements are set 
up substantially different from current emphasis in negotiations on caps. The prime international 
agreement in the institutionalist strategy is on a roughly equal set-up and level of emission tax, 
agreed in a core group, see (Brenton 2013, Falkner 2015, Falkner 2015a). For (MacKay, Cramton 
et al. 2015) the reason to prefer this type of agreement is because of its greater political feasibility 
as compared to binding caps. Agreements here focus on equal emission pricing between the 
countries joining this Climate Club33 (Nordhaus 2015, Falkner 2015a). With (MacKay, Cramton et 
al. 2015) the main reason for shifting the international agreement to equal emission prices is 
political feasibility, avoiding the difficulties as have been encountered in Kyoto-Copenhagen and 
still present in the set-up of the goals of COP21 in Paris, as focused at binding cap agreements. 
There are no caps involved in the pricing agreement. Border tax adjustments are based only on 
the tax element, not on the real costs of emission reduction. This relatively simple reasoning for 
border tax adjustments allows for a fast and simple sanction mechanism against free riders in this 
institutionalist mode, while giving a direct incentive to also join the climate club. The exporting 
country confronted with the import levy on its products can prevent that loss by taxing the same 
amount upon export. Then the option to tax under the WTO rules vanishes, see (Dong, Ishikawa 
et al. 2015). This emissions based export tax can be the start of an emission tax, first covering 
exports only, but with quite some logic to also cover inland production and consumption. The 
position taken by (Droege 2011) that BTAs could endanger international climate negotiations 
relates to Kyoto-type of cap agreements, not to international emission tax agreements. The 
emission distribution between taxing countries resulting would be similar to the imaginary results 
of an international emission trading scheme linked to national trading schemes, with countries 
with less costly emission reduction options reducing more, other countries paying them, and vice 
versa. The political and administrative feasibility of such an extensive international agreement 
may be doubted. The assumption here is that at least some partial international agreement is 
reached on equal set-up and level of an upstream emission tax, easier for the small group starting 
Climate Club than for the globally binding caps agreement.  
The emission tax levied upstream on imports of coal, oil and gas and derived energy products is 
not a border tax but an upstream inland emission price, equal for national and foreign producers. 
However, for emission intensive products a Border Tax Adjustment (BTA) is part of 
instrumentation, not covering induced cost of production due to climate policy, as in the planning 
& control case, but only the transfer costs of the emission tax. For the disadvantaged exporter, a 
most simple and economically equivalent measure is an export subsidy based on generic pricing 
rules, like an exemption from emission pricing, as now used in the EU ETS, or more precisely 
through a repayment of implicitly paid emission tax, based on specified emissions related to the 
export product. Enacting taxes upon import would be the mirror, to also create an even playing 
field within the climate policy country. These import levies need also to fit within the constraints 
set by the WTO, see (Green 2005) and more positive (Tamiotti 2011) for considerations. 
Effectively this would create a partially applied emission tax abroad, but received by the importing 
                                                          
33 The term originates from public goods domain. Collective goods have Non-Rivalness and Non-Excludability. Club 
goods exhibit substantial Non-Rivalness and Excludability. Goods fit for Rivalness and Excludability. By creating a 
Club, non-participating countries pay a price for not having climate policy.  
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country, see (Gros and Egenhofer 2011). The exporting country confronted with the import levy 
on its products can prevent that proceeds loss by taxing the same amount upon export, using the 
same method of quantification. Then the option to tax under the WTO rules vanishes for the 
importing country, see (Dong, Ishikawa et al. 2015). The application is limited to cases where the 
cost of transfer payment under the emission tax are substantial, above at least a few percent of 
total cost of production. Such cases will be rare now already and dwindle under decarbonization 
of the production sector, with few exceptions 
Leaving out induced price effects of the emission tax in BTA solves otherwise hard to quantify 
issues. The border tax is set equal to the emission price in the EU and is imputed on estimated 
emission levels abroad, disregarding real cost of emission reduction and also disregarding other 
mechanisms induced by emission pricing, like lower prices of fossils. If a dispute arises, better 
data on foreign emissions may be supplied by the complaining country. At export of energy 
intensive products to non-climate policy countries, the refund is given based on actual emissions. 
Steel is one clear example where such import and export corrections are due.  
The Adjustments here don’t reckon with induced price and technology changes, like lower energy 
oil and gas prices due to the reduced use because of the emission tax, and reduced costs due to 
technology adaptation. Including such effects would lead to lower BTAs. Nor do they cover the 
induced cost of avoiding the emission tax to some extent by emission reducing measures, which 
would increase BTAs. See (Böhringer and Rutherford 2002) for decomposition of effects and 
(Böhringer, Balistreri et al. 2012, Böhringer, Rutherford et al. 2012) for an extensive survey. 
Induced effects on costs and prices are empirically inherently soft, because based on historical 
developments amidst many other factors, as difficult to establish counterfactuals. These 
constitute the basis for BTAs in the Planning & Control strategy, as there is no carbon pricing 
there. Such complex reasoning might well lead to a substantial amount of uncertainty and hence 
to manipulation and then conflicts in WTO, see (Holmes, Reilly et al. 2011). It is not sure to what 
extent such considerations are allowable yet under current WTO rules. The BTA for correcting 
only the direct effect of the emission tax is acceptable now already.  
The global welfare effect lost long term by not reckoning with induced cost effects seems small 
however, see the extensive study by (Böhringer, Balistreri et al. 2012) and the modelling study by 
(Meyer and Meyer 2013) and in a similar vein (Kuik, Branger et al. 2013). Without having BTA on 
the emission tax element, the effect would be more substantial, but very much depending on 
how other suboptimal taxes are reduced based on emission tax proceeds. Such general 
considerations are highly relevant with a very limited role for climate policy instruments however. 
Overall tax structure, labor market design and education will be main determinants of long term 
competitiveness, measured at OECD level 3, see (Kuik, Branger et al. 2013) Section 3.2. 
Summarizing, the institutionalist approach differs from the current mainly planning & control 
approach in three main respects. 
 There are no national emission targets per year, only a long term global reference emission 
volume used for setting the emission price path. 
 The agreement is not universal but between core starting countries, open for others to join 
the Climate Club ((Nordhaus 2015) and similar (Brenton 2013)), for all joining on the same 
conditions.  
CECILIA2050 D6.1   Instrumentation Strategies and Instrument Mixes for Long Term Climate Policy  PART 1 
124  
 Border Tax Adjustments cover only the transfer payment of the emission tax and create a 
sanction on not joining. They can conform to BTA rules (Tamiotti 2011) and can be avoided by 
the exporting country by levying the same tax on its exports itself (Dong, Ishikawa et al. 2015). 
 
7.3. Instruments common between strategies 
The instrumentation in the two strategies has been exposed with emphasis on differences. At 
different places however also similar elements have come up, both substantial and smaller issues. 
The common elements in both strategies are mostly tainted by their different philosophies 
however, see the following examples, following the order of instrument levels from general to 
specific and binding as in Table 3. 
 Ownership and use rules on geothermal energy & underground heat storage capacity (level 1) 
The focus with Planning & Control is on use rules, with Institutionalists on ownership rules. 
 Infrastructure planning for trans-European DC High Tension transmission grid (level 2) 
The capacity requirements with Planning & Control will be more limited as compared to the 
more extensive Institutionalist requirements in a fully open single EU electricity market. 
 Infrastructure planning for fast charging electric cars and refilling of hydrogen fuel cell cars 
(level 2) 
With Planning & Control the planning and implementation are directly linked, in public-private 
partnerships; with the Institutionalist strategy, the main monopolistic infrastructure is 
planned and implemented publicly, with further implementation left to private parties. 
 Infrastructure planning for low speed transport in cities  (level 2) 
These might fully overlap between the two modes. 
 Pre-competitive R&D on promising technologies and competitive Demonstration projects 
(level 3) 
In the Planning & Control mode these would be combined, never in the Institutionalist mode. 
There also are equal mechanism induced between the two instrumentation strategies, in an 
economic-technical sense. Under effective climate policy fossil resources now on the balance 
sheets of fossils producing firms will lose their value, ultimately to near zero, unless CCS takes off 
substantially after efficiency increases in emission reduction. In planning & control this would 
require political strength also in periods of budget squeeze and upcoming competing issues for 
funding. Similarly, investments made in many products and installations will not be recovered, 
ranging from mining apparatus and road infrastructure to harbors and bulk carriers, and the 
industries behind that. Such structural changes in the economy are usual and of course cause 
hardship. But they belong to normal economic life, even on shorter notice. The shale gas 
revolution in the US has reduced the value of coal mines by 90%, on relatively short notice. The 
low coal price in the US has reduced coal prices in Europe, leading to the closing of newly built 
gas fired power stations, as in the Netherlands. Political pressures to compensate such unpleasant 
developments for those concerned will of course come up. Halting the subsidies on renewables 
may then be more directly in view than not raising the price of the emission tax. Of course the 
emission tax will reduce the attractiveness of coal fired power stations, and natural gas fired 
power stations as well. With periods of very low (but not zero) market prices every day, the 
profitability of fossil electricity production will be reduced, as is the intention of the emission tax.  
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Having emission standards and renewables subsidies will squeeze fossils out of the market as 
well. A further indirect effect, the tax effect will be different as well. The emission tax lowers other 
taxes in the Institutionalist approach, while with Planning & Control the subsidies for renewables 
and other primary and secondary production capacity require funding, through increased taxes, 
in the broadest sense, including surcharges. 
 
7.4. Divergent pathways managed in the short, medium and long term 
The end results in terms of instrumentation are substantially different for the two strategies. The 
starting points are equal, with their long term divergence leading to somewhat different pathways 
following short term already and, more so, medium term. How long might the options for either 
strategy direction in instrumentation be kept open? This may not only depend on the 
requirements for each strategy but also on an active choice to keep options open as long as 
possible. Instruments may be adapted so as to fit in both strategies. Temporary subsidies on 
renewables may shift from feed-in tariffs (FiTs), not compatible with open real time markets; to 
feed-in premiums (FiPs) or Contracts for Difference (CFDs), more compatible; to investment 
subsidies (with conditions) which are nearly fully compatible with open markets in the 
Institutionalist Strategy, but are also compatible with a Planning & Control Strategy. This may 
allow to postpone basic strategy choices somewhat. Similarly, development of a pan-European 
transmission grid does not yet determine the type of electricity market it is to function in. The 
more limited electricity transport volume required in the Planning & Control mode may well be 
set up so as to allow for the later expansion for the Institutionalist mode. Conversely, specific 
choices now may reduce options for either strategy later. Most clearly this is the case in a binding 
international agreement on yearly reduced caps per country, as being incompatible with an 
international agreement on a common yearly rising level emission tax, possibly as a Carbon Club34, 
starting with limited membership. The current UNFCCC process now considers the cap option 
only, but discussions on the tax approach have opened with influential supporters, see recently 
in Nature (MacKay, Cramton et al. 2015). 
The long term unavoidably comes after the short and medium term however. Would there be 
obstacles for developing either of the strategies in due time, or for both of them? 
A few obstacles can be imagined but are mostly easy to avoid.  
 The option of a Carbon Trading Authority is not to be realized as it would create an obstacle 
to developing a simplified price stabilized emission pricing system in the institutionalist mode, 
and is not required for the planning & control mode. This obstacle can easily be avoided by 
not having this Authority. 
 For learning curves creation, hybrid electric drive cars are not any more incentivized as by 
subsidies and Fleet Standard premiums, in neither strategy. There are millions of hybrid cars 
now sold per year already (market share Japan: 30%). There also is a substantial 
underestimation of their actual fuel use due to the non-realistic measurement standards 
used. In such circumstances hybrid drive vehicles may even help create a lock-in at high 
powered gasoline using heavy weight cars. Hybrid SUVs are expanding fastest in this market 
now. The lock in results from such drives being very actively promoted by current climate 
                                                          
34 Carbon Club is a less military term than coalition of the willing, or more neutral: climate coalition or more 
dynamic: front runner coalition. 
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policies. This obstacle can easily be avoided by removing the subsidy and replacing the NEDC 
(New European Driving Cycle) measurement standards by real performance measurement35. 
In the Intuitionalist strategy Fleet Standards and their adjoining measurement rules (NEDC 
and coming WLTP) are abolished fully, moving the measurement issue to the private domain. 
 Subsidies for creating learning curves in electric cars also seem a waste of money, given that 
several main producers are marketing them now already, globally. This obstacle can easily be 
avoided, by pure real life fleet standards in the Planning & Control strategy and by rising 
emission taxes in the Institutionalist strategy. 
 For the Institutionalist strategy the strict implementation of a strengthened Unbundling 
Directive is essential, probably not at variance with the Planning & Control Strategy. However, 
with Planning & Control the fruits of a better functioning electricity market cannot be fully 
realized due to technology specific intervention in the electricity market. This obstacle cannot 
easily be avoided. 
 Changes in the ETS cannot avoid a choice for either of the governance strategies. In the 
Institutionalist Strategy the ETS domain is expanded so as to cover all fossil emissions, also 
the transport sector, making Fleet Standards, also improved ones, superfluous in due time. In 
the Planning & Control strategy, the ETS first remains as is and becomes superseded by other 
instruments.  
 For the option of pure and strict cap-and-trade, not part of any governance strategy here, 
additional measures would be due: phase out all subsidies on technologies under the cap as 
these don’t lower the fixed cap and constitute complex transfer payments to producers and 
users only. 
 The difference between the two strategies regarding road transport are fundamental. 
Planning & Control uses fleet standards and electric vehicle subsidies, in a high priced 
electricity market, in current prices in the order of €0.25 cents per kWh. In the Institutionalist 
mode, the emission tax raises gasoline and Diesel prices substantially, see Table 6, while 
loading at very low electricity prices, in the order of €0.05, see BOX 1. Additional 
attractiveness comes from the option to use the battery advantageously in the open real time 
electricity market.  
 
Table 11 Instrument Mixes in Planning & Control and Institutionalist Governance 
PLANNING & CONTROL STRATEGY INSTITUTIONALIST STRATEGY 
1. Institutional Framework Conditions 1. Institutional Framework Conditions 
ETS not expanded and maintained, overtaken by technology 
specific instruments; no relevant generic emission pricing  
Electricity markets somewhat fragmented, with some 
vertical integration of production & distribution; load 
clearance by large producers & operators; bilateral 
international trade 
Access rules for use for underground energy storage and 
geothermal resources 
Generic emission tax, fully upstream, rising levels 
specified 
Electricity market, single price, equal for all, also 
internationally; phase out of FiTs and similar 
Small lender markets rules as for low emission housing 
Minor revision of landlord-tenant relations. 
Ownership rules for underground energy storage and 
geothermal resources 
 
                                                          
35 Also WLTP (Worldwide harmonized Light vehicles Test Procedures) as agreed in UN context will be prone to 
“optimization” by car producers, as any other lab standard. A-select real drive performance measurement does not 
have this optimization option. 
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EU Directives on Spatial Planning for low energy cities and 
transport infrastructure  
Standardization at EU level, if possible global: as for 
communication in internet of things, for plugs etc. 
Smart grid regulation 
No Directives on national spatial planning 
 
Standardization at EU level, if possible global, as for 
communication in internet of things, for plugs etc. 
No smart grid regulation 
2. Public Infrastructure 2. Public Infrastructure 
EU subsidies for implementation of low energy building and 
transport infrastructure by member states; public-private 
partnerships as negotiated for management of main 
infrastructure. 
Pricing of infrastructure use based on funding, including 
profits. 
No energy efficiency policy for climate reasons 
Long distance EU High tension DC grid;  
Public ownership for inherently monopolistic inter-
country energy transport  
Pricing of infrastructure use substantially based on 
capacity pricing. 
3. Publicly funded Research, R&D and 
Demonstration 
3. Publicly funded Research, R&D and 
Demonstration 
Less basic research, more RD&D  
Design contests  
More close to application R&D and many learning curve 
cases 
More basic research and CARPA projects 
Design contests  
Less close to application R&D and few learning curve 
cases 
4. Regulating Private Actors 4. Regulating Private Actors 
 4.1 Informational instruments  4.1 Informational instruments 
Public information systems: methods and data, tending to 
short/medium term, e.g. current energy performance 
based: mandatory energy performance labelling (MEPL) 
Standards for technology comparison, linked to long 
term low emission scenarios (to be developed) 
 4.2 Financial Instruments  4.2 Financial Instruments 
Electricity: production subsidies, feed-in premiums and 
investment subsidies; nuclear premiums and inv. subsidies; 
fossil capital subsidies (as capacity payment); electricity 
storage subsidies; electricity to flex heat subsidies; …. 
Heating: Non-fossil heating tech subsidies; insulation 
subsidies stock; …. 
Transport, additional to low-price ETS: EU guidance on 
differentiated subsidies on cars (purchase, registration, road 
use, parking, etc.; rising additional carbon based fuel taxes, 
also LPG (and similar household butane/propane and 
heating oil), rising with reference ‘relevant’ price level.  
Subsidies on all non-combustion drive vehicles 
Electricity: None by EU, open to member states iff in line 
with open EU-wide electricity market 
 
 
Heating: None by EU 
 
Transport): None for climate reasons, apart from EU 
emission taxes  
 4.3 Standards & Regulations  4.3 Standards & Regulations 
Detailed and changing smart grid metering prescriptions 
Energy in building: insulation standards; technology 
standards heating/cooling and cooking; etc. 
Expanding the Energy Using Product Directive, using CE 
labelling to enforce 
Transport: Fleet standards reformed to pure climate, 
covering all, vanishing differentiation between categories; 
increasing stringency to zero 
No smart grid metering prescriptions 
Building standards: None by EU?  
Heating/cooling: None by EU? 
Reducing use of Energy Using Product Directive: (very 
useful but not for LT climate reasons) 
Transport: Fleet standards first reformed to pure 
climate covering all, fading medium term 
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8. Comparing strategic Instrument mixes 
8.1. Effectiveness, Cost-effectiveness, Feasibility and Optimality  
Customary evaluation criteria for instrument mixes include effectiveness, efficiency as cost-
effectiveness, and feasibility aspects, see [(Görlach 2013)]. They are difficult to specify for long 
term transformations however, and certainly not fit for quantified overall weighted optimality 
analysis. Strategic governance considerations are prime background for judgment on long term 
instrument strategies. Fitting with views on broader governance, societal and socio-economic 
developments is overarching on the more technical-economic criteria related to optimality. 
Quantified optimality criteria may apply in more short-to-medium term analysis. For the long 
term, all such considerations can be applied only softly and qualitatively.  
Optimality criteria to assess instrument mixes relate to effectiveness; cost-effectiveness or 
efficiency; different feasibility aspects; and some overarching integrative concept of optimality, 
see the CECILIA2050 report (Görlach 2013). These concepts are modulated by the time frames 
distinguished here following (Grubb, Hourcade et al. 2014), leading to different frames of analysis: 
satisficing in the short term, optimizing in the medium term and transformation in the long term. 
The long term frame of analysis is prime here, as the two strategies are both long term strategies. 
What is added here is the requirement that these strategies must be able to be effective in 
reducing EU emissions. That effectiveness requirement shifts all other criteria to a specific corner. 
Cost-effectiveness is reduced to costs but not bounded by any specific level: at takes what it takes 
to arrive at the 2-degrees goal. Also feasibility shifts. An emission tax going up to €400 per tonne 
CO2 and an emission standard on electricity production and vehicle use going mostly to zero may 
seem unacceptable and hence not feasible politically. But then the question is how other equally 
effective instrument sets might be designed with higher long term political feasibility. Increasing 
cost of policy certainly does not contribute to political feasibility. Also legal and administrative 
feasibility change nature with a moving time horizon. What does not fit into current regulations 
is to be amended. What does not fit into the EU government procedures might be a reason to 
adapt them, like the rules in the Lisbon Treaty. This seems not to be required in either of the two 
strategies however. The optimality issue remains very open, apart from the assumption that 
effective climate policy is required for optimality. As there are substantial differences between 
optimality concepts some discussion on how the strategies stand there is due. 
 
8.2. Long term effectiveness and cost effectiveness 
EU effectiveness in a climate sense is prime of course in EU climate policy instrumentation. 
Effectiveness seems possible in both strategies, assuming political willingness and adequate 
operational implementation. Technologies for a near-zero CO2 emission society are mostly there 
already, though innovation will certainly create different ones, also conditional on 
instrumentation choices.  
Global climate effectiveness of policies cannot be realized by the EU alone. In a non-cooperative 
global context, when the EU would be going it alone, effective EU level climate policy would 
reduce global temperature rise by 0.1˚C according to (González-Eguino, Iñigo et al. 2015) to 3.7˚C 
above preindustrial levels in 2100, instead of 3.8˚C. In these circumstances it seems quite 
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impossible to keep EU policy on the 90% reduction path for CO2. Two less extreme scenarios are 
investigated by (González-Eguino, Iñigo et al. 2015), the Non-global-deal scenario and the Middle-
of-the-road scenario assuming climate policy abroad, but less strict than the more optimistic 
assumption on climate policy in here in this report. Their conclusion in Section 3.2 of their 
CECILIA2050 report is that the global effects of EU climate policy would still be limited. Also more 
stringent border tax adjustment are to be installed to reduce long term carbon leakage. In this 
report effectiveness relates to EU effectiveness, with also different global governance scenarios 
per strategy, but both assuming enough international cooperation to keep EU policy on track, and 
both assuming border tax adjustments, though on a different basis. 
EU-effectiveness between the EU climate policy strategies depends on the stringency with which 
they are implemented: the emission standard reduction for electricity and vehicle emissions, and 
further instruments, need harsh quantification and the unpleasant price path for CO2 emissions 
is to be determined, with time lines also for the introduction of other instruments, like the real 
time open electricity market. There seems to be a difference between the effectiveness of the 
strategies in terms of time lines of emission reduction involved. In both, resistance to  change as 
described by (Geels 2014) may be highly relevant but is assumed to have effectively been 
overcome.  
Technology specific actions can work fast, locally. But their later expansion may be limited with 
rising burdens of taxes for funding subsidies, including surcharges on electricity, and as creating 
long term dynamics is difficult with future technology options not yet present. The rising emission 
tax level works more long term, leaving more current technologies in place till substitution 
processes and transformative processes start to dominate. Overall both instrument strategies 
may however be effective.  
The speed of emission reduction may differ between strategies, with concrete, now available, 
options being implemented short and medium term in the planning & control strategy, especially 
when involving reduction of energy use. However, technology-specific measures with primary 
positive effects may have overall limited and sometimes even negative effects through rebound 
mechanisms, see (Font Vivanco and van der Voet 2014a, Font Vivanco, Kemp et al. 2015), which 
then are to be controlled. The institutionalist strategy might start slower but may lead to deeper 
technology and behavior changes towards zero emissions, also by reducing rebound mechanisms. 
The idea that planning & control will deliver more “sure” results seems not justified, vide 
Dieselgate and the soft handling of the issue in the EU and the recent 17% Chinese data revision 
on coal use, which might allow for on-paper reductions later. 
Long term cost-effectiveness cannot be established in an operational sense, as as yet unknown 
innovations and unknown market mechanisms will determine what comes up. For the long term, 
the technologies and their cost structure are very open. Cost-effectiveness then can be 
established at best in a semi-quantitative way, on an indirect primarily qualitative basis. 
Qualitative reasoning might involve reasoning that a stable price signal based on long term 
expectations of emission price development is conducive to cost-effective long term technology 
development. However, such an analysis has no absolute meaning. But alternative instrument 
mixes may be compared in a reasoned way. Also quantitative modelling may give some general 
indication as to cost of emission reduction. Based on several types of modelling (Anderson, Parry 
et al. 2011) conclude that reducing emissions with pricing instruments can be at roughly half the 
cost as reducing the same amount by technology specific standards and regulations. However, 
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the instrument scenario they have in mind differs from the instruments mixes developed here 
and all assessment of future technologies by necessity are more open than they assume. So there 
may be reasons to associate cost-effectiveness with design of open markets, reasoning towards 
semi-quantitative differences would remain speculative. Overall, there are qualitative reasons 
only to expect a higher cost-effectiveness for the Institutionalist strategy, unquantified and 
unquantifiable. 
 
8.3. Long term feasibility aspects  
Feasibility is an evaluative concept, indicating how difficult or probable it is that an instrument 
strategy will come about and will have the desired effectiveness. Effectiveness is a starting 
assumption here, with both sets of instrumentation in principle being able to get to the 2050 
emission target. Feasibility may relate to simple preferences individuals may have, like preferring 
subsidies over taxes. Though a political reality, such simple-minded preferences over individual 
instruments are blocking long term effectiveness of relevant instrument mixes.  One may reason 
on the relative feasibility of individual instruments but it is the feasibility of the effective mixes 
which is to be compared. Long term effectiveness is prime, even if this will mean going against 
preferences on specific instruments people have now, see for an analysis regarding a general 
public (Zvěřinová, Ščasný et al. 2013) and for public policy officials  (Munaretto and Walz 2015). 
Any effective instrument mix of course should avoid contradictions where possible. In real life 
political development, additional issues like co-benefits and compensating measures in other 
policy domains will be part of the deal, but not part of the strategy. 
Feasibility, as a multifaceted concept, may involve legal feasibility, economic feasibility, 
administrative feasibility, and social and political feasibility. An encompassing feasibility aspect is 
the overall legitimacy of climate policy, as part of total policy. Again, these aspects all have to be 
assessed in the realm of successful climate policy, and only in a comparative way, stating relative 
feasibility of overall instrument mixes. 
8.3.1. Legal feasibility 
Legal feasibility relates to how far the EU legal system would have to be adapted to have either 
of the two instrument mixes fully implemented. This would be repeated for the national level 
instruments, relative to national legal frameworks and relative to EU regulations, our of scope 
here. More detailed analysis of EU and national legal frameworks is in (Mehling, Bausch et al. 
2013). In their general analysis no long term impediments come up, neither at the EU or at the 
member state level, though details are important. Such details are beyond the current project. 
Legal feasibility regards two main aspects: do the climate policy instrument mixes fit the Lisbon 
Treaty and are possible national level instruments in line with EU regulations, especially those 
related to state support and free trade of products and services in the EU. It seems that with 
proper attention both instrument mixes can comply with these requirements. 
8.3.2. Economic feasibility 
Economic feasibility relates to the required speed of transformation; introducing new 
technologies takes time and new technology systems take substantial time. In the energy domain 
novel technologies tend to lose momentum as soon as they approach relevant volumes (Kramer 
and Haigh 2009) while basically new technology systems need around 35 years to reach their 
highest speed of penetration, the Hirooka Rule (Hirooka 2006). The speed is however 
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substantially dependent on the strength of the incentive, where planning and control may start 
fastest and the institutionalist approach may have the best long-term cards.  
Contrary to most economic reasoning, cost-effectiveness (or efficiency) is not a prime evaluative 
criterion when assessing long term climate policy instrumentation, as specification of 
technologies, including their future relative costs is neigh impossible. It may play a role in a 
different, indirect, sense: would the instrumentation allow for cost-effective choices ‘by then’, 
say 25 and 35 years from now? Also in this limited sense the criterion is quite secondary however. 
Structural change is a key feature of dynamic economies. The prime issue seems how large the 
risk on substantial losses is, particularly losses in specific sectors and regions. Again it is not the 
losses due to the success of climate policy. Coal fired power stations will have a difficult time, and 
lose out, quite unavoidably, and gas fired power stations later as well. Such closures are 
unavoidable in successful climate policy and hence must be feasible. Predictability and 
adaptability of the conversion path to a low emission economy seems a main factor for avoiding 
substantial losses, by not investing in the wrong directions any more. 
Conversely, the economic feasibility refers to the possibility to build-up a mainly renewables 
based energy production and use chain by 2050: are there unsurmountable economic 
bottlenecks? Do they differ between governance strategies? There seem to be no hard obstacles, 
also not in a resource sense (Koning, Kleijn et al. 2015). But there will be differences between the 
instrument strategies, as the institutionalist strategy is more flexible, and gives more long term 
economic guidance. 
8.3.3. Administrative feasibility 
Administrative feasibility refers to size and complexity of the administrative tasks involved in 
effective implementation, with options for fraud and improper use of the instruments to be 
mainly resolved. It is a more general evaluative aspect of administration. However, if the capacity 
is required for effective implementation it is to be delivered. In a comparative sense, the volume 
and complexity of the administrative tasks may be evaluated. The Institutionalist mix requires 
substantially less administrative input as there is not much detail in regulation for effective 
emission taxing and the electricity market is a privately going concern after having set up the rules 
and the infrastructure. At the member state level there are no specific problem to be expected in 
an administrative sense, not more than in other domains. Excises as the mode of emission tax 
administration are a most broadly applied instrument already in all EU countries. The more 
detailed instrumentation in the planning & control mode uses familiar instruments as well, 
ranging from subsidies and taxes in all legal forms to standards and regulations. More specifically, 
the administrative aspects of renewables subsidies and fleet standards seem surveyable, as are 
emission standards in electricity production. Current issues as in Dieselgate may substantially be 
avoided by setting up controls closer to reality. Implementing technology-specific regulations in 
industry will require the most extensive apparatus and sensitive tactics for advancing more 
stringent technologies, but in a well-established tradition present in most countries. Though 
related to a more substantive tasks, there are no fundamental administrative novelties with 
problems to be expected, beyond what is usual in other domains. The national administering of 
the upstream implemented emission tax is also established routine, fully comparable to centuries 
old excises as on alcohol, and even simpler than that.  
Overall, there are no basic administrative problems in either strategy but there is a substantially 
higher density of regulation in the planning and control mode. 
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8.3.4. Social and political feasibility 
Social feasibility refers to how acceptable or unacceptable climate policy instruments, and their 
induced technology and market changes, are to persons and organizations. Again, the assumed 
effectiveness of climate policy means that much will have to be accepted overall.  
Political feasibility has a willingness and a capacity element. Willingness is assumed here for 
effective climate policy. The capacity element is more diverse. More specific regulations tend to 
have more specific opponents, and a larger number of policy decisions is required, competing 
with other also non-climate issues. The Diesel fraud, detected by the Commission in 2013, was 
put on hold as economic recovery had priority (Brunsden and Oliver 2015), action forced only by 
the US EPA. Such mechanisms are part of regime resistance, see (Geels 2014). Fleet standards in 
an easy range may create limited opposition, and even support for other reasons, like creating 
barriers for new entrants to the EU car market. However, when car factories start to be closed 
the opinion on fleet standards may change abruptly. Greening the tax structure (Andersen and 
Ekins 2009) as by introducing the generic high rising emission tax, with compensating national 
reductions of other taxes, will have broader but diffuser opposition. The high CO2 emission tax in 
Norway and Sweden, and the yearly rising emission tax in British Columbia and similar Price Floor 
Tax in the UK did not meet with strong opposition. Overall, single large decisions like the 
introduction of the institutionalist high emission tax or planning & control strong fleet standards 
will need the momentum of the right moment, readily prepared, with strategy-dependent 
justifications. 
In the design of instrumentation the most conflicting options have already been avoided. Forced 
movement for home insulation and forbidding touristic long distance flight might be useful 
measures but not socially feasible. The design process has dealt with such socially infeasible 
extravagancies, in both instrumentation strategies. The related political feasibility again must be 
approached from the long term effectiveness perspective. It certainly will not be a walk-over to 
present emission standards in major domains of energy, buildings and transport to go down to 
near zero in surveyable time period of 25 years from now or starting in 2020. Neither will it be 
easy to introduce an emission tax rising to €300 or 400 a year in 2050, even though accompanied 
by compensating tax reductions. The public actions involved in the mixes, from electricity market 
design to spatial planning and infrastructure seem of lesser importance in terms of political 
feasibility, vide the ease with which a fundamental change like the unbundling of electricity 
production has effectively been introduced.  
Again, though specific instruments may slightly differ, there don’t seem to be deep differences in 
social and political feasibility between the two instrumentation strategies. 
8.3.5. Legitimacy  
Legitimacy of climate policy as part of the legitimacy of the political system is a final feasibility 
aspect. Planning and control may generate short term enthusiasm with climate environmentalists 
and beneficiaries of subsidies. Individuals prefer subsidies over taxes (Brannlund and Persson 
2012). The subsidy given requires raising the same amount of tax however. Long term planning & 
control policy will have to deal with lack of support for continuously constraining specific 
instruments, with unavoidable implementation scandals, and with additional taxes (in the 
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broadest sense) to fund substantial subsidies. Emission taxes with their diffuse ‘normal’ market 
mechanisms may create less of a legitimacy issue, being part of continuous economic transitions 
due to many factors. They also allow for more decentral participatory processes, assumed to 
contribute to legitimacy, see (Borrás and Ejrnæs 2011). 
There are some deeper legitimacy aspects. Responsibility for climate results is a main governance 
and legitimacy issue, different between the strategies. In the planning & control direction the full 
responsibility is with the central government level in the EU, implementing what is required for 
the quantified emission reduction target. A centralizing tendency then is nearly unavoidable, 
preferably backed up ultimately with a legally binding international agreement on national caps. 
Such EU policy may act directly, as with fleet standards, or indirectly with decentralized tasks. If 
countries then don’t play their part in emission reduction, central EU level government must step 
in36. In the Institutionalist direction there are no binding targets for the EU nor for member states. 
There is only one EU level implemented incentive for emission reduction, the uniform emission 
tax, and one key enabling element in institutions and infrastructure: EU-wide infrastructure and 
open markets for electricity and hydrogen. How emission reductions will emerge is up to member 
states, to regions, cities, and communities, and broader to civil society and firms, in an also 
international context. If over decades emissions remain too high for a relevant reduction level, 
the Baumol tax must be raised, pressing decentral responsible action further. 
Overall, there seems to be a legitimacy advantage for the institutionalist mode. 
 
8.4. Long term optimality aspects: risks, costs and welfare 
Optimality, viewed differently in the theoretical domain, is focused here at the combination of 
climate effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and different feasibility aspects as surveyed in the 
preceding sections. For the long term it is a qualitative aspect only. The analysis given indicates 
slight differences in terms of long term efficiency and similarly only few differences in the 
feasibility aspects distinguished.  
Some remarks of caution are due in this discourse. There is a tendency to equate markets with 
optimality. Whatever the exact relation may be, here markets are first seen as a major mechanism 
for resource allocation, with details in market design relevant for specifics in resource allocation. 
Though direct public determination of resource use is possible, the public span of control is 
limited. Market failures may be specified, and possibly remedied, like undue market power of 
monopolist and cooperating oligopolists. There will always be deviations from the optimal in a 
very basic sense however, as Nobel prize winners (Akerlof and Shiller 2015) have eloquently 
described; there are no independent utility functions in their perspective, and consistency is 
economic choices is substantially lacking, see also (Thaler 2015). So optimality of markets is a 
basically fluid concept. Efficiency can then be a partial concept only, with costs not related to an 
overall welfare concept related to optimality. Markets create resource allocation but not 
necessarily in the ideal welfare optimal way, with a few clear sub-optimalities possibly resolved 
for climate reasons. 
The most basic issue in optimality here is the climate issue itself. It tends to be specified in terms 
of the damages caused by emissions on the welfare of current and future populations, expressed 
                                                          
36 EU Parliament acclaimed a procedural resolution on 27 Oct 2015 to centralize surveillance to an EU authority to 
oversee car-emission tests, intending to prevent further fraud, cheating and similar. 
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in market terms and in broader terms like disability adjusted life years lost, and using discounting 
procedures in order to express future effects in current terms. However, such measures are first 
extremely difficult to predict in any quantified sense, being highly uncertain and contingent, as 
on adaptation measures, and depending on deeply contested discounting procedures. The most 
basic issue however is that deep risks go beyond what can be economically measured: the 
possible breakdown of society. In modest economic terms called that falls under fat tail effects 
(Weitzman 2009, Weitzman 2011), and named more alarmingly Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem.  
In a market type of reasoning, the institutionalist approach of emission pricing and overall 
electricity market design may have a cost advantage over technology specific instrumentation 
with standards and subsidies, dominant in the command and control approach. Well-designed 
technology specific instrumentation may however have a faster start, as feed-in tariffs have 
shown. For overall (soft) welfare development it seems that other considerations will be more 
relevant, linked deeply to the strategy choices also made for climate policy: how will our society 
be actively developed in the next half century? 
 
8.5. Long term strategic governance choices  
The considerations leading to the two instrument strategies developed here are basic in societal 
development, not in a directly political sense but in an ideological guidance sense for all 
governance development, not just in the EU but nearly globally. Climate policy instrumentation 
is not independent from these more general considerations and can be framed in them, as has 
been done. So ultimately it is not optimality considerations guiding choices, even if one could 
come up with an overall preference. It is much softer and deeper considerations related to the 
role of civil society; independence from government interference; certainty on climate outcomes; 
views on possible global governance and more such basic views which determine preferences 
over the two strategic directions for climate policy instrumentation developed here. 
So it is basic ideological governance aspects which constitute the core difference between the 
two strategies. The Planning & Control Strategy of course adheres to planning and control. The 
community sense of all together doing what is collectively deemed best is part of its ideological 
attractiveness. The Institutionalist Strategy has its focus on decentral independence and the role 
of civil society in guiding cultural and socio-economic development. Also in climate policy 
instrumentation a choice is unavoidable. 
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9. Key outcomes and general recommendations 
9.1. On governance 
1. There are two mutually incompatible approaches to governance, a more technology specific 
Planning & Control Strategy and more incentives oriented Institutionalist Strategy.  
2. Instrument mixes go in either direction: One cannot have feed-in-tariffs or premiums; BAT-
based industrial standards; obligatory housing insulation and Fleet standards, and at the same 
time have an open real time electricity market. 
3. Technology specific instrumentation may be combined administrative-technically with price 
based emission pricing but not with strict volume based emission pricing, as in pure cap-and-
trade systems and pure fleet standards.  
4. The Planning & Control governance strategy uses technology-specific instrumentation, 
including technology specific financial incentives, making a rational set-up of generic emission 
pricing difficult. 
5. The incentivizing Institutionalist governance strategy tries to avoid technology-specific 
instrumentation as much as possible, using more abstract incentives.  
6. With an EU level Institutionalist instrumentation in a few domains only, encompassing carbon 
pricing and a an open real time EU electricity market, more technology specific instruments 
can be left to the domain of Member States and private actors, with their complex motives, 
like being prime mover, clean city, clear firm or clean person, etc. 
7. In the Planning & Control development the role of EU instrumentation is more encompassing 
and is substantially intermingled with national level instrumentation, easily leading to 
lobbying activities and legitimacy issues at member states level. 
 
9.2. On combined energy and climate policy instrumentation 
1. The single most effective and most low-cost measure is at the level of institutional framework 
conditions: to set up an open to all real time EU electricity market, increasing efficiency and 
translating emission price incentives to all market parties. This is a side effect of this climate 
policy instrument. 
2. Effective climate policy based on replacement of fossils by renewables (and possibly nuclear) 
will also increase supply security, weaning the EU from fossils with their uncertainties. This is 
a co-benefit in this respect. 
3. Reduced energy use belongs to the most expensive instruments for long term climate policy 
when deep reductions are to be realized; societies cannot function well with a constrained 
energy supply. 
4. In a nearly fully decarbonized energy systems, long term, energy reduction does not lead to 
emission reduction. 
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9.3. On emission pricing  
1. ETS as a pure cap-and-trade system is instable: it will go to oblivion if taken over effectively 
by technology-specific instruments or will be price stabilized to avoid irrelevantly low prices 
or unacceptably high prices. Instable systems will not function long term. 
2. The lack of long term predictable emission prices is resolved by explicit price stabilization 
helping guide both research, R&D, and investment planning. 
3. Upstream application of the emission pricing system allows for including smaller energy users, 
also private users, increasing the domain of application from current 45% to near to 100%. 
4. Upstream application reduces also administrative complexity and cost, as by reducing the 
number of regulatees very substantially. 
5. The advantage of a predictable price level, as with the UK Price Floor Tax, is strongest with a 
long term fully fixed price path. 
6. With full coverage of all fossil emissions and a fixed single price path, transforming the cap 
permit system into the domain duties, taxes and excises allows for substantial administrative 
simplification, shifting from a permit system to a transaction system. 
7. All emission pricing systems can be made compatible with the Lisbon Treaty, with 
administrative implantation at member state level and (nearly all) proceeds going to Member 
States, different from current ETS. 
8. Explicit and stable emission pricing systems allow for an easier introduction of Border Tax 
Adjustments. 
9. Emission pricing systems require a well-functioning electricity market and related energy 
markets for the price incentive to reach all relevant decision makers; that is all government 
bodies, firms and persons in the EU.  
10. Emission reduction may be earlier and faster in the Planning & Control Strategy, but slow 
down later due to more limited innovation incentives, with the Institutionalist Strategy 
catching up later with deeper innovations and transformations.  
 
9.4. On electricity markets 
1. In the Planning & Control Strategy specific adaptations in the electricity market are introduced 
so as to allow controlled input of renewables as through public-private partnerships; the 
funding of renewables by subsidies like Feed-in tariffs, and funding of subsidies by surtaxes 
differentiated as to user groups. This precludes the emergence of an open real time electricity 
market and requires bodies with the responsibility and authority for market clearance. EU 
level trade will be limited and mostly restricted to bilateral trade. 
2. In the Institutionalist Strategy an open real time market - with equal prices for all delivering 
and equal prices for all using electricity - translates emission prices to all producers and users 
of electricity, and related markets. This precludes the use of different electricity prices for 
technology specific purposes. 
3. In the Planning & Control Strategy the transmission grid may be owned publicly or public-
privately, but with pricing cost and profits based, also if operated by public bodies. Grid 
investment planning is based on expected needs and proceeds. 
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4. In the Institutionalist Strategy the transmission grid is owned and operated publicly, with 
congestion based pricing. Grid investment planning is based on where congestion prices are 
high, indicating that capacity should be expanded in these parts of the grid.  
 
9.5. On research, research and development, and demonstration 
1. In the Planning & Control Strategy funding is focused at R&D and Demonstration projects and 
on public-private market development. 
2. In the Institutionalist Strategy funding is focused at Research and R&D, with public 
development exceptionally where risks are too high for private development, as happened in 
the IT domain with the roll-out of internet infrastructure. There are no candidates yet. 
 
9.6. On instruments regarding specific technologies, markets and behaviors 
1. In the Planning & Control Strategy, electricity production can be transformed roughly with 
current instrument means, then substantially expanded and stricter applied. Similar holds for 
buildings and households, where electrification can be stimulated and forced. The political 
challenge in transport is to expand fleet standards to all transport and use really high 
reduction percentages per year (~14%) to press fossil drives out of the market. Subsidizing 
non-fossil drives can ease the process in the medium term, but is not feasible in the long term. 
There is a great challenge in industry. Standards are differentiated as to production domains, 
based on BATs. Current BATs do not induce dynamics very much, mainly pressing out laggards. 
The climate BATs are to be dynamically developed and next diffused into industry, with carrots 
(subsidies) and sticks (standards).  
2. In the Institutionalist Strategy, there is limited interference in market processes, with two 
main exceptions. Near monopolistic sectors like electricity transmission and hydrogen 
transport are public, taking them out of private market functioning. The introduction of 
charging stations for electric vehicles and refueling stations for hydrogen are brought into the 
market with mixed means. A few large very-high-risk, long-term, very-high-impact projects 
may be implemented publicly. 
 
9.7. General recommendations 
1. Roadmaps for long term instrumentation strategies are to be developed, not one but several 
most relevant ones. This avoids incremental development without the transformative power 
required for a low carbon society, and makes the political process more transparent. 
2. These Roadmaps are at least to include a Planning & Control Strategy, focused on tangible 
results, primarily using technology specific instruments, especially caps, standards and 
subsidies, and an Institutionalist Strategy focused on incentives and avoids technology specific 
instrumentation. 
3. Strategic choices are to be made in climate policy: a Planning & Control and an Institutionalist 
Strategies of governance lead to substantially differing instrumentation of climate policy, 
regarding: internalization of external effects in prices; electricity market structure; physical 
infrastructure; innovation policies; and volume and nature of technology regulation in the 
private sector. The strategies are mutually exclusive. A strategic choice on instrumentation is 
to be made in the next half decade. 
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4. Subsidies and premiums for creating learning curves in hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles are 
to stop as they have been mass produced already. Battery electric cars are near that point as 
well, while fuel cell cars may need substantial learning curves still, with subsidies.  
5. Emission reduction percentages are better to be specified relative to the previous year, similar 
to economic growth rates, efficiency improvements, and emission intensity improvements in 
the economy, as compound yearly rates. This better supports long term perspective on 
performance development through better comparability. 
6. Pure volume systems in instrumentation, like the EU ETS and the EU Fleets Standards, are at 
variance with other instruments applied now in the same domains. These other instruments 
don’t much change the cap and standard as set in these instruments. Not just ETS, also Fleet 
Standards make bottom-up actions mostly irrelevant, if not worse through the in-built 
premiums: more electric cars allows for higher overall CO2 emissions on the medium term. 
This is a socially and politically undesirable consequence of volume systems, to be repaired as 
soon as possible. 
7. A pure cap-and-trade system, without price stabilization, as the ETS intended to be before the 
Market Stability Reserve (MSR), is instable economically and politically. Either effective 
technology specific instruments lower its price, the lower price making it less relevant, with 
the importance of technology specific instruments then further increasing. Or the pure cap 
system is dominant, accepting very low prices as now and extreme price rises as may come 
up, especially in periods of high economic growth, and not introducing technology specific 
instruments effectively. If these consequences are not accepted and permit volumes are 
adapted, the pure cap domain is left. A choice for either leaving the cap pricing system or 
making it price dependent is due on short notice; the MSR is only an intermediate step. 
8. The introduction of a price element in the cap system, adapting volume to an intended price, 
resolves the incompatibility with decentral instruments and initiatives, first possibly by 
creating a price floor and a price cap, with a bandwidth. The bandwidth has no economic or 
environmental meaning however and should converge to zero, making costly trading (with 
tax evasion and fraud) superfluous. In a further step, the administrative set-up can be much 
simplified by moving from a permit to an excise system. The ETS cap than is transformed into 
an encompassing generic emission tax. This transformed ETS is to be the core instrument in 
the Institutionalist Strategy for long term climate policy instrumentation. 
9. The electricity market plays a key role in linking low emission energy technologies, as most 
renewables produce electricity, and electricity will play a main role in energy use. The number 
of primary and secondary producers may well rise to in the order of 100 million. For linking 
such numbers and for translating emission prices into market prices, a substantially changed 
European electricity market is to be developed, well beyond the targets of the Unbundling 
Directive and the European Energy Union. Core target is a real time variable priced market 
system, with equal prices for all producers and all users, and load clearance by market forces, 
not central operators. EU infrastructure as a pan-European DC High Tension grid linking 
national transmission grids is to constitute the physical basis. 
10. Having fleet standards determining car technology regarding emissions at the EU level makes 
subsidy schemes for low emission cars as now common at the national level mostly irrelevant. 
These then use substantial amounts of public money going to the car industry, without 
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reducing overall emissions and without creating innovation incentives or learning curves. This 
state of affairs is to be effectively communicated to member states.  
11. In the Planning & Control strategy, Fleet Standards are to be substantially adapted to make 
them pure emission reducing instruments: no mass correction; no low emission vehicle 
premiums; no differentiation between person cars and vans; and realistic emission 
measurement to replace NEDC measurement standards, and fleet volumes sold being part of 
the system, with trade in expected emission volumes made possible. In the Institutionalist 
strategy such  adapted standards may play a role in the short to medium term till emission tax 
has risen enough, as the period towards all cars being zero emission is very short, to be 100% 
zero by 2040 latest.  
12. Proceeds from the emission tax will first be rising roughly towards the mid-Thirties and 
decreasing thereafter. There is no reason in the Institutionalist strategy to link proceeds to 
specific outlays. Proceeds are due to member states, to their discretion, for greening the tax 
system, to reduce budget imbalances or for specific outlays. 
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Executive summary 
The existing climate policy mix is uneven, both in terms of coverage and stringency, within and 
between sectors and Member States. Despite this, it has delivered relatively substantial CO2 
abatement, with a positive overall impact on both GDP and employment, with no evidence of 
induced carbon leakage. Whilst economic instruments have been important, they are not 
exploiting their full potential as a result of design flaws, insufficiently managed interactions 
with other instruments, and the presence of market distortions. Instead, regulatory 
instruments have thus far delivered a substantial proportion of policy-induced abatement. 
‘Non-Climate’ instruments, and non-policy drivers, have also had a noticeable impact on GHG 
emissions in some sectors. Broadly speaking, ‘information’ instruments have thus far had little 
influence on driving low-carbon investment and behaviour changes. Instruments of all 
descriptions, both at EU and Member State level, are often not designed to deal with or correct 
for unexpected developments or side effects, producing sub-optimal or even 
counterproductive outcomes, and reducing credibility. Additionally, Institutional and legal 
configuration, characteristics and procedures at both EU and Member State level has a 
substantial influence over whether an instrument or instrument mix is effective, or feasible to 
introduce in the first place. 
In order to achieve the objective of a reduction in GHG emissions of 80% in the EU by 2050 
(from 1990 levels), the rate of abatement across all sectors must decrease substantially, driven 
by a comprehensive, effective, cost-efficient yet feasible instrument mix, and facilitated by 
appropriate governance and institutional structures and processes. Such instruments and 
reforms must meet or overcome ten key challenges in both the short- and long-term: 
- Establish a Meaningful Carbon Price 
- EU-Wide Electricity Market Reform and System Integration 
- Make Sounds Infrastructure Choices Despite Technological Uncertainty 
- Provide Finance and Mobilise the Investments Necessary for a Low-Carbon Economy 
- Encourage Low-Carbon Lifestyles 
- ‘Fully’ Decarbonise the Power Sector 
- Facilitate Low-Carbon Transport 
- Tackle the Energy Consumption of the Housing Stock 
- Stimulate Radical Low-Carbon Innovation in Industry 
- Address non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Particularly from Agriculture 
Various options are presented to meet, or lay the foundations and trajectory towards meeting 
these challenges in the short-term (by 2030). In terms of ‘framework’ conditions, and the 
reform and operation of public institutions, key examples include maximising the potential 
benefits of EU-wide, supranational initiatives such as the Energy Union and Innovation Union 
concepts, along with leveraging the potential for subnational and regional governance 
initiatives (such as the Covenant of Mayors), to facilitate and encourage the emergence 
     
Page 9  | Short-Term Development Options for the EU Climate Policy Mix   PART 2 
synergies, ‘frontrunners’ and ‘policy labs’ at all levels of governance. This is supported by the 
‘mainstreaming’ of the low-carbon objective across all areas of policy making and investments 
made by public funds, or by public financial institutions. Indeed, dedicated funds and 
instruments for low-carbon development and innovation should be stepped up, at both the EU 
and Member State level. Ensuring clear and appropriate spatial planning regimes and 
administrative competences, perhaps unified in a single body at all relevant levels of 
jurisdiction, may overcome the need for several complex, unclear and disjointed processes, in 
turn reducing administrative barriers to the development of low-carbon infrastructure. The 
production of long-term plans by Member States helps highlight potential synergies between 
proposed low-carbon development pathways, helps identify and avoid conflicts before they 
occur, and helps recognise key areas of uncertainty for future focus. Increasing the application 
of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, at both EU level and by Member States, would 
also likely prove beneficial. 
In terms of broad policy instrumentation, two broad pathways are presented. The first is the 
‘incentive-based’ policy pathway, which focuses on pricing and other technology-neutral 
incentivising instruments to drive low-carbon investments and behaviour. A strengthened EU 
ETS, expanded to cover the residential heating sector, is the primary instrument and 
cornerstone of the instrument mix. This is supported by the introduction and harmonisation of 
a carbon price in the (road) transport sector, through CO2-based vehicle registration and 
circulation taxes, and CO2-based road pricing. Existing regulatory requirements and targets 
largely remain, but are generally not tightened, and many expire once time-limited targets are 
met. The second pathway is the ‘technology-specific’ policy pathway, which focuses on 
regulatory targets and limits, and instruments that encourage particular technologies. Market-
based elements remain a strong feature, and may often be used to accelerate the development 
or increase the deployment of particular technologies. The role of pricing instruments is 
secondary in this pathway, and many existing ‘incentivising’ instruments (e.g. vehicle 
registration taxes), may be removed over time from a climate policy perspective. 
However, regardless of the specific policy pathway taken, various cross-cutting options for the 
introduction of new and the reform of existing policy instruments are available. This includes 
the reform, where appropriate, of renewable support mechanisms and capacity mechanisms 
to ensure effectiveness, cost-efficiency and sustainability for as long as such mechanisms are 
likely to be required. Additionally, existing information instruments, which have had relatively 
little influence thus far, may be amended to ensure they present clear, reliable and appropriate 
information, whilst new information instruments may be introduced where they have thus far 
been underexploited. This includes the use of ‘soft’ transport measures, and potentially a ‘food 
to fork’ GHG accounting system for the integrated agri-food sector. Actions to reduce market 
distortions, such as those presented by company car taxation rules in many Member States, 
may also be taken. 
Broadly, whichever policy pathway is taken and specific options implemented, the design of 
individual instruments (both existing and new) and instrument mixes, and associated 
governance approaches, must be ‘smarter’, in order to deal with uncertainty, improve stability 
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and increase confidence. Such an approach may be summarised into five key criteria; (a) 
Effective instrument targeting, (b) Effective monitoring/compliance mechanisms, (c) allows for 
future revision if required, (d) able to deal with changing circumstances (both expected and 
unexpected, and (e) Inducement and promotion of positive co-benefits.  
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1 Introduction 
The EU has set itself an ambition to reach a reduction in GHG emissions of 80-95% by 2050, 
from 1990 levels. Between 1990 and 2012, GHG emissions reduced by around 20% (European 
Environment Agency, 2015b). If the 2050 target is to be achieved, the rate of emission 
reductions must therefore increase substantially. Whilst the evidence suggests that the EU and 
Member State climate policy mix made a relatively significant contribution to the emission 
reductions achieved so far (particularly in the latter years), to achieve the step-change 
required, it must be substantially strengthened. It must also achieve its goal as cost-efficiently 
as possible.  However, any effort to implement a strengthened, cost-effective policy mix (and 
the institutional reforms required to enable it), it must move beyond theoretical arguments 
and consider ‘feasibility’; including the existing complement of policy instruments and 
institutional arrangements, political and public acceptability, legal compatibility and 
administrative capabilities. 
The objective of this report is to present options for the reform of the existing EU climate policy 
mix and institutional architecture, to improve its effectiveness and cost efficiency, within the 
bounds of ‘feasibility’ as described above. Essentially, it seeks to achieve ‘optimality’ using a 
broad definition employed by the CECILIA2050 project (and described in Section 5.2), which 
moves beyond the traditional definition. It focuses on short-term changes; those that may be 
introduced up to 2030, and establishes the basis for further abatement and policy 
development in the longer-term (to 2050). 
Section 2 first discusses the general composition, achievements and limitations of the existing 
EU climate policy mix, key institutional aspects and initiatives that concern such policy, and 
basic technical and policy requirements for the future. Section 3 then presents the ten key 
decarbonisation ‘challenges’ that must be met or overcome to enable a successful low-carbon 
transition to develop, along with the ‘status quo’ from which any reform options must depart. 
Section 4 follows with instrumentation and institutional reform options for how to meet and 
overcome these challenges, drawn together in Section 5 by how these options together 
achieve these objectives. Section 6 concludes. 
2 The Current Climate Policy Mix – Composition, Achievements and 
Limitations, and Requirements for the Future 
2.1 The Current Climate Policy Landscape 
2.1.1 Composition, Effects and ‘Lessons Learned’ 
This section provides a brief overview of the current landscape of climate policy in the EU, what 
it has and has not achieved thus far, and where key limitations may be found. A more detailed 
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description and discussion may be found in Drummond (2014)1, and in Section 3, concerning 
specific ‘challenges’, below. 
The existing climate policy mix is uneven, in terms of both coverage and stringency, within 
and between sectors and Member States. 
The power and industry sectors experience the most coherent policy landscape, with the EU 
ETS producing a single, EU-wide carbon price across these sectors. However, the combination 
of the economic crisis (and resulting fall in emissions), generous use of international offset 
credits, and the success of complementary policies (such as renewable electricity (RES-E) 
support mechanisms) have rendered the EU ETS largely ineffective as a driver for abatement, 
as evidenced in the substantial allowance surplus and the resulting low price. 27 of 28 Member 
States also promote the deployment of renewables in the power sector through dedicated 
support mechanisms (with highly varied design and level of support) (Agnolucci and 
Drummond, 2014). 
In the buildings sector, EU-level policy has focussed largely on new buildings, with high 
apparent ambition, but low effective implementation by Member States. Existing buildings 
have only recently become directly subject to EU-level policy focus, with implementation yet 
to be achieved in many Member States. However, instruments addressing components of 
energy consumption and emissions from buildings, such as energy-using and energy-related 
products, have been in place for some time, and have been relatively effective (Drummond, 
2013). In transport, several instruments act on passenger cars, with other road-based vehicles 
and non-road transport modes (such as aviation and shipping) subject to little if any policy 
instrumentation. No explicit climate policy instrumentation exists at the EU level for the 
agriculture sector (and few for non-CO2 GHG more broadly). Instruments that do exist are at 
the Member State level, are largely recent introductions, focus on information dissemination 
and R&D rather than direct emissions abatement, and are implemented on a voluntary basis 
(Kuik and Kalfagianni, 2013). 
Despite this, the existing climate policy mix has delivered relatively substantial CO2 
abatement, with a positive impact on both GDP and employment at the EU level. 
Econometric modelling suggests that the presence of the EU ETS, renewable electricity support 
mechanisms and environmental tax reforms across the EU reduced CO2 emissions by up to 12-
13% in some Member States against the counterfactual, in 2008 (with substantial variation). 
This value would likely increase when considering the impact of flanking instruments. In 
combination, it is clear that these instruments did not have a negative impact on EU GDP in 
2008, and likely had a positive impact. Similarly, employment was also likely higher than in the 
counterfactual scenario. However, substantial variation between Member States is present 
(Meyer and Meyer, 2013). 
                                                     
1 This report summarises a series of reports produced under the CECILIA2050 project, each of which assesses the 
impact of the current climate policy mix on individual sectors, or cross-sectoral aspects. 
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There is no evidence to suggest that ‘carbon leakage’ has occurred. 
Whilst much ex-ante analysis predicted the EU ETS would lead to a substantial loss of 
competiveness producing carbon leakage (of between 5-20%), no evidence suggests that any 
carbon leakage has yet occurred. This may be due to various reasons, including (a) the presence 
of anti-leakage measures, such as free allocation of permits, (b) the low price experienced for 
much of the EU ETS’ history, (c) the relative importance of other factors such as labour force 
qualification, infrastructure quality and proximity to customers (d) characteristics such as 
capital intensity determining how ‘footloose’ an industry is, or (e) non-consideration of policy-
induced impacts such as first-mover advantages, ‘spillover’ effects, and induced innovation 
(Branger and Quirion, 2013; Kuik et al, 2013). 
Non-‘climate’ instruments, and non-policy drivers, have also had a noticeable impact on GHG 
emissions in some sectors. 
GHG emissions from the agriculture sector have decreased by over 20% since 1990 (particularly 
CH4 and N2O). This has been driven by a combination of provisions in instruments introduced 
for non-climate reasons, such as the Nitrates Directive, Water Framework Directive and 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and non-policy drivers such as rapid increases in animal 
productivity in Central and Eastern Europe (Kuik and Kalfagianni, 2013). In the power sector, 
the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) has likely had some impact in advancing the 
closure of coal-fired power stations (Agnolucci and Drummond, 2014). More broadly, the 
financial crisis is likely to have had a substantial impact on CO2 emissions across different 
sectors. 
Whilst economic instruments have been important, regulatory approaches have delivered a 
substantial proportion of abatement induced by the policy mix. 
The EU ETS reduced CO2 emissions by around 1-3% in most Member States (in 2008), almost 
entirely through temporary ‘fuel switching’ from coal to gas in the power sector. The 
deployment of renewables in the power sector is driven by dedicated support mechanisms 
(often through market-based instruments), producing around 3.5% CO2 abatement on average 
across Member States in 2008 (Drummond and Agnolucci, 2014; Meyer and Meyer, 2013). In 
the road transport sector, regulations for passenger cars have been successful in reducing 
fleet-average CO2 intensity of new vehicles in recent years, with the 2015 regulatory target 
achieved early. In the buildings sector, minimum energy performance standards on energy-
using and energy-related products (through the Ecodesign Directive) have likely been 
instrumental in shifting the market to more efficient products for lighting, heating and cooling 
equipment, white goods and other appliances (Drummond, 2013). 
Economic instruments are not exploiting their full potential as a result of design flaws, 
interactions with other instruments, and the presence of market distortions 
Design flaws often centre on a lack of flexibility or capacity to deal with uncertainty, discussed 
below. The overlap of economic instruments in combination with regulatory approaches, in 
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some instances, is likely to have increased costs without generating additional emission 
reductions. For example, subsidies for the purchase of new low-carbon passenger cars, as 
present in many Member States, are largely superfluous in the presence of EU-wide CO2 
intensity fleet standards. However, the often-cited overlap (and resulting inefficiency) 
between dedicated renewable electricity support mechanisms and the EU ETS is not as 
problematic as it is made out to be, since the 2020 renewable deployment target was 
considered in the EU ETS cap-setting (Drummond, 2013). 
Market distortions are often significant. Tax arrangements for company cars in many Member 
States are such that the purchase of highly-CO2 intensive cars are incentivised, whilst the driver 
of the vehicle is not liable for fuel costs. As such, the effects of fuel taxation and other market-
based instruments to encourage reduced CO2 emissions are substantially dulled. Additionally, 
fuel taxes and levies vary substantially across Member States. This produces tax competition 
and fuel tourism, particularly for long-distance freight vehicles, creating additional CO2 
emissions and undermining the effect of fuel taxation in a given Member State (Maca et al, 
2013). Under existing legal frameworks, fuel for residential heating and agricultural application 
are exempt from taxation (Drummond, 2013). In addition, some Member States provide other 
energy consumption subsidies that also act to reduce the effects of pricing instruments. For 
example, reduced-rate VAT is applied to residential heating fuels in the UK (5% rather than the 
standard rate of 20%). This constitutes an annual implicit subsidy of around £5 billion (Advani 
et al, 2013). In many Member States, electricity prices for residential consumers continue to 
be tightly regulated at a low level. 
Information instruments (e.g. labelling) have thus far had little influence on driving low-
carbon investment and behaviour changes. 
There are four broad contributing factors to this insight. Firstly, the target audience (e.g. 
consumers) are often simply unaware of the instrument in the first place. Secondly, if they are 
aware, understanding of the information presented is often low. This links to the third aspect 
of instrument design, which often allows for confusion, misinterpretation, or otherwise does 
not provide information required to maximise the potential of such an instrument. The final 
aspect concerns priorities of the target audience and the existing incentive framework. 
Cognitive complexities (such as discounting future costs and benefits) or other priorities 
(capital costs, cultural preferences, etc.) often inhibit the effectiveness of information 
presented, compounding the lack of an appropriate economic incentive in the first place 
(Drummond, 2013). 
Instruments are often not designed to deal with or correct for unexpected developments or 
side effects, producing sub-optimal or even counterproductive outcomes, and reducing 
credibility. 
The key example is the EU ETS, which is currently experiencing a substantial surplus of emission 
allowances resulting (principally) from the economic crisis. This results in low carbon prices, 
which despite the adoption of the Market Stability Reserve, will likely persist for a number of 
years, rendering the EU ETS largely defunct as an instrument for driving low-carbon 
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investment. RES-E support mechanisms in some Member States have been repeatedly altered 
to respond to specific concerns, particularly increasing overall costs of the system, overly 
generous rates as technology costs decreased, or conflict with state aid rules. This has 
produced legal challenges in some instances. In Spain, retroactive changes to tariff rates were 
introduced in response to spiralling costs, substantially reducing confidence in renewables 
investment (González-Eguino et al, 2013). 
Institutional and legal configuration, characteristics and procedures at both EU and Member 
State level has a substantial influence over whether an instrument or instrument mix is 
effective, or feasible to introduce in the first place. 
Unanimity in the European Council is required for the introduction of or substantial changes to 
instruments operating EU-wide and that are ‘primarily of a fiscal nature’. This has influenced 
the instrument choice in climate policy in the past, in particular favouring the EU ETS over an 
EU-wide carbon tax (Mehling et al, 2013). 
Depending on administrative divisions, a number of entities may be responsible for, or have 
influence over, different elements of the climate policy mix or individual instruments, at both 
EU and national levels. This can lead to institutional conflicts that impede the implementation 
and coherence of policy instruments. In some Member States, sub-national governance levels 
are essential for effective implementation and operation of climate policies. Evidence suggests 
that this has both helped and hindered the implementation of low-carbon policies in different 
Member States (Bausch et al, 2015).  
2.1.2 Overarching Targets and Initiatives 
2.1.2.1 2030 Climate and Energy Package 
The 2020 Climate and Energy Package, introduced in 2009, set the well-known ’20-20-20’ 
targets for GHG reduction, deployment of renewables and increase in energy efficiency. In 
January 2014 the European Commission proposed a 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy 
Policies. The European Council agreed the package in October 2014. As per the 2020 Package, 
the framework contains three key elements (European Commission, 2015a; European 
Commission, 2014a): 
- 40% GHG emission reduction by 2030 from 1990 levels (delivered by an estimated 43% 
reduction in EU ETS emissions and 30% in non-ETS sectors, from 2005 levels), increased 
from a target of 20% by 2020. As per the 2020 Package, this is to be delivered via binding 
targets on Member States2 
                                                     
2 Yet to be assigned, but non-ETS targets are to be calculated in the same manner as for the 2020 Effort Sharing 
Decision (i.e. relative GDP per capita). Targets will set at between 0% and -40% from 2005 levels, for each Member 
State. Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) is not included in the 2020 Package, and inclusion is yet 
to be decided for the 2030 Package (discussed under Section 4.1.1.1). 
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- 27% renewables in final energy consumption by 2030, an increase from 20% in 2020, but 
‘binding’ at the EU-level only. The main driver for this is expected to be an increase in 
renewable electricity generation from around 21% at present, to 45% by 2030.  
- 27% increase energy efficiency by 2030, against baseline projections for primary energy 
consumption – an increase from 20% in 2020. This target is ‘binding’ at EU-level only, and 
will be reviewed in 2020 for a potential increase to 30%. 
Whilst the EU is broadly on track to meet the ’20-20-20’ targets by 2020 (driven by a 
combination of policy measures and exogenous factors), it is clear that the existing policy 
landscape is not sufficient to deliver the 2030 Framework targets (and certainly not the long-
term ambition of a 80-95% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050) (European Environment 
Agency, 2015a). As such, the existing climate policy instrument mix, and supporting 
governance approaches and institutions, must be reformed and extended to match the level 
of ambition required in the short- and long-term.  
2.1.2.2 The ‘Energy Union’ 
In February 2015, the European Commission published its proposal for an ‘Energy Union’ – the 
implementation of which is one of the new Commission’s overarching ’10 Priorities’3. The 
objective of the proposed Union, broadly, is to ‘bring greater energy security, sustainability and 
competitiveness’, through five interrelated dimensions of (a) energy security, solidarity and 
trust, (b) a fully integrated European energy market, (c) energy efficiency contributing to 
moderation of demand, (d) decarbonising the economy, and (e) research, innovation and 
competitiveness (European Commission, 2015b). These ‘dimensions’ may be further broken 
down into fifteen proposed ‘Action Points’ (KAPs), many of which relate to the proposed 
options and directions for short-term reforms and instruments discussed in Section 4. As such, 
these KAPs will be discussed where appropriate. The first ‘State of the Energy Union’ report 
due in Autumn 2015, after which annual reporting is expected. 
2.1.2.3 The Innovation Union 
Launched in 2010, the ‘Innovation Union’ is one of the seven flagship initiatives of the Europe 
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth4, and holds three key aims: (a) make 
Europe into a world-class science performer, (b) remove obstacles to innovation, and (c) 
revolutionise the way public and private sectors work together, notably through ‘Innovation 
Partnerships’. These aims are to be delivered through 34 ‘action points’, grouped into 13 broad 
titles. Each action point holds specific targets and timeframes for achievement.  (European 
Commission, 2015r): 
                                                     
3 Along with ‘Jobs, Growth and Investment’, ‘Digital Single Market’, ‘Internal Market’, Economic and Monetary 
Union’, ‘EU-US Free Trade’, ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’, ‘Migration’, EU as a Global Actor’ and ‘Democratic 
Change’. See http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm for more information. 
4 The other six include: ‘Digital Agenda for Europe’, ‘Youth on the Move’, ‘Resource Efficient Europe’, ‘An Industrial 
Policy for the Globalisation Era’, ‘An Agenda for New Skills and Jobs’, and ‘European Platform Against Poverty’. 
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- Promoting excellence in education and skills development – train researchers, promote 
attractive employment conditions, ranking and benchmarking of university performance, 
creation of ‘knowledge alliances’. 
- Delivering the European Research Area (ERA) – remove obstacles to mobility and cross-
border co-operation of researchers and research organisations, and encourage 
dissemination, transfer and use of research results. 
- Focus EU funding instruments on Innovation Union priorities – focus on Europe 2020 
objectives, particularly societal challenges, and simplify access to funding (particularly to 
SMEs). Strengthen the base for policymaking through the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and 
create a ‘European Forum on Forward Looking Activities’. 
- Promote the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) as a model of 
innovation governance in Europe – creation of Strategic Innovation Agenda, including the 
creation of new Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs). 
- Enhancing access to finance for innovative companies – EU financial instruments to attract 
private finance, enable venture capital funds to function and invest freely across the EU, 
and strengthen cross-border matching of innovative firms with suitable investors. 
- Creating a single innovation market – EU and Member States to undertake screening of 
regulatory framework in key areas (including eco-innovation), to identify improvement 
requirements. Member States to set aside dedicated budgets for procurement of pre-
commercial and innovative products and services totalling at least €10 billion (‘Green Public 
Procurement’, discussed in Section 4.1.2.6). An ‘eco-innovation action plan’ should be 
developed. 
- Promoting openness and capitalising on Europe’s creative potential – The Commission will 
promote open access to publicly funded research, and facilitate collaborative research and 
knowledge transfer. Development of European knowledge market for patents and licensing, 
and role of competition policy assessed. 
- Spreading the benefits of innovation across the Union – Member States to improve use of 
Structural Funds for research and innovation projects (including trans-national projects). 
- Increasing social benefits – social innovation to become a mainstream focus, with 
dedicated research programme on public sector and social innovation and the use of a 
European Public Sector Innovation Scoreboard. 
- Pooling forces to achieve breakthroughs: European Innovation Partnerships – The 
Commission invites all stakeholders to commit to the innovation partnership concept, and 
to pool efforts and resources. 
- Leveraging policies externally – The EU and Member States should contribute to global 
approaches and solutions to societal challenges, and the establishment of a level playing 
field. Agreement should be reached with international partners on the development of 
research infrastructures, which owing to cost, complexity and interoperability can only be 
developed on a global scale. 
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- Reforming research and innovation systems – Member States carry out self-assessments 
to identify key challenges and critical reforms, supported by the Commission through 
sharing of best-practice, peer reviews and development of the evidence base. 
- Measuring progress – The Commission will monitor progress on these objectives and 
targets through the use of a Research and Innovation Union Scoreboard. 
The Innovation union should also allow achievement of the overarching target of 3% GDP 
invested in Research and Development (R&D) by 2020 (delivered cumulatively by national 
targets, and divided between public investment (1%) and private investment (2%)) - one of the 
five targets of the Europe 2020 strategy5. Progress in achieving the objectives of the Innovation 
Union, and possible options for its future development, are discussed in Section 4.1.1.1.  
2.2 Basic Requirements for the Future 
2.2.1 Basic Requirements for GHG Reduction 
The EU has committed to a long-term target of a reduction of GHG emissions of 80-95% by 
2050, from 1990 levels. As discussed above, the EU is broadly on track to meet its intermediate 
2020 targets for climate and energy, but requires additional effort to achieve its stated 
ambitions for 2030 and beyond. Figure 1 illustrates actual CO2 emissions in the EU28 between 
1990 and 2012 by sector, and projected CO2 emissions to 2050 based on the EU’s Energy 
Roadmap 2050 (ER2050) (European Commission, 2011b)6. 
 
In 2012, the power generation sector accounted for the largest proportion of CO2 emissions in 
the EU, at around a third (excluding LULUCF). The industry and (domestic) transport sectors 
                                                     
5 The five targets are described in Footnote 55 
6 ‘Industry’ includes Manufacturing and Construction, and Industrial Processes. ‘Transport’ excludes international 
transport. ‘Buildings’ includes residential, commercial and institutional buildings. ‘Other’ includes emissions from 
fuel combustion in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, waste and other non-specified sources. Emissions exclude 
Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). ER2050 projection are based on the ‘Diversified Supply 
Technology’ Scenario. 
Figure 1 - EU28 CO2 Emissions - Actual (1990-2012) and Projected (2013-2050) 
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accounted for around a fifth and a quarter, respectively, with buildings at around 16%. ‘Other’ 
emissions accounted for the remainder, at 8%. As is clear from Figure 1, CO2 emissions from all 
sectors must reduce significantly over the coming decades to achieve the stated overarching 
abatement goals. 
In order to remain on the trajectory to the 2050 targets, the modelling work represented by 
Figure 1 suggests that CO2 emissions from the power generation and industry sectors (plus 
‘other’ emissions) should approximately halve by 2030 from 2012 levels, with CO2 emissions 
from buildings reducing by 20%. Transport emissions remain stable. Such trends occur in the 
face of likely increases in demand for the services and products these sectors provide. In the 
long-term, more dramatic reductions occur. The power sector in particular, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, should almost completely decarbonise, whilst all other sectors reduce to around a 
third of their 2012 CO2 emissions. Whilst the reduction of CO2 emissions, which account for 
over 80% of all (non-LULUCF) GHG emissions in the EU (European Environment Agency, 2015b), 
must clearly be the focus of abatement efforts, non-CO2 GHGs must also be tackled where 
feasible. More detail on the abatement required, and how they may be delivered through 
technological and behavioural changes, are discussed under the relevant ‘challenges’ 
presented in Section 3. 
2.2.2 Basic Requirements for Climate Policy  
Both theory and evidence suggests that a combination of climate policy instruments is 
essential, in a well coordinated ‘instrument mix’ in order to deliver the GHG reductions that 
are required in a cost-effective, feasible manner (Drummond, 2015). The landmark Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change (or ‘Stern Review’), considered that a policy 
framework for CO2 abatement should have three elements: carbon pricing, technology policy 
and the removal of barriers to behaviour change (Stern, 2006). Grubb et al (2014) advanced 
this concept, as illustrated by Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 - Three 'Domains of Change' and 'Pillars of Policy' (Source: Grubb et al, 2014) 
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Figure 2 illustrates three ‘domains of change’ and corresponding ‘pillars of policy’. Each domain 
of change reflects a distinct sphere of economic decision-making and development. The first, 
‘satisficing’, describes the tendency of individuals and organisations to base decisions on habit, 
assumptions and ‘rules of thumb’. Such phenomena link to behavioural and organisational 
economics, for which the first pillar of policy, ‘standards and engagement’, may be employed 
to produce ‘smarter choices’. The second domain, ‘optimising’, describes the ‘rational’ 
approach of actors making ‘optimal’ choices on economic factors. This reflects traditional 
assumptions around market behaviour and corresponding theories of neoclassical and welfare 
economics. The second pillar of policy, ‘markets and pricing’, employs this framework to deliver 
‘cleaner products and processes’. The final domain, ‘transformation’, encapsulates the ways in 
which complex systems develop over time under the influence of strategic choices made by 
large entities, particularly governments, multinational corporations and institutional investors. 
The insights of evolutionary and institutional economics may be employed in the third pillar of 
policy, in which ‘strategic investment’, delivers ‘innovation and infrastructure’ (Grubb, 2014). 
Each of the three domains and pillars of policy, whilst presented as conceptually distinct, 
interact through numerous channels. As Figure 2 illustrates, whilst the impact is strongest in 
one, each of the pillars of policy have at least some influence on all three domains. All three 
domains, and by extension all three pillars of policy, are of largely equal importance in 
delivering a low carbon energy system and economy (Grubb, 2014). 
However, the particular form instruments under each of these pillars of policy take, both 
individually and in combination, may vary substantially between Member States and over time, 
depending on the specific issues that require tackling, and the feasibility of different 
approaches (including public and political acceptability, legal compatibility and institutional 
structure and capacity). 
3 Key Decarbonisation ‘Challenges’ 
It is clear that in order to successfully achieve the EU’s low carbon ambition in the short- and 
long-term, certain infrastructural and policy hurdles must be overcome. Section 3.1 describes 
five ‘systemic’ challenges that must be addressed. These challenges may be considered 
‘enablers’ and broad drivers of a low-carbon transition, without which such a transition would 
be substantially more difficult to achieve, or only at a significantly higher cost. Section 0 
describes four ‘sectoral’ challenges, which relate to issues surrounding specific sectors of the 
energy system and economy. 
Given the nature of the challenges presented, many overlaps and interdependencies exist. Key 
overlapping issues are raised where relevant. Additionally, the challenges are not fully 
comprehensive, and do not necessarily directly address all issues that require attention. They 
are simply those that are considered to be of highest importance. However, many other issues 
are, by their nature, addressed directly or indirectly through these key challenges. 
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For each of the ten challenges, a discussion of the ‘status quo’ is provided (both in terms of the 
policy landscape and physical attributes, depending on the challenge), along with what broad 
aspects must be achieved or delivered for the challenge to be overcome.  
3.1 Systemic ‘Challenges’  - Description and Status Quo 
3.1.1 Establish a Meaningful Carbon Price 
It is clear that a strong, credible carbon price must be a component of any policy package that 
aims to limit emissions in a cost-effective way. Carbon pricing is central to the second pillar of 
policy (‘Markets and Pricing’) illustrated in Figure 2, and is required to influence investment 
choices and prevent high-carbon lock-in. 
As discussed under Section 2.1.1, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
(Directive 2009/29/EC) is the primary carbon pricing instrument in the EU (plus Norway, 
Iceland and Lichtenstein), and covers CO2 emissions around 11,000 stationary installations in 
the power and heavy industry sectors, accounting for around 45% of GHGs from the EU28 
(European Commission, 2015)7. Combustion installations with a rated thermal input below 
20MW are exempt. Both domestic and international aviation are also coved by the EU ETS, 
although compliance requirements for the latter are suspended until 20168. 
As of the beginning of Phase 3 in 2013, permits are fully auctioned to the power sector (with 
temporary derogations in some Member States). In the Industry sector, permits are allocated 
based on product-specific ‘benchmarks’. Each benchmark is calculated as the average 
emissions of the top 10% performing installations in the EU producing a given product. This 
means that installations that meet these benchmarks will receive free allocation sufficient to 
cover their total emissions, with those not meeting the benchmark receiving proportionally 
less. A further distinction is made between industries deemed to be at the risk of carbon 
leakage9 – which currently receive 100% of the free allocation calculated on the basis of the 
benchmarks – and those not exposed to the leakage risk, which received 80% of the 
benchmark-based allocation in 2013, decreasing to 30% in 2020 (Drummond, 2015). 
Whilst the permit price reached very high levels in the first year of operation in 2005, and again 
in 2008 at the start of the 2nd trading period (at around €25/tCO2), prices have remained 
significantly lower since, and have experienced significant volatility (with prices remaining well 
                                                     
7 N2O from the production of nitric, adipic, glyoxal and glyoxalic acids, and PFCs from aluminum production, is also 
covered. 
8 Domestic’ aviation is defined as any flight internal to an Individual Member State, or any intra EU28+3 flight. 
‘International ‘ aviation is defined as any flight to or from any EU28+3 airport originating or terminating outside 
the EU28. 
9 Defined at ‘energy-intensive, trade exposed’ (EITE) industries. Sectors or sub-sectors qualify as EITE if ‘the extent 
to which the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the [EU ETS] would lead to an increase of 
production cost, calculated as a proportion of the Gross Value Added, of at least 5%; and the trade intensity 
(imports and exports) of the sector with countries outside the EU is above 10%. Sectors or sub-sectors are also 
deemed to be at significant risk of carbon leakage ‘if the sum of direct and indirect additional costs is at least 30%, 
or the non-EU trade intensity is above 30%’ (European Commission, 2015e). 
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below €10/tCO2 since late 2011). As discussed under Section 2.1.1, such prices have produced 
only relatively modest abatement, achieved almost entirely through temporary ‘fuel switching’ 
from coal to gas in the power sector. These low prices are the product of a substantial 
oversupply of permits in the system. Whilst various factors have contributed to this surplus, a 
significant factor is almost certainly reduced demand for electricity and industrial products 
(and therefore the emissions associated with generation and production), stemming from the 
2008 financial crisis (Agnolucci and Drummond, 2014). Options for structural reform of the EU 
ETS to attempt to overcome these issues were recently agreed, and are discussed in Section 
4.2.1. 
No other explicit carbon pricing instruments exist at the EU level, although some sporadic 
instruments exist in some Member States10. However, the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) 
(Directive 2003/96/EC) acts to place minimum taxation values on all energy products, including 
electricity - although fuels used to produce electricity are exempt, as these are covered by the 
EU ETS. Products used for domestic heating and in agriculture may also be exempt, along with 
products used for heating and the operation of stationary motors in energy-intensive industry, 
and fuel for international aviation (both of which are covered by the EU ETS) and international 
shipping (Drummond, 2013). For products and sectors subject to these minima, rates are set 
on a volume basis, and are not equalised across products in terms of either energy or carbon 
content. For example, the implicit carbon price for the minimum levy on coal is around 
€1.1/tCO2, whereas for petrol, this value is €145/tCO2 (European Commission, 2011a). 
However, it must be made clear that such fuel taxes serve a number of purposes, and 
internalising the external costs of CO2 emissions is only one among them. Additionally, many 
Member States levy rates substantially higher than the minimum on different products for 
different purposes, often exacerbating market distortions (see Sections 0 and 3.2.3, below). 
Numerous modelling studies have sought to determine the shadow marginal (or explicit) 
carbon price produced with (or required for) significant decarbonisation of the energy system 
by 2050. Knopf et al (2013) applies European decarbonisation scenarios11 to thirteen different 
models12, with resulting marginal carbon prices ranging from €61-169t/CO2 in 2030 (with a 
median of €76/tCO2), and €240-1127/tCO2 in 2050 (with a median of €521/tCO2) (Drummond, 
2015). The modelling work undertaken as part of the CECILIA2050 project produce values that 
fall largely within this range. Solano and Drummond (2014) project a value of €80/tCO2 by 2030 
and €220 by 2050, whilst Meyer et al (2014) project values of €230 – 460/tCO2 by 2050. 
Additionally, the modelling work undertaken by the ER2050 projects a 2050 value of €265/tCO2 
(European Commission, 2011b). 
The choice of instrument to achieve such prices is largely secondary from a technical 
                                                     
10 e.g. the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme in the UK. 
11 All scenarios reach an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions below 1990, but with differences in international co-
operation, trade and other linkages. See Knopf et al (2013) for more detail. 
12 Partial equilibrium energy system, macroeconomic computable general equilibrium (CGE) and growth models, 
with different geographic and temporal resolutions, and sectoral definition and coverage. See Knopf et al (2013) 
for more details. 
     
Page 23  | Short-Term Development Options for the EU Climate Policy Mix   PART 2 
perspective (although theoretical arguments would favour the use of a taxation approach, 
rather than an emissions trading system). Whilst in the long-term theoretical arguments may 
drive decision making, in the short-term decisions are constrained by the design of existing 
climate policy landscape and aspects of feasibility (particularly political acceptability and legal 
compatibility). 
3.1.2 Complete the EU-Wide Electricity Market Reform and System 
Integration 
Currently, electricity generated and available in European markets is dispatched according to 
the ‘merit order’, which is set by the marginal generation costs of each generator. For fossil 
fuel generators the marginal cost represents fuel costs (including a carbon price), whilst for 
renewable generators, this cost is zero (or near zero). As such, renewables enter first in the 
merit order and are (generally) dispatched first, with the generators of increasing marginal cost 
(first nuclear, and then fossil fuel plants), dispatched according to demand. The wholesale 
electricity price is set by the marginal costs of the marginal generator, meaning that at times 
of high demand prices are higher, with generators lower in the merit order receiving increasing 
revenue (at the differential between their marginal costs, and the wholesale price). With 
increasing penetration of renewables, fossil fuel plants are increasingly displaced, resulting in 
lower average wholesale prices are produced. This means that more expensive fossil fuel plants 
are increasingly priced out of the market, operating fewer hours than anticipated, and thus 
unable to generate the expected revenue, leading to a ‘missing money’ problem. This dynamic 
also reduces revenue to renewable generators, and in the absence of dedicated support 
mechanisms, renders them also unable to generate sufficient revenue to cover non-marginal 
fixed costs (Drummond, 2015). As such, as the share of renewables in electricity generation 
increases, investment in new generation capacity (of any description) is no longer incentivised 
by the market, and the risk of creating stranded assets grows. Indeed, negative pricing on the 
wholesale market13 has begun to occur in some Member States (Agnolucci and Drummond, 
2014). Around half of all Member States have introduced, or have proposed the introduction 
of, capacity mechanisms (discussed under Section 4.4.1 to ensure presence of and investment 
in adequate capacity in response to fears that the energy-only market will increasingly fail to 
provide such incentive (Platts, 2015). Therefore, a new electricity market design is required. 
The establishment of a single, EU-wide integrated redesigned electricity market holds 
enormous potential for creating more efficiency, stability and resilience in the power sector, 
and offers more options to balance fluctuations in power generation across Member States 
than are currently available, potentially reducing the need for parallel instruments (e.g. 
                                                     
13 Negative pricing occurs when inflexible generation (such as nuclear and coal generation), submit negatively 
priced bids to allow them to remain generating in the presence of significant renewable generation and low 
demand, as the process of shutting down and restarting such plants is often more expensive. 
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capacity mechanisms). However, this requires a fully integrated physical transmission and 
distribution network.  
The establishment of a single, integrated and liberalised EU electricity market and network has 
long been a policy objective of the EU. A key policy package that attempts to realise this 
objective is the ‘Third Energy Package’, introduced in 2009, and largely ‘operationalised’ 
through Directive 2003/54/EC), which requires: 
- ‘Unbundling’ of generators, suppliers and transmission system operators (TSOs). This 
principally involves the separation of network activities from generation and supply 
activities, and the separation of generation and supply accounts. The purpose is to ensure 
competition in the market, that activities operate according to commercial principles, and 
access to transmission infrastructure is non-discriminatory (Agnolucci and Drummond, 
2014). Around 96 of the approximately 100 TSOs are compliant with the ‘unbundling’ 
requirements, although full implantation is still required across all Member States 
(European Commission, 2014c). 
- ‘Open and fair’ retail markets. Whilst ‘unbundling’ of interests produces competition, 
allowing for a competitive market price for electricity to emerge, retail markets must be 
able to respond effectively and pass a ‘fair’ price, but one that reflects the cost of generation 
and transmission, through to consumers. The establishment of independent regulators is 
required to ensure this. The independent Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) was also established to ensure cross-border co-operation between such regulators. 
However, full independence and suitable allocation of legal competence is not fully in place 
for regulators in all Member States (European Commission, 2014c). Additionally, many 
Member States still apply regulated, rather than market-based retail prices (covering 51% 
of residential consumers in 2012) (European Commission, 2014d). 
- Deployment of smart meters. Smart meters must be deployed to at least 80% of electricity 
consumers in the EU by 2020, for cases in which such deployment is considered positive on 
a cost-benefit analysis. This was the case for around two-thirds of electricity consumers in 
the EU. At least 16 Member States will proceed (or already have) with a large-scale rollout 
of smart meters by 2020 or earlier. Currently, five Member States have no legal framework 
for deployment and/or regulating specific matters, such as timeline of the rollout, or setting 
technical specifications for the meters. In total, around 72% of electricity consumers are 
likely to use a smart meter by 2020 (European Commission, 2014d). Commission 
Recommendation 2012/148/EU, on preparations for the roll-out of smart metering 
systems, provides recommended minimum common technical requirements for electricity 
smart metering systems14. However, at present only 8 Member States are in compliance 
with these voluntary standards (European Commission, 2014d). 
                                                     
14 Including (a) Provide ‘real-time’ readings and visualised consumption data directly to the consumer (using a 
standardised interface, (b) allow remote reading by the operator, and frequently enough to be used for network 
planning, (c) provide two-way communication between the smart metering system and external networks for 
maintenance and control of the metering system, (d) support advanced tariff systems through the use of time-of-
use registers and remote tariff control, (e) provide the option import/export and reactive metering, which may 
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- Development ‘Ten Year Network Development Plan’ (TYNDP) and ‘network codes’. The 
European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E) was established by the 
Third Energy Package with various objectives, including the production of biennial ‘Ten-Year 
National Development Plans’ (TYNDPs), to identify gaps and priority requirements for EU 
transmission infrastructure that require attention (further discussed below), and the 
development of ten ‘network codes’ for governing various aspects of the electricity 
network and market (required by Regulation 714/2009). These may be broadly categorised 
into ‘Connection Codes’ (including Requirements for Generators, Demand Connection and 
HVDC Connections), ‘Operational Codes’ (including Operational Security, Operational 
Planning and Scheduling, and Load Frequency Control and Reserves), and ‘Market Codes’ 
(Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management, Forward Capacity Allocation and 
Electricity Balancing). A final ‘stand-alone’ code concerns Emergency and Restoration15 
Figure 3 illustrates the current development status of each network code. As is clear, no 
network codes have yet entered the implementation stage. 
 
                                                     
be activated and deactivated in accordance with the wishes and needs of the consumer (f) allow remote on/off 
control of the supply and/or flow of power limitation, and (g) provide secure data communications and allow for 
fraud detection and prevention. 
15 See http://networkcodes.entsoe.eu/ for more information regarding each of the codes. 
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The Renewable Energy Directive (discussed further under Section 3.2.1) requires Member 
States to ‘take appropriate steps to develop transmission and grid infrastructure…including 
interconnection between Member States and third countries’, in order to accommodate the 
increase in intermittent and distributed renewable generation (Drummond, 2013). A target set 
in 2002 by the European Commission, which required interconnector capacity in each Member 
State to equal 10% of domestic generation capacity by 2005, supports this (Agnolucci and 
Drummond, 2014). However, Zane et al (2012) find that of the EU27, only three countries 
exhibit a grid infrastructure and management approach (e.g. grid expansion plans, rules 
governing sharing and bearing of costs), favourable to RES-E integration (Finland, Ireland and 
Portugal), with nine providing negative conditions (including the UK, France, Poland and the 
Czech Republic), with the remaining fifteen found as neutral. A lack of suitable grid 
infrastructure is cited as a barrier to RES-E deployment in ten Member States. At least eleven 
Member States were found to not consider the requirements of RES-E sufficiently in long-term 
development plans (Agnolucci and Drummond, 2014; Zane et al, 2012). Additionally, by the 
Figure 3 - Network Codes Implementation Status - July 2015 (Source: ENTSO-E, 2015) 
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end of 2014, twelve Member States had still failed to reach the 10% interconnection target16 
(European Commission, 2015k). Key reasons for such circumstances are discussed below. 
The 2014 TYNDP, introduced above, estimates that an additional 44,000km of transmission 
capacity likely to be required by 2030, in addition to the approximate 300,000km already in 
existence (Eurelectric, 2013). This equals a required annual increase of 1% per year (ENTSOE, 
2014). However, such values do not consider existing transmission lines that will require 
replacement. The average age of the European high-voltage transmission system is 30-40 
years, against a typical lifetime of 30-50 years (Battaglini et al, 2012), meaning a high 
proportion of existing capacity must also be replaced by 2030 (Drummond, 2015). In addition, 
the TYNDP projects that interconnector capacity should on average double by 2030, although 
there are large discrepancies between regions, with some requiring much greater capacity 
increases. Connection between the Iberian Peninsula and mainland Europe may require up to 
a tenfold increase, with interconnection between the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) and the rest of the EU, trebling. Interconnection capacity between Ireland, the UK 
and continental Europe is also projected to require doubling, if not trebling (Drummond, 2015; 
ENTSOE, 2014). 
However, three key hurdles have inhibited, and are likely to continue to inhibit, such 
developments. The first surrounds authorisation, planning and procedural issues, which vary 
significantly between Member States (Battaglini et al, 2012). For example, the complexity and 
unpredictability of procedures and decision making at local authority level (several of which 
such infrastructure must pass through), and opposition by local inhabitants, means that 
permission processes to construct long-distance, cross border interconnectors may take up to 
20 years in some cases (Battaglini et al, 2012), with an average of 10-13 years for most 
transmission infrastructure projects (European Commission 2015f). To combat such issues, 
permit applications must be ‘one-stop-shops’ (i.e. a single competent authority) for cross-
border transmission lines categorised as Projects of Common Interest (PCI)17, as mandated by 
the Regulation on Guidelines for Trans-European Energy Infrastructure (TEN-E Regulation) 
(347/2013). The TEN-E Regulation also places a binding time limit of 3.5 years for permit 
granting for PCI projects, along with a requirements for ‘enhanced public participation. Whilst 
TEN-E regulation requirements were not achieved by November 2013 (as required), 
enforcement action by the Commission means all Member States should now be in compliance 
(European Commission, 2015d). 
The second key hurdle is that of financing. Transmission and distribution infrastructure is 
currently financed largely through tariffs on consumer bills, usually defined by national 
                                                     
16 Ireland, Italy, Romania, Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the UK, Spain, Poland, Cyprus and Malta. 
17 Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) are those that (a) have a significant impact on the energy markets of at least 
two EU countries such as by contributing to the integration of their networks, (b) increase competition in energy 
markets by offering alternatives to consumers, (c) enhance the EU’s security of supply by allowing countries to 
receive energy from a greater number of sources, and (d) contribute towards the EU’s energy and climate goals, 
for example by facilitating the integration of renewable energy into the grid. PCIs are selected based on the 
TYNDP, and are updated every 2 years (European Commission, 2015q). 
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regulatory agencies to reflect capital costs, depreciation and operational costs of an ‘efficient’ 
Transmission System Operator (TSO). However, the magnitude of the investment required 
across Member States in the coming years means that continuing such an approach is likely to 
be unsustainable. This may be particularly the case for interconnectors, which are generally 
built on the basis of ‘user commitments’, following agreement between TSOs and regulators 
in each jurisdiction. Usually, countries that are net importers ultimately pay those that are net 
exporters via a centrally administered fund, with costs recovered from consumers via tariffs 
described above. However, producing such agreements becomes increasingly difficult as the 
benefits of interconnectors become more regional than national, or where a link between two 
countries primarily benefits a third country18 (Drummond, 2015). The final hurdle, linked to the 
above issues, is political. For example, Member States are unlikely to be willing to invest in new 
infrastructure, particularly interconnectors, if the beneficiaries lay primarily within another 
Member State. Interconnections between France and Spain have been reportedly delayed due 
to fears that low marginal cost renewable generation from Spain would undermine nuclear 
generators in France – a highly political issue (Drummond, 2015). 
3.1.3 Make Sound Infrastructure Choices Despite Technological 
Uncertainty 
Whether for electricity generation, transport or residential heating (amongst others), there is 
much uncertainty surrounding what exactly the low-carbon economy and society will look like, 
and which technologies will ultimately be made available and deployed to deliver it cost-
effectively. For example, electricity may be generated largely by centralised or decentralised 
renewables, with CCS playing perhaps a significant role or none at all. In transport, the 
combination of electricity and hydrogen, or mode switching, that will eventually produce the 
requisite decarbonisation requirements is unclear. Additionally, the cost-effective and 
appropriate solutions may vary across both space (i.e. Member States) and time (i.e. one 
technology may become initially dominant, with another then superseding it). 
Whilst market dynamics (with targeted policy intervention) may hold a significant influence on 
which competing solutions are ultimately implemented, core choices made by governments of 
all levels define the parameters within which markets may operate, and may create path 
dependency. Some such choices must be made to enable substantial decarbonisation to occur 
in the timeframe required, however these choices must enable such decarbonisation in a cost 
efficient manner, and minimise the risk of creating stranded assets. 
Various Directives require Member States to construct plans for how they plan to deliver the 
obligations laid out by accompanying provisions, which often necessitates such long-term 
decisions. For example, the Renewable Energy Directive requires Member States to adopt 
                                                     
18 The ability to finance International transmission lines through the ‘merchant interconnector’ model, in which 
operators may profit from the difference in electricity prices between countries, will also reduce over time as the 
single electricity market becomes established, producing price convergence (UK Parliament, 2011). 
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National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs)19, whilst the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(discussed under Section 3.2.3) requires the implementation of a National Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan (NEEAP)20. Although, such plans only require detailing up to the time horizon for 
which obligations are present (often 2020), and compliance with required content and 
submission deadlines for such plans is often low (Drummond, 2013). Other key examples 
include the Alternative Fuels Directive (discussed under Section 0), and the TYNDP (discussed 
under Section 3.1.2, above). At Member State and local level, spatial planning regimes are also 
pivotal in facilitating or preventing the required infrastructure. 
3.1.4 Provide Finance and Mobilise the Investments Necessary for a 
Low-Carbon Economy 
The low-carbon transition will require not only the mobilisation of new finance, but also a 
substantial shift of existing finance invested in high carbon assets, across all sectors and from 
all sources. Finance and investments may come from governments or other public institutions 
(such as state-owned enterprises, public financial institutions or other investment vehicles), 
institutional investors such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, commercial banks 
and capital markets, private (non-financial) businesses, and individuals. The resources these 
sources collectively hold are well beyond the investments required to successfully achieve the 
low-carbon transition. However, various barriers stand in the way to unlocking the flow of 
finance required. Principal examples include (OECD, 2015): 
- Relative attractiveness of high- and low-carbon investments. High-carbon investments 
and assets, in the absence of a substantive carbon price (and in the presence of various 
market distortions, such as fossil fuel subsidies), are often lower cost and/or provide a 
greater return than equivalent low-carbon assets (e.g. diesel vehicles over electric, or gas-
fired power plants over offshore wind).  
- Reduced government budgets. Since the 2008 financial crisis, governments (local, national 
and supranational) have fewer resources to allocate for different purposes, including 
investment in infrastructure and encouraging the development and deployment of both 
new and (relatively) mature low-carbon technologies 
- Financial market and investor requirements and incentives. Some argue that the 
international ‘Basel III’ accords, which were introduced in the wake of the financial crisis 
and aim at improving and harmonising supervision and regulation of banks (including 
strengthening the stringency of capital adequacy and liquidity requirements), are having 
unintended consequences on the ability of private financial actors to invest in long-term, 
                                                     
19 Must include individual renewable energy targets for the electricity, heating and cooling and transport sectors; 
the planned mix of different renewables technologies; policy measures to achieve national targets including co-
operation between local, regional, and national authorities; planned statistical transfers and/or joint projects with 
other countries, national policies to develop biomass resources; and measures to ensure that biofuels use to meet 
renewable energy targets are in compliance with sustainability criteria. 
20 Must be submitted every 3 years, and include information on how each of the provisions in the EED is to be 
achieved. A guidance template was published by the Commission in 2013 
(https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20131106_swd_guidance_neeaps.pdf). 
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low-carbon infrastructure (NCE, 2015). Similar arguments are presented for ‘Solvency II’, 
which introduces more stringent quantitative (solvency ratios) and qualitative (risk 
management and supervision) requirements for EU insurance companies (implemented by 
Directive 2009/138/EC). It is argued that these requirements have the effect of inducing 
insurers to reallocate investments away from equity and towards more highly rated 
securities. The impact on direct infrastructure may also be negative, as the amount insurers 
may invest in non-listed assets is no longer limited. 
- Information failures. A lack of clarity on fiduciary duty concerning environmental, social 
and governance issues, and the broad lack of disclosure and risk assessments concerning 
both emissions and high-carbon assets (including fossil fuel assets) that may form 
substantial liabilities or become stranded assets in the long term, fails to provide investors 
and finance providers with the appropriate information to adequately assess risk profiles. 
- Low long-term confidence. Confused and abruptly changing political commitments, policy 
frameworks and instruments deter private investment (in both deployment and 
development in new technologies), and raise the cost of capital. 
Actions to reduce and overcome these barriers must be encouraged and introduced as soon 
as possible in order to establish the required infrastructure, prevent continued investment in 
assets that may be at increasing risk of becoming stranded as the requirement for reduced 
GHG emissions tightens over time. 
3.1.5 Encourage Low-Carbon Lifestyles 
For efforts to achieve the low-carbon transition to be effective and feasible, individual citizens 
must become involved in implementing low-carbon lifestyles in their function as consumers, 
as investors, or as members of local communities. To do so, citizens must be motivated to make 
appropriate choices, be informed as to what these choices are, and be empowered to make 
them. Additionally, as voters, they need to be convinced to support, or at least to accept 
climate policy measures of sufficient ambition to meet increasingly demanding GHG reduction 
requirements. From a policy design perspective, this requires climate policies which create 
clear and demonstrable social benefits, and which – to the greatest extent possible – address 
any negative distributional impacts of climate policies, and cater for the needs of particularly 
vulnerable groups. 
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3.2 Sectoral ‘Challenges’ - Description and Status Quo 
3.2.1 ‘Fully’ Decarbonise the Power Sector 
The power sector is the largest contributor to EU CO2 emissions, and as discussed in Section 
2.2.1, must lead the way in producing abatement by decreasing its emissions between 2012 
and 2030 by half, and achieving almost total decarbonisation by 2050 (see Figure 1). As 
discussed under the various ‘challenges’ below, a key strategy for decarbonisation is the 
electrification of energy service demands across various end-use sectors (particularly in 
transport and buildings). As such, it is essential that CO2 emissions are not simply shifted 
upstream. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the profile of power generation across the EU 
28 between 1990 and 2013. 
 
As is clear from Figure 4, the profile of the EU’s power sector has changed significantly since 
199021. By 2013, coal and nuclear accounted for around 27% of generation each, followed by 
natural gas and renewables at around 15% each, hydro at around 13%, and generation from 
oil at around 2%. The average CO2 intensity of generation in 2012 was around 370gCO2/kWh 
(down from around 550gCO2/kWh in 1990 and 420gCO2/kWh in 2000). 
Two principal climate policy instruments currently exist to tackle CO2 emissions from the power 
sector. The first is the EU ETS, described in Section 3.1.1, which acts to place a cap on emissions 
from the covered sectors, and a carbon price on fossil fuel generation. The second is the 
Renewable Energy Directive (RED) (Directive 2009/28/EC), which places legally binding targets 
on Member States for gross final energy consumption sourced from renewables by 2020 
(operationalising the 20% EU-wide target for 202022). All Member States (excluding Latvia) 
                                                     
21 See Agnolucci and Drummond (2014) for a detailed description of this change, and the drivers behind it. 
22 The average of these targets is 20%. Each Member State target takes into account its share of renewable energy 
in 2005, modulated to reflect efforts made in preceding years. 5.5% is then added to this modulated value for 
each Member State. The remaining effort required was then weighted according to each country’s GDP and 
population (Drummond, 2013a). 
Figure 4 - Gross Electricity Generation - Total and by Source (including autoproduction) (Data Source: Eurostat) 
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currently offer support mechanisms and incentives of varied design (e.g. feed-in tariffs, feed-
in premiums, portfolio obligations, etc.) for the deployment of different types and sizes of 
renewable electricity installations, in order to achieve these regulatory requirements. The RED 
also requires Member States to, inter alia: 
- Ensure a certification scheme for installers of microgeneration technologies is established, 
with a list of certified installers made public (and mutually recognised across Member 
States). 
- Ensure the division of responsibility between national, regional and local authorities is 
clear and transparent, with administrative processes streamlined. 
- Ensure guaranteed access to the grid for energy produced from renewables, with 
generation from renewable sources given priority for dispatch. 
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, whilst the EU ETS has thus far produced relatively moderate, 
temporary abatement through ‘fuel switching’, the principal climate policy driver behind the 
increase in renewables illustrated in Figure 4, and associated reduction in CO2 intensity, are 
dedicated renewable support mechanisms largely introduced to satisfy the requirements of 
the RED (and its predecessor, the Renewable Electricity Directive). However, poor design of 
support mechanisms in some Member States (including in some cases, retroactive changes to 
support provided), along with under- and poor-quality implementation of other RED provisions 
have acted as key barriers to further and more rapid deployment of renewable electricity. For 
example, most Member States still require multiple permissions to be granted, with only a few 
providing ‘one-stop-shops’ (European Commission, 2013). Additionally, most Member States 
have issues with ineffective or inefficient administrative procedures, and with guaranteeing 
grid connections (Agnolucci and Drummond, 2014). The latter issue is, in part, due to issues 
with the deployment of grid infrastructure, discussed in Section 3.1.2, above. Issues with 
spatial planning and public acceptability are also substantial in some Member States (Agnolucci 
and Drummond, 2014). 
As also discussed in Section 2.1.1, the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) (Directive 
2001/80/EC), which aims to reduce emissions of acidifying pollutants, particles and ozone 
precursors from large combustion plants with a rated thermal input greater than 50MW, has 
also likely had some impact in advancing the closure of aging coal-fired power plants. Whilst 
not a driver for abatement thus far, the CCS Directive (Directive 2009/31/EC), requires all new 
thermal combustion plants to be CCS ‘capture ready’, if suitable storage sites are available, 
transport facilities are technically an economically feasible, and it is technically and 
economically feasible to retrofit for CO2 capture (Articles 32 and 33). 
In order to reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector by approximately half between 2012 
and 2030, CO2 intensity of generation must reduce to around 150gCO2/kWh by 2030, alongside 
relatively rapid increases in electricity demand expected over the coming years (despite the 
recent plateau illustrated in Figure 4, as a result of increasing electrification of transport and 
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heating). In the long-term, this must reduce to a maximum of around 10gCO2/kWh (by 2050) 
(Drummond, 2015). Whilst the particular configuration of generation (and generating capacity) 
to achieve this is not clear, such levels are only feasible if the generation mix is dominated by 
zero-carbon power generation (including storage), with very limited fossil generation as back-
up. It is thus certain that renewables must continue to increase dramatically (potentially 
complemented by and increase in nuclear23 and fossil fuel with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) in the medium- to long-term), whilst conventional fossil fuel generation must rapidly 
reduce. In particular, the construction of new unabated coal-fired installations – the most CO2-
intensive fossil fuel generating source – must be avoided, to reduce the risk of creating high-
cost stranded assets (coal-fired power stations have a typical lifespan of around 40 years). 
Other aspects, such as a suitable electricity market and adequate transmission infrastructure 
(discussed in Section 3.1.2), are also required. 
3.2.2 Facilitate Low-Carbon Transport 
As the second largest contributor to EU CO2 emissions in 2012 (Figure 1), facilitating a 
substantial shift to low-carbon transport is crucial. Reducing CO2 emissions from road transport 
is a particular priority, as these modes alone account for ~95% of all domestic transport-related 
CO2 emissions in the EU (and around 72% if international transport CO2 emissions are 
considered) (European Environment Agency, 2015b). 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, the existing policy landscape for the transport sector is uneven; 
passenger cars are subject to various instruments, whilst the international shipping sector is 
subject to none, with other modes covered to different degrees in between. The principal 
instrument acting on passenger cars is fleet-average CO2 intensity regulations (implemented 
by Regulations 443/2009 and 333/2014). Manufacturers are required to ensure that by 2015, 
the average of new vehicles sold must not exceed a CO2 intensity of 130gCO2/km across their 
fleet, with this target reducing to 95gCO2/km by 2021. The average CO2 intensity of new 
passenger cars sold in 2014 across the EU was 123.4gCO2, indicating the 2015 target has been 
achieved early (European Environment Agency, 2015c). Light Goods Vehicles (LGVs) are also 
subject to such fleet-average regulations (implemented by Regulations 510/2011 and 
253/2014), with corresponding targets of 175gCO2/km by 2017, and 147gCO2/km by 2020. The 
average CO2 intensity of new LGVs sold in 2014 across the EU was 169.2gCO2, again indicating 
early achievement (European Environment Agency, 2015c). In order to incentivise the 
development and deployment of ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEVs, with a CO2 intensity 
below 50gCO2/km), ‘super credits’ are available to manufacturers of both passenger cars and 
LGVs24. 
                                                     
23 However, the deployment of nuclear generation is usually a political choice, with relatively few EU Member 
States currently in favour of constructing substantial (if any) new capacity (Solano and Drummond, 2014). 
24 For cars, each ULEV counts as the equivalent of 3.5 vehicles in 2013, 2.5 in 2014, 1.5 in 2015 and 1 from 2016 
to 2019. However, this increases again to 2 vehicles in 2020, 1.67 in 2021, 1.33 in 2022 and 1 in 2023 (although 
from 2020 onwards, super credits may only be used to achieve a maximum of 7.5gCO2.km towards compliance.. 
For LGVs, these values are 3.5 in 2014 and 2015, 2.5 in 2016, 1.5 in 2017 and 1 from 2018 onwards. 
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Vehicle testing to determine compliance with these regulations is currently conducted using 
the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) methodology. The NEDC does not take into account 
various factors that influence CO2 emissions (e.g. vehicle weight) (ICCT, 2014), and has resulted 
in an increasing differential between ‘laboratory’ and ‘real world’ CO2 intensity (Nijland et al, 
2012). To counter this, it was agreed in March 2014 that the Worldwide harmonised Light 
vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP), with a design improved over the NEDC, will adopted in the 
coming years. 
Passenger cars are also subject to the Car Labelling Directive (Directive 1999/94/EC), which 
requires information relating to the fuel economy and CO2 intensity of passenger cars to be 
displayed at the point of sale for all new passenger cars sold or leased. Whilst minimum 
information requirements are mandated, specific designs vary by Member State. However, 
evidence suggests that such labelling has had little if any influence on consumer purchase 
decisions, due to a combination of low awareness of the label, poor understanding of the 
information provided, and a relatively low importance placed on environmental factors by 
consumers when purchasing a vehicle (Drummond, 2013a). 
Although not an EU level instrument, another key policy factor that directly seeks to influence 
the vehicle purchase choices is national registration and circulation taxes25. 21 Member States 
currently levy registration taxes passenger cars (with very significant variations in value). Only 
6 subject HGVs to registration taxes26 (and even then exemptions or reductions often apply27). 
14 Member States consider CO2 emissions when setting registration taxes on passenger 
vehicles, with 6 holding CO2 as one of two parameters (with the other often vehicle value). 
None of the 6 Member States that apply registration taxes to HGVs considers CO2 emissions as 
a parameter (van Essen et al, 2012). Circulation taxes apply to passenger cars in 24 Member 
States, whilst all apply circulation taxes for HGVs (although again, with significantly different 
values). CO2 is considered a parameter for passenger cars in 18 Member States (and the sole 
parameter in 6), but not at all in setting rates for HGVs. 
Three key instruments directly apply to road transport fuel. Principal among these is the ETD, 
discussed in Section 3.1.1, which applies minimum taxation levels on all road transport fuels. 
However, as illustrated by Figure 5, there is a significant disparity between actual rates levied, 
both between petrol and diesel (the two primary fuels), and between Member States. 
                                                     
25 Registration tax is an upfront tax levied on a vehicle when it is first purchased and registered. A circulation (or 
ownership) tax is a levy incurred by the owner to allow the use of a vehicle on public roads, the frequency of 
which (quarterly/biannual/annual) varies by Member State. 
26 Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Malta and Romania 
27 e.g. Denmark (exemption for freight vehicles with GVW over 4,000 kg, and buses) and Malta (tax level for class 
N3 vehicles of one of the two most recent EURO classes equal to zero) (DG MOVE, 2012) 
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Few Member States levy rates on the basis of CO2 content. Additionally, such differentials 
produce varied price signals and lead to incidences of ‘fuel tourism’, particularly for long 
distance HGVs, which may plan refuelling stops to take advantage of price differentials, or even 
drive extra distance if cost-effective to do so, thus producing additional emissions (Maca et al, 
2013). 
The second two instruments are the RED and the Fuel Quality Directive (2009/30/EC). The 
former requires Member States to ensure that at least 10% of final energy consumption from 
all forms of transport is from renewable sources within their territory, by 2020. Although this 
target applies to all forms of transport, the use of biofuels in road transport fuels is likely to be 
the manner in which this target is achieved in most Member States (Drummond, 2013a). The 
latter instrument requires a 6% reduction in GHG intensity of road transport fuels on a lifecycle 
basis between 2010 and 2020. This is also likely to be achieved primarily through the use of 
biofuels (European Commission, 2015h) 
At present, the rules surrounding company car taxation in many Member States often act to 
significantly dull the influence of climate policy (particularly market-based) instruments acting 
on passenger cars. The reasons behind this are further discussed in Section 4.4.2. However, the 
effects of such distortions are evident in the size and make up of the company car fleet. Around 
half of all new car purchases in the EU are company cars (Copenhagen Economics, 2010), and 
higher in some Member States (e.g. 70% in Germany (Federal Motor Transport Authority, 
2013)). Since, in most cases, the fuel costs are covered by the employer and not by the driver, 
the incentive for purchasing a fuel-efficient car is reduced. As a result, the market is heavily 
skewed towards larger, more powerful and more expensive vehicles. For example in Germany, 
over 85% of ‘high-end’ vehicles are sold as company cars, with some luxury models exclusively 
registered as company vehicles (Federal Motor Transport Authority, 2013). Consequently, CO2 
intensity for company cars is, on average, higher than for private vehicles (Maca et al, 2013). 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, modelling suggests that CO2 emissions from the transport sector 
should plateau until 2030, and then reduce to around a third of 2012 levels by 2050. This 
Figure 5 - Excise Rates on Petrol and Diesel in the EU28 (Source: DG TAXUD via Maca et al (2013)) 
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reflects that transport emissions increased significantly between 1990 and 2007 (before slowly 
decreasing from 2008), as illustrated in Figure 1, and have yet to enter into a phase of more 
drastic reductions. As such, GHG emissions from transport were 20.5% higher in 2012 than 
1990 emissions (European Environment Agency, 2015b). This increase was driven largely by 
increasing demand, which, ceteris paribus, is likely to continue to increase. 
Decarbonisation in the transport sector must be driven by a combination of three factors; 
reducing transport demand, modal shift of passengers and freight to existing low- or lower-
carbon modes, and decarbonising the fuel mix of existing high-carbon modes. Whilst (and 
because) the weighting between these three drivers is difficult to foresee ex ante (both at 
Member State and EU level), all options must be facilitated (Drummond, 2015). For the first 
and second, cities must allow for and deploy the infrastructure required to enable, for example, 
remote working, improving efficiency in existing transport capacities, and ensuring high 
capacity public and active transportation (e.g. walking and cycling), whilst regions and Member 
States must allow and deploy infrastructure for long-distance, high-speed rail infrastructure. 
For the third, a shift from fossil fuels to low- and ultra-low emission vehicles and fuel, 
particularly electricity and hydrogen, must be facilitated and encouraged. This includes 
planning for and putting in place enabling infrastructure, such as electric charging points and 
hydrogen fuelling stations and supply pipelines if, where and when required. 
Regarding such infrastructure, the Alternative Fuels Directive (Directive 2014/94/EU) is a key 
existing policy instrument. Under the Directive, Member States are to develop national policy 
frameworks for the market development of alternative fuels and their infrastructure. Each 
Member State must ensure that the requisite number of publicly available electric recharging 
points is in place by 31st December 2020 to ensure that electric vehicles are able to circulate at 
least in urban and suburban agglomerations and other densely populated areas. Of Member 
States that choose to adopt hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles, an appropriate number of 
refuelling points must be available to ensure circulation of such vehicles within nationally 
determined networks (including cross-border links), by 31st December 2025.  Member States 
have until September 2016 to transpose these requirements into national law (Drummond, 
2015). 
3.2.3 Tackle the Energy Consumption of the Housing Stock 
As illustrated by Figure 1, direct CO2 emissions from buildings account for around 16% of total 
CO2 emissions from the EU28. The residential sector accounts for around 70% of this (European 
Environment Agency, 2015b), along with a quarter of total final energy consumption within the 
EU28 (with space and water heating accounting for the vast majority of both CO2 emissions 
and energy demand). In 2012, the average energy intensity of the existing EU residential stock 
was 185 kWh/m2 (Gynther et al, 2015). Reducing the energy consumption of the building stock 
is therefore an essential first step for reducing CO2 emissions from the residential building stock 
(with a reduction in the CO2-intensity of remaining demand also required). Due to the longevity 
of the residential building stock, the risk of high-energy and high-carbon lock-in is significant. 
As such, early action must be taken to prevent such lock-in from persisting. Additionally, due 
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to the existing ‘energy efficiency gap’28, improving the energy efficiency of residential buildings 
may generate net savings, and reduce the cost implications of other, increasingly stringent 
climate policy measures on individual consumers (e.g. increasing carbon pricing, RES-E cost 
recovery). 
Four key Directives currently attempt to tackle energy consumption in the residential sector 
(and buildings more broadly). The first is the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) 
(2002/91/EC), which contains two key provisions concerning the residential sector. The first is 
the requirements for building minimum energy performance standards (MEPS), including the 
requirement that by 31st December 2020, all new buildings must be classified as ‘nearly zero-
energy buildings’ (NZEBs). An NZEB is defined as a building with a ‘very high’ energy 
performance, with the remaining energy demand covered ‘very significantly’ by renewable 
energy. Each Member State is required to submit their own interpretation of this definition 
considering national, regional and local conditions. Requirements for new residential buildings 
vary between 33 kWh/m2/y (Croatia) and 95 kWh/m2/y (Latvia), with the majority setting 
definitions at 45 kWh/m2/y or 50 kWh/m2/y. Additionally, few Member States explicitly require 
that any proportion of the remaining energy consumption must be supplied by renewable 
sources (Ecofys, 2014a). Moreover, existing MEPS in many Member States are already poorly 
enforced, with compliance often found to be relatively low (Pan and Garmiston, 2012). The 
second key provision is the requirement that any new building, or any building that is sold or 
rented to a new tenant must issue an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC), which contains 
information on the energy performance of the building, reference values (such as minimum 
requirements), recommendations for the cost-effective improvement of energy performance, 
and indications of where the owner or tenant may find more information to implement these 
recommendations (Drummond, 2013a). The evidence suggests that EPCs have produced little 
impact on energy consumption for various reasons, including (a) varied design across Member 
States, (b) the use of different calculation methodologies across Member States, which are not 
uniformly robust, (c) low rates of monitoring across all Member States, casting doubt on the 
level of compliance, and (d) the precedence of other factors in the decision to purchase or rent 
a property (Drummond, 2015). 
The second key Directive is the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) (Directive 2012/27/EU), which 
again contains two key provisions concerning the residential buildings sector. The first is the 
requirement for Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes (EEOS) in all Member States, in which 
energy suppliers must achieve the equivalent of average annual cumulative savings of 1.5% of 
total sales, by volume, based on average total sales of the industry across the three-year period 
                                                     
28 Defined as the ‘wedge between the cost-minimising level of energy efficiency and the level actually realised’ 
(Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). Wesselink et al (2010) estimate that if such cost-negative actions were taken up 
by the EU’s residential sector, its energy consumption would reduce by around 10% (ignoring potential rebound 
effects). 
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leading up to the 1st January 201329. The obligation period is from 1st January 2014 to 31st 
December 2020, and Member States have flexibility as to how and when the required savings 
are implemented over this period. Alternative measures may be implemented in place of an 
EEOS (including an ‘Energy Efficiency National Fund’ to support energy efficiency initiatives), 
as long as such instruments achieve equivalent energy savings (Drummond, 2015). At present, 
17 Member States have, or plan to implement, an EEOS (often in combination with other 
instruments, although of these, 8 have major credibility issues, 6 have minor credibility issues, 
and only 2 have no issues30). Additionally, evidence suggests that planned monitoring, 
verification, control and compliance regimes are likely to be inadequate (Rosenow et al, 2015). 
The second key provision under the EED (or rather, group of provisions) requires various 
measures to encourage the introduction of voluntary energy efficiency measures and action 
by end-users. This includes the introduction of smart meters (linked to the Third Energy 
Package requirements, discussed under Section 3.1.2), the provision of accurate billing 
information (including information on average energy consumption for households of a similar 
profile (a ‘nudging’ instrument31) and information on how to receive a free energy audit where 
‘possible and useful’), and the establishment of qualification, accreditation and certification 
schemes for providers of energy services, audits and installers of energy-efficiency elements, 
in Member States where technical competence, objectivity and reliability is insufficient. 
The third key Directive is the Ecodesign Directive (2009/125/EC), which applies minimum 
performance standards on a range of energy-using and energy-related products32. Although 
not exclusively, in-use energy consumption or efficiency is often subject to such minimum 
standards. Various products, including heating system components (such as boilers), white 
goods and other appliances are currently subject to Ecodesign requirements, which the 
evidence suggests have been effective in driving (often substantial) efficiency improvements 
(Drummond, 2013a). However, the evidence also suggests a non-compliance rate of around 
10-20%, largely due to under-resourced monitoring and enforcement procedures (Drummond, 
2013a). Additionally, there are documented differences in efficiency levels of up to 30% 
between products subject to test procedures, and those operating in the real world (Toulouse, 
2014). 
The fourth and final key Directive is the Energy Labelling Directive (Directive 2010/30/EU), 
which requires suppliers placing on the market or putting into service any energy-related 
                                                     
29 Sales volumes to installations covered by the EU ETS may be excluded, along with consumption in the transport 
sector. As such, energy consumption from buildings is the de facto target for this instrument across most Member 
States. 
30 The final Member State, Portugal, has an existing ESOS instrument in place but has not notified the Commission 
of their intention to use this for Article 7 compliance, and thus instrument credibility was not assessed by this 
study. 
31 ‘Nudge theory’ is a strain of behavioural science that looks at how the target can be encouraged to implicitly 
comply with policy objectives.  It focuses on non-price interventions that can be just as powerful as prices in 
changing consumer choices, and energy policy has been shown to be an area which can benefit from ‘nudging’ 
people in the right direction (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010), 
32 Products that have an indirect impact on energy consumption, such as water-using devices, insulation materials 
and windows 
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product subject to an implementing measure (most often those also subject to Ecodesign 
Directive) to supply a label and a fiche (table of information) with the product containing 
information relating to energy consumption and other resources, where relevant. Products 
must be labelled on a relative scale, usually ranging from A+++ to D33 (Drummond, 2013a). 
Whilst assessment of the effectiveness of the Energy Labelling Directive are difficult to 
separate from that of parallel measures (particularly the Ecodesign Directive), it is unlikely that 
it has had any significant impact on overall market sizes, structure or product choices amongst 
consumers for the products covered (Ecofys, 2014b). Evidence suggests that the introduction 
of A ‘plus’ labels appears to have induced confusion and a feeling of diminishing returns 
amongst consumers, reducing its efficacy compared to the simpler A-G scale previously in place 
(LE and Ipsos, 2014; Heinzle and Wüstenhagen, 2012). Additionally, around 90% of appliances 
covered by implementing measures fall into the ‘A’ category, removing the ability of consumers 
to distinguish between products on the basis of energy efficiency (Heinzle & Wüstenhagen, 
2012). Moreover, the level of compliance monitoring is low across Member States (Ecofys, 
2014b). 
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, domestic heating fuels may be exempt from taxation (except 
VAT) under the ETD, with carbon pricing only (commonly) levied on electricity via upstream 
application of the EU ETS. Issues such as the ‘landlord-tenant dilemma’34 and access to 
appropriate finance (Section 3.1.4), are key issues that must be overcome to satisfy this 
challenge. 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, direct CO2 emissions from EU buildings must decrease by around 
20% between 2012 and 2030, and to a third of 2012 levels by 2050, with a large majority of 
this reduction to be produced by the residential sector. This must occur despite a projected 
increase in residential floor space of around 25% by 2050 (IEA, 2012). This would mean a 
reduction in average energy intensity of the residential stock to under 150kWh/m2 by 2030, 
and under 100kWh/m2 by 2050 (from around 185kWh/m2 in 2010) (Drummond, 2015). CO2 
intensity, however, must decrease at a more rapid rate. As such, whilst ensuring high energy 
efficiency and low emissions from new buildings is important, energy efficiency and CO2 
intensity of existing buildings must respectively increase and decrease substantially (including 
closure of the energy efficiency gap), through increasing both the efficiency of building 
envelopes (insulation, multi-glazed windows, air-sealing, the avoidance of thermal bridging 
and efficient thermal and lighting design, for example) and of energy-using products within the 
building (from boilers and air conditioning units and design, to lighting, white goods and 
consumer electronics) (Drummond, 2015). The remaining energy demand, particularly for 
space and water heating, must be increasingly satisfied by renewable or other low-carbon 
energy. Although it is once again not clear the extent to which different technologies are likely 
                                                     
33 A+ to A+++ ratings were introduced in the 2010 recast of the Directive. Prior to this, ratings were between A 
and G. 
34 Split incentives between the landlord (usually liable for capital cost of installation) and the tenant (usually liable 
for payment of energy bills). 
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to contribute to this, electrification via heat pumps, in particular, is likely to play a significant 
role. However other technologies, such as solar thermal and biomass boilers, are also likely to 
contribute. 
3.2.4 Stimulate Radical Low-Carbon Innovation in Industry 
As illustrated by Figure 1, GHG emissions from industry must approximately halve between 
2012 and 2030, and reach around a third of 2012 levels by 2050. Unlike other sectors, where 
clear options are already largely available to facilitate a low-carbon shift, options in the 
industrial sector to produce the level of abatement required are thus far lacking. GHG 
emissions in the industrial sector emanate both from energy production for self-consumption 
(e.g. the use of blast furnaces in the steel sector), and from chemical reactions from various 
industrial processes (additionally, as a substantial end-user of electricity produced by the 
power sector, indirect emissions are significant). Whilst some options are available to reduce 
current emission levels from each of these sources, ‘breakthrough’ technologies are need to 
achieve the level of abatement sought. 
Most emissions from the industrial sector are covered by the EU ETS. Although as discussed in 
Section 3.1.1, above, the carbon price produced thus far has been too low for most of the ETS’ 
operation to trigger energy-saving investments in industry. In addition, the majority of 
industrial installations receive most of their emission allowances allocated for free, to guard 
against the threat of carbon leakage. For the same reason, several Member States compensate 
electricity-intensive industries for the indirect carbon price they experience through purchased 
electricity. However, the presence of market failures associated with innovation means that 
pricing instruments such as the EU ETS, even if applied fully to the industrial sector (with 
appropriate carbon leakage measures), are unlikely to be sufficient. For example, it is virtually 
impossible to attribute all the benefits of innovation to the innovating firm – part of these 
benefits is bound to ‘spill over’, i.e. to diffuse beyond those that bore the cost of development, 
thereby reducing the incentive for an individual firm, for example, to invest in the first place 
when its competitors would also benefit (Jaffe et al, 2003; Lehmann, 2012). 
As such, various other initiatives are in place to encourage low-carbon innovation in the 
industrial sector. The ‘Innovation Union’, and the various initiatives contained therein 
(discussed under Section 2.1.2.3, above), is the principal example. Additionally, the Strategic 
Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) aims to accelerate the development and deployment of 
low-carbon technologies, and includes the ‘European Industrial Initiatives’ (EIIs), which aims to 
bring together the EU, Member States, industry and researchers by pooling funding and 
resources to promote the development and uptake of key technologies. The Strategic Energy 
Technologies Information System (SETIS), led by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), plays a central 
role in delivering the SET-Plan. It undertakes independent research and publishes research 
reports and technology assessments and roadmaps. It also monitors the implementation of 
the SET-Plan using a range of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) (European Commission, 2015t). 
Work undertaken by SETIS feeds into ‘Horizon2020’, the EU’s most recent framework 
programme for research and innovation, which provides funding for research into various 
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societal challenges, into which low-carbon industrial innovation falls35. The JRC is also required 
by Article 13 of the Industrial Emissions Directive (Directive 2010/75/EU) to draw up, review 
and where necessary, update ‘Best Available Technology’ (BAT) reference documents, and 
organise an exchange of information between Member States, the industries concerned, non-
governmental organisations promoting environmental protection, and the Commission. 
3.2.5 Address non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Particularly from 
Agriculture 
Non-CO2 emissions36 currently account for around 20% of total GHG emissions from the EU, 
although as highlighted in Section 2.1.1, the majority of existing climate policy in the EU focuses 
on CO2 emissions from the energy system. Non-CO2 GHG emissions are rarely tackled in climate 
policy, or only very broadly (e.g. as part of the economy-wide targets under the ESD). An 
exception is the industry sector, which has non-CO2 emissions covered by the EU ETS, and 
fluorinated gasses (F-gasses), man-made GHGs used primarily in industrial applications, 
covered by F-Gas Regulations (Regulation 842/2006)37 
Agriculture accounts for around half of non-CO2 GHG emissions in the EU (excluding LULUCF, 
discussed in Section 4.1.1.1), and thus around 10% of total EU GHG emissions (European 
Environment Agency, 2015b). As also described in Section 2.1.1, climate policy instruments 
that exist for the agriculture sector are at the Member State level, and are largely recent 
introductions, focus on information dissemination and R&D rather than direct emissions 
abatement, and are implemented on a voluntary basis. Although GHG emissions from the 
agriculture sector have decreased by over 20% since 1990 (particularly CH4 and N2O), this has 
been driven by a combination of provisions in instruments introduced for non-climate reasons. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the primary instrument concerning the EU’s 
agriculture sector, and is one of the oldest and most prominent policy instruments introduced 
by the EU (Kuik and Kalfagianni, 2013). Its broad objective is to manage the markets for 
agricultural products within the EU38. Whilst the CAP has undergone numerous revisions over 
the years, including increasing attention to environmental issues, a focus on actions to mitigate 
climate change first arose during the 2008 CAP ‘Health Check’, of which ‘mastering new 
challenges from climate change’ formed part of one of the three main issues addressed. 
                                                     
35 Particularly ‘Secure, Clean and Efficient Energy’ and ‘Climate Action, Environment, Resource Efficiency and Raw 
Materials’. 
36 Methane (CH4), hydrofluorocarbons  (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and nitrous 
oxide (N2O). 
37 F-gasses include hydrofluorocarbons  (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), which 
have global warming potentials (GWP) of up to 23,000 times that of CO2. See Drummond (2013a) for a discussion 
of the instrument. 
38 More specifically, Article 39 of the TFEU states its primary objectives to be (a) to increase agricultural 
productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production 
and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, in particular labour, (b) thus to ensure a fair standard of 
living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture, (c) to stabilize markets, (d) to assure the availability of supplies, (e) to ensure that supplies reach 
consumers at reasonable prices. 
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Various measures were strengthened as a result, including R&D measures, innovation, ‘cross 
compliance’39, and advice on energy saving and emission mitigation approaches. However, no 
formal evaluation of the effects of these measures has yet been undertaken (Kuik and 
Kalfagianni, 2013). The Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and its components (e.g. the 
Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC))40 are also key non-climate instruments that influence 
agricultural GHG emissions. 
GHG emissions (principally CH4) from the waste sector account for around 15% of total non-
CO2 GHG emissions in the EU (European Environment Agency, 2015b). A key instrument for 
tackling solid waste disposal (responsible for around two-thirds of waste sector GHG 
emissions) is the Landfill Directive (1999/31/EC). The principal provision of the Landfill 
Directive is the requirement for Member States to reduce biodegradable waste (the source of 
CH4 emissions) entering landfill to 75% of 1995 levels by, reducing to 50% in 2009 and 25% in 
2016. Most Member States have met or exceeded the 2009 target, with many achieving the 
2016 target several years early (Drummond, 2013). 
Whilst the focus of climate policy must remain with the energy system as the primary source 
of GHG (particularly CO2) emissions, in the medium to long-term in particular, substantial 
reductions in agricultural emissions are likely to be required (along with reductions in non-CO2 
from other sources). 
4 Options and Pathways for Policy Instrumentation and Institutions 
in the Short-Term 
The options for instrument and institutional reform presented here consider the ‘lessons 
learned’ from the existing climate policy mix as described in Section 2.1.1, and take the ‘status 
quo’ described in the various challenges presented in Section 3 as the point of departure. All 
options presented respect the overarching targets and initiatives described in 2.1.2, along with 
the basic requirements for GHG reduction and climate policy described in Section 2.2. The 
overarching effectiveness, cost efficiency and feasibility of the instrument mix is also 
considered, and summarised in Section 5.2. 
The options presented assume that broad division of competences between the EU and 
Member States (e.g.. the principal of subsidiarity) is maintained in the short-term. It is also 
                                                     
39Cross-compliance is a mechanism that links direct payments to compliance by farmers with basic standards 
concerning the environment, food safety, animal and plant health and animal welfare, as well as the requirement 
of maintaining land in good agricultural and environmental condition (European Commission, 2015y). 
40 The WFD provides a framework of provisions and measures that aims to achieve ‘good’ quality ground and 
surface water by 2015. The Nitrates Directive aims at protecting water quality by preventing surface and 
groundwater pollution caused or induced by nitrates from agricultural sources through the promotion of good 
farming practices (Drummond, 2013a). 
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assumed that international co-operation in climate change mitigation improves against current 
levels, but does not achieve full alignment. 
Although many of the options presented in this section are applicable regardless of specific 
developments under these broad assumptions, some options may be mutually exclusive if 
effectiveness, cost efficiency and feasibility is to be achieved. These options are presented as 
two distinct pathways of ‘incentive-based’ and ‘technology-specific’ options, and are described 
in Sections 4.2 and Section 4.3, respectively. 
4.1 ‘Framework’ Conditions, and Reform and Operation of Public 
Institutions 
‘Framework Conditions’, presented in Section 4.1.1, refers largely to the overarching 
strategies, rules and requirements implemented at the EU level and applicable cross Member 
States. The ‘Reform and Operation of Public Institutions’, presented in Section 4.1.2, refers 
largely to the design, role and actions of public institutions at both EU level and within Member 
States. 
4.1.1  ‘Framework’ Conditions, Processes and Actions 
4.1.1.1 Maximise Benefits of the 2030 Climate and Energy Package, ‘Energy Union’ and 
‘Innovation Union’ 
2030 Climate and Energy Package 
As described in Section 2.1.2.1, the 2030 Climate and Energy Package only requires an 
overarching GHG emission target to be binding at individual Member State level, with 
renewable energy and energy efficiency targets ‘binding’ at EU level only. This is a departure 
from the 2020 Package, in which binding targets for GHG reduction and renewable energy are 
applicable to individual Member States. Whilst it is reasonable to suggest that three parallel, 
binding targets as per the 2020 Package may have been mutually reinforcing and encouraged 
Member States to actively pursue all three aspects, the current design means it must fall to 
other EU and Member State level measures to encourage aggregate achievement of the non-
binding renewable energy and energy efficiency targets, alongside (and as contributors to) 
GHG targets. The options presented throughout Section 4 seek to achieve this end. 
In October 2014, the European Council required the development of a policy proposal to 
include Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) in the 2030 Package. LULUCF 
activities include both emissions and removal of (principally) CO2 from the atmosphere 
resulting from the use of soils (including agricultural soils, which unlike other agriculture sector 
emissions, are not included under the ESD), trees, plants, biomass and timber (European 
Commission, 2015m). LULUCF activities are currently a net sink of CO2, absorbing the 
equivalent of around 7% of GHG emissions emitted by the EU28 in 2012 (European 
Environment Agency, 2015b), although this is projected to decrease out to 2030 (Böttcher and 
Graichen, 2015). Historically, net emissions from LULUCF have been excluded from both EU 
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and international level targets and agreements due to a lack of a robust, consistent 
measurement and accounting approach (Drummond, 2013a). Following the adoption of 
revised common measurement and accounting rules by the UNFCCC in 2011, a dedicated legal 
framework was introduced and implemented in 2013 by the EU in order to implement this 
harmonised methodology across Member States. The EU also requires Member States to 
prepare actions to increase removals and decrease emissions of GHGs from activities related 
to forestry and agriculture (Drummond, 2013a). In March 2015, the Commission opened a 
consultation on how the inclusion of LULUCF into the 2030 Package may be achieved41. Three 
key options were presented (Böttcher and Graichen, 2015): 
- Option 1 – ‘LULUCF pillar’ – Maintain non-CO2 agriculture sector emissions in a potential 
future Effort Sharing Decision (ESD), and further develop a LULUCF sector policy approach 
separately. 
- Option 2 – ‘Land use sector pillar’ Merge the LULUCF and non-CO2 agriculture sector 
emissions into one new independent pillar of the EU’s climate policy 
- Option 3 – Include LULUCF in the ESD 
It is likely that Option 1, the introduction of a fully independent LULUCF sector policy 
approach, is the most desirable - particularly from the perspective of overall environmental 
effectiveness. The reasons for this surround simply the nature of LULUCF emissions, and 
uncertainty of accounting. GHG emissions and removals from LULUCF activities are 
fundamentally different from fossil-based emissions and other sources of non-CO2 emissions 
(including agriculture), for two key reasons. The first is the significant variability in LULUCF net 
emissions (for both natural and anthropogenic reasons). The capacity of land-based carbon 
sinks to remove CO2 may vary substantially over seasons, and even daily (inter-annual 
fluctuations in some Member States are up to 60% (European Commission, 2012b)). The 
second is the long lead times for mitigation measures; most actions to increase sink capacity 
and absorption rates or reduce emissions take many years to take effect. Such phenomena 
make accurate accounting of LULUCF net emissions particularly difficult. Indeed, the average 
level of uncertainty associated with estimating net GHG emissions from LULUCF is sectors is 
around 35% across the EU (compared to 2-6% for fossil fuel-combusting sectors). Additionally, 
abatement measures, alongside exhibiting long lead times, are non-permanent, and may easily 
reversed (e.g. afforestation) (Client Earth, 2014). 
As such, combining LULUCF with all other non-traded ESD sectors (Option 3), or with all other 
agricultural activities (Option 2) and thus allowing offsets between such sectors (or different 
types of activities within sectors), would likely undermine the credibility of the overall target 
and allow for the use of ‘temporary’ LULUCF measures to meet GHG targets that may be easily 
reversed, rather than more permanent systemic change in non-ETS energy system sectors. 
However in the longer-term (post-2030), once substantial decarbonisation has taken place in 
                                                     
41 This consultation closed in June 2015, however at the time of writing, the results had not been published. 
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other sectors and as LULUCF accounting approaches have improved (with uncertainties 
reduced), broader inclusion may become more desirable. 
Energy Union 
At the time of writing, the proposed Energy Union remains largely a conceptual idea. Various 
options exist to maximise the potential for this initiative to drive the decarbonisation agenda. 
Two broad potential options are discussed here. The first is the explicit reframing of the Energy 
Union to the ‘Energy and Climate Union’. This may further embed the prominence of the 
decarbonisation imperative and emphasise dimension ‘(d)’ of the existing concept 
(decarbonising the economy, discussed in Section 2.1.2.2). Additionally, this would allow for 
the Vice President for Energy Union to explicitly take on a ‘climate’ role, contributing the 
‘mainstreaming’ of climate mitigation (in particular) across broader EU activities and policy 
making. Whether this is a more or less desirable option would depend on whether a single 
Commissioner for climate and energy remains, or whether such competencies are divided 
(such issues are discussed under Section 4.1.2.1, below). However, the political feasibility of 
such a ‘rebrand’ may be questioned, and the extent of benefits in addition to the climate-
related aspects of the existing concept of the Energy Union (and associated KAPs), must be 
further investigated before such an option is proposed. 
The second option is leveraging the Energy Union concept and processes to encourage and 
incentivise the deployment of renewables and energy efficiency measures, to compensate 
for the lack of binding Member State level targets and direct incentives in the 2030 Climate 
and Energy Package. For example, non-binding benchmark targets for renewables deployment 
and energy efficiency improvement could be calculated for each EU region (perhaps using a 
methodology akin to that used for calculation of the Member State 2020 targets for 
renewables, but aggregated to regional levels42). Additional funding (such as hypothecated EU 
ETS revenue, discussed under Section 4.2.1) or other benefits may be provided to incentivise 
achievement (and/or overachievement) of these benchmark targets (Held et al, 2015). 
A regional approach such as this may have several advantages against a situation of no such 
benchmarks and incentives (and even against a Member State level approach), as it encourages 
co-operation between Member States. This may help to reduce or remove existing barriers to 
harmonisation efforts, particularly concerning electricity transmission infrastructure and 
electricity markets (discussed further under Section 4.1.1.3, below). Long-term and co-
ordinated planning is incentivised to prevent excessive investment in infrastructure and 
reducing the risk of stranded assets (discussed further under Section 4.1.2.4), potentially 
increasing the cost efficiency of investments in renewables and energy efficiency measures 
(and others, such as reserve electricity generation capacity), potentially delivered through 
                                                     
42 For renewables each Member State target takes into account its share of renewable energy in 2005, modulated 
to reflect efforts made in preceding years. 5.5% is then added to this modulated value for each Member State. 
The remaining effort required was then weighted according to each country’s GDP and population, in order to 
produce nationally appropriate target efforts to achieve the overarching goal (Drummond, 2013a). 
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increasingly harmonised support mechanisms (further discussed in Section 4.4.1. The potential 
for future inter-State conflicts (expected and unexpected) is thus reduced (Held et al, 2015). 
Innovation Union 
The first ‘State of the Innovation Union’ report, published in 2014, concludes that the 
Innovation Union initiative is broadly succeeding in achieving its objectives. Of the 34 ‘action 
points’ only one has not been achieved, or is not on track for achievement (namely, the 
requirement for Member States to set aside national procurement budgets for innovation, 
discussed further under Section 4.1.2.6) (European Commission, 2014). As such, an option may 
be to produce an ambitious post-2020 ‘Innovation Union’ Strategy, which may include 
‘mission-driven’ objectives for the development of key low-carbon technologies. Such an 
approach would require regular assessment of the state of key technologies across the energy 
system, and where R&D attention must be focussed. Indeed, KAP 14 of the Energy Union 
states that ‘the EU needs to develop a forward-looking energy and climate Research and 
Investment (R&I) strategy to maintain European technological leadership and expand export 
opportunities’. Under this KAP, the Commission will in 2015/16 propose a European energy 
R&I approach, comprising an upgraded SET-Plan, with ‘a limited number of essential priorities 
and clear objectives’ (European Commission, 2015b).  
A review of the SET-Plan in 2012 concluded that it in order to be most effective, it requires, 
inter alia, an increased focus on energy system integration, and increased integration of 
activities along the innovation chain. As such, in 2013 the Commission proposed the 
development of an ‘integrated’ SET-Plan which will define priorities across the entire energy 
system through one consistent agenda at EU level, from research to market uptake. A 
Communication specifically addressing the future role of the SET-Plan is expected in September 
201543, and is expected to contain the following (European Commission, 2015u): 
- Identifies 10 actions for research and innovation, based on an assessment of the energy 
system needs and on their importance for the energy system transformation and the 
potential to create growth and jobs in the EU; 
- Addresses for these actions the whole innovation chain, from basic research to market 
uptake, both in terms of financing as well as in terms of regulatory framework; 
- Adapts the structures set up under the SET-Plan to ensure a more effective interaction with 
Member States and stakeholders; 
- Proposes to measure progress as part of the annual reporting of the State of the Energy 
Union via overall Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s), such as the level of investment in R&I, 
as well as specific KPIs to measure progress on the performance and cost-reduction for the 
priorities. 
Technology-specific assessments can provide guidance on the amount of support that should 
be channelled to both mature and innovative technologies, balancing R&D and deployment 
support (if required), reducing the potential for over-subsidisation (del Rio et al, 2015). 
                                                     
43 The Communication had not been published at the time of writing. 
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4.1.1.2 Establish Enabling Rules and Guidance for Public Investments and other 
Financial Market Actors and Investments 
As discussed in Section 3.1.4, existing rules and guidance (or a lack thereof) for private and 
public investors (and other actors in the financial system) act as actual or potential barriers to 
unlocking the requisite flow of finance and investment to the development and deployment of 
low carbon technologies and infrastructure. As such, existing rules and guidance should be 
corrected where required, and introduced where appropriate, to ensure such flows are 
facilitated and encouraged. Various options are available, for application to public sector funds 
and institutions, the private sector, or both.  
First, the use of a ‘social cost of carbon’ (SCC) value in investments involving public funds and 
public financial institutions may help prevent investments in at least the most highly CO2-
intensive assets. Whilst there is strong debate and disagreement in the literature regarding an 
appropriate value for the social cost of carbon (and appropriate discount rates), an option may 
be for the Commission to publish guidance on a value, or perhaps a range of values, to use. 
Such values could perhaps be made mandatory (as a minimum) for all EU level institutions 
(although the European Investment Bank (EIB) already employs a SCC in it’s decision-making), 
and encouraged for adoption by public authorities and financial institutions in Member States. 
Over time, as real carbon prices increase (and potentially spread beyond existing sectors), such 
a requirement may be removed. An alternative, or complementary approach may be to 
prohibit investment in certain types of high-carbon infrastructure (e.g. unabated coal-fired 
power generation), with such requirements tightening over time (again, co-ordinated with the 
requirement for such rules, as the relative economic attractiveness of alternative investment 
options changes over time). 
The use of suitable financial instruments, such as guarantees, grants and bonds, offered by 
public financial institutions, private finance and other businesses, is likely to be a key pillar in 
efforts to raise and direct appropriate finance (OECD, 2015), and their development should be 
encouraged. To facilitate this, guidelines for the use of standardised and transparent 
Environmental, Social and Governance investment instruments (including ‘Climate’ and 
broader ‘Green’ Bonds), could be adopted for use across the EU (and be mandatory for 
instruments issues by public funds and institutions). Such industry-led guidelines are already 
available44, however the requirement for action by governing authorities (e.g. the Commission) 
to develop guidelines should be assessed. Indeed, this question was posed in a consultation 
concerning the objectives and design of the proposed Capital Markets Union45 (for which a 
summary of responses is yet to be published).  
                                                     
44 For more information, see: http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/green-bonds/ 
45 ‘The Capital Markets Union (CMU) is a plan of the European Commission that aims to create deeper and more 
integrated capital markets in the 28 Member States of the EU. With the CMU, the Commission will explore ways 
of reducing fragmentation in financial markets, diversifying financing sources, strengthening cross border capital 
flows and improving access to finance for businesses, particularly SMEs’ (European Commission, 2015w). 
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Basel III and Solvency II regulations, as discussed in Section 3.1.4, may be having unintended 
consequences on the ability of financial institutions to finance particularly long-term low 
carbon investments. However, to date there is a lack of data and empirical evidence to support 
these claims, and it may yet be too early for these effects to be detected given the relatively 
recent introduction of these regulations (indeed, Basel II only comes into full force in 2019). 
Despite this, the EU could monitor whether such initiatives do indeed produce unintended 
consequences for financing the low-carbon transition (OECD, 2015), and propose 
amendments where necessary. This would be simpler for Solvency II, which is an EU-only 
instrument. 
To overcome information deficits that prevent an accurate assessment of the risks involved 
with particular investments (discussed under Section 3.1.4), standards and requirements for 
integrated environmental, social and governance disclosure could be established centrally by 
the Commission (OECD, 2015). At least initially, this could apply to firm from certain sectors, 
and of a certain size. At a minimum, such standards should include the disclosure of GHG 
emissions (discussed below). The disclosure of GHG emissions by firms has two potential 
effects. The first is that it requires initial measurement and quantification of emissions and 
their sources, to which little attention may have previously been paid. This may highlight, or 
allow for the identification of, measures that may already be cost-effective to introduce. The 
evidence for such a ‘manage what you measure’ effect is relatively strong (Grubb et al, 2014; 
Montabon et al, 2007). The second potential effect is that by providing such information to 
stakeholders and potential investors, the risks associated with an increasing carbon price, for 
example, may be appropriately assessed and investments altered accordingly. Both effects act 
to raise the prominence of GHG emissions in corporate decision-making (particularly in the 
shorter-term, in the absence of a substantial carbon price). 
Such an instrument may be implemented in various ways. A model approach may be that taken 
in the UK, in which the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
Regulations 2013 requires all UK quoted companies to report on their GHG emissions as part 
of their annual Directors Report, from October 201346 (UK Government, 2015). Participants 
must report Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions of all six GHGs defined in the Kyoto Protocol must 
be reported47. A GHG ‘intensity ratio’ must also be reported to normalise the values reported 
(Drummond, 2013b). However, as this Regulation is relatively recent, little assessment of the 
impacts of these regulations has yet taken place48.  Supplementary options are available, such 
as ‘league tables’ for sectors or sub-sectors to aid stakeholders with comparisons between 
organisations.  
                                                     
46 This includes all UK incorporated companies listed on the main market of the London Stock Exchange, a 
European Economic Area market or whose shares are dealing on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. 
47 ‘Scope 1’ refers to direct emissions from activities owned or controlled by the organisation. ‘Scope 2’ refers to 
indirect emissions from the generation or production of the electricity, heat, steam and cooling purchased and 
used by the organisation. The six GHGs are CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6. 
48 It its ex ante estimates, DEFRA projects GHG savings of up to 4MtCO2 by 2021 from this legislation, with annual 
cost savings to organisations estimated as up to £89 million (DEFRA, 2011). 
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Such requirements may also provide guidance for additional climate-related disclosures. For 
example, disclosure of risk assessment procedures surrounding existing and prospective high-
carbon assets (including mergers and acquisitions of other firms), whether organisations 
employ a social cost of carbon in the decision-making, and whether a climate risk management 
plan has been adopted, may produce additional benefit. Such guidance (and/or requirements) 
may vary across sectors, according to relevance and feasibility of holding, collating and 
reporting such information. 
Whether such an instrument is introduced EU-wide for all qualifying organisations or 
implemented voluntarily by individual Member States depends on political feasibility. 
Regardless of what precisely is included in these requirements (and their legal basis), the 
provision of a standardised approach would allow for clarity and comparability, and reduce 
administrative burdens against the use of a range of different potential approaches. 
4.1.1.3 Remove Barriers to Integrated Electricity Grid and Single Electricity Market 
Electricity Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure 
As discussed under Section 3.1.2, the first key hurdle to the development of an appropriate, 
EU-wide electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure is existing authorisation, 
planning and related procedural issues. Options for reducing or removing such issues are 
discussed in Sections 4.1.2.3 and 4.1.2.1. The second key issue is that of financing such 
infrastructure. At present, projects identified as PCIs (discussed under Section 3.1.2) are able 
to access the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), which is expected to provide around €4.7 billion 
for such purposes, depending on the final configuration of the proposed European Fund for 
Strategic Investment. The European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), proposed by the 
Commission in January 2015 and illustrated in Figure 6, is intended as the main vehicle for the 
Commission’s Investment Plan49. It will employ €21 billion of public and European Investment 
Bank (EIB) funds to mobilise private finance with a desired multiplier effect of 15 to raise a total 
of €215 billion, largely for long-term investments (such as electricity interconnectors)50. The 
EFSI legislative proposal states that funded projects should not be limited to cross-border 
infrastructure, meaning that it may be also used to finance infrastructure internal to a single 
Member State. Due to the potentially (politically) infeasible continuation of on-bill cost 
recovery for transmission infrastructure investments, the use of centralised EU funding may 
be a key option for ensuring the required investment takes place. Indeed, financial support 
from European institutions for such investment is KAP 4 of the proposed Energy Union. 
                                                     
49 The Investment Plan focuses on removing obstacles to investment, providing visibility and technical assistance 
to investment projects and making smarter use of new and existing financial resources. The achieve these goals, 
the plan is active in three areas: (s) mobilizing investments of at least €315 billion in 3 years, (b) supporting 
investment in the real economy, and (c) creating an investment friendly environment (European Commission, 
2015s). 
50 The legislative proposal states that the EFSI should target ‘projects with a higher risk-return profile than existing 
EIB and Union instruments to ensure additionality over existing operations. (…) The EFSI should only be used 
where financing is not available from other sources on reasonable terms.’ 
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Additionally, European Commission (2015k) reaffirms the target of interconnector capacity in 
each Member State equivalent to 10% domestic generating capacity (discussed under Section 
3.1.2) to be achieved by 2020, with an increased minimum target of 15% to be achieved by 
2030. The Commission also expects the 15% interconnector target to be delivered largely by 
the continued identification of PCIs, which are able to access central European funds and make 
use of other benefits described in Section 3.1.2, such as rapid authorisation procedures 
(European Commission, 2015k).  
 
 
Electricity Market 
As discussed under Section 3.1.2, the current electricity market design is unsuitable for an 
increasing penetration of renewables. As such, changes are required to ensure investment 
continues and security of supply is achieved. Energy Union KAPs 5 to 8 concern the 
development of an appropriate electricity market (European Commission, 2015b). In July 2015, 
a consultation was launched with the objective of proposing a new market design by the end 
of the year (the ‘Market Design Initiative’), followed by legislative proposals in 2016 (KAP 5). 
The most appropriate design is fiercely debated, and it is beyond the scope of this report to 
discuss possible designs in detail. However, two general approaches are broadly possible, as 
summarised by Glachant and Henriot (2013): 
- ‘Melting Pot’ Paradigm. Once RES-E technologies begin to become competitive with 
conventional generation on a levelised cost of generation basis, support and capacity 
mechanisms are removed and RES-E generators are exposed to the same rules as other 
Figure 6 - Investment Plan for Europe (Source: European Commission, 2015l) 
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generators (e.g. bid to supply units of electricity, but also scheduling and balancing 
obligations). Proponents argue that the market will then find a new equilibrium position 
and associated prices able to stimulate the needed investments, along with optimal 
selection of RES-E generation sites, improvement of maintenance planning and technology 
combinations, control of production in extreme cases, higher efficiency of system balancing 
in general, incentives for innovation, better production forecasts and transparency. 
Wholesale prices would likely be highly variable (with clearance horizons likely much 
reduced from current day-ahead markets), with some installations seeking to recover 
investments through generation at times of particularly high demand (and high prices), for 
perhaps a few hours a year. 
 
- ‘Salad Bowl’ Paradigm. This approach considers the specificities of each type of generation 
(dispatchable and intermittent renewables), and applies different but complementary rules 
to each. Proponents of this paradigm consider the fundamental differences between these 
types of generation mean that a stable market equilibrium cannot be found, rendering a 
‘Melting Pot’ approach unsuitable. 
Each of these approaches has theoretical and practical benefits and problems (see Glachant 
and Henriot (2013) for a summary discussion of these points), and the decision on which broad 
approach is taken will depend on a range of factors, such as technical and political feasibility 
(including, for example, the level of control willing to be left to the market, the expected impact 
on investor confidence, and to whom the risks and costs burden will mainly fall), but also on 
the broad policy pathway taken in the short-term (discussed in Sections 4.2 and Section 4.3)51 
and the long-term.  
However, two actions may be identified that would likely prove beneficial, regardless of the 
eventual specific design of the EU electricity market. Firstly, RES-E support and capacity 
mechanisms will be required at least in the near-term (and potentially in the longer-term). As 
such, these mechanisms must be optimised, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, below. Secondly, full 
implementation of the Third Energy Package, such as implementation of network codes, 
‘unbundling’ of generators, suppliers and TSOs and the presence of ‘open and fair’ retail 
markets (including the removal of below-cost, regulated electricity prices), would be highly 
constructive. This forms KAP 6 of the Energy Union. The Commission will also ‘seek the phasing-
out of below cost regulated prices through the competition and economic governance 
frameworks. It will also encourage Member States to establish a road map for the phasing-out 
of all regulated prices’ (European Commission, 2015b). This could also include other distortions 
on electricity (and other energy) prices, such as reduced rate-VAT for domestic consumption 
in the UK (as discussed in Section 2.1.1). 
                                                     
51 Due to the nature of these two approaches, it is likely that the ‘Melting Pot’ paradigm matches most closely 
with the ‘Incentive-based’ policy pathway, whilst the ‘Salad Bowl’ approach matches with the ‘technology-
specific’ pathway. 
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As discussed in Section 3.1.2, above, only 8 Member States currently abide by the 
recommended minimum common technical requirements for electricity smart metering 
systems containing in Recommendation 2012/148/EU. To ensure interoperability and the 
possibility for demand side response measures in a future electricity market design, these 
common minimum technical standard for smart meters may be made mandatory. Indeed, 
the Commission proposes to ‘continue to push for [such] standardisation’ (European 
Commission, 2015b). 
As the electricity market becomes increasingly unified and centralised, the role of ENTSO-E and 
ACER, and perhaps that of Distribution System Operators (DSOs) in the likely event of 
increasingly substantial decentralised generation, is likely to increase (Glachant and Henriot, 
2013). As such, it should be ensued that such institutions are able to fulfil their required role. 
Such examination forms KAP 6 of the Energy Union (European Commission, 2015b). 
4.1.1.4 Leverage Subnational and Regional Governance Institutions and Initiatives 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, subnational authorities may hinder the decarbonisation 
ambition of a given Member State, depending on their legal and decision-making competence. 
However, the reverse may also be true; the ambition of local authorities may be hindered by 
the focus of instrumentation and resources at the Member State level, and the associated 
political economy52. By enhancing the role and prominence of sub-national governance 
institutions and initiatives (and regional, discussed below), city-level ‘frontrunners’ may 
emerge, functioning as policy and technology ‘labs’ from which lessons may be learned to 
broader application. 
One institution that is well placed to facilitate and support such a process is the Covenant of 
Mayors (CoM). The CoM was created in 2009 as ‘the mainstream European movement 
involving local and regional authorities, voluntarily committing to increasing energy efficiency 
and the use of renewable energy sources on their territories. By their commitment, Covenant 
signatories aim to meet and exceed the European Union 20% CO2 reduction objective by 2020’. 
It currently holds over 6,300 signatories, covering over 204 million inhabitants53 (CoM, 2015). 
Signatories must prepare a Baseline Emission Inventory, and submit, within a year following 
their signature, a Sustainable Energy Action Plan (SEAP) outlining the key actions they plan to 
undertake. Various mechanisms allow for technical and administrative assistance, whilst 
‘Benchmarks of Excellence’ act as a platform for sharing best-practice techniques. van der Veen 
et al, 2013 found that the CoM is a successful initiative. In particular: 
- The CoM has played a strong role in involving local authorities in energy policy, and in 
spreading the culture of CO2 emission measurement and reduction in European 
municipalities. 
                                                     
52 An example is that of Warsaw, Poland, a signatory of the Covenant of Mayors (discussed below), and Bristol, 
UK. See http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/warsaw-breaks-ranks-poland-2030-climate-goals-307987 
and http://www.euractiv.com/sections/sustainable-dev/mayor-i-told-cameron-give-me-money-turn-bristol-lab-
315627 , respectively, for more information. 
53 Mostly in the EU, although with around 200 signatories in non-EU countries. 
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- The reduction in CO2 emissions by signatories is relatively significant. At the time of the 
review, a large majority of signatories (89%) expected their 2020 targets to be met. 
- The CoM provides various types of added value to signatories, particularly regarding (a) 
their visibility and communication outside the city or towards the citizens, (b) the 
reinforcement of their capacity-building as a result of collective exercises to measure CO2 
emissions and to design actions to diminish them, (c) the political emphasis put on CO2 
emissions and (d) transfers of knowledge, know-how and experience from other signatories 
from different countries. 
An option may be for the CoM to extend SEAPs and measures to a 2030 horizon, and require 
signatories to at least meet the target of 40% CO2 reduction below 1990 level. It is possible 
that this requirement could be made stricter, such as requiring a minimum 50% projected 
reduction. Van der Veen et al (2013) also produce various recommendations to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the CoM, including the provision of additional financing 
instruments available only to CoM signatories to assist in implementation of SEAP measures. 
Also, administrative support, capacity building and guidelines should be improved, including 
the provision of common monitoring guidelines. 
4.1.1.5 Increase Monitoring and Application of Enforcement Mechanisms 
As is clear from the description of the various ‘challenges’ discussed above (Section 3), non- 
and under-compliance by Member States with requirements set by EU Directives is a relatively 
pervasive issue, and forms a substantial hurdle to the low-carbon transition in many cases. 
Examples include the continued presence of regulated energy prices, low compliance with 
minimum energy performance standards for buildings, and non-compliance with requirements 
and deadlines with reporting obligations. 
As such, a more vigorous application of enforcement and penalty mechanisms to ensure 
Member States are in compliance with legally binding provisions should be a priority. If 
compliance by Member States remains as currently with various Directives and provisions, any 
revision, reform or strengthening of requirements may prove ineffective. Indeed, the ‘full 
implementation and strict enforcement of existing energy and related legislation is the first 
priority to establish the energy union’ (forming KAP 1) (European Commission, 2015b). 
4.1.2 Reform and Operation of Public Institutions 
4.1.2.1 ‘Mainstreaming’ of Low-Carbon Objectives 
Ensuring low-carbon objectives are ‘mainstreamed’ into decision making across all levels of 
governance reduces the risk of the introduction of counterproductive instruments, incentives 
and investments, and enhances possible synergies with ‘non-climate’ instruments and 
initiatives that may (extendedly or unexpectedly) influence the low-carbon transition in some 
sectors. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, such non-climate instruments have been highly 
influential in some sectors (particularly agriculture). Administrative, public and political 
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acceptability barriers that often act to prevent investment in low-carbon infrastructure in 
many Member States may also be reduced. 
Achieving such an objective in practice may be difficult, although various options are available. 
The use of a social cost of carbon in policy and associated impact assessments for example 
(discussed in Section 4.1.1.2), may be one such option that may be applied to all levels of 
governance. At the EU level, the possible reforming of the Energy Union to an ‘Energy and 
Climate Union’, with an attached Vice President with a cross-cutting remit (discussed under 
Section 4.1.1.1, above), may be beneficial. This may be linked with the reintroduction of a 
separate Commissioner for DG CLIMA and DG Energy, which may help reduce the risk of 
propagating the risk that ‘energy-only’ matters are prioritised over ‘climate’ issues (Bausch et 
al, 2015). However, this must be balanced against the potential loss of the benefits associated 
with such a joint remit, given the indivisible link between the energy system and the low carbon 
transition. However, regardless of whether emission mitigation becomes the remit of both a 
Vice President and a dedicated Commissioner, or remains largely the portfolio of a combined 
energy and climate Commissioner, increasing the role and prominence of DG CLIMA may be 
beneficial in ensuring such issues are mainstreamed across EU level decision-making. As 
limited human resources have been emphasised as a crucial drawback in allowing DG CLIMA 
to play a more prominent role in the past (Bausch et al, 2015), an increase in staffing (and 
associated budget) may be required. This is also linked with the ability of the Commission to 
enhance information sharing, discussed in the following section. 
At the Member State (and potentially local) level, the introduction of crosscutting bodies such 
as the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC)54 may be an option in some Member States. 
Independent infrastructure planning bodies (discussed under Section 4.1.2.3) may also provide 
a similar function. 
4.1.2.2 Regular Review and Dissemination of ‘Best-Practice’ Approaches 
As discussed under Section 2.1.1, instrument design flaws have lead to some EU and Member 
State level climate policy instruments not exploiting their full potential (particularly economic 
instruments), others to produce additional cost without additional benefit, and yet others to 
be counterproductive. Such consequences act to reduce the overall effectiveness, increase 
costs and reduce the credibility of the instrument mix. Monitoring and reviewing the design 
and impact of policy instruments and governance approaches across Member States to 
determine best-practice, and subsequent dissemination of this information, may reduce or 
avoid this issue in future and allow for more rapid policy learning and a more robust, 
                                                     
54 The Committee on Climate Change (the CCC) is an independent, statutory body established under the UK’s 
Climate Change Act 2008. Its purpose is to advise the UK Government and Devolved Administrations on emissions 
targets and report to Parliament on progress made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and preparing for 
climate change. Specifically, its remit is to (a) provide independent advice to government on setting and meeting 
the UK’s ‘carbon budgets’ and preparing for climate change, (b) monitor progress in reducing emissions and 
achieving carbon budget, (c) conduct independent analysis into climate change science, economics and policy, 
and (d) to engage with a wide range of organisations and individuals to share evidence and analysis (Committee 
on Climate Change, 2015) 
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effective, cost efficient and feasible policy mix and governance approaches. An existing 
example is the provision of guidance for the design of renewable support mechanisms, 
published by the Commission in 2013 (discussed further in Section 4.4.1). Such guidance may 
be replicated regarding, for example, energy efficiency obligation schemes, labelling and other 
information instruments, and approaches to spatial planning and permitting procedures 
(discussed below). However, this may also require a substantial increase in resources for DG 
CLIMA (discussed above). Such guidance would also complement the existing requirements for 
BAT reference documentation under the Industrial Emissions Directive (discussed in Section 
3.2.4), and information sharing platforms under the CoM (discussed in Section 4.1.1.4). 
A key mechanism for promoting economic policy coherence within and between Member 
States is the European Semester. The European Semester is an annual cycle in which the 
Commission undertakes a detailed analysis of Member States’ plans of budgetary, 
macroeconomic and structural reforms and provides them with individual, targeted 
recommendations for the following 12-18 months, with the objective of ensuring that the 
Europe 2020 targets are met, including the three headline targets of the 2020 Climate and 
Energy Package55. If recommendations are not acted upon within this timeframe, ‘policy 
warnings’ may be issued. Enforcement action may be driven through incentives or sanctions 
(European Commission, 2015n). The continuation of an annual review of Member States’ 
climate and energy policies and issuance of targeted recommendations for improvement to 
2030 may be beneficial, regardless of the mechanism employed to deliver it. Indeed, in the 
2015 European Semester the theme of climate and energy was absent, as it is expected that 
this will be taken on as part of the Energy Union (European Commission, 2015o). 
Recommendations may focus on governance approaches, the design and combination of 
specific instruments and market distortions (such as misaligned company car taxation 
arrangements and fossil fuel subsidies). Irrespective of whether climate and energy-specific 
recommendations are provided as part of the European Semester or a separate process under 
the Energy Union, it must be ensured that recommendations that continue to be provided 
under the Semester process for other subjects or objectives are aligned with the low-carbon 
transition. This may be assisted by, and contribute to, the ‘mainstreaming’ objective, discussed 
above. It also contributes to the objectives of the Innovation Union, discussed in Section 
2.1.2.3. 
4.1.2.3 Ensure Clear and Appropriate Spatial Planning Regimes and Administrative 
Competence 
The design of spatial planning regimes and other authorisation procedures have proven a 
hindrance to the deployment of various types of infrastructure in many Member States, as 
                                                     
55 The five Europe 2020 targets are: (1) 75% of the 20-64 year olds to be employed, (2) 3% of the EU’s GDP to be 
invested in R&D, (3) the three headline targets of the 2020 Energy and Climate Package, (4) Reducing the rates of 
early school leaving below 10% and at least 40% of 30-24 year olds completing third level education, and (5) at 
least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion (European Commission, 2015p). 
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discussed above concerning renewables and electricity transmission and distribution 
infrastructure (Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.1). 
Spatial Planning Approaches 
A spatial planning regime that allows for low-carbon options and development, and that 
integrates different aspects of land-use planning (such as housing, transport and energy 
generation and supply), may be crucial in facilitating the low-carbon transition. For example, 
limits on building height in cities, for example, may cause urban sprawl and increase transport 
demand and thus emissions (along with restricting the viability of active transport options) 
(OECD, 2015). As spatial planning is a Member State competence in full, such reforms must be 
instituted by national governments (and relevant sub-national authorities). However, the 
Commission may provide guidance and share best-practice examples (as discussed under 
Section 4.1.2.2). Initiatives such as the CoM may also be leveraged to advance such reforms 
and disseminate lessons-learned. Parallel reforms, such as property taxation, may also be of 
substantial benefit. For example, property tax levied on buildings and other land 
improvements rather than on land values may make suburban greenfield development more 
attractive than urban brownfield development in many cities and Member States (OECD, 
2015). 
Administrative Integration and Clarity 
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, the number of jurisdictions certain infrastructure must pass 
through (particularly electricity transmission infrastructure), and the complexity and 
unpredictability of processes and decision making in each, is often a substantial barrier to 
infrastructure development. Whilst the creation of ‘one-stop-shops’ for authorising inter-
Member State transmission infrastructure has been largely achieved, this is not the case for 
sub-national transmission or other types of infrastructure in many Member States. Therefore, 
responsibility for infrastructure planning and authorisation and could be concentrated in a 
single body at key levels of governance, with the distribution of competence made clear, 
along with processes for dispute resolution processes where required. For example, a 
National Infrastructure Authority may be instituted, with Municipal Infrastructure Bodies 
acting at the local level (e.g. cities, states or regions). At the national level, at least, such bodies 
may be semi-independent of government. This would allow for long-term, holistic 
infrastructure planning with uncertainties produced by political cycles and interactions 
between various authorities and departments, reduced. 
As well as functioning as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for various forms of permitting (including 
renewables), such bodies may also be a focal point for stakeholder engagement. Effective 
public participation strategies and understanding of local attitudes is often cited as a priority 
for reducing barriers to the deployment of renewables (del Rio et al, 2015). 
4.1.2.4 Produce Long-Term Infrastructure Plans 
As discussed in Section 3.1.3, various Directives require Member States to produce plans for 
how their provisions are to be met (concerning both infrastructure to be deployed, and policy 
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instruments to achieve such deployment). Such plans are generally only required to consider a 
time horizon for which mandated targets or requirements are in place - often 2020. 
In order to ensure Member States consider how they intend to achieve decarbonisation in the 
longer-term, it may be prudent for Member States to produce comprehensive, integrated 
national infrastructure and policy plans, with iterations produced on a pre-defined timescale 
(e.g. every 5 years). Such plans may cover key elements and sectors of the energy system (e.g. 
power generation, buildings, transport, etc.), with specific requirements or guidance on what 
to include perhaps defined by the Commission56, and would remove the need for the 
production of independent parallel plans for different, but interrelated purposes. Indeed, the 
Commission recognises the need to simplify and streamline the requirement for such separate 
processes, and has proposed a consolidated approach through the production of ‘National 
Plans for Competitive, Secure and Sustainable Energy’ as part of the governance framework 
for the 2030 Package57. The specific time horizon for such plans must be carefully considered. 
For example, whilst 2030 would certainly be appropriate for some sectors for plans produced 
prior to 2020, for others it risks irrelevance as technological developments and other 
uncertainties may render any planning beyond broad generalities particularly difficult. 
Regardless, such long-term, comprehensive planning would likely have multiple benefits. It 
would ensure that Member States appropriately consider all key aspects of their 
decarbonisation pathway and options available in an integrated fashion, reducing the risk of 
stranded assets and excessive cost, and reduce the potential for reciprocal barriers to certain 
developments (e.g. the ‘chicken and egg’ situation concerning renewable generation and grid 
infrastructure). Such plans may then be assessed by the Commission to determine, in 
particular, synergies and conflicts with neighbouring Member States, and suggest changes 
where appropriate. Such plans may facilitate co-operation between Member States, and allow 
for combined efforts and policy measures to meet regional renewable or energy efficiency 
targets, for example (as discussed under Section 4.1.1.1). They may also feed into EU-level 
planning mechanisms, such as the TYNDPs. National Infrastructure Authorities discussed in the 
previous section could be responsible for producing such plans. Local plans may also be 
produced by Municipal Infrastructure Authorities, and be linked to Member State-level plans 
to ensure consistency. 
4.1.2.5 Provide Dedicated Funding Sources for Low-Carbon Infrastructure, Deployment 
and Innovation 
Whilst establishing broad rules and guidance for public funds and financial institutions 
(discussed under Section 4.1.1.2, above) is a step towards enabling the appropriate availability 
and flow of finance, providing dedicated funding sources and financial institutions with a 
specific mandate to invest in and provide and finance for the low-carbon transition would 
                                                     
56 The level of detail possible to provide would likely depend on which of the two pathways presented in Sections 
4.2 and Section 4.3, below, are pursued. 
57 See European Commission (2014a) for more information. 
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likely provide additional benefit. Indeed, the role of public finance and public financial 
institutions is likely to be critical in stimulating the low-carbon transition, by facilitating access 
to long-term financing, reducing project and financial risks, attracting investment from the 
private sector, and in filling the ‘capacity gap’ (i.e. providing expertise to support low-carbon 
investments and market development (OECD, 2015). 
The EIB currently commits to investing at least 25% of its lending portfolio in climate action 
(although not exclusively in the EU or neighbouring states). In 2014, this value totalled €19.1 
billion, broken down by various sectors, including around 14% to RDI (Research Development 
and Innovation), as illustrated by Figure 7. 
 
Central EU funds, such as Cohesion Policy and the framework programme for research funds 
(the most recent of which is ‘Horizon2020’, discussed under Section 3.2.4), are also relatively 
significant sources of dedicated funding. The proposed EFSI, as briefly described in Section 
4.1.1.3 and illustrated in Figure 6, above, is also likely to be a significant source of funding. 
Indeed, EFSI is intended to focus on four areas: (a) strategic infrastructure (including energy, 
transport and digital), (b) education, research, development and innovation, (c) expansion of 
renewable energy and resource efficiency, and (d) support for smaller businesses and mid-cap 
companies (EIB, 2015b). 
Under the options presented in this report, additional funds are available from proposed 
strengthening of GPP requirements (discussed under Section 4.1.2.6), and proposed 
earmarking of revenues from the EU ETS (discussed under Section 4.3.1). However, whether 
such funds, instruments and institutions (both existing and proposed) are effective and 
sufficient should be regularly reviewed. 
To be effective, the availability of such funds must be advertised to potential recipients and co-
investors, and presented in a coherent manner. Three recent Commission proposals seek to 
achieve this. Firstly, the Commission intends to ‘work with Member States and regions to 
ensure synergies between the different EU funds, and to exploit the potential of Cohesion 
Figure 7 - EIB Climate Action Lending 2014 (Source: EIB, 2015a) 
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Policy funding for innovation’ (European Commission, 2015b). Secondly, the European 
Investment Project Portal (EIPP) – a web portal to clearly list potential investment 
opportunities in the EU to give ‘clarity and confidence to investors’ – is currently under 
development (European Commission, 2015x). Thirdly, a ‘Smart Financing for Smart Buildings’ 
initiative, which aims to ‘facilitate access to existing funding instruments’ for energy efficiency 
in existing buildings, is also under development (European Commission, 2015b).  It should also 
be ensured that such ‘transparency’ mechanisms are also fit for purpose. 
An option to complement EU level funding may be through the establishment of public 
financial institutions with explicit mandates for low-carbon investment. Various countries 
and EU Member States have established such institutions in recent years, with primary 
examples being KfW in Germany, and the Green Investment Bank in the UK. Such examples are 
‘scaling-up private investment in green infrastructure, and creating a track record for 
investment in clean energy’ (OECD, 2015). 
4.1.2.6 Enhance the use of Green Public Procurement 
Public authorities are major market actors in the EU, with their spending equivalent to around 
19% of the EU’s total GDP (European Commission, 2015v). As such, through their purchasing 
power they have the potential to provide and drive the market for both mature and innovative 
low-carbon, high-efficiency products and services across a range of sectors. EU policy for green 
public procurement (GPP) is based on the 2008 Communication ‘Public Procurement for a 
Better Environment’, which required the Commission to produce common criteria for GPP for 
different products for voluntary adoption by Member States, and set an EU-wide indicative 
target that by 2010, all public tendering procedures should be compliant with GPP criteria for 
priority product/service categories (European Commission, 2008). Renda et al (2012) found 
that in 2010, this value was only 26%, and that the use of GPP criteria varied very significantly 
across Member States)58. As discussed in Section 4.1.1.1, the use of procurement funds to 
directly encourage innovation is not on track to meet objectives under the Innovation Union. 
As such, the uptake of GPP should be enhanced. As part of the Energy Union reforms, the 
Commission has stated its intention to ‘explore how public procurement can exploit its 
potential to act as a catalyst for industrial and business innovation, and green growth both 
within the EU and beyond its borders’ (European Commission, 2012b). The use of Forward 
Commitment Procurement (FCP) may be of particular benefit. FCP commits government to 
purchasing goods or services that meet a given performance standard that is currently not yet 
available (UCL GEPC, 2014), providing a market for such products and services and incentivising 
their development. The concept was developed in the UK, from which various examples 
demonstrate FCPs successfully facilitating the development of innovative products (BIS, 2011).  
                                                     
58 However, provisions in other Directives, such as the Clean Vehicles Directive, the Energy Labelling Directive and 
Energy Efficiency Directive, support these voluntary guidelines; although there are usually subject to flexible cost-
benefit clauses, which reduces their stringency. 
 
  Short-Term Development Options for the EU Climate Policy Mix  PART 2 | Page 60 
One approach to enhancing the role of GPP would be through proposing and introducing 
mandatory requirements. However, the (political) feasibility of this option is questionable. The 
alternative is to encourage and incentivise voluntary uptake of GPP, for example through 
information sharing platforms and initiatives, and initiatives for joint procurement (increasing 
purchasing power). For sub-Member State public authorities, initiatives such as the CoM may 
have a similar impact (e.g. cities may share information and issue joint procurement 
agreements). 
4.2 Policy Pathway One – ‘Incentive-Based’ 
This pathway focuses on pricing and other technology-neutral incentivising instruments to 
drive low-carbon investments and behaviour. A strengthened and expanded EU ETS is the 
primary instrument and cornerstone of the instrument mix. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, 
existing regulatory requirements and targets largely remain, but are not tightened (e.g. 
minimum energy performance standards for buildings) and many expire once time-limited 
targets are met (e.g. Fuel Quality Directive targets, energy efficiency obligation schemes, CO2 
intensity targets for passenger cars and LGVs, etc.). 
4.2.1 Structural Reform and Expansion of the EU ETS 
Despite the modest abatement produced by the EU ETS thus far, and the various issues that 
currently inhibit its ability to produce a substantive carbon price now and into the future (i.e. 
late 2020s), it remains the most appropriate instrument through which a substantive carbon 
price may be established (particularly for the sectors it already covers). Administrative 
processes are already in place, initial legal barriers and challenges have been overcome 
(Mehling et al, 2013), and those subject to it now broadly accept its presence. Whilst reforms 
to produce a substantive, increasing and more predictable carbon price would (and already 
have) meet with resistance (and reduced associated political feasibility), the ETS likely remains 
the most acceptable and otherwise feasible instrument in the short-term. As such, the 
strengthening of the EU ETS should be the first priority for the evolution of the instrument mix 
(in both policy pathways presented). 
Options for Structural Reform and Expansion 
A first attempt to tackle the existing surplus of allowances was through the implementation of 
‘backloading’ of permit auction volumes over 2014 to 201659, to be made available instead in 
2019-2020. However, whilst this restricts allowance supply in the short-term, as these 
allowances are to be returned to the market later in Phase 3, backloading did not change the 
total supply of allowances, and hence failed to address the core of the problem. As such, in 
2012 the Commission released a report on the ‘State of the European Carbon Market’, which 
identified six options for structural reform (European Commission, 2012a). Two of these six 
suggestions have progressed: 
                                                     
59 900 million in total - 400 million in 2014, 300 million in 2015 and 200 million in 2016. 
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- Discretionary Price Management Mechanisms. Essentially, such measures seek to 
influence the price produced by the EU ETS, and as such move from a pure cap-and-trade 
to a hybrid instrument. A legislative proposal put forward in January 2014 proposed the 
creation of a ‘Market Stability Reserve’ (MSR). The proposal was approved by the European 
Parliament (with some design amendments) in July 2015, and subsequently approved by 
the European Council. If such approval is received, the MSR will therefore become 
operational in 2019. The MSR will function by triggering adjustments to annual auction 
volumes based on clear rules. Where such conditions are met, permits equal to 12% of 
those in circulation may be deduced from auction volumes in any given year, and placed in 
the Reserve. Similarly, 100 million permits will be released (if available) and made available 
for auction above normal volumes when the volume of permit circulation is fewer than 400 
million. Additionally, all ‘backloaded’ allowances will be entered directly into the MSR. 
Permit prices are therefore influenced by proxy, through altering permit supply dynamics. 
- Revision of the annual Linear Reduction Factor (LRF). At present, the total issuance of 
permits (both auctioned and freely allocated) decreased at a rate of 1.74% of the average 
total quantity of permits released annually in 2008-2012. However, in order to achieve the 
required contribution towards the 40% GHG reduction target for 2030 from the EU ETS 
sectors (discussed in Section 2.1.2.1), this value will increase to 2.2% from 2021. 
Broadly, such actions appear to be sensible options in in the short-term to tackle the permit 
oversupply and begin to produce a more substantive, stable and credible carbon price signal. 
Under this ‘incentive-based’ policy pathway, such interventions should aim to achieve a carbon 
price of at least €70 by 203060. However, discussion of whether the specific combination of 
these structural amendments will produce such a price, and thus whether their designs are 
suitable or stringent enough, is beyond the scope of this report. 
Another of the options for structural reforms proposed by European Commission (2012a) was 
sectoral expansion to sectors whose emissions are less strongly influenced by economic cycles. 
Whilst not taken forward as a legislative proposal by the Commission, such an option may be 
highly beneficial under this policy pathway. Discussion surrounding expansion of the EU ETS 
has focussed largely on road transport fuels and heating fuels. Whilst an expansion to the road 
transport sector may be beneficial in the long-term, it is unlikely to be the most appropriate 
option for extending the reach of carbon pricing in the shot-term (discussed below, in Section 
4.2.2). However, expansion to heating fuels – particularly natural gas in the residential sector - 
may be a desirable option in the short-term. The residential sector accounts for around 28% of 
natural gas consumption in the EU (a higher proportion than any other individual sector, 
including power generation at around 19% (excluding CHP)), whilst natural gas accounts for 
around a third of residential energy consumption (the highest proportion of any individual 
                                                     
60 As discussed under Section 3.1.1. However, as many of these models assume perfect markets, or otherwise do 
not characterise well market failures that reduce the effects of a price signal, a higher value may be required in 
practice to achieve the same ends envisaged by the models. However, many of the reform and instrumentation 
options presented for this policy pathway, and in Sections 4.1 and 4.4, may help to reduce or overcome such 
issues. 
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energy carrier) (European Environment Agency, 2015d), with the vast majority used for space 
and water heating. As such, it is an important source of CO2 emissions that remains unpriced, 
and which must be substantially reduced over time61. 
At present, domestic heating fuels may be exempt from taxation under the Energy Taxation 
Directive (except VAT). Whilst only six Member States provide full exemptions to natural gas62, 
only thirteen levy rates that exceed an equivalent of a €10/tCO2 carbon price (excluding VAT). 
Expanding a strengthened EU ETS to natural gas use in the residential sector would then ensure 
a carbon price signal is received, encouraging a shift away from natural gas to higher energy 
efficiency and low-carbon energy in both new and existing buildings, and tackling the potential 
for continued fossil fuel lock-in in the sector. 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the potential effect of an expanded EU ETS on residential natural gas prices 
across the EU, with a €70/tCO2 carbon price in 2030, and €250/tCO2 in 2050. The values for 
basic prices, taxes and levies and VAT are averaged over a seven-year period (2007-2013). 
Projected values for 2030 and 2050 represent total (additional) cost, with the assumption that 
gas prices maintain a constant average, and existing levies (except VAT) are reduced to offset 
the EU ETS price (entirely if possible)63. Under these assumptions, an average price increase of 
13% is projected by 2030 (with significant variation, including no increase in Denmark, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden)64 (Drummond, 2015).  
                                                     
61 Whilst the pricing of CO2 from other heating fuels, such as coal and oil, would also be beneficial from the 
perspective of environmental effectiveness and cost efficiency, their relatively minor (and decreasing) 
contribution to domestic energy demand renders them a lower priority. 
62 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. 
63 Data for Cyprus, Malta and Finland is not available. A CO2 intensity value of 0.051tCO2/GJ for natural gas was 
applied. Data for Band D2 (20GJ to 200GJ) were used. The cost imposed by VAT would also change as a result of 
carbon prices/ (with the equivalent sign), however this change is not calculated.  For Taxes and Levies, only non-
recoverable values are used. 
64 By 2050, an average price increase of 77% is projected, again with significant variations (including no increase 
in Denmark). 
Figure 8 - Residential Natural Gas Carbon Price Projections - 2030 and 2050 (Source: Drummond, 2015) 
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Modelling evidence suggests that such a carbon price could be highly effective in fostering 
energy efficiency retrofits (in particular) and the uptake of renewables in the building stock, 
particularly in owner-occupier dwellings (approximately 70% of households in the EU (Bouyon, 
2015)). However, in the rented sector, only the most inefficient are retrofitted (Nauleau et al, 
2014). As such, to maximise the effectiveness, cost efficiency and feasibility of such a sectoral 
expansion, measures to overcome issues such as the landlord-tenant dilemma (such as 
continued energy efficiency obligations, or increasingly stringent minimum energy 
performance standards), and the use of compensatory mechanisms to counter the (likely 
regressive) increase in energy prices, would likely be required. Additionally, care would have 
to be taken to redefine the EU ETS cap, to maintain confidence in expected future prices. 
For this expansion to be administratively feasible, the point of obligation should be upstream 
(e.g. with the supplier), rather than individual emitters, as is currently the case with existing 
EU ETS sectors. This would also allow for natural gas used for other domestic purposes (e.g. 
cooking), and in other sectors (e.g. commercial and public, or smaller industrial installations 
currently exempt from the EU ETS under de minimis conditions) to be included within the scope 
of the EU ETS. If the point of obligation is shifted yet further upstream (i.e. at point of 
production or import), then the power and industrial sectors may also be included under this 
single administrative approach. 
Whilst the above options strengthen and expand the carbon price produced by the EU ETS, 
various operational features and concessions (discussed in Section 3.1.1) mean that many 
installations in the industrial sector are not fully subject to the existing carbon price. As such, 
steps must be taken as far as possible to address this. 
- Introduce full auctioning to non-EITE sectors by 2030. At present, the proportion of 
permits freely allocated to the non-EITE (manufacturing) sectors is set to decrease to 30% 
by 2020 (from 80% in 2013), based on the ‘benchmarking’ process described in Section 
3.1.1. Under current proposals, this is set to continue to 2030 (although with more frequent 
updating of benchmark values to reflect changing technological capacity and progress) 
(European Commission, 2015f). Under this policy pathway, this could change to a linear 
reduction from 30% in 2020 to zero by 2030. Compensation to electricity-intensive firms 
remains a Member State competence and prerogative, under state aid restrictions. 
- Improve definition and targeting of EITE sectors. At present, sectors accounting for more 
than 97% of industrial EU ETS emissions are considered EITE sectors, and thus at risk of 
carbon leakage and eligible for free permit allocation of 100% of the benchmark value 
(European Commission, 2015g). In order for the increase in auction volumes to be effective 
(as suggested above), this proportion must be reduced. The Commission has proposed 
changes to the rules that determine which sectors are listed as at risk of carbon leakage65, 
                                                     
65 ‘Sectors and sub-sectors where the product exceeds 0.2 from multiplying their intensity of trade with third 
countries, defined as the ratio between the total value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports from 
third countries and the total market size for the European Economic Area (annual turnover plus total imports 
from third countries), by their emission intensity, measured in kgCO2 divided by their gross value added (in €), 
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which will reduce their number from 177 currently to around 50 from 2021. However, given 
the sectors that will remain on the list, the proportion of CO2 emissions receiving free 
allocation remains high. The political feasibility (and desirability) of reducing this list further 
appears limited in the short-term. As such, potential alternatives to 100% free allocation to 
these sectors must be advanced. 
- Alternative options for carbon leakage protection measures. At present, sectors that 
receive 100% free allocation are subject to little incentive to reduce CO2 emissions, aside 
from the opportunity cost of the permits freely received (which with low prices, is not 
significant). Additionally, due to their high trade intensity and level of international 
competition they are subject to, this (opportunity) cost is not passed-through to product 
prices, thus producing no incentive for consumers to seek lower-carbon alternatives 
(Neuhoff et al, 2014a). A commonly proposed option to solve these issues is the use of 
Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs), in which the carbon price is refunded to products 
exported, whilst those imported from regions lacking a (comparable) carbon price are 
subject to an import tariff of equivalent value. Such border levelling would effectively 
prevent carbon leakage and allow cost pass-through. However, compatibility with World 
Trade Organization (WTO rules) is unclear, and political feasibility is questionable (Antimiani 
et al, 2015). Whilst a BCA approach may be an appropriate solution in the long-term, for 
the short-term an alternative is required. 
A combination of output-based allocation (OBA) with domestic indirect ‘consumption 
charges’ may be one such alternative. Under OBA, free allocation would remain, but be 
distributed to sectors at risk of carbon leakage on the basis of units of (recent) production 
and a ‘best available technology’ benchmark, rather than historic emissions of individual 
installations (as proposed by the Commission, discussed above). This would be coupled 
with an indirect consumption-based charge, based on the CO2 intensity of the consumed 
product and linked to the EU ETS price. Such a charge would not be applicable to products 
sold to non-EU consumers, and would apply to products imported from non-EU producers 
(with the liability created at the point of production or import, but only due when released 
for consumption). 
As such, this combination has the potential to prevent carbon leverage whilst providing an 
incentive for reduced CO2 (and energy) intensity by producers, and by establishing a price 
signal for (domestic) consumers, an incentive for efficiency and product substitution 
downstream (within the EU). The use of an indirect consumption charge has various 
benefits over the use of a direct production, consumption or import tax. Following the 
principle of destination, and being internationally neutral, non-discriminatory and in line 
with ‘national treatment’ requirements, WTO compatibility is likely. From an EU 
                                                     
shall be deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage; or where the product from multiplying their intensity of trade 
with third countries by their emission intensity is above 0.18 on the basis of a qualitative assessment using the 
following criteria: a) the extent to which it is possible for individual installations in the sector or sub-sectors 
concerned to reduce emission levels or electricity consumption; (b) current and projected market characteristics; 
(c) profit margins as a potential indicator of long-run investment or relocation decisions’ (European Commission, 
2015g). 
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perspective, as a ‘parafiscal’ charge, this instrument is not considered ‘primarily of a fiscal 
nature’, that would require unanimous support by the European Council. Instead, a 
qualified majority vote would suffice66. Consumption charges are long established and 
widely implemented on various products (including alcohol, tobacco and fuel), and thus are 
considered to be highly administratively feasible (Neuhoff et al, 2014a; Neuhoff et al, 
2014b).  
Use of Auction Revenues 
At present, 90% of ETS revenues go directly to Member States, at least 50% of which (or 
equivalent financial value) ‘should’ be used for climate and energy related purposes (Member 
States are currently well in excess of this (non-binding) target). The remaining 10% of auction 
revenues are distributed as additional funds to ‘less wealthy’67 Member States (via additional 
EUA allocation). Under existing proposals for 2021 onwards, this additional 10% is set to 
continue. 
The existing proposals for EU ETS reform however include additional mechanisms that earmark 
additional revenues at the EU level for specific purposes (thus reducing the proportion of 
revenues allocated to Member States and used at their discretion). The first is a ‘Modernisation 
Fund’, in which an additional 2% of revenues are to be distributed to ten ‘low-income’ Member 
States68, to ‘improve energy efficiency and to modernise the energy systems of [these] 
Member States’ (European Commission, 2015f). The second is an ‘Innovation Fund’. The 
Innovation Fund, intended to begin in 2021, is an extension of the current NER300 facility69, 
with a proposed initial endowment of 400 million allowances. The scope of funding will be 
extended from the power sector to also include industrial sector innovation. Such a mechanism 
is likely to be beneficial in the long term, as evidence suggests the uses of direct financial 
support in this manner would help prevent ‘innovation investment’ leakage (Antimiani et al, 
2015). 
However, additional revenues reduced from those currently distributed to Member States and 
earmarked centrally for a focussed purpose could produce additional benefit in the short- to 
long-term. For example, additional revenues could be earmarked at the EU level to directly 
support renewable energy and energy efficiency deployment across Member States. Such 
funds could be distributed proportionally to Member States (or regions) that commit to 
meeting or exceeding their benchmark target values for renewables and efficiency (as 
discussed under Section 4.1.1.1, above), and provide an incentive in the absence of binding 
                                                     
66 In contrast to a tax (falling under TFEU 192 para 2), which is easily adjustable by government and usable for 
general government expenditures, a levy is classified as a ‘parafiscal charge’ (falling under TFEU 192 para 1) when 
revenues are earmarked, assigned to a body governed by public law, and does not contribute to the national 
budget. As such, revenues from this charge should be collated in a Member State-level public ‘trust fund’, with 
revenues earmarked for climate purposes.  
67 GDP per capita that does not exceed 90% of the EU average (in 2013). 
68 GDP per capita that does not exceed 60% of the EU average. 
69 ‘NER300’, funded from the sale of 300 million permits from the New Entrants Reserve, was set up in Phase 3 to 
provide funding for demonstration projects in the power sector (specifically CCS and renewable technologies). 
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targets. For funds used specifically for renewable electricity, this would contribute to the 
reducing wholesale electricity prices via the merit-order effect (under the current market 
design), whilst also reducing support mechanism costs, and thus the cost of compensatory 
measures to all sectors. Other instruments, such as support mechanisms for renewable heating 
and cooling and energy efficiency measures in the residential sector, may also be funded from 
this additional revenue stream (and allow for compensation to some degree from the inclusion 
of natural gas in the residential sector in the EU ETS). 
The level to which this would reduce the total proportion of auction revenues distributed to 
Member States would depend on the specific design of each of these options. However, due 
to the structural reforms producing higher prices, sectoral expansion and the inclusion of 
consumption charges for sectors at risk of carbon leakage, the total value of revenues received 
are likely to be significantly more substantial than currently experienced. 
4.2.2 Introduce and Harmonise Carbon Price Signal in the Road 
Transport Sector 
Although not proposed for inclusion under the EU ETS in the short-term, under this policy 
pathway the introduction (or strengthening) of a carbon price must be considered in other key 
sectors; particularly road transport (currently accounting for nearly a quarter of CO2 emissions 
in the EU). 
Implementing a carbon price on the source of the externality, the fossil fuel combusted to 
propel vehicles, would seem the logical choice to achieve this. As discussed in Section 0, whilst 
the ETD places minimum taxation values on transport fuel, the values are not intended to 
internalise CO2 emissions (and as such are not tied to carbon content), and the actual values 
levied by Member States are highly varied (see Figure 5). This produces different price signals, 
and encourages fuel tourism. However, it must be noted that many Member States that set 
values above the minima do so at least in part to internalise CO2 emissions, although very few 
publically state the proportion of the levy applicable to CO2 emissions or to other transport-
related externalities (e.g. local air pollutants). 
There are two clear options to introduce a carbon price on transport fuels. The first is via 
inclusion in a strengthened EU ETS (applied upstream at suppliers, producers or importers), 
and the second is via a revision of the ETD, as proposed by the Commission in 2011. The 
proposal (COM(2011) 169/3) suggests a revised minima for all fuels, set as the sum of an 
‘energy’ component, which would set a minimum value based on energy content (€9.6/GJ for 
transport fuels), and a ‘carbon’ component, applicable across all energy products (except 
electricity), which would be revised on a regular basis to follow the evolution of the carbon 
price generated by the EU ETS (Drummond, 2013a). 
However, neither of these options are necessarily desirable in the short-term. Regardless of 
which mechanism is used to internalise a carbon price to transport fuels, even if the existing 
ETD minima remains the same with the carbon price fully additional, existing tax rates in 
addition to the minima in many Member States are already higher than the additional cost a 
€70/tCO2 carbon price would impose. This is particularly the case for petrol, for which 13 
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Member States levy rates higher than an equivalent €70/tCO2 carbon price, in addition to the 
minima (although for diesel, only two Member States levy such rates). As such, if a revised ETD 
imposed such a carbon price, many Member States would already be in compliance (although 
administrative changes may be required), and if imposed by the EU ETS, national levies may be 
reduced to compensate. 
Two further issues remain. The first is of political feasibility; for example, the proposed revision 
of the ETD has not yet progressed, and would require unanimity to introduce. The second is 
that of basic fuel price volatility. Figure 9 illustrates the range of weighted average petrol and 
diesel prices in the EU between 2005 and 2015. It is clear there has been significant volatility 
in weighted average prices over the last decade, largely driven by trends in oil prices (with 
duties and taxes remaining largely static), with the differential between peak and trough prices 
at €0.62/l for diesel, and €0.72/l for petrol (Drummond, 2015). These values are approximately 
the same magnitude of additional cost that would result from a €250/tCO2 carbon price. 
As such, underlying fuel price fluctuations and relatively high levies rates already exhibited by 
many Member States mean that in the short-term, introducing a carbon price on transport fuel 
is unlikely to produce a price signal to encourage an increase in the rate of shift towards low-
carbon transport (even if politically feasible). This is particularly the case given evidence that 
in the short-term, for passenger cars, fuel prices are effective at reducing demand for transport 
(i.e. distance driven), but have little influence on initial vehicle purchase decisions (Nijland et 
al, 2012). Nevertheless, such efforts to introduce an equalised carbon price for transport fuels 
would be of value, as the importance of these factors in the short-term reduces as carbon 
prices rise in the longer-term. This would also have the effect of reducing fuel price 
differentials, reducing the incidence of fuel tourism. 
Figure 9 - Weight Average EU Petrol and Diesel Prices for the EU28 - 2005-2015 (Source: Drummond, 2015) 
  Short-Term Development Options for the EU Climate Policy Mix  PART 2 | Page 68 
However, in order to encourage short-term action as a basis for securing a long-term transition, 
alternative action must be taken to send the appropriate carbon price signal, particularly to 
influence vehicle purchase decisions and reduce fuel tourism. Two options may be available to 
achieve this. The first is the reform of vehicle registration and circulation taxes to consider 
CO2 intensity as a primary factor, and extend to all road vehicles across all Member States. 
As discussed in Section 0, a high proportion of Member States already levy registration taxes 
on passenger cars (with very highly varied values), with CO2 intensity considered as a 
parameter in around two-thirds of these. Few Member States levy registration taxes on other 
road vehicles. By reforming existing rates by using CO2 as a primary factor, and extending to all 
road vehicle types, a strong carbon price signal is sent to actors purchasing new vehicles. A 
promising design could be the emulation of the French ‘bonus-malus’ system; a ‘feebate’ 
instrument in which a ‘rebate’ is offered to purchasers of low-emission vehicles, whilst ‘fee’ is 
levied on the purchase of high-emission vehicles (Adamou et al, 2014). The evidence suggests 
such an approach has been effective in reducing the CO2 intensity of passenger cars sold 
(D’Haultfoeuille et al, 2013). Figure 10 and Figure 11 illustrate the potential effect on the total 
cost of ownership (TCO) for passenger cars from the use of a Bonus-Malus approach. 
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Figure 10 - Total Cost of Ownership - Conventional and Alternative-Fuelled Vehicles (Source: Maca et al, 2013) 
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Figure 10 illustrates the TCO of conventional and alternatively fuelled passenger cars, under a 
given set of assumptions reflecting current price relations and technologies, and no dedicated 
support schemes.70 Under these assumptions, low-carbon cars are significantly more 
expensive than conventional ones. Figure 11 illustrates the change in TCO resulting from the 
use of a bonus-malus scheme, with the same design as the French instrument71. It is 
immediately clear that low-carbon cars become highly competitive with conventional options 
on a TCO basis. Such a result may be broadly expected for LGVS and HGVs, depending on the 
specific design of the instrument (although for HGVs in particular, fuel prices are likely to 
account for a much higher proportion of TCO than for passenger cars). A feebate instrument 
may contribute to tackling issues of high capital cost for alternatively fuelled vehicles, in turn 
reducing the issue of access to and cost of finance, and of private discounting that often acts 
to hamper the ability of fuel prices to influence vehicle purchase choice (particularly for private 
passenger cars). Additionally, Member States may design the feebate to be revenue neutral, 
either entirely (such as in Member States that currently levy no registration tax), or compared 
to non-zero rates (in Member States that rely on the income generated from existing 
registration levies) (Drummond, 2015). As such, public acceptability and political feasibility may 
be considered relatively high for this approach.  
As discussed in Section 0, Circulation taxes apply to passenger cars in 24 Member States, and 
to HGVs in all Member States (although again, with significantly different values). CO2 is 
considered a parameter for passenger cars in 18 Member States (and the sole parameter in 6), 
but not at all in setting rates for HGVs. By setting CO2 as a primary parameter for circulation 
taxes for all vehicle types across all Member States, TCO values for new low-carbon vehicles 
                                                     
70 Key assumptions include: 14 year vehicle lifespan, no residual value, a 3% discount rate, mileage assumptions 
of 8,000km/year (urban), 15,000km/year (suburban) and 15,000km/year (rural), and fuel consumption of 
96l/1000km for petrol, and 67l/1000km for diesel. See Maca et al (2013) for more information. 
71 Pre-2014 values, which range from a €7,000 rebate to a €6,000 fee. Assumptions detailed in Footnote 70 remain 
the same. 
Figure 11 - Total Cost of Ownership - Conventional and Alternative-Fuelled Passenger Vehicles – Bonus-Malus (Source: Maca 
et al, 2013) 
50	
60	
70	
80	
90	
100	
110	
Urban	 Suburban	 Rural	
€
0
0
0
/v
e
h
ic
le
	
TCO	-	Conven onal	and	Alterna ve-Fuelled	Passenger	Cars	-	
Bonus-Malus	
Petrol	 Diesel	 PHEV	(Petrol)	 PHEV	(Diesel)	 EV	
  Short-Term Development Options for the EU Climate Policy Mix  PART 2 | Page 70 
are positively affected, whilst incentives to purchase more efficient second-hand vehicles are 
also increased. This is particularly important in Member States where the second-hand 
passenger car market is particularly prominent. However, overall, the influence of a CO2 graded 
circulation tax is likely to be relatively minor compared to a feebate instrument. Nevertheless, 
it would likely prove a useful complementary mechanism for including CO2 intensity in 
decision-making (Drummond, 2015). 
In 2005, the Commission released a legislative proposal that would require Member States to, 
inter alia, restructure both existing registration and circulation taxes for passenger cars (only) 
to consider CO2 intensity in their calculation, with the long-term objective of abolishing such 
taxes. As this proposal was not adopted, it is likely a mandatory approach to achieving the 
more stringent approach proposed in this policy pathway would be politically infeasible in the 
short-term. As such, the use of instruments such as the European Semester and other 
information sharing platforms to encourage this approach may be the most appropriate option 
immediately available. In the long-term, as road transport becomes increasingly low-carbon 
and a carbon price on fossil fuels increases, registration and circulation taxes may be abolished 
from a climate policy perspective. 
The second option to transmit an appropriate carbon price signal to the road transport sector 
is the introduction of CO2-based road pricing in cities, and EU-wide road pricing for HGVs. 
Various city-level road pricing instruments exist around the EU, although the externality (or 
externalities) targeted varies (e.g. congestion, local air pollutants, CO2 emissions – or a 
combination) (Drummond, 2015). The evidence suggest that the most significant impact of 
these instruments is most often a reduction in the number of passenger vehicles entering the 
affected zone coupled with a broad modal shift to public transport, rather than a broad shift 
in average emission intensities (in systems that differentiate by pollutant intensity)72  (Li and 
Hensher, 2012). However, Borjesson (2012) found that the exemption experienced by 
alternative-fuelled vehicles from the Stockholm congestion charge led to a substantial increase 
in the sales of AFVs (Drummond, 2015). As such, the potential for such instruments to 
encourage a passenger modal shift for local transport and the purchase of low-carbon vehicles, 
if applied in cities across the EU, may be substantial. Such instruments may be encouraged 
though local governance initiatives, such as the CoM (see Section 4.1.1.4), with the revenues 
raised potentially used to provide and improve infrastructure and stock for low-carbon public 
and active transport (and/or electric vehicle charging and parking spaces, for example), further 
facilitating a transition to low-carbon options. ‘Efficient’ pricing of transport infrastructure is a 
component of KAP 11 of the Energy Union. 
Directive 1999/62/EC73 sets various framework conditions for the use of distance-related tolls 
and time-based user charges (vignettes) for the use of certain infrastructure. Where they are 
implemented, such instruments must, inter alia, be levied according to the distance travelled 
and the type of vehicle (tolls), be levied according to the duration made use of the 
                                                     
72 The evidence is mixed on whether traffic is to some extent displaced to outside of the affected zone. 
73 Modified by Directives 2006/38/EC and 2011/76/EU 
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infrastructure and the vehicle’s emission class (vignettes), and include an ‘external cost charge’ 
to reflect the cost of noise and air pollution (respecting maximum values given by the Directive 
(European Commission, 2015h). Figure 12 illustrates the Member States that currently employ 
such instruments. 
 
By making road pricing for HGVs mandatory across all Member States, along with the use of 
electronic, distance-based levies only for the full network (as already in place in 7 Member 
States illustrated in Figure 12), and with ‘external cost charges’ expanded to cover CO2 
emissions, a carbon price signal may be successfully sent to HGV operators. If designed 
correctly, it could reduce the effects of fuel price differentials between Member States that 
leads to fuel tourism by this class of road user (however, fuel price differentials may still 
remain, meaning the issue would not be entirely removed). Such an approach would likely be 
feasible from both an administrative perspective, as existing physical (and payment) 
infrastructure may be used, and from a legal perspective, as such charges would be parafiscal 
in nature (see Footnote 66). Whilst this would thus not require full consensus to implement, it 
Figure 12 - Charging of Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) in the EU (Source: European Commission, 2015h) 
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may remain difficult to achieve broad support, given the additional direct cost such an 
instrument would impose. However, earmarked revenue may be used to provide 
compensation (at least in the short-term), such as for reduced business levies, additional 
subsidy or increased rebate for the purchase of low-emission vehicles, or for basic research 
into further development of such technologies and drivetrains. The use of such an instrument 
must be well co-ordinated with those above. For example, circulation taxes may be reduced or 
even removed for HGVs if such road pricing approach is introduced at the appropriate level to 
influence decision-making and stimulate innovation and/or modal shift. 
Each of the elements above seek to send the appropriate price signals to encourage 
decarbonisation in the road transport sector, and all serve similar but slightly different 
purposes (e.g. purchase decisions and usage patterns). As such, they may be effectively 
introduced in parallel in the short-term. 
4.3 Policy Pathway Two – ‘Technology-Specific’ 
This policy pathway focuses on regulatory targets and limits, and instruments that encourage 
particular technologies. Market-based instruments remain a strong feature, and may often be 
used to accelerate the development or increase the deployment of particular technologies. 
The role of pricing instruments is secondary in this pathway, and many specific instruments 
may be removed over time from a climate policy perspective (e.g. vehicle registration and 
circulation taxes, electric vehicle subsidies, etc.). 
4.3.1 Structural Reform of the EU ETS 
Despite the focus of this policy pathway the EU ETS remains a key component, although in 
contrast to the ‘incentive-based’ pathway its holds a supporting role to other instruments that 
more actively seek to drive decarbonisation. Structural reform actions described under Section 
4.2.1 for the ‘incentive-based’ pathway would still prove beneficial, however stringency and 
extent of such reforms may be reduced such that a lower price is targeted. A similar use of 
(albeit reduced) auction revenues may also be proposed.  
4.3.2 Introduce Power Sector CO2 Intensity Limit 
Under this policy pathway, a principal driver of decarbonisation in the power sector may be 
the use of a CO2 intensity limit for new installations, known as an Emission Performance 
Standard (EPS) (although such an instrument may have various labels). A reformed EU ETS, as 
described above, whilst becoming increasingly redundant in its function for driving 
decarbonisation, may then act as a ‘backstop’ to EPS. As described under Section 3.2.1, at a 
minimum the construction of new unabated coal-fired power stations must be incentivised 
against or otherwise prevented, to avoid the creation of stranded assets. Figure 13 illustrates 
the minimum and maximum specific CO2 emissions for different fossil-generating plants in the 
EU found in the literature. 
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According to the values presented in Figure 13, an EPS value of around 600gCO2/KWh (as an 
upper value) would be suitable in order to prevent the construction of new unabated coal-fired 
installations. Both open cycle gas turbines (OCGT) and closed cycle gas turbines (CCGT), along 
with high efficiency oil installations, would be permitted. However, in practice, only CCGT gas-
fired installations are likely to remain a viable option for new non-coal fossil fuel construction, 
as the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) for OCGT and (particularly) oil-fired plants are 
significantly higher than CCGT installations (DECC, 2013), whilst the latter also experiences 
other restrictions, such as air quality regulation. The EPS value may reduce over time, for 
example to a maximum of around 350gCO2/KWh by 2030, to prevent the construction of all 
but the most efficient CCGT installations (which are likely to maintain a small, but important 
share of the electricity mix in 2050) (Drummond, 2015), and coal-fired installations equipped 
with CCS. However, the specific levels required should be subject to further assessment, and 
are outside the scope of this report. 
The introduction and operation of an EPS would be administratively and legally 
straightforward; similar and more complex regulations already exist for the power sector (e.g. 
LCPD). The political acceptability of such an instrument is less clear. The European Parliament 
had sought to amend the proposed text for what became the CCS Directive by replacing the 
‘capture readiness’ requirement (Articles 32 and 33) with an EPS set at 500gCO2/kWh 
applicable from January 2015. The Commission and Council rejected this amendment, however 
Article 38 requires the Commission to examine the necessity of an EPS when reviewing the CCS 
Directive in 2015, although under the condition that CCS is proven safe and economically 
feasible (Woerdman et al, 2015). Whilst this criterion has not been met, the review 
recommends that the use of an EPS for implementation towards 2030 should be investigated 
(Triple E et al, 2015). The introduction of an EPS must be co-ordinated with the structural 
reform of the EU ETS, to ensure issues previously experienced (e.g. permit oversupply) are not 
again induced. 
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Figure 13 - Specific CO2 Emissions of Power Generation Technologies (Source: Steen, 2001) 
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4.3.3 Reform and Extend Minimum Performance Standards and 
Energy Efficiency Requirements for Buildings 
Minimum Standards for New Buildings 
As discussed under Section 3.2.3, whilst new residential buildings must be ‘nearly zero-energy 
buildings’ by 2020, in practice, energy intensity requirements in most Member States are to be 
set at 45-50kWh/m2, with the requirement for the remaining energy consumption to be 
satisfied ‘very significantly’ by renewables largely disregarded.  
As such, under this policy pathway, the ‘near zero-energy’ requirement may be reformed to 
become a ‘net zero-energy’ requirement by 2030. This means that all new residential 
properties must be a net-zero consumer of energy produced outside the system boundary74 
(based on delivered rather than primary energy) meaning that each building must be able to 
generate and export as much energy as it consumes from delivered sources, annually 
(producing zero direct CO2 emissions). This incentivises building developers to deploy the most 
cost-effective combination of efficiency measures and renewables, according to local 
conditions. For example, building developers in southern Member States may deploy solar PV 
to a higher degree than northern Member States, which may see high levels of energy 
efficiency as the priority (Drummond, 2015). Whilst such a reform would likely produce little 
additional administrative burden against existing requirements (except additional monitoring 
and enforcement efforts, largely required regardless), political acceptability may be difficult to 
obtain in many Member States. For example the UK recently reduces its ambition for new 
buildings by removing its Zero Carbon Homes policy (HM Treasury, 2015). The use of best-
practice sharing, along with sub-national governance initiatives (e.g. CoM) for those cities or 
other jurisdictions that have the required regulatory competence, may help to overcome this. 
Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes 
Member States are currently obliged to ensure that energy suppliers achieve the equivalent of 
average annual cumulative savings of 1.5% of total sales, by volume, based on average total 
sales of the industry across the three-year period leading up to the 1st January 2013. Under 
this policy pathway, EEOS could become fully mandatory across Member States, and 
extended to at least 2030. As discussed under Section 3.2.3, the majority of energy savings 
delivered by the existing requirement is likely to be delivered in the buildings (and particularly 
residential) sector. However, post-2020 the energy saving target may be set exclusively on the 
residential (or wider buildings sector), to ensure such focus is maintained. The ability to use 
other forms of compliance, such as payment into a Energy Efficiency National Fund, could also 
be limited. Further analysis would be required to determine an appropriate annual savings rate 
to set post-2020. 
At present, energy suppliers have flexibility regarding when they introduce measures to 
achieve compliance with their cumulative obligations between 2014 and 2020 (Drummond, 
                                                     
74 The site of the individual building or collection of new buildings. This allows for the development of community-
level renewable energy installations, including the use of district heating. 
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2015). Such flexibility, in a restricted form, would remain beneficial with an extended 
obligation. For example energy suppliers may be able to ‘bank’ annual overachievement for 
future compliance, but not ‘borrow’ from future years for earlier compliance. White certificate 
systems may also be employed, to encourage cost-efficiency. This, along with imposition of a 
clear, long-term requirement, may encourage ‘deep’ retrofits to a greater extent than short-
term instruments where overachievement is not incentivised. Additionally, if the energy 
reduction target post-2020 based on delivered energy rather than simply final energy 
consumption, it may also encourage the installation of renewable technologies (which the 
existing formulation does not incentivise) (Drummond, 2015). 
For the post-2020 period, it may be of benefit to set sub-targets for achievement. For example, 
a certain proportion of energy savings must be achieved in low-income households. This may 
increase the acceptability of this instrument by tackling issues such as fuel poverty (but possibly 
at the expense of administrative complexity). Existing instruments, such as with the UK’s 
Energy Company Obligation, already take such an approach75. 
4.3.4 Extend Ambition of the Ecodesign Directive 
At present, the MEPS introduced by the Ecodesign Directive seek to eliminate the 
worst’performers from the market (usually in terms of energy consumption). Under this policy 
pathway, the Ecodesign Directive may be strengthened to operate in line with the Japanese 
‘Top Runner’ approach, which seeks to ‘aim for the best’ environmental performance 
(Siderius and Nakagami, 2007). In Top Runner, the highest energy efficiency currently available 
on the market is set as the minimum standard all manufacturers must meet for the weighted 
average of all their products available on the market by a certain target year (Siderius and 
Nakagami, 2007). In some cases, the standards are set above the most efficient products on 
the market to take into account the potential for energy efficiency improvement in the future 
(Kimura, 2010). Between 1998-2009, 21 technology groups were included across building-
related technologies (and transport), with required average energy efficiency improvement 
rates ranging from 16% to 80%. Each of these targets has been achieved, often relatively easily 
and with significant overachievement (Kimura, 2010; Siderius and Nakagami, 2007).  
By focussing requirements on disseminating the most efficient products rather than on 
removing the least efficient products, it is likely that a Top Runner approach would be more 
effective in shifting the market for regulated products to higher average energy efficiency level. 
A shift to an ‘average’ approach may also encourage continuous innovation, which is not 
necessarily induced by the current minimum standards (Drummond, 2013a). The rate at which 
more efficient products are likely to enter use (and thus generate any savings against the 
                                                     
75 The Energy Company Obligation 1 (ECO), which runs from 2013-2015, includes three sub-targets. These are a 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Obligation, focussing on domestic solid wall insulation and hard-to-treat cavity wall 
insulation, a Carbon Saving Community Obligation, focussing on providing insulation measures and connections 
to domestic district heating systems supplying low-income households (15% must be achieved in vulnerable 
households in rural areas), and a Home Heating Cost Reduction Obligation, focussing on low-income and 
vulnerable households. 
  Short-Term Development Options for the EU Climate Policy Mix  PART 2 | Page 76 
counterfactual) is likely to depend on the product in question. For example, building heating 
systems have a significantly longer average lifetime than a television. As a result, a ‘top runner’ 
approach should first focus on long-lived products to reduce the risk of high-energy lock-in. 
Additionally, a review of the existing product testing methodology, along with proposals for a 
revised approach may be a appropriate, given the observed differences in efficiency levels 
between laboratory conditions and real world operation (discussed in Section 3.2.3).  
4.3.5 Reform and Extend CO2 Intensity Regulations for Road Transport 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, fleet-average CO2 intensity regulations have been a key driver 
for reducing the CO2 intensity of passenger cars in recent years. As discussed in Section 0, such 
regulations currently apply to passenger cars and LGVs to 2021 and 2020, respectively. Under 
this policy pathway, such regulations could remain the principal instrument for reducing the 
CO2 intensity of the passenger car and LGV fleet with requirements continuing to tighten, and 
be extended to the HGV fleet. The EU’s HGV Strategy adopted in May 2014 envisages 
legislation to be proposed in 2015 that would require CO2 emissions from new HGVs to be 
certified, reported and monitored. Indeed, this is seen as a ‘stepping stone’ to further 
measures in the medium-term, of which the most apparent option is such fleet-average 
regulations (European Commission, 2015i). 
For each of these three key transport modes, fleet-average values could be set for 2025 and 
2030 in line with long-term decarbonisation requirements, to provide clear incentives for 
investments in innovation to be made in suitable time for resulting developments to reach 
commercial availability. However, to be truly effective, two further adjustments should be 
delivered. The first is to halt the issuance and use of ‘super credits’ for ULEVs. With 
increasingly stringent fleet-average targets, the value this mechanism has reduced, whilst its 
potential to skew the ‘actual’ fleet average CO2 intensity of new vehicles sold increases. The 
second adjustment is the adoption and enforcement, as soon as possible, of a new vehicle 
test procedure to reduce the difference between laboratory and real world conditions. The 
new Worldwide harmonised Light vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP) is intended to achieve this 
when introduced in 2017, however analysis suggests that the differential between laboratory 
and real world conditions may decrease from around 35% to just 23% under this new regime. 
As such, options for other approaches should be investigated (such as a comprehensive in-use 
conformity testing scheme, supplemented by on-road vehicle testing, which evidence suggests 
may reduce the gap to just 5%) (Stewart et al, 2015).  
4.4 Cross-cutting Policy Instrumentation Options 
Each of the options presented in this section would likely prove beneficial in the short-term 
(and potentially long-term), regardless of which of the policy pathways presented above is 
taken. However, it is likely that some options presented may prove more effective or desirable 
in one pathway or the other. This is highlighted where relevant.  
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4.4.1 Ensure Renewable Electricity Support and Capacity Mechanisms 
are ‘Sustainable’ 
Renewable Electricity Support Mechanisms 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, all but one Member State provide financial support for the 
deployment of renewable electricity. It is likely that such support mechanisms will be required 
for some time to come, at least until the existing electricity market is restructured to directly 
incentivise and cater for renewable generation (Held et al, 2015). As such, these mechanisms 
must be cost-effective (particularly to engender public and political acceptability), whilst 
maintaining investor confidence. A new Renewable Energy Package is expected in 2016-2017 
(as part of the Energy Union KAP 13), which must contain provisions to ensure such objectives 
are achieved. 
Guidelines for State Aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 (European 
Commission, 2014b) require that support for at least 5% of planned new capacity from 
renewable sources should be granted by a competitive bidding process in 2015-2016, and for 
all ‘large’ installations (with an installed capacity of 1MW and over, or 6MW for wind) from 
January 2017. Such competitive bidding is intended to ensure that support is cost-effective. 
Support for smaller installations, or for demonstration projects, are exempt from this 
requirement76. The Commission could regularly assess and disseminate examples of best 
practice support mechanisms, for both competitive and non-competitive mechanisms, for as 
long as such guidance may prove useful. The Commission first produced such guidance in 
201377. Based on this guidance, and regular assessments of mechanisms in practice, the 
Commission may also propose options for improvement of individual mechanisms. This could 
be delivered via, for example, the European Semester process, or a separate mechanism under 
the Energy Union (discussed under Section 4.1.2.2). This may include encouragement for the 
introduction of cross-border or aligned support mechanisms, and the increased use of 
statistical transfers. The introduction of regional targets for RES-E deployment under the 
Energy Union, discussed under Section 4.1.1.1, may lay the foundations and provide incentives 
for such action (Held et al, 2015). 
Although an increase in the use of (potentially cross-border) competitive bidding processes 
coupled with continued cost reductions in renewable electricity technologies would reduce the 
cost of delivering RES-E technologies over time (along with reducing average wholesale 
electricity prices under the current market design), the cumulative investment required will 
likely mean total costs will continue to increase into the foreseeable future. At present, the 
                                                     
76 Unless Member States can prove that either (a) only one or a very limited number of projects or sites could be 
eligible, or (b), a competitive bidding process would lead to higher support levels or low project realisation rates. 
Additionally, the process may be limited to specific technologies when an open process would lead to a 
suboptimal result which cannot be addressed in process design in view of the longer-term potential for a given 
new and innovative technology, the need for diversification, network constraints and grid stability, system 
(integration) costs, or the need to avoid distortions on the raw material markets from biomass support. 
77 European Commission (2013) European Commission Guidance for the Design of Renewables Support Schemes, 
SWD (2013) 439 final. 
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many support mechanisms recover their costs through levies on energy bills (Agnolucci and 
Drummond, 2014). Cost recovery could continue via levies on energy bills, meaning that 
instability and vulnerability inherent in the use of general government budgets may be 
avoided (de Rio et al, 2015), providing increased confidence for investors in terms of the 
support available. However, at present, such mechanisms are regressive with the domestic 
sector bearing much of the burden (with industrial and commercial consumers commonly 
receiving discounts or exemptions) (Agnolucci and Drummond, 2014). As cumulative costs 
increase, this issue is likely to become exacerbated. As such, action could be taken to reduce 
such regressive effects and maintain public and political support for the deployment of RES-E 
technologies (from a cost perspective). 
Three options may be available. The first is the use of additional revenues from the EU ETS 
(higher than current revenues in both scenarios in the short-term, but significantly so under 
the ‘incentive-based’ pathway), earmarked at the EU level for the deployment of renewables 
and energy efficiency measures, as discussed under Section 4.2.1. This has the benefit both of 
directly absorbing some of the cost of RES-E deployment and thus avoiding the need to recover 
it on-bill, and by encouraging energy efficiency exposure to such costs is reduced (particularly 
under the ‘incentive-based’ policy pathway, in which an increasing carbon price is levied on 
residential natural gas). The second option is the use of (increased) EU ETS revenues received 
by Member States to achieve the same ends, although as these revenues form part of 
government budgets, they once again become uncertain in the medium-term. The third option 
is to reduce or remove discounts and exemptions for other sectors, and compensate such 
interests where required through other means, such as support for efficiency measures, or 
through Environmental Tax Reform principles (e.g. a reduction in labour or other corporate 
taxation). The extent to which costs may increase and compensation is required depends 
significantly on the design of the reformed electricity market, and when it is introduced.  
Capacity Mechanisms 
Although the Commission states that ‘capacity mechanisms should only be developed to 
address security of supply if a regional system adequacy assessment points to such a need’ 
(European Commission, 2015b), as discussed in Section 3.1.2, around half of EU Member States 
have introduced, or proposed the introduction of, capacity mechanisms to ensure the presence 
of and investment in adequate capacity to meet future demand. It is likely that capacity 
mechanisms will indeed be required in the short-term to provide adequate capacity and 
encourage investment, particularly prior to the introduction of a new electricity market design, 
and perhaps afterwards. 
Capacity mechanisms may be of various designs, but all provide payments to generators in 
return for bringing a certain level of capacity online when required. However, as with RES-E 
support mechanisms, misalignment of capacity mechanisms between Member States may 
cause substantial distortions in an increasingly integrated single electricity market.  A single 
design is unlikely to be appropriate across all Member States (particularly in the short-term), 
however cross-border co-ordination for capacity mechanisms is likely to be required. This 
might include co-ordinated approaches to the allocation of remuneration of such capacity, and 
     
Page 79  | Short-Term Development Options for the EU Climate Policy Mix   PART 2 
the rights to consume the electricity generated when required (with respect to solidarity 
principles enshrined in the TFEU) (Henriot et al, 2015)78. Additionally, the requirement for such 
mechanisms to consider the inclusion of demand-side measures may be highly beneficial79. 
Indeed, the Commission has stated that it will ensure that energy efficiency and demand side 
response will be able to compete on equal terms with generation capacity in any new 
electricity market design (European Commission, 2015b). 
4.4.2 Reduction and Removal of Market Distortions 
Regardless of the policy pathway taken, the reduction and removal of market distortions would 
be highly beneficial. Under the ‘incentive-based’ policy pathway, effectiveness of the 
instrument mix may be greatly increased, as such distortions directly undermine the function 
of pricing and other market-based instruments. Under the ‘technology-specific’ pathway, by 
reducing the relative attractiveness of high-carbon options encouraged by such market 
distortions, the political and public acceptability of increasingly stringent regulations may be 
improved. 
As discussed in Section 0, rules surrounding company car taxation provide a particularly clear 
example of such a market distortion (although various other important examples exist). In most 
Member States, such rules constitute a significant market distortion that substantially dulls the 
effects of market-based instruments for encouraging CO2 reduction from the passenger car 
fleet. In all Member States, a company car is bought by the employer for use by the employee, 
who declares the vehicle as an in-kind benefit as part of taxable income. How the value of this 
in-kind benefit value differs (e.g. a proportion of catalogue price, assumed split between 
business and personal use, or another standard rate). Costs related to insurance, maintenance, 
repair and other taxes are covered by the employer, but typically not factored in to the 
calculation of the taxable in-kind benefit. Fuel costs are also commonly covered by the 
employer, which is often, alongside the costs of maintenance, insurance and other taxes, plus 
the purchase price of the vehicle itself, VAT deductible. Additionally, as the employee receives 
the vehicle as an in-kind benefit substituting for a proportion of forgone salary, social security 
and other related taxes levied on income, which are paid by both the employer and employee, 
are not due (Maca et al, 2013). 
As such, the purchase of a company car is financially beneficial to both the employer and 
employee; with the incentives each is faced with distorted. For example, the employee has no 
need to consider the fuel efficiency of the vehicle they are receiving, as they are not bearing 
the cost of the fuel (which also reduces incentives to reduce vehicle use). Whilst the employer 
has an incentive to reduce fuel costs (via a more efficient vehicle), it is also incentivised to 
                                                     
78 Within the confines of State Aid guidelines. In April 2015, a sector inquiry was launched to examine in particular 
whether capacity mechanisms ensure sufficient electricity supply without distorting competition or trade in the 
EU's Single Market.  
79 For example, in a mechanism that secures capacity via auction, large industrial consumers may bid to reduce 
their demand by a level equivalent to the additional capacity level required at the time requested, thereby 
offsetting the need for additional capacity and generation in the first place. 
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choose a vehicle with high capital costs, to maximise the benefit of reduced taxation 
(Drummond, 2015). To reduce the effects such distortions have on new vehicles sold (discussed 
under section 0), company car taxation rules could be reformed. Reforms in both Belgium and 
the UK may provide lessons on how this may be achieved. In both cases, the taxable proportion 
of the in-kind benefit is related to the CO2 intensity of the vehicle (e.g. the higher the CO2 
intensity, the higher the rate of tax levied), and at least part of the fuel received must be 
declared as taxable income. As such, the employee bears increasing costs for more CO2 
intensive vehicles, reducing their attractiveness as an in-kind benefit (and impacting incentives 
for vehicle use once purchased) (Copenhagen Economics, 2010). Evidence from the UK 
suggests that such reforms are effective in reducing CO2 intensity of company cars, where 
average CO2 intensity decreased quicker than passenger cars bought for private use after 
reforms were introduced (Veitch and Underdown, 2007). It also suggests that the company car 
market may respond to market conditions faster than the private car market (Maca et al, 2013).  
Other key market distortions include the regulated electricity prices (discussed in Section 
4.1.1.3), and subsidies for fossil fuel extraction. Such reforms may be encouraged by the 
European Semester process, ‘best-practice’ sharing, or through legal obligations issued by the 
Commission where possible. However, the former two options are likely to be the most feasible 
in the short-term. 
4.4.3 Reform Key Existing and Introduction of New Information 
Instruments 
As discussed under Section 2.1.1, informational instruments have thus far had little influence 
in reducing CO2 emissions directly or indirectly (e.g. by encouraging the purchase of energy 
efficient products), due to four broad reasons: (a) low awareness, (b) low understanding of the 
information presented, (c) ineffective instrument design, and (d) lack of incentives, cognitive 
complexities and the presence of other priorities. For the key information instruments 
presented in previous sections, various options are available to reduce some of these barriers 
and improve their efficacy: 
- Revise the Energy Labelling Directive. As discussed under Section 3.2.3, the presence of ‘A 
plus’ labels, and the grouping of the majority of products into a single efficiency rating 
reduces the effectiveness of this instrument. As such, efficiency ratings may be re-graded 
to A-G, with the range for each value set such that products in the market fall across all 
bands (with regular revision). Indeed, the European Commission (2015j) proposed to 
undertake such reforms in July 2015. Other information, such as expected lifetime energy 
costs compared to a reference level (e.g. products in the ‘C’ category), may also prove 
effective in influencing purchase decisions. 
- Standardise EPC format and calculation methodology. A standardised approach to 
calculation methodologies for EPCs, along with an increased standardisation of their design 
(along current best-practice approaches), may reduce increase the ability of EPCs to be 
effective in providing accurate, relevant and understandable information to consumers, and 
allow comparisons between Member States. 
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- Strengthen requirements for energy billing information provision. Current requirements 
for the provision of information on the energy consumption of households of a similar 
profile, and information on where to seek information on energy efficiency (as described 
under Section 3.2.3), may be boosted by the provision of more ‘direct’ information on 
efficiency options. For example, cost-saving estimates for switching off appliances rather 
than using a ‘standby’ mode, or the use of more efficient lamps, may encourage such 
actions to be taken. 
- Revise and standardise Car Labelling Directive requirements. As described under Section 
0, the Car Labelling Directive has had little influence thus far. This may increase with 
standardisation of the labels provided (with ‘best-practice’ design), including the provision 
of more salient information, such as expected fuel cost savings over the lifetime of the 
vehicle. 
Whether the above options are implemented as mandatory requirements or are simply 
encouraged by processes such as the European Semester or other ‘best-practice’ information 
sharing for a depends both on whether or not the option must be implemented centrally (e.g. 
energy labelling classifications), and political feasibility. 
Whilst such options are likely to be beneficial regardless of the instrumentation direction 
taken, it is likely that their importance would increase under the ‘incentive-based’ policy 
pathway. Other actions presented for the ‘incentive-based’ pathway (under Section 4.2) seek 
to tackle point (d) above, and alter the incentive framework (and alter priorities) such that 
more cost-effective action can be taken, and thus information instruments have a more 
significant role to play. Under the ‘technology-specific’ pathway, such options are reduced 
(although choices remain present), diminishing the potential role of such instruments in driving 
decarbonisation (in the long-term, in particular). However, by overcoming information failures 
and asymmetries and increasing demand for energy efficient products (for example), the public 
acceptability of instruments proposed under the ‘technology-specific’ pathway may increase, 
as they may appear less stringent than may otherwise have been the case. 
There is much more that information instruments can do to encourage consumers to make 
smarter choices. Below are two key examples. 
‘Farm to Fork’ GHG Accounting System 
The evidence suggests that to be truly effective, any instrument mix that seeks to tackle 
emissions from the food and agriculture sector must consider the full supply chain in an 
integrated manner. Otherwise, a piecemeal approach may emerge in which important (direct 
or indirect) abatement options may not be induced or incentivised (Kuik and Kalfagianni, 2013). 
A sensible first step towards such a holistic approach would be to investigate the potential for 
a common ‘farm to ‘fork’ GHG accounting system for the key foodstuffs (particularly meat 
products). Some Member States have, or are in the process of, developing such accounts on 
an experimental basis (e.g. the UK and Netherlands). The development of a common approach 
may be lead by the EU’s statistical office, EUROSTAT. 
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Such an instrument would allow for the identification of key areas to tackle, and in the medium 
to long-term, lay robust foundations for policy instruments that make use of this information. 
Examples would include GHG labelling or fiscal incentives (such as a tax), to encourage 
consumers to select products or brands with a lower GHG footprint (including a move away 
from meat, and a move towards locally produced foodstuffs). Further research is required to 
determine what the particular boundaries of such an accounting system may be, and how it 
may sit alongside other instruments (e.g. LULUCF accounting methodologies). Other 
instruments to ensure issues such as food waste must also be considered (including, for 
example, a potential tightening of the biodegradable waste provisions in the Landfill Directive). 
‘Soft’ Transport Measures 
‘Soft’ transport policy measures aim to directly influence decision making by altering 
perceptions of the objective environment, by altering judgements of the consequences 
associated with different travel alternatives, and by motivating and empowering individuals to 
switch to alternative travel options (Bamberg et al, 2011). Many instruments and initiatives 
may fall under this definition, although ‘Personalised Travel Planning’ (PTP), which provides 
information, incentives and motivation tailored to the individual, rather than through general 
mass marketing methods (Ker, 2003), holds particular promise - especially for shifting 
passenger travel from cars to other modes (the primary aim of most existing or historic PTP 
instruments) (Cairns et al, 2004). As such, introducing ‘soft’ transport measures, particularly 
PTP in large urban areas and key commuter regions, may encourage modal shift in passenger 
transport to lower-carbon alternatives (if such options are available, or made available). This 
may be voluntarily introduced, for example, through mechanisms such as the CoM. 
PTP instruments have been extensively trialled across the world. A review of PTPs in several 
cities across the world calculated that these instruments produced a reduction in car use of 
between 2% and 15% (DETRA, 2004). In London, four PTP pilots reduced car usage by 5%-11% 
(Transport for London, 2004). A meta-analysis of the effectiveness of 10 PTP instrument across 
four cities in Japan determined that an 18% reduction in car use was produced, along with a 
50% increase in public transport, producing a 19% reduction in CO2 emissions (Fujii and 
Taniguchi, 2006). Based on a review of 32 PTP programs in Sweden Friman et al (2013) 
conclude that positive effects are on a par with the results observed in other countries. In 7 of 
these programs, which focussed on car users, the reduction in the number of car trips is 22%. 
On average, these programs led to an increase in the number of bus trips by 36% (ranging 
between 2% and 93%). Two programs that aimed at increasing bicycle use report an average 
increase of 43 % in bicycle trips (Drummond, 2015). The evidence is generally positive that the 
effects generated by PTP instrument are maintained beyond the timeframe of the instrument, 
although further longitudinal studies are required to produce evidence for truly long-term 
impacts (Maca et al, 2013).  
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Addressing Short-Term Requirements 
As described in Section 2.2.2, a successful climate policy instrument mix must address all three 
‘pillars of policy’; ‘standards and engagement’, ‘markets and pricing’, and ‘strategic 
investment’. The options presented in the report ensure that this is achieved, with existing 
issues corrected where possible, and gaps in instrumentation filled where required. Two 
possible configurations are presented; the  ‘incentive-based’ pathway, in which the ‘markets 
and pricing’ pillar is key, and the ‘technology-specific’ pathway, in which the ‘standards and 
engagement’ pillars are the focus. Instrumentation options that would likely prove beneficial, 
alongside reform of framework conditions to facilitate effective operation of instruments 
across all three pillars of policy, both individually and in combination, regardless of the policy 
pathway pursued, are also presented. 
The standards and engagement pillar is emphasised under the ‘technology-specific pathway 
through the tightening and improvement of existing standards and regulations (e.g. a power 
sector Emission Performance Standard, CO2 intensity of vehicles regulations, a reformed 
Ecodesign Directive, etc.). Whilst such instruments remain largely untouched under the 
‘incentive-based’ approach in the short-term (in order to act as ‘backstop’ instruments), but 
become increasingly redundant over time (with no reforms instituted, and those with time or 
other limitations expiring after their obligations are met), regulations to overcome the 
landlord-tenant dilemma, for example, are kept. The reform of existing and introduction of 
new information instruments and the review and dissemination of best-practice policy 
approaches, for example, is proposed as applicable to both policy pathways. The markets and 
pricing pillar is emphasised under the ‘incentive-based’ policy pathway through the reform and 
expansion of the EU ETS, and the use of pricing instruments in remaining sectors to drive the 
low-carbon transformation. Under the ‘technology-specific’ pathway, the EU ETS is again 
reformed, but to a less ambitious extent, and retains its existing sectoral coverage. Market-
based instruments, or market-based elements, remain important. Under both pathways, the 
reduction and removal of market distortions is encouraged. The strategic investment pillar 
receives substantial attention in both pathways through, for example, the reform of RES-E 
support and capacity mechanisms, the provision of funding for innovation and other low-
carbon infrastructure (from various source), the production of long-term infrastructure plans 
and the ‘mainstreaming’ of low-carbon development (through, for example, the use of a social 
cost of carbon in decision making). 
The two subsections below discuss how each of the ten challenges discussed in Section 3 are 
achieved or overcome. As the interrelation between these challenges, and between the 
instrumentation and reform option in this report are complex and nuanced, only key points 
are raised to maintain clarity. 
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5.1.1 ‘Systemic’ Challenges 
- Establish a Meaningful Carbon Price. Under both policy pathways, a revised and 
strengthened EU ETS remains the primary instrument for delivering a carbon price. Price 
control mechanisms are introduced, and carbon leakage measures are reformed to ensure 
industry sectors (and downstream consumers) are fully subject to a carbon price. Under the 
‘incentive-based’ pathway, such revisions are more stringent to produce a carbon price of 
suitable levels to drive the low-carbon transition (and a clear indication of increasing prices 
of relatively high predictability into the future), including a scope extended to the domestic 
heating sector. For (road) transport under the ‘incentive-based’ pathway, a carbon price is 
instituted not through direct pricing of fuel, but through CO2-based registration and 
circulation taxes, and road pricing. Under the ‘technology-specific’ pathway, carbon pricing 
acts primarily as a complement and ‘backstop’ to regulatory instruments, which act to drive 
decarbonisation. Under both policy pathways, reforms such as revised company car 
taxation rules and the phasing out of regulated energy prices are introduced to ensure 
carbon price signals are transmitted to end-users, whilst instruments such as CO2 labelling 
of cars and corporate GHG reporting help to encourage such signals to be acted upon.  
- Complete the EU-Wide Electricity Market Reform and System Integration. Barriers to the 
deployment of appropriate grid infrastructure are reduced through streamlined and clear 
planning and authorisation procedures, and the continued provision of central EU funds for 
the construction of key sub- and inter-state infrastructure. Integrated, multi-state long-term 
planning procedures and incentives help to reduce administrative and political barriers, and 
the potential for unintended consequences. Two primary options for electricity market 
design are presented, ‘Melting Pot’ and ‘Salad Bowl’. The former, which applies an 
equalised, technology-neutral market mechanism for all generating sources, is clearly 
aligned with the ‘incentive-based’ approach, whilst the latter, which applies differentiated 
market rules based on different types of generator, is clearly aligned with the ‘technology-
specific’ approach. Regardless of which approach (and policy pathway) chosen, a full 
implementation of the Third Energy Package facilitates the creating of a fully integrated 
single market. Additional options, such as the introduction of mandatory minimum 
technical standards for smart meters to facilitate demand-side response (in particular), also 
contribute. 
- Make Sound Infrastructure Choices Despite Technological Uncertainty. The production of 
long-term infrastructure plans (potentially produced by National Infrastructure Authorities, 
and municipal-level counterparts), will help to highlight such uncertainties, along with 
conflicts and synergies of such plans both within and between Member States. Such plans 
may be central to a ‘technology-specific’ approach, in which the regulator takes a leading 
role in technology selection, but of substantially reduced scope in the ‘incentive-based’ 
pathway, where the role of technology selection is left (largely) the role of the market. 
Under both pathways the ‘mainstreaming’ the low-carbon objective, including through the 
use of a social cost of carbon in planning decisions, and revised operating rules and 
guidelines for public financial institutions and other investments help, at a minimum, to 
prevent the creation of what may become stranded assets. Corporate information 
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disclosure also encourages such organisations to consider long-term developments, and 
reduce high-carbon activities and investments.  
- Provide Finance and Mobilise the Investments Necessary for a Low-Carbon Economy. The 
strengthening of carbon pricing (under both policy pathways), along with the reduction and 
removal of market distortions, helps to align the incentives for investment in low-carbon 
over high-carbon assets in the first place. A review and alignment of rules governing 
financial markets to ensure they are compatible with the long-term financing required for 
low-carbon infrastructure, along with the provision of institutions, funds and financial 
instruments (at the EU and national level) with a mandate to invest in low-carbon 
infrastructure and assets, helps unlock substantial private sector capital. Additional revenue 
earmarked from the EU ETS for the deployment of renewables and energy efficiency, and 
to encourage innovation in the power and industry sectors may also be important. 
Information instruments, such as corporate disclosure of GHG emissions and high-carbon 
assets, along with instruments aimed directly at consumers, enables improved risk 
assessment, and encourages a shift to lower-carbon investments and assets. ‘Smarter’ 
policy design (discussed in Section 6, below), aided by the dissemination of ‘best-practice’ 
approaches, helps provide long-term confidence in the instrument mix, and guards against 
abrupt changes as far as possible. 
- Encourage Low-Carbon Lifestyles. As with unlocking the appropriate finance, the first 
policy-relevant steps in encouraging the emergence of low-carbon lifestyles is to ensure the 
economic incentives are appropriate, the choices available exclude particularly high-carbon 
options, and low-carbon options are easily attainable. Carbon pricing in the ‘incentive-
based’ pathway and regulatory requirements in the ‘technology-specific’ pathway 
contribute to the first two points. Under both approaches the use of streamlined and 
integrated spatial planning help to achieve the third, in particular. All three points are 
supported by the provision of information in order to influence the decisions of citizens as 
consumers (e.g. ‘nudging’ and PTP instrument) and as investors (discussed above).  
5.1.2 ‘Sectoral’ Challenges 
- ‘Fully’ Decarbonise the Power Sector. Under the ‘incentive-based’ policy pathway, a strong, 
more resilient EU ETS primarily drives this through shifting the merit-order in the short-
term, and sending a long-term carbon price signal for new investments. Whilst a reformed 
EU ETS remains a key driver in the ‘technology-specific’ pathway, an increasingly stringent 
Emission Performance Standard prevents construction of new high-carbon capacity 
(particularly unabated coal). Under both approaches, RES-E support mechanisms remain 
vital in the short-term (and are revised to be more effective and cost-efficient where 
required), along with a facilitating electricity market and interconnected grid (discussed 
above). Non-binding renewables targets, perhaps instituted by the Energy Union process 
and with earmarked EU ETS revenue to incentivise (over)achievement, may encourage 
appropriate ambition political commitment. 
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- Facilitate Low-Carbon Transport. Under the ‘Incentive-Based’ pathway, CO2-based 
registration and circulation taxes, along with road pricing, encourage a shift to low-carbon 
drivetrains for road vehicles, and a shift to modes with a lower-CO2 intensity. Under the 
‘technology-specific’ pathway, a shift to low carbon vehicles is driven by strengthened and 
expanded CO2 intensity regulations. However, various other options presented support 
these instruments. From a governance perspective, integrated spatial planning processes 
and the production of long-term infrastructure planning (at the national, supranational and 
perhaps municipal level), identify and facilitate the required infrastructure. Initiatives such 
as the CoM encourage low-carbon solutions (e.g. active or public transport) where 
transport emissions are particularly concentrated. GPP criteria and requirements may 
support this by enabling the deployment of ultra-low public transport vehicles (e.g. electric 
or hydrogen bus fleets). The removal of market distortions (e.g. company car taxation rules) 
and the provision of information (e.g. personalised transport planning), seek to alter 
consumer choices to low-carbon options 
- Tackle the Energy Consumption of the Housing Stock. The expansion of the EU ETS to 
natural gas in the residential sector, supported by subsidy instruments for the deployment 
of energy efficiency and renewable (heating and cooling) technologies (possibly funded by 
additional EU ETS revenue), are the primary drivers for energy efficiency and 
decarbonisation of the housing stock. Whilst existing near-zero energy requirements for 
new buildings and energy efficiency obligation requirements for existing buildings remain 
in this policy pathway, in the ‘technology-specific’ option, such instruments are 
strengthened and expanded, and become the primary driver of energy efficiency and low-
carbon technologies  - supported by an Ecodesign Directive of substantially increased 
ambition. Under both pathways, increased monitoring and enforcement action ensures 
practical compliance with these Directives. Information instruments and instruments such 
as ‘nudging’, a revised energy labeling directive and the continued deployment of smart 
meters (with minimum technical standards) encourage individuals to adopt cost-effective 
measures and behaviours, and to close the ‘energy efficiency gap’. For instruments and 
approaches not standardized at the EU level, ‘best-practice’ sharing platforms encourage 
effective and cost-effective designs. 
- Stimulate Radical Low-Carbon Innovation in Industry. Under both policy pathways, a 
revision of carbon leakage measures under the EU ETS (including definition of sectors at 
risk) reduces the insulation from carbon price signals the industry sector currently 
experiences (whilst maintaining temporary protection for industries that require it). This is 
expected to encourage adoption of existing technologies that may have not previously been 
incentivised, and to raise the necessity for investment in innovative technologies and for 
their deployment in the long-term. This would be particularly the case under the ‘incentive-
based’ pathway, with a much-enhanced, credible and predictable carbon price. Under the 
‘technology-specific’ pathway, innovation may be driven my increasingly stringent 
Ecodesign requirements, supported by carbon pricing. Both approaches may be supported 
by corporate disclosure guidelines/requirements. To reduce market failures associated with 
innovation, regular assessments of technological options and developments (via a revised 
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SET-Plan), along with increased EU level funding (from various sources including EFSI, 
Cohesion Policy Funds, the EIB and the ‘Innovation Fund’ under the EU ETS – particularly 
enhanced under the ‘incentive-based’ pathway, with substantial additional revenue) and 
national sources (including public financial institutions) support initiative under the 
Innovation Union. 
- Address non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Particularly from Agriculture. Under both 
policy pathways, the first step in addressing this challenge is to investigate options for a 
‘farm to fork’ GHG accounting system. This prepares the ground for the introduction of well-
targeted instruments, such as fiscal incentives, regulatory or information instruments in the 
future, to tackle emissions where the priority and opportunity is greatest. However, various 
institutional reforms also contribute to the abatement of non-CO2 GHGs in the short-term. 
For example, the ‘mainstreaming’ of the low-carbon objectives ensures that non-climate 
instruments, that have historically been the (policy induced) drivers of abatement in the 
agriculture sector, continue to contribute. Increased monitoring and enforcement action 
also aligns with this objective (such as ensuring cross-compliance under the CAP). From a 
strategic ‘framework’ perspective, maintaining emissions from agricultural activities under 
the ESD, rather than establishing a ‘LULUCF + agriculture’ pillar under the 2030 Climate and 
Energy Framework, retains a long-term abatement incentive and avoids the possibility of 
meeting obligations using other, often problematic LULUCF actions. 
5.2 How ‘Optimal’ are these Options? 
Much existing policy analysis, particularly when conducted from an economic standpoint, 
focuses largely on static efficiency (defined below), which often leads directly to the 
recommended implementation of pricing instruments alone as the cost-minimising solution 
(Görlach, 2013). Such an approach is simplistic and neglects many ‘real world’ issues that limit 
the effectiveness, including various market failures that prevent the transmission of the price 
signal and the ability or willingness of market actors to respond to it (split incentives, 
environmentally harmful subsidies, information asymmetries, etc.), legal compatibility, 
administrative burden, and political and public acceptability. As such, the CECILIA2050 project 
employs a broader definition of ‘optimality’ that considers three criteria against which a policy 
mix may be applied (Görlach, 2013): 
- Effectiveness – Are the policy instruments, and the instrument mix overall, achieving 
their/its objective(s)? Whilst the overall objective of the instrument mix is to drive GHG 
mitigation, individual instruments may have varied objectives (e.g. information provision, 
deployment of renewables, etc.), against which their effectiveness must be measured. 
- Cost-effectiveness – This criterion holds two components. The first is static cost-efficiency, 
which implies that an instrument or instrument mix achieves its objectives at least cost, 
given currently available abatement options. The second is dynamic cost-efficiency, which 
concerns the delivery of abatement at least cost over a given time period, by incentivising 
the continual development and implementation of low-carbon technologies and 
behaviours. 
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- Feasibility – Does the instrument or instrument mix match with practical considerations? 
This includes various components, including administrative burden (including ease of 
administration, transaction costs for compliance and enforcement, etc.), legal and 
institutional feasibility (compatibility with existing legal frameworks, institutional culture 
and capacity, etc.), political and public acceptability (likelihood of political support and 
acceptance by the public, including equity and distributional concerns), and flexibility 
(ability to risks and uncertainties of the effects of the instrument or instrument mix itself, 
or to exogenous developments). 
These criteria have some clear inter-relations and trade-offs, and are a mix of (potentially) 
quantifiable and fully qualitative criteria. They may also be applied to individual instruments, 
collections of instruments, or the instrument mix as a whole. They may also be applied at 
different spatial scales (e.g. all-EU, or individual Member States).  See Görlach (2013) for a full 
discussion of this extended definition of ‘optimality’. In the three sub-sections below, the 
proposed instrument mix (and institutional reforms) is taken as a whole, and examined largely 
at the EU level. 
5.2.1 Effectiveness 
The ‘incentive-based’ policy pathway employs ideally technology-neutral pricing and other 
incentivising instruments to encourage a market-driven shift to low-carbon investments, 
technologies and behaviours. The primary instrument is a reformed and expanded EU ETS. As 
a cap-and-trade instrument, the maximum level of (mainly CO2) emissions from the covered 
sectors (power, industry and now residential heating) is known ex ante, with environmental 
effectiveness guaranteed80. However, this is not the case in the remaining non-ETS sectors (e.g. 
the use of CO2-based regulation and circulation taxes, and road pricing in the transport sector). 
Additionally, in both cases, the specific technologies deployed and behaviours adopted (or in 
the case of the ETS sectors, the division of abatement between sectors), is left to the market. 
Such uncertainty, which may produce increased difficultly for planning and ensuring co-
ordination of interdependent abatement efforts, is a trade-off for improved cost-efficiency, as 
discussed below. Reducing and overcoming both market distortions and information failures is 
important in exposing market actors to price signals, and allowing them to respond to these 
signals, and thus contributing to the effectiveness of the ‘incentive-based’ pathway. The first 
is delivered, for example, through reforming of company car taxation rules and the phasing out 
of regulated electricity prices. The second is delivered through the reformation of key existing 
information instruments (such as the Energy Labelling Directive and Energy Performance 
Certificate formats and calculation methodologies), alongside the introduction and promotion 
of new instruments (such as ‘soft’ transport measures and corporate reporting requirements). 
Such instruments and reforms may variously be implemented or encouraged through 
                                                     
80 Assuming adequate monitoring and enforcement into the future, the adequate prevention of fraudulent 
activities, and the prevention of the use of international credits with unclear credibility for compliance. 
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mandatory requirements, direct recommendation (e.g. via the European Semester process), or 
other initiatives, such as the CoM. 
Although pricing and other ‘incentive-based’ instruments are the driver of change in this 
pathway, the existing complement of regulatory instruments, with their associated 
requirements and targets, should remain in the short-term. Those with standing obligations, 
such as minimum energy performance standards for buildings, may act as a regulatory 
‘backstop’ to pricing instruments. Instruments with time-limited obligations, such as energy 
efficiency obligation schemes, may expire once met, and not be renewed. However, this 
particular example must be balanced against the requirement to tackle the landlord tenant 
dilemma – principal instruments for which are continued energy efficiency obligations, or 
(increasing) minimum energy performance standards for rented properties. Such an approach 
has two key benefits. Firstly, it allows time for the principal instruments in the ‘incentive-based’ 
pathway to become established and strengthened. Secondly, it maintains stability and reduces 
the administrative burden (and possible political discord) associated with the (early) 
termination of such instruments. 
The ‘technology-specific’ policy pathway employs regulatory targets and requirements as the 
primary drivers for decarbonisation, with pricing instruments providing a largely supporting 
role. Whilst a reformed EU ETS remains important (but with reforms less significant, including 
maintaining existing sectoral scope), in the power sector decarbonisation is driven by an 
Emission Performance Standard for new installations, preventing the construction of new, 
highly CO2-intensive capacity (e.g. unabated coal). In other sectors, largely existing instruments 
are improved, extended and tightened. In the (residential) buildings sector, ‘near-zero’ energy 
requirements for new builds become ‘net-zero’, whilst the requirement for energy efficiency 
obligation schemes for existing buildings are extended beyond 2020. These instruments are 
supported by an Ecodesign Directive with a significantly increased ambition. In the transport 
sector, fleet-average CO2 intensity regulations are expanded from cars and LGVs to HGVs, with 
targets set beyond the early 2020s  (as currently set for cars and LGVs). The practical operation 
of these instruments is also reformed, where required. This includes improved monitoring and 
compliance mechanisms, and a reduction in the ability to demonstrate compliance with the 
use of alternative mechanisms (where such options detract from the direct objective of the 
instrument). The increased application of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms may also 
ensure compliance with regulatory requirements (including those concerning information 
instruments and aspects such as full, accurate and timely reporting). This policy pathway allows 
for more direction over how the low-carbon transition is achieved compared to the ‘incentive-
based’ pathway, but with potentially reduced cost-efficiency (discussed below). 
In both pathways, design elements and processes to enhance the ability of the instrument mix 
to respond to and deal with risks and uncertainties buttresses the effectiveness of the climate 
policy mix into the longer-term, providing stability. Such elements and processes are discussed 
under ‘Feasibility’ (Section 0, below). 
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5.2.2 Cost-Effectiveness 
Under the ‘incentive-based’ pathway, by expanding the reach of the (strengthened) EU ETS 
and thus an equalised marginal abatement cost, the static cost-efficiency of the instrument 
mix is increased (both against the existing complement of instruments, and against the 
‘technology-specific’ pathway). This is supported by the use of instruments to tackle 
information failures and the reduction and removal or market distortions (to align incentives 
and increase the desire to respond to them), and by the reduction of financial and 
administrative barriers (facilitating such responses). Whilst the ‘technology-specific’ pathway 
relies mainly upon regulatory instruments, producing varied implicit marginal abatement costs, 
it is likely that the static cost-efficiency of this pathway is improved against the existing EU 
climate policy mix. Although the design and configuration of the ‘technology-specific’ pathway 
is similar to the status quo (including sectoral coverage of the EU ETS, and the possibility to 
employ market-based instrument or elements to achieve regulatory goals), improvements to 
the functioning of individual instruments (such as revised carbon leakage measures under the 
EU ETS, more effective compliance test mechanisms and the sharing of ‘best-practice’ 
instrument designs across Member States), coupled with the reduction of market distortions 
and removal of other barriers, as discussed above, would likely reduce the marginal abatement 
costs against a case in which the targets and requirements of existing instruments were simply 
extended. 
By providing an extended carbon price signal that recipients constantly seek to minimise 
(through the EU ETS, in particular), theory would suggest that the ‘incentive-based’ policy 
pathway would be the most dynamically cost-efficient of the two pathways. However, for this 
to be the case, market actors must have confidence in the future presence and magnitude of 
such liability, which the EU ETS has thus far largely failed to provide (Drummond, 2013a). Whilst 
the various reforms to the EU ETS (in particular) proposed above (for both policy pathways) 
should substantially improve this situation, the (relative) regulatory certainty provided by the 
instruments under the ‘technology-specific’ pathway (including increased clarify regarding 
specific sectoral and sub-sectoral contributions, specific targets and the timeframe in which 
they must be achieve), provides a clear incentive to develop and deploy technologies with ever-
reducing marginal abatement costs. Whilst under a regulatory instrument a dynamic incentive 
is broadly not provided, as there is little motivation to exceed the requirements set, 
establishing long-term requirements or targets of increasing stringency significantly diminishes 
this argument. However, by it’s very nature the ‘technology-specific’ pathway holds an 
inherent element of ‘picking winners’ by government, which may not induce deployment of 
the most cost-effective technological options. In some sectors, such as industry, there remains 
substantial uncertainty regarding technological development and therefore the most cost-
effective technologies for regulation to promote. This may in turn induce regulatory 
uncertainty, if the favoured technology (or set of technologies) do not deliver the expected 
abatement, does not mature or reduce in cost at expected rates, or are otherwise unpopular. 
Irrespective of the pathway chosen, the dynamic cost-efficiency of the instrument mix is likely 
to be increased against the status quo. This is supported by the measures introduced to 
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overcome market failures associated with innovation, such as frequent review and 
prioritisation of key technologies, the provision of dedicated funding for the development of 
innovative technologies (from various sources, both EU and Member State level) and enhanced 
Green Public Procurement criteria. Frequent review of technologies (through a revised SET-
Plan procedure) also allows for clarity on the division between and level of support for 
innovation and for deployment, allowing for effective targeting and a reduced risk of over-
subsidisation. 
At a macroeconomic level, modelling evidence suggests that substantive action taken to 
decarbonise the economy, driven by the options and pathways presented in this report, would 
have a substantially positive impact on GDP growth in the EU (particularly in the short term). 
This is driven particularly through investments in renewables, electricity grids and energy 
efficiency (Meyer et al, 2014), the latter of which, as discussed above, exhibits significant cost-
negative opportunities for energy and emission reductions. Additionally, such investments may 
substantially increase the international competitiveness of the renewables industries, 
potentially stimulating first-mover advantages (Antimiani et al, 2015). 
In order to minimise the total costs of decarbonisation, the risk of creating stranded assets 
must be minimised. The options presented in this report, under both pathways, including (a) 
long-term instrumentation clarity and confidence, including carbon prices and regulatory 
requirements, (b) long-term planning to reduce the risk of incompatible choices, (c) 
‘mainstreaming’ of low-carbon objectives in governance, policy making and public investments 
and financial institutions, and (d) corporate reporting and disclosure of GHG emissions, high-
carbon assets and risk assessment procedures, help to reduce these risks. However, stranded 
assets remain a possibility regardless of the pathway chosen, although present through 
different mechanisms. In the ‘incentive-based’ pathway, the free choice of actors responding 
to price signals may include investment in assets that become uneconomic. Whilst the 
‘technology-specific’ pathway would at first seem less likely to lead to the creation of stranded 
assets, the promotion of what may turn out to be a relatively high-cost technologies may 
produce the same effect. 
5.2.3 Feasibility 
The options and policy pathways presented are likely to produce and necessitate relatively 
substantial changes to existing administrative requirements. Initially, significant effort may be 
required in order to establish the governance structures, procedures and instrument reforms 
proposed (under each pathway). At the EU level, a potentially enhanced role for DG CLIMA (in 
terms of ensuring ‘mainstreaming’ of low-carbon objectives, collating and disseminating best-
practice guidance, and increased monitoring and enforcement action), for example, may 
increase administrative requirements in the longer-term, regardless of the policy pathway 
chosen. This is likely a key trade-off required to buttress the effectiveness of the instrument 
mix. Whether the administrative burden is increased at the Member State level in the longer-
term depends on existing structures and processes. However, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the ‘incentive-based’ pathway, with its promotion of pricing and other incentivising 
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instruments (including a potential shift of EU ETS compliance upstream) would infer less of an 
administrative burden (at all levels) than the ‘technology-specific’ pathway, with its various, 
differentiated and specific requirements. 
Many options presented are likely to reduce administrative burden in the longer-term, for 
public authorities at all levels, and for other market actors (from industrial sector to 
individuals). Examples include the collation and clarity of administrative responsibilities, long-
term planning and reporting mechanisms for public authorities (Member States in particular), 
and the simplification and standardisation of compliance, monitoring and reporting 
requirements and guidance (where appropriate) for individual instruments. 
All options presented in this report are possible within the existing overarching legal 
framework of the EU, although many would require the introduction of new or amendments 
to existing Directives or Regulations to introduce, and subsequent transposition into Member 
State law. A particular example of common concern is the legal compatibility of alternative 
carbon leakage measures under the EU ETS. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the introduction of 
output-based permit allocation with consumption-based charges avoids questions of WTO 
compatibility, and as the latter component is a parafiscal charge, may be introduced by 
qualified majority in the European Council, rather than unanimity.  
Acceptance by the public, industry and other societal actors is often critical in obtaining 
political feasibility. The industry acceptability of the proposed revised carbon leakage 
measures is difficult to ascertain, although the combination of OBA, using frequently updated 
production data against a ‘best available technology’ benchmark, with CO2-based consumption 
charges, is likely to be one of the more acceptable options available. Free allocation remains, 
whilst allocation of such allowances against frequently updated benchmarks, reducing windfall 
rents, is a measure already proposed by the Commission. This relative increase is costs may be 
tempered in the medium- to long-term by an increase in the provision of funding for innovation 
in the industry sector (from various sources, including the ‘Innovation Fund’ under the EU ETS). 
The downstream CO2 consumption charge may induce a reduction in demand for such 
products (varied by sub-sector, depending on specific demand elasticities and the availability 
of substitutes) in the short- to medium-term, before less-CO2 intensive options are developed. 
However, as many industrial products are fed into other products or processes (steel, cement, 
etc.), such charges are incorporated into the price of the final consumer product, and are not 
therefore explicitly visible to the public. Additionally, the marginal price increase of an 
individual end-user product may be negligible (at least in the short- to medium-term). Such 
aspects likely render such a charge broadly acceptable by the general public. From a broader 
perspective, the long-term clarity and stability of such revised rules, and of the EU ETS (and 
instrument mix) more widely, is essential in allowing for long-term planning and investment 
(Neuhoff et al, 2014b), and likely raises the acceptability of these options to the industrial 
sector independently of their specific design. Such an effect is likely to be present beyond the 
industrial (EU ETS) sectors (e.g. vehicle manufacturers). 
The proposed instrument mixes and reform options exhibit many features that seek to 
maximise public acceptability. A principal issue is that of increasing cost to the consumer 
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resulting from the instrument mix, either directly (for example, though inclusion of residential 
natural gas under a strengthened EU ETS), or indirectly (for example, through higher cost 
products, or levies on energy bills to allow cost-recovery of renewable support mechanisms). 
More intelligent instrument designs, such as market-responsive RES-E support mechanisms, 
and the use of other flexibility mechanisms (discussed below), helps to minimise such costs in 
the first place (across both policy pathways). The additional use of central EU funding for the 
deployment of renewables, energy efficiency and transmission infrastructure further reduces 
the impact of (often regressive) on-bill cost recovery. Whilst the deployment of energy 
efficiency measures (particularly in the residential sector) further counters the effects of 
remaining costs, careful instrument design (such as the use of sub-targets under an extended 
energy efficiency obligation schemes under the ‘technology-specific’ pathway), may encourage 
an equitable, progressive and more publically acceptable outcome (Zvěřinová et al, 2013). 
Improved and expanded information instruments highlight cost-effective (or net cost-
negative) products and behaviours of which consumers may previously been unaware, 
allowing for further cost savings. This is particularly the case if low-cost options that may have 
previously been unavailable, such as active transport infrastructure, are made available (e.g. 
through integrated spatial planning). In turn, these measures, coupled with the reduction and 
removal of key market distortions, may increase the public acceptability of increasingly 
stringent instruments that may have been previously considered untenable. For example, by 
removing the market distortion for company cars currently experienced in many Member 
States (and thus reducing demand for highly CO2-intensive cars), and providing alternatives 
such as low-cost (and low-carbon) active and public transport, the public acceptability of CO2-
based road pricing in cities (under the ‘incentive-based’ pathway) or increasingly stringent 
fleet-average CO2 regulations for vehicles (both of which might be expected to increase the 
cost of purchasing and driving a vehicle81), is likely to increase. However removing such a 
distortion, which currently benefits employees, employers and the manufacturers of CO2-
intensive vehicles, is likely to prove politically difficult in many Member States. 
Aside from the actual or perceived impacts of proposed instruments and instrument mixes, 
other elements act to enhance public acceptability. For example, evidence suggests that the 
earmarking of revenue raised from pricing instruments (or the removal of market distortions) 
increases public support for an instrument or instrument mix (Zvěřinová et al, 2013). Increased 
earmarking of EU ETS revenues for renewables, energy efficiency and innovation investment 
for example, particularly in the incentive-based pathway with its expanded scope, may thus 
increase public support whilst creating a double dividend. Another element is the creation and 
promotion of ‘co-benefits’ from an instrument or instrument mix. For example, an instrument 
designed to reduce the CO2-intensity of passenger cars, and which thus has the effect of 
encouraging deployment of electric vehicles and mode switching to active transport, induces 
                                                     
81 Although the evidence suggests that various key regulatory instruments, such as CO2 intensity regulations for 
passenger cars and the Ecodesign Directive have not had any significant influence on the capital cost of related 
products thus far (Drummond, 2013a), it is reasonable to suggest that that may not be the case in future as ‘low 
hanging fruit’ becomes increasingly scarce. 
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not just a reduction of CO2 emissions, but also local air pollutants and increased exercise, both 
with substantial (co-)benefits for human health (and associated reductions in healthcare costs, 
etc.) (Watts et al, 2015). The calculation, promotion and possible framing of instruments in 
terms of these co-benefits may stimulate additional acceptance, and even active (public and 
political) support. Indeed the protecting human health is an objective of environmental policy 
under the TFEU. The promotion of economic benefits of an instrument or instrument mix, from 
the impacts on GDP (discussed above), to the (positive) impact on future domestic energy bills, 
may have similar effects. 
A final aspect of public acceptability concerns the presence of infrastructure required for the 
low-carbon transition in local communities (e.g. electricity transmission infrastructure). The 
presence and promotion of benefits of the low-carbon transition, and instruments and 
investments required to deliver it, as discussed above, may be a first step in encouraging 
acceptance of the presence of enabling infrastructure where required. Improved public 
participation, facilitated by the presence of a single focal point for such processes at the 
relevant governance levels, may be second. Additionally, stimulating community involvement 
and potentially ownership through local initiatives (such as the CoM) may spur interest in and 
acceptance of such infrastructure (Warren and McFayden, 2010). 
Although many options presented would be most effective if introduced by legal requirement 
(through the introduction of new or amendment of existing Directives and Regulations, for 
example), and whilst some must be achieved through this approach (e.g. EU ETS reform), the 
political acceptability of instituting others as mandatory requirements for Member States is 
questionable. As such, the use of general and targeted recommendations (through the 
European Semester and perhaps processes under the Energy Union) and the issuance of 
guidance and best-practice sharing, to encourage the adoption of these options voluntarily in 
the first instance (where such mandatory approaches are questionable), and may be used to 
build support for a subsequent mandatory, legally binding approach. 
Many options discussed contain, or are intended to, allow for flexibility in the instrument mix, 
and allow it to deal with uncertainties that may otherwise render it ineffective, cost-inefficient, 
or otherwise (politically) untenable. Key examples include the introduction of a Market 
Stability Reserve under the EU ETS (under both policy pathways), to reduce the risk of the 
carbon price returning to broadly ineffective levels, and the use of degression mechanisms in 
RES-E support mechanisms to prevent excessive deployment and associated costs82. Regular, 
pre-determined review and compliance periods, coupled with policy learning and information 
dissemination mechanisms (including through facilitating the emergence of ‘frontrunners’ that 
may act as ‘policy labs’) and regular reviews of the status of key technologies (through the SET-
Plan, in particular), also contribute to ‘future proofing’ of the instrument mix. Similarly, the 
reduction and removal of concessions, such as ‘super credits’ under CO2 intensity regulations 
                                                     
82 if costs of new installations fall faster than expected and growth in installations grows beyond reasonable 
expectations, a volume ceiling can trigger a reduction in the tariff. Where the constraint is financial, the ceiling 
could be based on support expenditure rather than volume (European Commission, 2013) 
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for vehicles (under the technology-specific pathway) and the continued reduction and removal 
of free allocation to (an expanded range) of EU ETS sectors not considered at risk of carbon 
leakage (under both policy pathways), reduce and prevent entrenched roadblocks to 
appropriate revision and strengthening of the instrument mix (where required) in the future. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
The existing climate policy mix is uneven, both in terms of coverage and stringency, within and 
between sectors and Member States. Despite this, it has delivered relatively substantial CO2 
abatement, with a positive overall impact on both GDP and employment, with no evidence of 
induced carbon leakage. Whilst economic instruments have been important, they are not 
exploiting their full potential as a result of design flaws, interactions with other instruments, 
and the presence of market distortions. Instead, regulatory instruments have thus far delivered 
a substantial proportion of policy-induced abatement. ‘Non-Climate’ instruments, and non-
policy drivers, have also had a noticeable impact on GHG emissions in some sectors. Broadly 
speaking, information instruments have thus far had little influence on driving low-carbon 
investment and behaviour changes. Instruments of all descriptions, both at EU and Member 
State level, are often not designed to deal with or correct for unexpected developments or side 
effects, producing sub-optimal or even counterproductive outcomes, and reducing credibility. 
Additionally, Institutional and legal configuration, characteristics and procedures at both EU 
and Member State level has a substantial influence over whether an instrument or instrument 
mix is effective, or feasible to introduce in the first place. 
In order to achieve the objective of a reduction in GHG emissions of 80% in the EU by 2050 
(from 1990 levels), the rate of abatement across all sectors must increase substantially, driven 
by a comprehensive, effective, cost-efficient yet feasible instrument mix, and facilitated by 
appropriate governance and institutional structures and processes.  
Such instruments and reforms must meet or overcome ten key challenges in both the short- 
and long-term (five systemic, five sectoral): 
- Establish a Meaningful Carbon Price 
- Complete the EU-Wide Electricity Market Reform and System Integration 
- Make Sounds Infrastructure Choices Despite Technological Uncertainty 
- Provide Finance and Mobilise the Investments Necessary for a Low-Carbon Economy 
- Encourage Low-Carbon Lifestyles 
- ‘Fully’ Decarbonise the Power Sector 
- Facilitate Low-Carbon Transport 
- Tackle the Energy Consumption of the Housing Stock 
- Stimulate Radical Low-Carbon Innovation in Industry 
- Address non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Particularly from Agriculture 
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Various options are presented to meet, or lay the foundations and trajectory towards meeting 
these challenges in the short-term (by 2030). In terms of ‘framework’ conditions, and the 
reform and operation of public institutions, key examples include maximising the potential 
benefits of EU-wide, supranational initiatives such as the Energy Union and Innovation Union 
concepts, along with leveraging the potential for subnational and regional governance 
initiatives (such as the Covenant of Mayors), to facilitate and encourage the emergence 
synergies, ‘frontrunners’ and ‘policy labs’ at all levels of governance. This is supported by the 
‘mainstreaming’ of the low-carbon objective across all areas of policy making and investments 
made by public funds, or by public financial institutions. Indeed, dedicated funds and 
instruments for low-carbon development and innovation should be stepped up, at both the EU 
and Member State level. Ensuring clear an appropriate spatial planning regimes and 
administrative competences, perhaps unified in a single body at all relevant levels of 
jurisdiction, may overcome the need for several complex, unclear and disjointed processes, in 
turn reducing administrative barriers to the development of low-carbon infrastructure. The 
production of long-term plans by Member States helps highlight potential synergies between 
proposed low-carbon development pathways, helps identify and avoid conflicts before they 
occur, and helps recognise key areas of uncertainty for future focus. Increasing the application 
of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, at both EU level and by Member States, would 
also likely prove beneficial. 
In terms of broad policy instrumentation, two broad pathways are presented. The first is the 
‘incentive-based’ policy pathway, which focuses on pricing and other technology-neutral 
incentivising instruments to drive low-carbon investments and behaviour. A strengthened EU 
ETS, expanded to cover the residential heating sector, is the primary instrument and 
cornerstone of the instrument mix. This is supported by the introduction and harmonisation of 
a carbon price in the (road) transport sector, through CO2-based vehicle registration and 
circulation taxes, and CO2-based road pricing. Existing regulatory requirements and targets 
largely remain, but are generally not tightened, and many expire once time-limited targets are 
met. The second pathway is the ‘technology-specific’ policy pathway, which focuses on 
regulatory targets and limits, and instruments that encourage particular technologies. Market-
based instruments remain a strong feature, and may often be used to accelerate the 
development or increase the deployment of particular technologies. The role of pricing 
instruments is secondary in this pathway, and many existing ‘incentivising’ instruments (e.g. 
vehicle registration taxes), may be removed over time from a climate policy perspective. 
However, regardless of the specific policy pathway taken, various cross-cutting options for the 
introduction of new and the reform of existing policy instruments are available. This includes 
the reform, where appropriate, of renewable support mechanisms and capacity mechanisms 
to ensure effectiveness, cost-efficiency and sustainability for as long as such mechanisms are 
likely to be required. Additionally, existing information instruments, which have had relatively 
little influence thus far, may be amended to ensure they present clear, reliable and appropriate 
information, whilst new information instruments may be introduced where they have thus far 
been underexploited. This includes the use of ‘soft’ transport measures, and potentially a ‘food 
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to fork’ GHG accounting system for the integrated agri-food sector. Actions to reduce market 
distortions, such as those presented by company car taxation rules in many Member States, 
may also be taken. 
Broadly, whichever policy pathway is taken and specific options implemented, the design of 
individual instruments (both existing and new) and instrument mixes, and associated 
governance approaches, must be ‘smarter’, in order to deal with uncertainty, improve stability 
and increase confidence. Such an approach may be summarised into five key criteria: 
a) Effective targeting. Targeting the scope of application where evidence suggests 
effectiveness is likely to high, rather than what economic efficiency may necessarily suggest 
(e.g. the use of CO2-based registration and circulation taxes rather than a carbon price on 
fuel, under the ‘incentive-based’ policy pathway). 
b) Effective monitoring/compliance mechanisms. Existing monitoring/compliance 
mechanisms for some instruments indicate technical compliance, but practical under-
achievement, whilst others entail relatively significant administrative burdens that produce 
low levels of monitoring. Others render comparisons between Member States and over 
time extremely difficult, preventing accurate assessments of effectiveness. 
c) Allows for future revision if required. In particular, avoidance of the installation of potential 
‘roadblocks’ to revision, such as non-time limited/conditional exemptions or concessions. 
d) Able to deal with changing circumstances (both expected and unexpected). These may be 
self-induced, induced by other policy, or non-policy developments (e.g. technological 
development, economic growth, etc.). Examples include the Market Stability Reserve for 
the EU ETS, and the presence of degression mechanisms in renewable support 
mechanisms. This reduces need for revision, and provides long-term stability and 
confidence. With the above point, this may be called ‘future proofing’. 
e) Inducement and promotion of positive co-benefits. The earmarking of revenues from a 
pricing instrument, for example, may be used for particular purposes (e.g. EU ETS revenue 
used for deployment of renewables and energy efficiency, and to support industrial 
innovation), to increase acceptability of instruments and produce potential ‘double 
dividends’. Intelligent ‘framing’ of an instrument to promote positive (e.g. health) co-
benefits, may also improve public acceptability and political feasibility.  
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Executive summary 
In addition to the challenge of reducing emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050, the EU 
has to be prepared to respond suitably to different external factors. Two of the most critical 
factors for success in meeting this target are: (i) what climate policies other countries will 
follow and (ii) how governance rules will evolve within the EU? Given that supranational 
governance scenarios are going to be crucial for the effectiveness and feasibility of EU climate 
policy, the aim of this document is to assess EU instrument options under different scenarios 
and come up with general insights for EU policy makers. 
Drummond (2015) and Huppes (2015) have proposed different development options for EU 
climate policy in the short-term and long-term, respectively. Their analysis assumes 
international governance and the level of EU centralisation will remain roughly as they are 
now. This document goes one step further and carries out a sort of resilience analysis. We 
analyse climate instrumentation in two additional international governance scenarios:  
i. No-global-deal scenario, which assumes very ambitious international commitments but 
without legally binding agreements and a low degree of convergence and 
harmonization of climate instruments, and  
ii. A middle-of-the-road scenario, which assumes a high degree of policy convergence but 
a lack of ambition in emission reduction.  
We also analyse climate instrumentation in two additional EU governance scenarios:  
i. An EU centralised scenario, which assumes most of the climate decisions are 
established at the EU level and, therefore, where there is a centralisation of EU 
governance structure, and  
ii. An EU decentralised scenario, which assumes a re-nationalisation of climate policy and 
thereby climate instruments that are designed and implemented at national level.   
Our analysis for each scenario is developed from the four instrument packages proposed by 
Huppes (2015): (a) the technology-specific pathway whose focus is on regulatory standards 
and subsidies; and in which market-based instruments such as the EU ETS are phased out in a 
stepwise fashion; (b) the ETS pure-cap pathway where the EU ETS is the main driver of 
decarbonisation and where the emission cap is expanded to cover the main sectors; (c) the ETS 
price stabilization pathway in which a reform of the EU ETS takes place, setting a price floor 
and ceiling for carbon; and (d) the emission tax pathway where a transformation of the EU ETS 
into an emission tax occurs and technology-specific instruments are removed.  
The key results of the report are summarized below.  
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Non-global-deal scenario 
 In a non-global-deal scenario, carbon leakage remains a big challenge for EU climate 
policy. The lack of international coordination and harmonization of climate instruments 
may create divergences between countries.  
 The performance of a technology-specific pathway relative to market-based pathways 
depends on the stringency level chosen for the former: too low a level of stringency and 
the carbon target is not met; too high a level of stringency and EU competiveness is 
compromised. Moreover, a technology-specific pathway is not superior to market-
based pathways in order to avoid carbon leakage. Inappropriate stringency levels of 
standards may reduce the EU competitiveness. The volatility and uncertainty associated 
with a pure cap ETS system is also an obstacle to reduce carbon leakage in this scenario. 
 Regardless of the policy pathway, additional anti-leakage measures should be 
implemented in the energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. The free allocation 
of allowances is the most effective and feasible way to avoid carbon leakage in those 
sectors covered by the EU ETS. Exemptions could be applied to those sectors subject to 
standards. When an emission tax is implemented, border carbon adjustment is the best 
option. However, compatibility with World Trade Organization (WTO) is unclear, and 
political feasibility is probably low.      
 In presence of market failures (e.g. principal agent problem), market-based pathways 
could benefit from technology-specific instruments, which would promote investment 
and innovation in low carbon technologies. This is particularly important in the ETS 
pure-cap pathway, where the price signal may be very uncertain and volatile, and 
possibly weak. 
 The global ambition to reduce emissions would increase the demand of low carbon 
technologies, creating business opportunities for many industries. Technology-specific 
instruments could help to encourage technology development and innovation, and 
thus, gain market share in the world economy.  
 A reform to stabilize prices in the EU ETS is necessary to decrease price uncertainty. 
Moreover, such a reform would allow additional instruments to be used without 
affecting the price signal. However, a price collar is outside the structural reform 
proposed by the European Commission and its political feasibility may be low. Likewise, 
an emission tax would also face feasibility problems.  
 
Middle-of-the-road scenario 
 The low international ambition under this scenario may reduce the political feasibility 
of EU climate policy. In such an international context, EU climate policy will probably 
focus on maximizing non-climate benefits of emissions reduction (e.g. health, energy 
security).  
 The static efficiency of market-based pathways is generally high because marginal 
abatement costs are equalised across sectors and emitters. However, emission price 
would not internalise non-climate benefits. Emissions reductions are determined 
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regardless of the co-benefits. Hence, a technology-specific pathway may be superior to 
market-based pathways in this international context. Market-based pathways could be 
improved adding technologic-specific instruments to those sectors which can deliver 
high non-climate benefits. 
 Although international coordination offers the opportunity to harmonize climate 
instruments across borders, some pathways may have difficulties to take advantage of 
this international context. For instance, there is a trade-off between stabilizing 
allowances price within the EU and linking the EU ETS with other trading systems.     
 The low international ambition would increase the risk of carbon leakage, particularly 
through the price channel.    
 Regardless of the specific policy pathway taken, non-climate benefits of emission 
reductions should be highlighted to increase the public acceptability of instrument 
mixes. 
EU centralised scenario 
 This scenario would increase the political feasibility of all pathways. The centralisation 
of the EU climate policy would allow a structural reform of the EU ETS and expand the 
coverage of the EU ETS, including the transport and the buildings sector. 
 The effectiveness of the instrument packages will depend on the stringency levels. 
However, in the absence of a price signal, a technology-specific pathway may be subject 
to rebound effects. Likewise, market failures (e.g. principal agent problem) may reduce 
the effectiveness of market-based pathways.  
 A price stabilization reform may be beneficial to reduce price uncertainty and encourage 
investment and innovation in those sectors covered by the EU ETS. Besides, the EU ETS 
could be compatible with national initiatives, without affecting the price signal. 
Although this scenario assumes a centralisation of climate policy, national and/or sub-
national measures would be useful to take into account national differences. Moreover, 
they would encourage front-runners and increase the feasibility of the instrument 
package.   
 In a technology-specific pathway, higher centralisation could increase bureaucracy and 
reduce the capacity for modification as new information emerges. 
EU decentralised scenario 
 This scenario would limit the number of pathways that the EU climate policy could take. 
The most feasible would be the technologic-specific pathway.  
 The role of the EU would focus on coordinating national policies and recommending 
effective pathways in emission reduction. The EU should aim to harmonise emission 
standards in key sectors, particularly energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries, to 
avoid a race to the bottom and standard based competition between Member States. 
 In order to deal with the intermittency in most renewables, the role of the EU should 
be focused on reducing barriers to link national electricity markets. 
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 In a decentralised scenario, it looks unrealistic that the EU ETS could play a leading role. 
The EU ETS could remain to guarantee a minimum emission reduction target. Member 
States could introduce a carbon price floor to maintain the price signal meaningful. 
 A price stabilization reform and emission tax pathway would require a high 
centralisation of EU climate policy and, therefore, these pathways are infeasible in this 
scenario.  
 
Supranational governance scenarios will be a key factor when designing EU climate policy. 
However, some robust conclusions can be drawn regardless of the governance scenarios: 
 Establish a meaningful carbon price (either EU ETS or emission tax) is essential to ensure 
effectiveness and cost-efficiency. A technology-specific pathway without a price signal 
would show critical weaknesses. The transport and buildings sector would face a high 
risk of rebound effects. Too much interventionism could hinder private actions. The 
flexibility of the instrument package to deal with changing circumstances would be very 
low.   
 Carbon price is necessary but not sufficient. A market-based pathway based exclusively 
on carbon pricing may not produce the expected results. Market failures would lead to 
important efficiency losses. A single carbon price would not internalise non-climate 
benefits, and thereby, climate policy may not take advantage of additional co-benefits. 
 The reform of the EU ETS would be beneficial to improve the performance of the 
scheme. A more predictable carbon price would help to encourage investment and 
innovation in low carbon technologies. This would also facilitate implementing 
additional instruments without affecting the price signal.            
 
The state of knowledge on which scenarios are likely to be realized is not static. Information 
will come at various stages over the coming years. COP21 will be an important milestone, as 
will the UK referendum. As this new information emerges, policy makers can modify the 
package of measures accordingly. In particular the analysis indicates the following changes may 
be appropriate:  
Non-global-deal-scenario:  
 Additional anti-leakage measures should be implemented.  
 Development and innovation in low carbon technologies should be promoted to take 
advantage of business opportunities. 
Middle-of-the-road scenario: 
 The co-benefits (e.g. health and energy security) of emission reduction should be 
emphasized. 
 Anti-leakage measures may be required. 
EU centralised scenario: 
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 The EU ETS should be reformed. A price collar could be implemented and, eventually, 
transformed in an emission tax. 
 The expansion of the EU ETS should be considered to cover the transport and buildings 
sectors.  
EU decentralised scenario: 
 EU climate policy should focus on technology regulation. 
 The role of the EU should be based on harmonizing national initiatives. 
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1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) faces a major challenge in cutting emissions to 80% below 1990 levels 
by 2050. In order to meet this target, and at the same time stimulate economic growth and 
ensure competitiveness of the EU, the Union is looking at cost-efficient ways to make the 
European economy more climate-friendly and less energy-consuming. Drummond (2015) and 
Huppes (2015)1 have proposed different policy instrumentation pathways to meet these 
targets. Drummond (2015) focuses on the short-term development options for the EU climate 
policy. His analysis identifies short-term improvements to make the current policy mix more 
effective and efficient. Huppes (2015) investigates how effective climate policy 
instrumentation could be developed in the long-term. Both Drummond (2015) and Huppes 
(2015) based their analysis on the most reasonable expected development of the international 
and EU governance scenarios. It is assumed that the level of international cooperation will be 
a ‘middle of the road’ track and the level of EU centralisation will remain roughly as it is now. 
This document goes one step further and carries out a sort of resilience analysis, where we 
investigate how the instrument mixes could be adapted depending on which scenarios 
regarding international governance and EU governance are realised. The CECILIA2050 project 
does not assess whether the costs of meeting EU’s targets are justified by the benefits of 
avoided emissions. It is assumed that EU’s long run targets are met regardless of the climate 
actions of other countries. The EU climate targets are taken as a starting point.   
The instrument mixes are assessed according to the criteria developed by Görlach (2013). The 
assessment covers three dimensions: environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and 
feasibility. The environmental effectiveness evaluates whether the instrument mix is able to 
bring about the necessary emission reduction. The cost-effectiveness criterion measures the 
cost associated with the emission reduction. This criterion has as the ideal the least cost 
reduction in emissions at least cost now (static efficiency) and over time (dynamic efficiency). 
The feasibility criterion indicates the risk that the policy fails to be adopted as planned and/or 
to deliver as expected.     
The international context will be a key element of EU climate policy. Not only the effectiveness 
but also the efficiency and the feasibility of EU climate policy will depend on the climate polices 
in the rest of the world. Although the COP21 in Paris should reveal climate actions and/or 
commitments outside the EU, the uncertainty about the evolution of the international context 
is likely to remain. Hence, the EU should be prepared to respond suitably to different 
international scenarios. In this document, we suggest two alternative scenarios to the one 
proposed by Drummond (2015) and Huppes (2015). First, we assume that international climate 
negotiations lead to very ambitious commitments but without legally binding agreements and 
a low degree of convergence and harmonization of climate instruments. On the other hand, 
our second scenario assumes low ambition by the rest of world but legally binding agreements 
                                                     
1 Drummond (2015) and Huppes (2015) are part of a coordinated effort in the CECILIA2050 projects.  
     
Page 11 PART 3 Assessment of EU Instrumentation Options under Different Supranational Governance Scenarios 
and a high degree of convergence and harmonization of climate instruments. As will be seen 
later these scenarios span a wide range of possible economic outcomes within which the EU 
actions can be evaluated. 
EU governance will also play an important role on EU climate policy, particularly for the 
feasibility of several instruments. Past experiences show that not all policy instruments are 
politically feasible. The rejection to the proposal of the European Commission to establish a 
carbon tax in the 1990s illustrates that EU governance will be crucial for the feasibility of 
several instruments. In this document, we suggest two alternative scenarios to the one 
proposed by Drummond (2015) and Huppes (2015). In the first scenario, we assume that most 
of the climate decisions are established at the EU level and, therefore, there is a centralisation 
of EU governance structure. In the second scenario, we assume a re-nationalisation of the 
climate policy and thereby climate instruments are designed and implemented at national 
level.      
The rest of the document is organized as follows. The next section describes governance 
scenarios. Section 2.1 and section 2.2 focuses on the international and the EU governance, 
respectively; current features of the international and EU governance are described and two 
scenarios are proposed for each governance dimension. Section 3 assesses the instrument 
packages proposed by Huppes (2015) in each governance scenario. Initially, Section 3.1 
summarizes the key characteristics of the climate policy pathways. Section 3.2 and section 3.3 
assess the climate policy pathway in the international and EU governance scenarios, 
respectively. Section 4 concludes.   
2 Governance Scenarios 
2.1 International Governance 
Climate change is a global problem and faces the difficulties common to all global public goods. 
The main benefits of unilateral actions are shared with other countries, while the cost is 
assumed by the region/country which implements mitigation measures. This makes the 
international dimension of the EU climate policy particularly important. In 2012 the EU 
accounted for around 10% of global emissions. This implies that the influence of the EU is very 
limited. Without international contribution, the impact of EU actions on emissions mitigation 
would be insufficient. Moreover, EU’s climate policies could lead to higher emissions outside 
the EU (i.e. carbon leakage).  
The CECILIA2050 project does not assess whether the costs of meeting EU’s targets are justified 
by the benefits of avoided emissions. It is assumed that EU’s long run targets are met regardless 
of the climate actions of other countries. The EU climate targets are taken as a starting point. 
However, these targets can be achieved with different strategies and the international context 
should be a key factor to determine these strategies. International cooperation may a have a 
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role in stimulating green investment and technological innovation. It can also be crucial for the 
acceptability of EU climate policies by the general public and the cost of meeting the EU targets.  
This document explores the implications of the international context on the EU climate policy. 
Following Zelljadt (2014) we propose different international scenarios based on two criteria: 
ambition and convergence. The degree of ambition measures how many countries implement 
climate policies and how stringent they are. The degree of convergence assesses the similarity 
between instrument structures and their harmonization. It also measures the likelihood of 
reaching binding international agreements.  
International climate negotiations have shown that there may be a trade-off between these 
two criteria (IPCC, 2014). Participating countries may be willing to accept more ambitious 
commitments when there are not strong and mandatory, while international cooperation and 
coordination may result in less ambitious targets. The Kyoto Protocol showed that when 
targets are ambitious the number of participants may be very low. On the other hand, in the 
Copenhagen 2009 conference a higher consensus was achieved, given that countries 
registered voluntary actions under non-committal pledges. Ideally international agreement 
should move to a scenario with a high degree of ambition and convergence, but this does not 
look very likely.  
     
Figure 1 Scenario landscapes 
 
Source: Zelljadt (2014) 
 
In Drummond (2015) and Huppes (2015), an international policy context is assumed in which 
the degree of ambition and convergence is slightly higher than current status quo. Thus, they 
do not assume major changes in the international arena and the balance between ambition 
and convergence remains roughly like now. In this document two additional scenarios are 
explored. Following the nomenclature given by Zelljadt (2014), we analyse the implications for 
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the EU climate policy of the Non-global-deal scenario and the Middle-of-the-road scenario. The 
Non-global-deal scenario assumes a high degree of ambition and a low degree of convergence. 
This implies that the likelihood of reaching a legally binding international agreement on global 
emission reduction target is very low. National measures are not coordinated, but they are 
ambitious enough for limiting global warming to 2˚C. The Middle-of-the-road scenario assumes 
a high degree of policy convergence but a lack of ambition. Countries agree on joint programs 
and global mitigation instruments. However, given the low ambition of climate policy 
instruments, global warming would tend to 4˚C.     
According to IPCC (2014) the structure of international governance can be specified around 
four elements: (i) legal binding nature, (ii) goals and targets, (iii) flexible mechanisms and (iv) 
equitable methods for effort sharing. We will base our analysis on these four elements to 
construct the international governance scenarios.  
2.1.1 Current features of International Governance 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main forum for 
climate change negotiations. The UNFCC is an international treaty which aims to “stabilize GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”. It was adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. 
Today, 196 countries have ratified the convention. Since 1995, the parties to the convention 
have met annually to assess the evolution of climate change.        
In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was adopted with the aim to commit UNFCCC parties by setting 
internationally binding emission reduction targets. It entered into forced in 2005, and has two 
commitment periods, the first started in 2008 and ended in 2012, and the second runs from 
2012 to 2020. Under Kyoto’s first commitment period, industrialised countries agreed to cut 
GHG emissions by about 5% over the period 2008-2012 from the 1990 levels. The 15 countries 
that were EU Member States at the time Kyoto Protocol was adopted committed to reduce 
GHG emissions by 8%. In the second Kyoto period 38 developed countries have agreed to 
participate, including the EU Member States. The Parties committed to cut emissions by at 
least 18% from 1990 levels. However, the impact of the Kyoto Protocol has been limited 
because several developed countries such as the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan and New 
Zealand are not participating. Moreover, the agreement only covers emissions on developed 
countries. This implies that the Kyoto Protocol applies to only around 14% of the world's 
emissions.     
After the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC parties have agreed to further commitments. In 2009, 114 
country Parties agreed on the Copenhagen Accord, which states that “deep cuts in global 
emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global 
temperature below 2ºC, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on 
the basis of equity” (UNFCCC, 2009). The accord agreed that developed countries would 
commit to emissions targets for 2020. Developed countries should also raise funds to help 
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developing countries cut emissions. These would implement mitigations actions to slow 
growth in their GHG emissions. The Copenhagen Accord includes countries representing over 
80% of global emissions. However, in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the accord is not legally 
binding.     
In the last Conference of the Parties of UNFCCC held in Lima, the basis for a new global climate 
agreement to be signed at the next meeting in Paris was established. The Parties reached an 
agreement on conditions for defining the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDC). Each country will define its mitigation commitments for implementation from 2020. 
Thus, the Parties will have a solid, common basis on which to negotiate in Paris. They also 
agreed on raise a new Green Climate Fund (GCF) with an initial $10 billion target.    
Although the UNFCCC has become the main framework for climate change negotiations, there 
is a growing number of fora and institutions at multiple scales2. Other institutions have 
emerged in part from the inclusion of climate change issues in other policy arenas (e.g., 
sustainable development and international trade). IPCC (2014) states the need to account for 
the variety of international, transnational, regional, national and sub-national agreements and 
institutions. They may represent an opportunity with potential co-benefits, but could also 
increase negation costs.      
For example, the REDD+ Partnership focuses on reducing emissions from deforestation and 
degradation.  More than 50 have signed non-binding agreements to raise money and thus 
finance project related to the conservation and management of the forests. The International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) brings together 163 states with the aim of developing and 
financing renewable energy technologies. Although members are only industrialized countries, 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD have become two important fora to 
provide analytical support on technical issues for climate change.    
   
2.1.2 Non-global-deal Scenario 
The philosophy of this scenario is developed by Zelljadt (2014). The Non-global-deal scenario 
assumes ambitious unilateral initiatives to reduce GHG emissions. In the absence of a UNFCCC 
legally binding agreement, each country (region) implements individual measures. There is a 
lack of coordination between national instruments; however they are ambitious enough to 
limit global warming to 2˚C. The EU initiatives such as the EU ETS are not linked to similar 
trading systems in other regions. Following IPCC (2014) we specify the structure of 
international cooperation around four elements: 
Legal commitment 
IPCC (2014) sets out four indicators of legal binding commitment: (i) legal type, (ii) mandatory 
commitments, (iii) specificity, and (iv) the type of enforcement procedures. Based on these 
                                                     
2 See IPCC 2014 for a complete review of international fora and institutions. 
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indicators, they show several examples of commitments in international agreements for 
climate change. For example, there are legally binding commitments with enforcement 
mechanism (e.g. Kyoto Protocol3) and mandatory provision in a non-legally binding agreement 
(e.g. Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agreements).     
We assume that in a Non-global-deal scenario the likelihood of reaching a legally binding 
commitment is very low. Thus, we do not consider that international agreements such as the 
Kyoto Protocol could be achieved. In this scenario international agreements are ‘soft’. There 
are not mandatory commitments and they are not expressed in sufficient detail. Each country 
would send their pledges on targets and actions, but there are no enforcement procedures, 
mechanisms and sanctions. The UNFCCC do not coordinate emissions monitoring, reporting 
and verification. Reputation and reciprocity are the main drivers of individual actions. 
Goals and targets 
In this scenario, the world’s largest emitters agree on limiting the temperature increase to 2˚C. 
This implies that GHG concentration level does not exceed 450 ppm and, therefore, requires 
the climate pledges made by individual parties to be very ambitious. The lack of an 
international binding agreement facilitates the adoption of ambitious plans. Countries set their 
GHG emission reduction targets relative to different measures: a historical baseline, economic 
output, population growth and business as usual projections. The EU maintains the domestic 
2030 GHG emission reduction target of at least 40% compared to 1990, 60% by 2040 and 80% 
by 2050.    
Flexible mechanisms 
The lack of coordinated actions would not allow the implementation of flexible mechanisms. 
National instruments would not be harmonized. This will impede countries to have flexibility 
in meeting their emission targets. The EU ETS, for instance, would not be linked to other 
emission trading systems. The flexible mechanisms provided under the Kyoto Protocol such as 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) could not be applied.   
Equitable methods for effort sharing 
In this context, one might expect that national efforts on emissions reduction would be based 
on own economic and environmental interests. In the absence of a global agreement, effort 
sharing may be limited to soft agreements between countries.  
 
                                                     
3 The withdrawal of Canada from the Kyoto Protocol shows that although there are enforcement mechanisms 
they have never been enforced.  
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2.1.3 Middle-of the-road scenario 
The philosophy of this scenario is based on the Middle-of-the-road scenario developed by 
Zelljadt (2014). In this scenario, the degree of convergence is higher than that in the Non-
global-deal scenario, but it comes at the expense of higher ambition. The lower ambition allows 
parties to reach an UNFCCC international agreement; however the lack of ambition prevents 
achieving the objective of limiting global warming to 2˚C. The EU commits to a GHG emission 
reduction target of 80% by 2050, even though the effort of the rest of the world remains much 
less ambitious. Given that the EU accounts for around 10% of global emissions, it would have 
little impact on global warming, which would head for an increase of 4˚C. The convergence of 
national and regional climate policy would facilitate the coordination of policy instruments. 
Parties may converge by adopting the same emissions caps, renewable energy quotas, energy 
efficiency standards or carbon taxes. Thus, the EU climate instruments such as the EU ETS could 
be linked to similar trading systems in other regions.             
In this context the four elements of international governance would be characterized by: 
Legal commitment 
Based on the IPCC (2014) indicators of international commitments, specified above, this 
scenario would be characterized by mandatory provisions in a legally binding agreement. The 
UNFCCC parties would reach an international agreement on emission reductions. The legal 
commitment would be very similar to that of the Kyoto Protocol. The low ambition on emission 
targets would facilitate reaching an agreement. Thus, in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the 
world largest emitters would participate in the agreement, including developing countries such 
as China and India.        
Goals and targets 
The high degree of convergence comes at the expense of lower ambition on emission reduction 
targets. Similarly to the Kyoto Protocol there would be fixed targets on developed countries. 
Developing countries could fix their emission targets relative to economic growth or business-
as-usual projections. The EU would keep its long-term emission targets, regardless of the 
climate actions of other countries. The likelihood of limiting global warming to 2˚C would be 
very low, and we would tend to an increase of 4˚C.  
Flexible mechanisms 
The high degree of convergence would allow flexible mechanisms to meet national targets. 
Although the global target to limit the temperature increase would be fixed, states would have 
flexibility in meeting their obligations and thereby lower the cost of reducing emissions. 
National and regional climate policy instrument would be coordinated. The three flexible 
mechanisms provided under the Kyoto Protocol (or some variants) could be implemented: the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and international emissions 
trading (IET). The CDM allows a country to implement an emission-reduction project in 
developing countries. JI allows a country to earn emission reduction units from an emission-
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reduction project in another country. IET allows countries trade emissions allowances. Thus, 
the EU climate instruments such as the EU ETS could be linked to similar trading systems in 
other regions. 
Equitable methods for effort sharing 
As pointed out by Bosetti and Frankel (2011), international agreements should be realistic. To 
make an international agreement politically feasible, countries should perceive the agreement 
to be fair to its own economic and environmental interests. IPCC (2014) shows a complete 
summary of effort sharing methods analysed in the literature. The aim of this document is not 
to assess whether an international agreement is fair or not. We will assume that in this scenario 
the world’s largest emitters agree to reduce emissions and set emissions targets, and these are 
accepted by all countries.    
 
Table 1 International governance scenarios 
 Legal 
commitment 
Goals and 
targets 
Flexible 
Mechanisms 
Equitable 
methods for 
effort sharing 
Non-global 
deal scenario 
There are not 
legally binding 
commitments. 
There is an 
International 
agreement to 
limit the 
temperature 
increase by 2˚C. 
There are not 
links between 
national/regional 
climate 
instruments. 
National efforts 
are based on 
each country’s 
economic and 
environmental 
interests. 
Middle-of-the-
road scenario 
There are 
mandatory 
provisions in a 
legally binding 
agreement. 
International 
commitments 
would limit the 
temperature 
increase by 4˚C. 
The high degree 
of international 
convergence 
allows the 
implementation 
of flexible 
mechanisms. 
International 
agreements are 
realistic and 
accepted by all 
countries.  
 
2.2 EU Governance  
When analysing climate instrument packages, it is essential to consider future EU governance 
structures. Not only the performance but also the feasibility of the instrument packages 
proposed by Drummond (2015) and Huppes (2015) will depend on future EU governance 
structures. Drummond (2015) and Huppes (2015) assume that it will remain roughly as it is 
now. This situation, however, may change. Governance in the EU is dynamic and may vary in 
the coming years. 
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The current climate instrument package is a mix of EU-wide and national initiatives. EU-wide 
instruments (e.g. EU ETS and Fleet Standards) coexist with national instruments (e.g. feed-in 
tariff schemes and low-emission-car subsidies). The development of current governance 
structure may take different pathways. In this section two additional EU governance scenarios 
are built according to the relationship between the EU and the Member States. There are two 
possible tendencies: (i) further centralisation or (ii) renationalisation of climate policies, with 
deviating interpretations of the subsidiarity principle.     
Bausch et al. (2015) offer a complete view of centralisation and decentralisation trends in the 
history of EU climate policy. They argue that, while the 2020 climate and energy package 
implies further centralisation on EU governance, the 2030 framework represents a more 
decentralised solution. Based on the current features, we construct two possible pathways for 
the development of EU governance.      
 
2.2.1 Current features of EU governance 
As in other areas where the EU and Member States share competence, climate policy has been 
a struggle between those Member States wanting more centralisation and others wanting 
more nationalisation of EU climate policy. Bausch et al. (2015) argue that the centralisation of 
climate policy instruments has not been an easy task. The first attempts to centralised climate 
policy instruments failed. For example, in the 1990s the European Commission proposed a 
carbon tax at the EU level. Taxation measures require unanimity in the Council of Ministers and 
many Member States opposed to carbon taxation at the EU level. The centralisation of EU 
climate policy began in the early 2000s. During this period, the Directive 2001/77/EC on the 
promotion of renewables and the Directive 2003/87/EC establishing the EU ETS were adopted. 
Although the promotion of renewables did not establish binding targets at national level and 
the EU ETS was initially a decentralised system, these directives represented a step toward 
more centralisation of EU climate policy.  
The so-called 20-20-20 targets, set by EU leaders in 2007, meant a higher centralisation in 
climate and energy governance at EU level (Wettestad et al., 2012). The 2020 climate and 
energy package is based on a set of binding legislation. The Renewable Energy Directive implied 
an increase in centralisation, making renewable targets binding for each Member State. 
Similarly the EU ETS became more centralised, substituting national caps with an EU-wide cap, 
and centralising the allocation of allowances. The Effort Sharing Decision established national 
emissions targets for those sectors not covered by the EU ETS such as housing, agriculture and 
transport. However, in contrast to the EU ETS, which is regulated at EU level, it is the 
responsibility of Member States to design and implement national policies to meet the target 
set by the Effort Sharing Decision. Although Member States have flexibility to implement their 
own policy instruments, some measures taken at EU level affect those sectors not covered by 
the EU ETS (e.g. CO2 emission standards for new cars and Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive). Finally, the 2020 climate and energy package set a 20% improvement in the EU’s 
energy efficiency, but not national targets.     
     
Page 19 PART 3 Assessment of EU Instrumentation Options under Different Supranational Governance Scenarios 
The 2030 framework for climate and energy policies shows a trend towards decentralisation. 
This framework requires that in 2030 EU emissions should be reduced by at least 40% 
compared to the 1990 level. Those sectors covered by the EU ETS would have to reduce their 
emissions by 43% compared to 2005. Although there is no specification for Member States, 
the non-EU ETS sectors would need to reduce emissions by 30% below the 2005 level4. In 
contrast to the 2020 climate package, the renewable energy target is binding for the EU as a 
whole, but without national targets.  This has meant a lower degree of legal commitment at 
national level. The energy efficiency target is also set at the EU level. The 2030 framework also 
presents a proposal to improve the design of the EU ETS. The first stages of the EU ETS were 
characterized by an oversupply of allowances, partly as a result of the economic crisis. The 
price of emission allowances slumped, affecting the cost-effectiveness of the system 
(European Commission, 2014a). The past performance of the EU ETS is a consequence of the 
design of the instrument and not of its centralisation. However, a structural reform of the EU 
ETS may lead to reconsider its degree of centralisation. Some Member States have 
implemented measures to improve the performance of the EU ETS. The UK, for example, 
introduced a “carbon price floor”, so that when the price of allowances falls below the set 
threshold, the power generation companies covered by the EU ETS would need to pay the 
difference (UK Parliament, 2013). This case illustrates that the development of the EU ETS can 
take different ways, and the decentralisation of the system cannot be dismissed.   
The 2030 framework proposes a new governance framework, which will respect the Member 
States’ freedom to determine their energy mix while facilitating coordination and cooperation 
between Member States.  The European Council (European Council, 2014) agreed that the new 
governance structure will: 
 Build on the existing building blocks such as national climate programmes. 
 Step up the role and rights of consumers, transparency and predictability for investors. 
 Facilitate coordination of national energy policies. 
The proposal for a new governance framework remains open and poses several questions. An 
important issue is how the Member States’ freedom to determine their energy mix will be 
shaped in the new proposal for an Energy Union. In February 2015, the European Commission 
presented a framework strategy for an Energy Union (European Commission, 2015a). The 
proposed framework aims to: 
 Improve energy security, solidarity and trust. 
 Integrate European energy market 
 Improve energy efficiency 
 Decarbonise the economy 
                                                     
4 The European Commission notes that this needs to be translated into individual targets for Member States. 
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 Encourage research, innovation and competitiveness. 
Currently each Member State has its own energy regulatory framework. An Energy Union 
would integrate national energy markets and create an EU-wide energy system where energy 
flows freely across borders. This would require a structural transformation of Europe’s energy 
system and, consequently, the development of an Energy Union would depend on the 
evolution of EU governance.       
 
2.2.2 EU centralised scenario 
This scenario assumes a centralisation of EU governance structure. This would imply that 
relevant climate decisions are established at the EU level. The EU would be a supranational 
body with the authority and control over climate policy. This would result in a harmonisation 
of climate policy across Member States.      
In this section we will focus on some key areas and assess how they would be affected by higher 
centralisation of the EU governance. 
Carbon pricing      
As mentioned above, the European Commission is currently assessing different alternatives to 
carry out a structural reform of the EU ETS. The first trading periods of the EU ETS were 
characterized by a large imbalance between supply and demand of allowances, which 
weakened the carbon price signal. This reduced the incentives for low-carbon investment and 
affected the cost-effectiveness of the system.      
We assume that further centralisation in the EU governance would facilitate the 
implementation of a structural reform of the EU ETS. This scenario assumes that the EU ETS 
could be reformed applying one of the six options proposed by the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2014b). In the short-term a market stability reserve could be 
implemented as proposed by the European Commission (European Commission, 2014c). 
According to the impact assessment (European Commission, 2014b) such a reserve could help 
address the current imbalance between the supply and demand for allowances. It would be 
implemented at the beginning of phase 4 in 2021. Allowances would be placed in and released 
from the reserve depending on the total number of allowances in circulation. This would 
provide supply flexibility to respond to demand shocks, caused by economic activity, fuel 
prices, weather, etc. Moreover, it would make possible to adjust the supply of allowances 
depending on the impacts of other climate policies such as renewables and energy efficiency 
instruments. Operating rules would be pre-defined and would leave no discretion to the 
Commission or Member States in its implementation. The market stability reserve will not 
affect the cap; thereby the emission reduction objective would be met.    
In the long-term, other mechanisms for carbon pricing could be implemented. The market 
stability reserve could be substituted by a price collar, as proposed by Knopf and Edenhofer 
(2014), which would keep allowance prices between a floor and a ceiling. The EU ETS could 
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eventually be transformed into an emission tax. All these reforms would be possible thanks to 
a strong EU.      
Energy Union 
European Commission (2015a) presents the main implications of an Energy Union. According 
to the European Commission an Energy Union would need an integrated governance to deepen 
the cooperation between Member States and with the Commission. An internal energy market 
would need bodies to ensure cooperation among transmission system operators and 
regulator. The European Commission considers that the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity and Gas (ENTSO-E/G) should be upgraded to integrate the 
transmission system operation. Likewise, the authority and independence of the Agency for 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) should be reinforced to carry out regulatory function 
at the EU level. Currently the ACER has very limited decision-making rights and acts through 
recommendations and opinions. An Energy Union would also require the implementation of 
infrastructure projects, such as the minimum interconnection for electricity at 10% of installed 
production capacity. To achieve this, it will be necessary to provide resources to different 
funding schemes (e.g. European Fund for Strategic Investments) which could finance viable 
investments.          
All these requirements can only be met with further centralisation of the EU governance. 
Hence, we consider that this scenario would allow a common energy market. This scenario 
would also lead to a loss in national powers.  Although the 2030 framework proposes a new 
governance framework, which will respect the Member States’ freedom to determine their 
energy mix (European Council, 2014), we assume that an Energy Union would make this 
impossible.  
Infrastructure 
Current EU infrastructures are not sufficient to make the transition to a low carbon economy. 
The implementation of new infrastructure projects will be particularly important for energy 
and transport. In this context, the level of governance will be crucial to determine how 
decisions about infrastructure investment are taken and how they are financed. When 
considering further centralisation of the EU governance, we will assume that a European body 
is created or adapted for infrastructure planning and financing5. This body would have 
sufficient financial resources for the implementation of major infrastructure projects. This 
body would be independent enough to assess objectively national infrastructure needs, 
considering all the benefits and the risks. This does not imply that infrastructure will be 
financed only through public funds. Public-private partnership approaches could be created, 
to attract private investments in infrastructure projects.         
                                                     
5 Currently there are several schemes to finance green infrastructure such as the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Fund for Strategic Investments and the European Investment Bank. 
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Target setting 
The 2020 climate and energy package set the 20-20-20 targets, regarding GHG emissions, 
energy consumption produced from renewable resources and energy efficiency at the EU level. 
The package also included binding national targets for reducing their GHG emissions from the 
sectors not covered by the EU ETS and national renewable energy targets. The recently agreed 
2030 framework for climate and energy policies excludes national targets. This has created a 
debate about advantages and disadvantages of specific targets and national targets (Bausch et 
al, 2015). This debate is related to the competences of the EU and the Member States. Some 
Member states consider that setting specific targets and national targets, they cannot follow 
their preferences and pathways to reduce emissions. We assume that a centralisation of 
climate policies would allow the EU to set specific targets and the level of ambition. They EU 
could also set binding national targets and would have the competence to monitor the 
compliance of the targets.           
 
2.2.3 EU decentralised scenario 
This scenario assumes a shift of the EU governance structure towards nationalisation. This 
would imply that most of the climate decisions are established at national level. The role of the 
EU would focus on the coordination and harmonisation of national climate policies. Regarding 
technology the EU cannot set standards (e.g. fleet, appliances) and it role is limited to 
information and recommendation.     
In this section we focus on some key areas and assess how they would be affected by higher 
decentralisation of the EU governance. 
Carbon pricing     
Although the functioning of the EU ETS has been suboptimal, a decentralised scenario would 
not make possible a structural reform of the system. In this scenario, the European Commission 
proposal for a structural reform of the EU ETS would not take place.      
In a decentralised scenario, we assume that there will not be major changes in the functioning 
of the EU ETS. We should expect that the current imbalance between supply and demand of 
allowances would remain in the coming years. The European Commission estimates that the 
surplus of allowances accounted for 2.1 billion by the end of 2013, and it will grow to more 
than 2.6 billion by 2020.    
In the absence of a structural reform at the EU level, we could expect that some Member States 
would introduce national mechanisms to correct the poor functioning of the EU ETS. Some 
Member States could follow the UK, and introduce a carbon price floor (UK Parliament, 2013). 
Eventually the EU ETS could phase out.     
Energy Union 
All the requirements for an Energy Union would be impossible to meet without further 
centralisation of the EU Governance. Consequently, we assume that in this scenario, there are 
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no major changes from current energy market. Currently each Member State has its own 
regulatory framework and the energy mix is determined at national level. Cross-border 
connections are limited and, therefore, we assume that they could be expanded in the future 
only under bilateral agreements. In this scenario, we also assume that infrastructure projects 
and financial requirements would manage at the national level.      
Infrastructure 
The lack of internal cohesion will not facilitate the creation of an independent European body 
for the implementation of major infrastructure projects. In this context, infrastructure planning 
and financing will be managed at national level. The lack of investment cooperation would 
increase the risk of not achieving emission reduction targets. The role of the EU would focus 
on basic functions of coordination. The EU could also co-finance some strategic infrastructure.     
Target setting 
Only a strong EU can set specific targets and national targets. Thus, in a decentralised scenario 
we do not expect that the EU can set binding targets on the GHG emissions of Member States. 
The compliance of emission reduction objectives would be a national competence. Each 
Member State would have the freedom to choose the pathway to achieve their climate targets. 
In this context, the EU would not be able to set targets on renewables and energy efficiency 
neither at national level nor at EU level. 
 
Table 2 EU governance scenarios 
 Carbon pricing Energy Union Infrastructure Target setting 
EU centralised 
scenario 
Structural 
reforms are 
possible. Other 
mechanisms for 
carbon pricing 
could be 
implemented. 
An Energy 
Union is 
created.   
A European 
body is created 
or adapted for 
infrastructure 
planning and 
financing. 
The EU could set 
binding national 
targets on 
emissions and 
other specific 
targets. 
EU 
decentralised 
scenario 
A structural 
reform of the 
EU ETS is not 
possible 
There are no 
major changes 
from current 
energy 
market. 
Infrastructure 
planning and 
financing is 
managed at 
national level. 
The EU role is 
limited to 
providing 
recommendations 
to member states. 
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3 Assessment of Instrument Packages in each Governance Scenario 
3.1 Instrument packages 
Based on a bottom-up approach, Huppes (2015) presents four options for the development of 
current climate policy instrumentation in the four main sectors: electricity, industry, buildings 
and transport. The set of instruments are linked to four basic options of emission pricing: no 
emission pricing, pure cap-and-trade, price stabilized cap-and-trade and pure emission tax. The 
four sectoral instrument mixes linked to each pricing system are added to come up with four 
climate policy pathways.  
This section presents the key features of these four climate policy pathways. A more complete 
analysis can be found in Huppes (2015).    
3.1.1 Technology-specific pathway 
Electricity sector 
 Emission standards and subsidies, as feed-in premiums and capacity payments, are 
implemented to promote renewables and stimulate storage facilities.   
 The implementation of emission standards, which are specified in terms of emissions 
per kWh, leading to the phase out of coal and later gas. 
 In principle, electricity sectors remain national.  
 The EU ETS is phased out. 
Industry sector 
 Emissions are regulated by standards. For some new and innovative low emission 
industries, technology subsidies are implemented. 
 Standards are based on BAT (Best Available Technology) and are specified by the EU 
and implemented nationally. 
 CCS technology may be subsidized in basic industries for primary iron and steel 
production and cement production.   
 The EU ETS is phased out and there is no generic carbon pricing. 
Buildings sector 
 Energy use in buildings is reduced through standards. There are also information 
measures and subsidies. 
 New buildings are subject to insulation standards. A combination of standards and 
subsidies is implemented for retrofitting the existing building stock. 
 The efficiency of appliances is improved through information measures and product 
standards. 
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 Decarbonizing buildings may follow two routes: electrification or hydrogen delivery 
replacing natural gas in distribution systems. Both seem mutually incompatible and cost 
development may determine the winner.  
 Initially, a hydrogen infrastructure may partly replace the natural gas infrastructure. 
There are demonstration projects on heat pumps and heat storage systems, and new 
multifunctional fuel cell systems.  
 Instruments are implemented at national level. The international hydrogen 
infrastructure would require the active support but not ownership by the European 
Commission. 
Transport sector 
 Fleet standards are implemented for all vehicle categories. The set-up of fleet standards 
is based on emissions only. 
 Similarly to buildings, there are different options for decarbonisation: electricity and 
hydrogen. It is induced the development of all relevant infrastructures to keep options 
open. 
 There are subsidies on electric and hydrogen fuel cell drives.   
 There is no carbon pricing. Fuel taxes rise modestly and there are taxes on combustion 
motors.   
 Air and sea transport are mostly left out of climate policy, but taxed normally.  
 
3.1.2 ETS pure-cap pathway 
Electricity sector 
 The EU ETS is the main driver of decarbonisation. The emission cap is set at a fixed 
reduction path of 8% per year. 
 Current subsidies on the promotion of renewables are phased out. However, there are 
learning curves subsidies for some renewables. 
 There are two options to counteract the high uncertainty on investment paths: (i) 
subsidizing stabilization technologies and (ii) developing and open electricity market.    
 In addition to the EU ETS, there are R&D subsidies for electricity storage system. 
Industry sector 
 The EU ETS covers all industrial emissions.  
 BAT specifications are implemented as an information instrument, to help industries 
reduce emissions actively. 
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 In order to overcome price uncertainty, technology specific instrumentation could be 
implemented, but more modestly than in the Stimulation and Forcing Mix. Some 
subsidies can be introduced with a focus on BAT. 
Buildings sector 
 The EU ETS is expanded to cover the buildings sector. This implies that the 
administrative implementation is moved upstream. The cap includes all primary 
production and imports of fossils and fossil energy products, also covering hydrogen 
production.   
 Similarly to industry sector, technology specific instrumentation could be implemented 
to counteract price uncertainty and encourage investment on low carbon technologies. 
These instruments cannot too ambitious and their contribution in terms of emission 
reduction should be taken into account, otherwise EU ETS price will plummet. 
 Additional technology specific measures could be refurbishing subsidies on the worst 
performance buildings and are implemented at national level. New technologies are 
subsidies to create learning curves. 
 Hydrogen infrastructure is developed by EU in parallel to natural gas piping.  
Transport sector 
 The EU ETS is expanded to cover the transport sector. As mentioned above, this implies 
that the administrative implementation is moved upstream.  
 The EU ETS domain is also expanded to include emissions in air and sea transport. 
 Fleet standards are phased out. National excise taxes on fuels lose importance under 
the pure cap. 
 In order to avoid technology lock-ins, new technologies are subsidized (e.g. electric and 
hydrogen fuel cell drives). 
 Member states are required to build refuelling electric and hydrogen network. 
 
3.1.3 ETS price stabilized pathway 
Electricity sector 
 The EU ETS is the main driver of decarbonisation. The EU ETS is reformed, setting a 
price floor and ceiling. The cap volume is adjusted to keep the EU ETS price between 
these values. 
 Subsidies are offered at different administrative levels. EU funding is focused on R&D. 
The creation of learning curves for upcoming technologies is co-funded by the EU and 
Member States.  
     
Page 27 PART 3 Assessment of EU Instrumentation Options under Different Supranational Governance Scenarios 
 There are also national subsidy schemes to promote renewables. National technology 
subsidies are implemented for resolving regional and national intermittency. 
Industry sector 
 All industrial emissions are covered by the EU ETS, which keeps the price within a 
determined range.  
 There is no risk of making the price of the EU ETS price irrelevant, as in the pure cap 
mix, and therefore, a more active industrial policy is developed. 
 There are EU subsidies for R&D. National efforts are focused on demonstration projects 
and implementation of highly relevant but slightly expensive technologies. 
 The EU develops hydrogen infrastructure. 
Buildings sector 
 The EU ETS covers all fossil fuels used in buildings. The administrative level is upstream. 
 Buildings standards remain to protect rental homes from underinvestment. In the long-
term information measures support market functioning. 
 In the medium-term, national subsidies are implemented to finance buildings 
insulation. 
 There is the EU electricity market and the EU international hydrogen transport. 
 EU funds for R&D are focused on integrating seasonal energy storage in buildings. 
Transport sector 
 The EU ETS is expanded to cover the transport sector, including air and sea transport. 
The cap is administered upstream beyond the refinery level. 
 Current fleet standards are abolished in the medium-term.  
 There may be limited subsidies for market creation of novel technologies, for instance, 
subsidizing zero emission cars. 
 Standardization is limited and coordinated by the EU. Fossil fuels are press out of most 
heavy transport domain by standards and subsidies.  
 There is a public transmission grid for electricity and hydrogen, which is owned by the 
EU and Member States. 
 Development of transport infrastructure is focused at model shifts. 
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3.1.4 Emission tax pathway 
Electricity sector 
 The EU ETS is stepwise transformed into an emission tax. The tax level could increase 
10€ per year, reaching for example €200 per tonne CO2 in 2040 and €300 in 2050.  
 The administrative implementation is first with electricity producers, but then moves 
to fossil fuel producers and importers. 
 There is a Single European Electricity Market. 
 The international electricity grid is owned and operated at EU level. The national 
electricity grids and distribution grids are owned and operated publicly at national level. 
  Standardization plays a limited role. 
 Public funds for R&D are focus on basic research. 
Industry sector 
 Firstly the EU ETS is broadened to cover all industrial emissions, and then a single 
emission tax is fixed. There is upstream administration to cover smaller firms. 
 The pure emission tax would lead to more emphasis on a stricter public-private 
separation and more focus on purely public tasks. 
 There are few subsidies for high risk high potential technologies. 
 The hydrogen option may require public provision of hydrogen transmission and 
storage infrastructure. 
Buildings sector 
 The emission tax covers all emission in buildings. 
 Additional climate measures are abolished. There are no technology specific subsidies 
and no standards. Insulation standards are replaced by information measures. 
 Lon-term markets may not function in some cases and, therefore, public intervention 
may be required exceptionally. This can be the case for the development of energy 
storage systems. Public funding on R&D is focused on energy storage in housing.    
 Public infrastructure is developed for delivering electricity and hydrogen. Use options 
are managed by private parties. 
Transport sector 
 The emission tax also covers all fossil fuels used in the transport sector. It covers 
aviation and shipping.  
 Public intervention is minimized. Current fleet standards are abolished and there are 
limited public funds for R&D. 
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 The main infrastructures are developed publicly. Electricity and hydrogen 
infrastructures and markets are set up publicly to make zero emission drives in 
transport possible.   
 
3.2 Implications of the international governance context 
International Governance will be a key aspect to determine the effectiveness, cost-
effectiveness and feasibility of EU’s climate policy. In this section, we analyse how EU’s 
decarbonisation strategies would be affected by the international context.   
González-Eguino et al. (2015) analyse the effectiveness of the EU climate policy in a wide range 
of possible international contexts6. The scenarios considered range from the case where the 
EU goes alone for an emission reduction target of 80% by 2050, to the case where most of the 
countries participate in an international agreement. In the scenario where the EU goes alone, 
they find that the global mean temperature increase would be reduced just by 0.1˚C at the end 
of the century compared to the business-as-usual scenario. In the business-as-usual scenario 
temperature increase would be 3.8˚C above preindustrial level in 2100, while EU’s action would 
limit global warming to 3.7˚C. An ambitious global climate action, on the other hand, would be 
much effective in reducing GHG emissions. According to their results, when an ambitious 
carbon tax is implemented in most countries, global warming could be limited to 2.4˚C.  
These results show that, in the absence of ambitious global actions, the impact of the EU 
climate policy would be very weak. Thus, we should expect that the effectiveness of the EU 
climate policy would be higher in a Non-global-deal scenario than in a middle-of-the-road 
scenario. However, we should also consider the risk of breaching the pledges.  Although the 
Non-global-deal scenario assumes that national pledges will be ambitious enough for limiting 
global warming to 2˚C, the lack of any binding commitment may reduce the credibility of 
national pledges, especially during periods of economic difficulty or of exceptional growth. 
When national pledges cannot be verified or enforced, free-riders may surge.  
Another important aspect of the international context is carbon leakage. The effectiveness of 
the EU climate policy will depend on the level of ambition the rest of the world. Unilateral EU 
action may result in higher emissions abroad. Kuik (2015) use a dynamic Computable General 
Equilibrium model to study the determinants of carbon leakage in the long run, with a focus 
on the European iron and steel industry. In the absence of anti-leakage measures (e.g. free 
allocation of allowances in the EU ETS), when the EU acts alone carbon leakage rate would be 
of 44%. In addition to the price channel, they decompose carbon leakage in competitiveness 
channel and investment reallocation channel. The results show that the price channel is main 
driver of carbon leakage in short and medium term. However, from 2025 the competitiveness 
                                                     
6 The tool used for the analysis is GCAM, a dynamic recursive economic partial equilibrium model driven by 
assumptions about population size and GDP growth. 
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and especially the investment channel gain importance. In 2050, almost 60% of carbon leakage 
is determined by the investment channel. González-Eguino et al (2015) reckon that the carbon 
leakage rate would be about 28% when EU acts alone7. This means that the rest of the world 
would increase emissions by 0.28 tCO2 for each ton of CO2 avoided in the EU. They find that 
carbon leakage is mainly triggered by land use changes. The lower energy demand in the EU 
The leakage rate declines as the size of the coalition implementing the international climate 
regime increases. 
International governance is also crucial for the cost-effectiveness of EU climate policies. Several 
studies have assessed how global climate action, or inaction, will have an impact on the cost 
of meeting the EU targets. De Cian et al. (2013) show how EU’s decarbonisation strategies 
would be affected by the international context. They use eight different models8 to analyse 
four international scenarios. When the EU reduces emissions by 80%, and the rest of the world 
remains less ambitious, global GDP would decline between 0% and -10%, with a median value 
of -4.1%. Most of the economic losses take place in the EU and mainly from 2030 onwards. Not 
all sectors would be affected in the same way, while production of energy-intensive industries 
would decline up to -40%, the maximum decline in non-energy intensive industries would be -
15%. When the rest of the world implements climate policies of similar stringency as in the EU, 
mitigation costs are reduced considerably. European energy-intensive industries would gain 
market share and total value added in Europe would be higher. In 2050 global consumption 
would increase up to 5% compared to the scenario with asymmetry between the efforts of the 
EU and the rest of the world. De Cian et al. (2013) also detect the importance of harmonizing 
climate policies. They find that linking emission trading markets could increase GDP up to 6% 
compared to a non-coordinated scenario. In the same vein, Antimiani et al. (2015) find that the 
EU economy would benefit and carbon leakage would decrease when similar mitigation efforts 
are carried out by other countries. They also highlight the positive effects of linking emission 
trading markets across countries. Meyer et al. (2014) find that the GDP average annual growth 
rate of the EU would be reduced less than 0.1% when there is global cooperation.       
Political feasibility could also be affected by the international context. As argued by Munaretto 
and Walz (2015), the international climate debate plays a major role on the EU climate policy 
development. Climate actions in the rest of the world will influence decisions at the EU level. 
They carry out an analysis based a multi-method approach9 and observe that interest groups 
                                                     
7 This study considers two sources of carbon leakage: one due to the different fuel prices in countries with a 
carbon target as opposed to countries without one, and the other resulting from a shift of biomass/food 
production that is carbon intensive out of regions with a carbon target to regions without one.   
8 The set of models includes three Computable General Equilibrium models (EPPA, PACE, FARM-EU), three 
Energy System Models (POLES, TIAM-UCL, TIMES-VTT) and two Optimal Growth Models (WITCH, MERGE-CPB).    
9 The multi-method approach includes semi-structured in-depth interviews, focus groups, an on-line survey and 
a policy simulation with relevant stakeholders in the EU climate policy domain.  
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would not agree on the EU to take ambitious actions when the rest of the world does not 
cooperate. 
 
3.2.1 Climate instrumentation under a Non-global-deal scenario 
Based on the analysis in previous section, we summarize the key aspects to consider when 
evaluating the EU climate instrumentation under a Non-global-deal scenario: 
 The degree of global ambition is high. The efforts of the EU are similar to those of other 
countries. 
 There are not binding international agreements which increase the risk of non-
compliance. 
 There is a low degree of convergence among national/regional climate instruments. 
This international governance scenario would result in several challenges and opportunities for 
the EU climate policy. Probably the most important challenge is the one related with the risk 
of carbon leakage. As mentioned above, carbon leakage can occur through two channels: the 
price channel and the competitiveness channel (Kuik, 2014). The price channel works reducing 
the demand for fossil fuels in regulated countries and, thus, induces a drop in international 
prices, which could increase the demand in non-regulated countries. The competitiveness 
channel affects the competiveness of some sectors, especially the energy-intensive and trade-
exposed (EITE) industries that could be relocated to non-regulated countries. In the short term, 
this would imply a change of the utilization rate of existing capacities (operational leakage), 
while in the long-term, it would imply a change in production capacities (investment leakage).      
In this scenario, the main risk of carbon leakage should occur through the competitiveness 
channel. Although high global ambition is assumed, the lack of international coordination can 
create divergences of the climate regulation in energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. 
Some countries/regions may implement ambitious climate targets for most sectors of the 
economy, but protect those industries exposed to international competition. Or even if all 
countries implement ambitious regulation in trade-exposed industries, asymmetrical 
mitigation instruments can cause carbon leakage. As argued by Marcu et al. (2013), climate 
instruments impose a visible and a ‘shadow’ price for carbon. When the shadow price is not 
taken into account, asymmetric carbon constraints can be created, affecting industrial 
competitiveness. Thus, the lack of convergence between countries/region would increase the 
risk of carbon leakage in some EU industries.     
Another challenge for the EU climate policy stems from the lack of binding international 
agreements. This scenario foresees an international commitment to reduce emissions and limit 
global warming to 2˚C. However, there is no international authority to sanction non-compliant 
parties. This increases the uncertainty related the actions of other countries/regions. In this 
context, flexibility and capacity for modification as new information emerges would become a 
valuable feature of the EU climate instrumentation.  
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On the other hand, this scenario presents an opportunity derived from the ambitious climate 
actions in the rest of the world. More stringent regulation should lead to a higher demand of 
low carbon technologies. Several EU industries could benefit from this international context.        
 
Challenges: 
 The lack of international coordination and harmonization is a risk for carbon leakage, 
particularly through the competitiveness and the investment channel.  
 The EU should deal with high uncertainty regarding the climate actions of other 
countries. 
Opportunities: 
 Higher global demand of low carbon technologies. 
 
Technology-specific pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of a technology-specific pathway under a Non-
global-deal scenario which is characterized by high international ambition to reduce GHG 
emissions but without international cooperation and harmonization of climate policy 
instruments. 
The international context will be a key determinant of the environmental effectiveness of the 
EU climate policy, since carbon leakage is determined by the different climate regulations 
across countries. A more stringent climate policy in the EU compared to the rest of the world 
could lead to a high carbon leakage rate, reducing the environmental effectiveness of the EU 
climate policy. As argued above, in a non-global-deal scenario there is a risk of carbon leakage 
through the competitiveness and the investment channel. 
The effects of a technology-specific pathway on carbon leakage are ambiguous. In this policy 
instrumentation, climate regulation is implemented by subsidies and emission standards. The 
EU ETS is phased out. Thus, those industries exposed to a risk of carbon leakage benefit from 
a lower carbon price; however the effects of non-market based instruments on carbon leakage 
are ambiguous. Emission standards, for instance, work as implicit emission taxes on the input 
side where the fictitious tax revenues are recycled as implicit subsidies on the output side 
(Holland et al., 2009). While an emission tax induces emissions reduction through substitution 
effects, an output subsidy induces inefficiently high output. This mechanism may imply that, in 
a fragmented international scenario, emission standards can prevent carbon leakage and 
increase cost-effectiveness compared to carbon pricing (Holland, 2012). However, using a 
computable general equilibrium model, Böhringer et al. (2015) find that emission standards 
may increase rather than decrease carbon leakage compared to emission taxes or tradable 
emission allowances. Inappropriate stringency levels may impose a high burden on energy-
intensive and trade-exposed industries, reducing international competitiveness and increasing 
carbon leakage. 
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Therefore, in the absence of international harmonization of climate policies, implementing 
non-market based instruments, which reduce (or eliminate) carbon pricing, may not reduce 
the risk of carbon leakage. In order to tackle the risk of carbon leakage and thus increase 
environmental effectiveness, additional anti-leakage measures should be included in this 
instrument package. Given that this climate instrumentation pathway avoids carbon pricing, 
granting exemptions to energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries could be implemented 
as an anti-leakage measure. This measure exempts those industries exposed to a risk of carbon 
leakage from emission regulation. Although less effective than border tariffs, Böhringer et al. 
(2012) find that exemptions are effective in reducing carbon leakage. However granting 
exemptions to some industries prevents equating marginal abatement cost across sectors, 
which may even increase rather than decrease emission reduction cost.      
The lack of coordinated global actions not only may affect environmental effectiveness but also 
cost-effectiveness. Several studies find that the harmonization and coordination of 
national/regional climate policies reduces considerably mitigation costs (De Cian et al., 2013; 
Antimiani et al., 2015). These studies generally analyse the effects of linking market-based 
instruments such as emission taxes and emission trading systems and, although there is not 
empirical evidence on the global harmonization of non-market based instruments, we suspect 
that similar conclusions could be drawn.  
In addition to the costs derived from non-coordinated global actions, implementing 
technology-specific instruments rather than market-based instruments in a scenario without 
cooperation can negatively affect the EU economy. Based on the standard economic postulate, 
which states that emission taxes or emission trading systems achieve emission reduction at 
lowest cost, technology-specific instruments may impose a high burden on local industries. 
Governments have limited information and their intervention may increase mitigation costs 
(Helm, 2010). Given that there are no coordinated global actions and competitors abroad may 
have a less costly regulation, European industries may face higher costs of compliance than 
their international competitors and this would lead to a comparative disadvantage for 
European industries. The electricity sector may also face a more costly regulation, increasing 
electricity prices and reducing the competitiveness of the EU economy. 
On the other hand, in a scenario with high uncertainty regarding the climate actions of the rest 
of the world, a technology-specific pathway may create a stable framework for investment. As 
pointed out by IPCC (2014), uncertainty about the performance of new technologies is a major 
factor in their deployment. For instance, technology support policies such as feed-in-tariffs 
have been effective in promoting renewables in Germany and other countries. In this scenario, 
all emitting industries would also benefit from low carbon technology paths which would be 
developed and implemented through subsidies and standards. This regulatory framework can 
be more stable than a marked-based pathway, attracting low carbon investment to Europe. 
The global ambition to reduce emissions would increase the demand of low carbon 
technologies, creating business opportunities for many industries. The development of the 
right technologies will be crucial to gain market share in the world economy. In this context, 
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research, technology development and innovation should play a crucial role. Given that there 
are several market failures associated with RD&D investment (IPCC, 2014), public intervention 
can be particularly convenient in this scenario. The technology-specific pathway which 
proposes the creation of learning curves and the public support for RD&D in most of the sectors 
can be superior to a pure market pathway. 
In an uncertain international scenario, flexibility and capacity for modification are 
advantageous features of an instrumentation pathway. This may represent a disadvantage for 
a technology-specific pathway because some technology support instruments (e.g. emission 
standards) have been considered less flexible than market-based instruments (Burtraw et al., 
2010).          
This international governance scenario should not decrease the feasibility of this instrument 
package. However, the lack of a price signal may reduce the feasibility of this policy pathway. 
Most stakeholders consider that carbon pricing is an appropriate way of reducing GHG 
emissions and, thus, in the absence of a price signal, the acceptability of the instrument 
package would be lower. Moreover, the implementation of a technology-specific pathway is 
perceived too organizationally complex, which could reduce its administrative feasibility 
(Munaretto and Walz, 2015).  
Summary: 
 The implementation of technology-specific instruments would reduce carbon price; 
however this may not lead to a lower risk of carbon leakage. Inappropriate stringency 
levels may reduce the competitiveness of energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries. 
 In this scenario, the instrument package would require additional anti-leakage 
measures such as exemptions.   
 The lack of international harmonization on technology deployment increases the risk 
caused by picking up winners. Wrong regulatory policies may lead to high economic 
costs, reducing the competitiveness of European industry.    
 In an international scenario with high uncertainty, technology-specific policies may 
encourage low-carbon investment.   
 This international governance scenario should not decrease the feasibility of this 
instrument package. However, the lack of a price signal may reduce the feasibility of 
this policy pathway. 
 
ETS pure-cap pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an ETS pure-cap pathway under a Non-global-deal 
scenario which is characterized by high international ambition to reduce GHG emissions but 
without international cooperation and harmonization of climate policy instruments. 
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As argued by Huppes (2015), this instrumentation pathway will have an average carbon price 
higher than the other two market-based pathways. This is because limited price predictability 
makes investment decisions more difficult. The carbon price must be higher to compensate for 
the higher uncertainty.  
Therefore, this scenario is characterized by uncertain and non-coordinated international 
climate actions, and by an instrument package with a volatile and high carbon price. In this 
context, the risk of carbon leakage is very high. EU industries should deal with high and volatile 
carbon prices, and different international regulations. Energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries may move and/or invest in other countries/regions laxer and more stable regulation. 
This scenario would require anti-leakage measures. 
The current mechanism for supporting those EU industries at risk of carbon leakage is free 
allocation of emission allowances10. The free allocation of allowances should not threaten the 
environmental effectiveness of the instrument package. Regardless of how allowances are 
allocated, an established cap should achieve a fix emission reduction level. This mechanism 
works as a production subsidy to recover (part of) losses in comparative advantage (Böhringer 
et al., 2012). Given that production is indirectly subsidised, it is not as effective as other anti-
leakage measures such as border tariffs. In terms of dynamic efficiency, free allocation rewards 
encourage the emission-intensive installations to catch up the best available technologies 
(Turcea and Kalfagianni, 2015). However there is no evidence free allocation has induced 
technological innovation.  
Carbon leakage can also be addressed through other anti-leakage measures such as border 
adjustments. Monjon and Quirion (2011) compare the performance of both border-
adjustments and output-based allocations11 to tackle carbon leakage in the EU ETS. They find 
that border-adjustments are more efficient in reducing carbon leakage. However, although 
output-based allocation is generally less effective in reducing carbon leakage, production 
losses affected by the EU ETS are lower. Moreover, when output-based allocation is properly 
implemented12, carbon leakage remains very limited. Turcea and Kalfagianni (2015) note that 
border-adjustment measures would require multilateral negotiations and, given that in this 
scenario international coordination is low, the political feasibility of border-adjustments is 
lower than that of output-based allocations. Therefore, the current mechanism of free 
allocation of emission allowances would be the best option to address carbon-leakage in this 
scenario. 
The cost-effectiveness of this instrument package would be also affected by the high 
uncertainty of this scenario. As mentioned above, uncertainty can discourage RD&D 
                                                     
10 Turcea and Kalfagianni (2015) offer a complete analysis of this anti-leakage measure. 
11 This measure is equivalent to the free allowance allocation (Böhringer et al., 2012). 
12 According to Monjon and Quirion (2011), this would imply auctioning allowances in the power sector and 
output-based allocation in the cement, steel and aluminium sectors, covering both direct and indirect emissions. 
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investments in low carbon technologies, which may prevent reduce mitigation costs in the 
long-term. In order to increase the cost-effectiveness, additional technology support policies 
should be included in this instrument package. Public RD&D funding should be included to 
promote innovation in low carbon technologies. Other instruments such as subsidies on 
emission reducing investment should also encourage the development and deployment of new 
technologies. In addition to increasing cost-effectiveness, these instruments could also 
increase the international competitiveness of some EU industries, which could take advantage 
of the business opportunities identified in this scenario. However, as argues by Huppes (2015), 
successful technology-support instruments may erode the role of the pure cap system, and 
diminish the carbon price and make it irrelevant. Hence, when implementing additional 
measures, their impact on the EU ETS should be considered and emission cap should be set 
accordingly.   
Although it is generally accepted that the EU ETS is not working properly, its political feasibility 
would be higher than that of other climate instruments because the EU ETS is already in place 
(Munaretto and Walz, 2015). Complementing the EU ETS with additional instruments could 
increase the acceptability of this instruments package. Munaretto and Walz (2015) find that 
industry and governmental officers tend to favour market based instruments, such as the EU 
ETS, complemented with technology-specific instruments.   
Summary: 
 Under high and volatile carbon prices, and non-coordinated international regulations, 
the risk of carbon leakage is very high.  
 Anti-leakage measures would be required. The free allocation of allowances should be 
implemented to minimize the risk of carbon leakage. 
 The high uncertainty could discourage investment in low carbon technologies and, thus, 
reduce the cost-effectiveness.  
 Additional technology-support instruments could improve the performance of the 
instrument package. However, an inappropriate setting may erode the role of the pure 
cap system, increasing the risk of failure of this instrument package.    
 Complementing the EU ETS with additional instruments could increase the acceptability 
of this instruments package. 
ETS price stabilized pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an ETS price stabilized pathway under a Non-
global-deal scenario, that is, a scenario with high international ambition to reduce GHG 
emissions but without international cooperation and harmonization of climate policy 
instruments. 
In contrast to a pure cap system, this pathway would deliver a stable carbon price, keeping 
permit prices between a floor and a ceiling. Besides, the longer predictability of the carbon 
price would allow carbon price set by the EU ETS to be reduced (Huppes, 2015).    
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Carbon price stabilization would be very beneficial to reduce the risk of carbon leakage. Not 
only is the carbon price path set by the EU ETS lower than that of the pure cap system, it also 
reduces uncertainty. Both aspects are key factors to reduce the risk of carbon leakage in an 
uncertain international context without non-coordinated climate actions. A price stabilization 
mechanism would reduce uncertainty for industry and allow permits supply to adjust to 
changing international circumstances (UK Government, 2015). Transparent rules and a 
predictable carbon price would provide a stable framework and dissuade energy-intensive 
industries reallocate production capacities in non-EU countries. 
However, in a non-coordinated international scenario, a stabilized carbon price might not be 
enough to prevent carbon leakage. Additional anti-leakage measures should be included in the 
instrument package. The current mechanism of free allocation of allowances could be the most 
politically feasible anti-leakage measure. As mentioned above, the free allocation of 
allowances does not affect environmental effectiveness, but it can reduce the cost-
effectiveness of the instrument package. Given that the price stabilized pathway involves lower 
risk of carbon leakage than a pure cap pathway, those industries exposed to carbon leakage 
should be less and, therefore, the list of sectors receiving free allowances should be more 
targeted.      
A price stabilization mechanism could also reduce the cost of emissions reduction, particularly, 
improving the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS. The degree to which the EU ETS encourage 
low-carbon investment depends on the stability of the carbon price (Neuhoff et al., 2015). A 
price stabilization mechanism is a useful way to manage expectations of future prices. Keeping 
permit prices between a floor and a ceiling would incentivize investments in innovations that 
are required for cost-effective long-term decarbonisation (Knopf and Edenhofer, 2014). 
Moreover, this scheme is not incompatible with technology-support instruments, which in a 
pure cap system can make the carbon price so low as to become irrelevant. The subsidies 
proposed in this pathway would not undermine the EU ETS. This can be particularly important 
in this international scenario where ambitious climate actions would generate business 
opportunities for EU industries. Thus, subsidies and other technology-support instruments may 
incentivize innovation and increase the international competitiveness of EU industries. 
In terms of flexibility, in an uncertain international environment, capacity for modification as 
new information emerges is a valuable feature of an instrument package. The price 
stabilization mechanism proposed in this policy pathway would allow permits supply to adjust 
to changing circumstances.     
Although there is a general agreement that the EU ETS should be reformed, Knopf and 
Edenhofer (2014) consider that the political feasibility of a price stabilisation mechanism would 
be limited. A price collar is outside the structural reform proposed by the European 
Commission, which recommends a market stability reserve.       
Summary: 
 The risk of carbon leakage would be reduced with predictable carbon prices. 
 Still the free allocation of allowances might be necessary in some specific sectors. 
 Assessment of EU Instrumentation Options under Different Supranational Governance Scenarios PART 3 Page 38 
 Lower uncertainty would increase the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS.  
 This instrument package would be compatible with technology-support instruments, 
which could be implemented to incentivize innovation and increase the international 
competitiveness of EU industries. 
 The political feasibility is limited. 
Emission tax pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an emission tax pathway under a Non-global-deal 
scenario which is characterized by high international ambition to reduce GHG emissions but 
without international cooperation and harmonization of climate policy instruments. 
The EU ETS reform, which stabilizes allowance prices between a floor and a ceiling, could 
eventually lead to an emission tax. The price path set by the emission tax would rise linearly, 
and could reach €400 per tonne in 2050. According to Huppes (2015), the higher long term 
predictability of an emission tax would reduce the carbon price level compared to the price 
path set by the EU ETS. 
Theoretically, emission taxes should not be superior to a trading system to address carbon 
leakage. In a first-best world both instruments are identical (Norregaard and Reppelin-Hill, 
2000). However, there exist markets failures and barriers which discourage private investment. 
An important barrier is uncertainty; the lower predictability of the carbon price may induce 
energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries to move and/or invest in other countries and, 
thus, increase the risk of carbon leakage. Consequently, emission taxes should be superior to 
emissions trading in order to avoid carbon leakage.       
Although emission taxes may induce lower carbon leakage than the EU ETS, this pathway may 
also require additional anti-leakage measures. This can be a disadvantage for emission taxes 
compared to a trading system. In the EU ETS the free allocation of permits can easily 
implemented. On the other hand, emission taxes would require other anti-leakage measure 
whose feasibility might be lower. An alternative anti-leakage measure is border carbon 
adjustment, which is the most effective instrument in cutting carbon leakage and reducing 
global costs (Böhringer et al., 2012). They can aggravate regional inequality but, given that this 
is non-cooperative international scenario, this might not be a problem. Besides, border 
adjustment measures would compatible with WTO law (Turcea and Kalfagianni, 2015). The 
feasibility of output-based allocation is also limited and exemptions may increase mitigation 
cost (Böhringer et al., 2012). 
The higher predictability of carbon prices would also benefit the cost effectiveness of an 
emission tax pathway. First, carbon prices would be lower because there is no need to 
compensate for greater uncertainty. Second, lower uncertainty increases investment into low-
carbon technology and makes technological learning easier (IPCC, 2014), increasing dynamic 
efficiency. Moreover, similarly to carbon price stabilization mechanisms, emission taxes can be 
implanted with other instruments without the risk of making them irrelevant. Although this 
instrument package is a pure market pathway, without technology-support instruments, in an 
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uncertain international scenario, public subsidies on low-carbon technologies may convenient 
to make EU industries more competitive.  
Regardless of the international scenario, the main obstacle for an emission tax pathway is 
political feasibility. Munaretto and Walz (2015) find that taxation is considered as politically 
infeasible by most stakeholders.         
Summary:         
 An emission tax pathway would deliver lower and more predictable carbon prices than 
the EU ETS, reducing the risk of carbon leakage.  
 Although the feasibility is low, a border carbon adjustment would be beneficial to 
reduce the risk of carbon leakage. 
 In an uncertain international scenario, public subsidies on low-carbon technologies may 
convenient to make EU industries more competitive.   
 The political feasibility of emission tax is very limited. 
 
3.2.2 Climate instrumentation under a Middle-of-the-road scenario 
Based on the analysis in previous sections, there exist key aspects to consider when analysing 
the EU climate instrumentation under a Middle-of-the-road scenario: 
 The degree of global ambition is low. This leads to a strong asymmetry between the 
efforts of the EU and the rest of the world.  
 Although emission reduction targets are low, the compliance of the targets is 
guaranteed by binding agreements. 
 The high degree of convergence makes possible the harmonization and coordination of 
climate policy instruments.    
This international governance scenario would result in several challenges and opportunities for 
the EU climate policy. The most important challenge stems from the lack of international 
ambition to reduce GHG emissions. Given that the EU’s targets are assumed to be met 
regardless of the climate actions of other countries, this would create large asymmetries 
between the EU and the rest of the world. The EU accounts for around 10% of global emissions 
and its actions would have little impact on limiting global warming. High mitigation costs with 
no effects would reduce legitimacy and political feasibility.     
In this context, the EU climate policy should focus on strengthening the non-climate benefits 
of mitigation measures. The co-benefits of reducing emissions are generally realised in the 
short-term and in those countries that implement mitigation measures (New Climate 
Economy, 2014). This increases the feasibility of an ambitious EU instrument package in an 
asymmetric international scenario. 
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There is extensive literature assessing the non-climate benefits of reducing emissions13. The 
health benefits, for instance, could account for $55-420/tCO2 due to avoided mortality (West 
et al., 2013). Another important co-benefit is higher energy security. The deployment of 
renewables would increase national energy sufficiency and resilience. The lower dependence 
on fossil fuels would alleviate future energy price volatility which characterizes these energy 
sources. IPCC (2014) enumerates other non-climate benefits such as energy access, 
employment, biodiversity conservation and water use. Parry et al. (2014) calculate the carbon 
price for the top twenty emitting countries which should be set to maximize own national 
interest due to domestic co-benefits (e.g. health, traffic congestion). Co-benefits vary across 
countries depending on several factors (e.g. population density), but on average a carbon price 
of $57.5/tCO2 could be justified on co-benefits alone, suggesting that there is no need for global 
actions to set such a carbon price because the domestic benefits.    
In this international scenario, the convergence and harmonization of climate instruments 
would minimize the risk of carbon leakage through the competitiveness and investment 
channel. We assume that there is an international agreement which coordinates climate 
actions and, thus, energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries would be faced with similar 
climate regulation in all countries. However, the higher ambition of EU climate policy may 
increase the risk of carbon leakage through the price channel. The lower demand for fossil fuels 
in the EU would imply a fall in prices, which could increase the demand in the rest of the world. 
The CO2 capture and storage (CCS) may be one of the few measures that can address the risk 
of carbon leakage caused by the price channel. In contrast to other climate instruments, CCS 
does not reduce the demand for fossil fuels and, consequently, does not affect international 
prices. Quirion et al. (2011) analyse the effects on carbon leakage of implementing CCS in OECD 
countries. They find that CCS may halve carbon leakage, even if it can increase abatement 
costs. 
Higher international coordination would represent an opportunity to harmonize and link 
climate instruments across countries. Although EU’s climate targets are more ambitious than 
in other countries, this is not an impediment to implement a set of coordinated instruments. 
This is particularly important for energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries, which would 
not deal with the risk of carbon leakage. The efficiency gains from globally coordinated actions 
have been widely analysed in the literature. De Cian et al. (2013) calculate the benefits of 
linking the EU ETS to a global carbon trading scheme. Although they analyse a scenario in which 
both the EU and the rest of the world implement ambitious targets, the efficiency gains from 
linking climate instrument are remarkable. They find that coordinated instruments could 
increase consumption and GDP by up to 8% and 6%, respectively.                     
Challenges: 
 The lack of international ambition is a risk for carbon leakage, particularly through the 
price channel. 
                                                     
13 Chapter 6 of IPCC (2014) reviews all the non-climate benefits of mitigation measures. 
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 Low international ambition may reduce the political feasibility of EU climate policy.  
Opportunities: 
 The EU climate instruments could be harmonized with other instruments across 
borders. 
 
Technology-specific pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of a technology-specific pathway under a Middle-of-
the-road scenario which is characterized by low international ambition to reduce GHG 
emissions but with international cooperation and harmonization of climate policy instruments. 
In this scenario, international cooperation allows participating countries to harmonize 
national/regional climate instruments. From the effectiveness perspective, this could prevent 
carbon leakage through the competitiveness and investment channel. Energy-intensive and 
trade-exposed industries would face similar regulation across countries, discouraging the 
reallocation of production capacities.  
However a technology-specific pathway may hinder the harmonization of climate instruments. 
This pathway assumes that the EU ETS price would be very low and irrelevant which could 
finally lead the EU ETS to phase out. In the absence of a carbon price, it would be difficult to 
harmonize policy instrument between countries/regions. In this context, coordination policies 
should focus on those industries exposed to the risk of carbon leakage. The EU could 
implement carbon standards which limit the amount of emissions per unit of output, and 
negotiate the introduction of similar instruments in other countries. As an alternative to 
emission standards, international coordination could lead to the introduction of technology 
standards which impose specific abatement technologies on emitters. Thus, those industries 
exposed to the risk of carbon leakage should have a similar cost of compliance across countries. 
This would avoid the comparative disadvantage for regulated EU industries.    
The higher international coordination will not reduce the risk of carbon leakage through the 
price channel. As mentioned above, the promotion of the CCS technology is one of the few 
measures that the EU could adopt to reduce this risk. The technology-specific pathway is 
particularly suitable for creating learning curves. The EU could implement feed-in tariffs or 
feed-in premiums which incentives the use of CCS technology. In addition to these subsidies, 
there should be public funding for R&D to promote innovation and reduce production costs of 
CCS.         
In this pathway, the inability to cover most sectors under the same policy instrument and, thus, 
to link this instrument to other instruments across countries will reduce the cost-effectiveness. 
Marginal abatement costs will vary across sectors and across emitters. This will prevent 
emitters to cut emissions where it costs least to do so. Additional measures to increase the 
cost-effectiveness of this instrument package would be convenient. For example, if possible, a 
 Assessment of EU Instrumentation Options under Different Supranational Governance Scenarios PART 3 Page 42 
single instrument such as feed-in premiums should cover the entire EU electricity sector. This 
will allow renewable generators to site the capacity where the resource is highest.  
The low international ambition to reduce emissions will be an obstacle for the feasibility of the 
EU climate policy. Emissions reduction should focus on those sectors which deliver high non-
climate benefits of reducing emissions. A technology-specific pathway, which is more 
interventionist than other pathways, is particularly suitable for this purpose. Given that most 
co-benefits (e.g. health, energy security, traffic congestion) are related to the transport sector, 
technology regulation and subsidies should be particularly high in this sector. Emissions should 
be reduced drastically in cities. Hence, in addition to the fleet standards proposed for this 
pathway, a modal shift to cycling and walking should be incentivised. The construction of new 
infrastructure and subsidies for public transport should complement energy standards.       
Summary:         
 A technology-specific pathway may hinder the international harmonization of climate 
instruments across countries/regions. 
 International coordination should lead to the introduction of emission standards which 
impose the same burden on energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries across 
countries. 
 The promotion of CCS technology through feed-in premiums could reduce the risk of 
carbon leakage through the price channel. 
 Marginal abatement costs would vary across sectors and across emitters, reducing the 
cost-effectiveness. 
 Technology regulation and subsidies should focus on the transport sector to increase 
the non-climate benefits of emissions reduction.  
ETS pure-cap pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an ETS pure-cap pathway under a Middle-of-the-
road scenario which is characterized by low international ambition to reduce GHG emissions 
but with international cooperation and harmonization of climate policy instruments. 
Although the EU climate policy is more ambitious than in the rest of the world, international 
cooperation would allow the EU ETS to be linked to compatible emission trading systems14. 
Linking emission trading markets creates political, administrative and economic benefits (Kachi 
el al., 2015). In terms of effectiveness, when systems link, the risk of carbon leakage through 
the competitive and investment channel is reduced, given that carbon price will converge 
across countries. Thus, all emitters covered by the emission trading system would face the 
same price signal. This will eliminate the comparative disadvantage of EU firms, and alleviate 
reallocation pressures. 
                                                     
14 See Kachi et al. (2015) for a complete literature review related to linking emissions trading systems.  
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A priori, larger linked markets would also increase liquidity and reduce price volatility (Ranson 
and Stavins, 2015). Given that uncertainty is one of the main drawbacks of the EU ETS, linking 
markets would involve a notable improvement for this policy pathway. Higher price 
predictability would make investment decision easier and boost innovation in low-carbon 
technologies. In the short term, the efficiency gains of linked markets would depend on the 
heterogeneity of abatement options (Kachi et al., 2015). When the EU ETS is linked to other 
systems with similar abatement costs, the potential for efficiency gains are limited. More 
heterogeneity, on the contrary, would expand mitigation options and reduce abatement costs. 
The main weakness of the policy pathway is the political feasibility. This scenario assumes that 
EU ambition is higher than in the rest of the world. In principle, linking emission trading systems 
with different stringency levels is feasible. However, a different ambition level is one of the 
main barriers to linking emission trading systems (Green et al., 2014). When two systems with 
different ambition levels (and different level of carbon price) are linked, carbon price declines 
in the more stringent system and rises in the less stringent system, until it becomes equal. This 
implies a money flow from the more stringent system to the less stringent system which can 
result in a political barrier (Zetterberg, 2012). Therefore, linking heterogeneous emission 
trading systems (i.e. with different abatement costs and carbon prices) benefits efficiency but 
may constitute a political barrier. Burtraw et al. (2013) state that linking emission trading 
systems may have political benefits because signals a common effort to reduce emissions.      
Another disadvantage of the EU ETS pure-cap pathway under this international scenario is that 
EU climate policy could not focus on non-climate benefits of GHG emission reduction. When 
the EU ETS covers most emitters, including the transport and buildings sector (as proposed for 
this policy pathway), there is no room for sectoral discrimination. It would not be possible to 
reduce emissions in those sectors which deliver more non-climate benefits without affecting 
the performance of the EU ETS. Additional measures to reduce emissions in cities, for instance, 
will reduce allowance price, affecting the (dynamic) cost-effectiveness of the scheme. 
In order to increase the feasibility of the EU ETS pure-cap pathway under this international 
scenario, the domain of application of the EU ETS could be limited to certain sectors. The EU 
ETS would cover those sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage and/or have similar 
ambition levels across countries. Although this will imply lower efficiency, it could increase 
political feasibility. Moreover, excluding the transport sector from the EU ETS, it would be 
possible to implement a relatively higher stringency level to this sector, and take advantage of 
the non-climate benefits due to emission reduction in this sector.          
Summary:         
 The EU ETS could be linked to compatible emission trading systems and, thus, reduce 
the risk of carbon leakage and improve the cost-effectiveness. 
 A larger emission trading market could reduce the high volatility associated to a pure-
cap system. Higher price predictability would make investment decision easier. 
 Linking emission trading systems with different stringency levels is feasible, but may 
constitute a political barrier. 
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 It might not be desirable to expand the EU ETS and cover all sectors.  
 The transport sector could face relatively a higher stringent regulation to take 
advantage of the non-climate benefits. 
ETS price stabilized pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an ETS price stabilized pathway under a Middle-
of-the-road scenario which is characterized by low international ambition to reduce GHG 
emissions but with international cooperation and harmonization of climate policy instruments. 
International cooperation would allow the EU to link the EU ETS to similar trading systems. As 
mentioned above, there are plenty of advantages associated to linking emission trading 
systems. In terms of effectiveness, it would reduce the risk of carbon leakage through the 
competitive and investment channel. Besides, from the cost-effectiveness perspective, it 
would expand mitigation options and, thus, reduce the cost of meeting the emission reduction 
target.   
The main challenge is to align the EU ETS with other emission trading systems in the presence 
of a price floor and ceiling. Stavins (2007) highlights the difficulties of linking two trading 
systems when there are cost containment measures. For instance, when the supply of 
allowances is restricted if the price falls below a price floor, linked programs would be affected 
as well (Burtraw et al., 2013). Recently, the UK has introduced a carbon price floor in the power 
sector which is already covered by the EU ETS (UK Parliament, 2013). This action will reduce 
the demand for EU allowances and, consequently, the carbon price, but it will not achieve 
further emission reductions. A unilateral price floor causes the effective marginal cost of 
emissions reductions to differ across participants, reducing the efficiency of the system 
(Burtraw et al. 2014). Therefore, the efficiency gains of linking emission trading systems may 
vanish in the presence of a price floor and ceiling. Given the different international ambitious 
levels, in the short-term it may be best to use the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). As pointed out by Stavins (2007), savings potential is larger, given the low-
cost emissions reduction opportunities in developing countries. Besides, the EU ETS could set 
a price floor and ceiling, without reducing the efficiency of the scheme. 
Thus, an ETS price stabilized pathway would not take full advantage of potential international 
agreements. Without linking emission trading systems, energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries, which are covered by the EU ETS, may face a more stringent climate regulation than 
their competitors abroad. Hence, it should be necessary to implement anti-leakage measures 
such as the free allocation of allowances. 
In contrast to the ETS pure-cap pathway, this pathway could implement additional measures 
to focus its efforts on non-climate benefits of GHG emission reduction. Additional measures 
will not affect allowances price, as this should be fluctuate between the carbon price floor and 
ceiling. The EU climate instrument mix could focus on the transport sector and minimize 
emission in cities with high population density. Subsidies for the deployment of zero emission 
cars could be implemented. The public sector should play an active role on the development 
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of new infrastructure for a modal shift. In order to reduce the risk of carbon leakage through 
the price channel, CCS technology could be promoted by subsidies and public funds for R&D.         
The difficulties in harmonizing the EU ETS with other emission trading systems would reduce 
the feasibility of this instrument package in this international context. There is a trade-off 
between stabilizing allowances price and linking the EU ETS with other trading systems. Given 
the low international ambition in reducing emission, EU climate policy should focus on the non-
climate benefits of emission reduction. This could increase the public acceptability of emission 
reduction measures, even if the ambition in rest of the world is lower than in the EU.  
Summary: 
 Although the international context would facilitate international agreements, setting a 
price floor and ceiling, the EU ETS could not be aligned with other emission trading 
systems abroad. 
 In the short-term, it may be best to use the CDM to reduce emissions abroad and 
increase the efficiency of the scheme. 
 Setting a price floor and ceiling, additional measures could be implemented with no risk 
of making the EU ETS price irrelevant. Thus, climate measures could be focused on 
maximizing non-climate benefits of emission reductions.    
 Non-climate benefits of emission reductions should be highlighted to increase the 
public acceptability of the instrument mix. 
Emission tax pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an Emission tax pathway under a Middle-of-the-
road scenario which is characterized by low international ambition to reduce GHG emissions 
but with international cooperation and harmonization of climate policy instruments. 
As in previous policy pathways, the international context would facilitate international 
agreements to coordinate climate policy instruments. It is generally argued that an ETS is easier 
to link across borders than agree on a common tax (IPCC, 2014). This would imply that the EU 
ETS pathway may more desirable in this international scenario. Harmonization is advantageous 
since it gives flexibility in reducing emissions and thereby reduces costs. However, as argued 
above, international linkage of trading systems may lead to a loss of control over domestic 
design. Thus, the link of emission trading system may also present difficulties. 
In this policy pathway driven by an emission tax, the EU could harmonize the carbon price with 
other countries. There could be a commitment to keep tax rates within some range (Metcalf, 
2009). However, the different ambition levels between the EU and the rest of the world could 
make harmonization difficult. The EU would like to establish an emission tax higher than in the 
rest of world. One option could be to harmonize an emission tax only for those sectors exposed 
to international competitiveness and, thus, reduce the carbon leakage. This however would 
imply two different emission tax rates in the EU: a less stringent emission tax on energy-
intensive and trade-exposed industries and a very ambitious tax rate on the rest of the sectors. 
Setting two different emission tax rates, the main benefits of an emission tax are vanished. 
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From the administrative point of view, it would not be possible to set an upstream 
administration which covers all primary production and imports of fossils and fossil energy 
products. From the cost-effectiveness perspective, marginal abatement costs would differ 
across sectors, increasing mitigation cost. 
In this international context, the EU could set a unique and less ambitious emission tax across 
all sectors. The tax rate should be harmonized with the rest of the world. There should be an 
international commitment to keep tax rates within some range. The harmonization of carbon 
prices would reduce the risk of carbon leakage through the competitive and investment 
channel. EU industries exposed to international competition would not face more stringent 
regulation than their competitors abroad. The EU should meet its more ambitious targets 
implementing additional measures. Energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries should be 
exempted from additional regulation. Additional measures should focus on those sectors in 
which emission reductions deliver non-climate benefits. An option would be reduce emissions 
from the transport sector. Decreasing oil consumption in the transport sector would deliver 
not only health benefits but also higher energy security due to lower dependence on fossil 
fuels. The instrument package should include subsidies to promote new technologies (e.g. 
electricity and hydrogen). The transition to low carbon transportation could be also 
incentivised with taxes on combustion motors. A shift to cycling and walking in cities should be 
a priority.    
In contrast to the ETS pure-cap, adding instruments to an emission tax would not affect the 
price signal. Moreover, implementing additional measures, which take into account non-
climate benefits, could increase the cost-effectiveness of the instrument mix. In order to keep 
the dynamic efficiency of the instrument package, public funding on R&D projects should 
compensate for the lower carbon price signal. These public funds would not be only focused 
on basic research but also on the development of clean technologies. 
A cooperative international scenario should increase the feasibility of implementing an 
emission tax. Private companies would offer less resistance to an emission tax when their 
competitors abroad have similar regulation. Moreover, implementing additional measures 
such as subsidies and reducing the rate of the emission tax should increase the acceptability of 
this instrument.  
Summary:         
 The different ambition levels between the EU and the rest of the world could make 
emission tax harmonization difficult. 
 The EU could set a less stringent emission tax, which would be in line with the rest of 
the world. This would reduce the risk of carbon leakage. 
 Additional measures should be implemented to meet the more ambitious EU targets. 
These measures could be focused on enlarging non-climate benefits of emission 
reduction. 
 A cooperative international scenario should increase the feasibility of implementing an 
emission tax.   
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3.3 Implications of the EU governance 
The development of the EU governance is going to be crucial for climate instrumentation. 
Similarly to the international governance, the EU governance will affect the effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness of the EU climate policy. In addition to these, the EU governance will be 
particularly important for the feasibility of the different instrument packages. As argued in the 
analysis below, the feasibility of some instrumentation pathways will depend largely on the 
centralisation or decentralisation of the EU climate policy. 
There is no optimal balance between centralised and decentralised climate policies (Bausch et 
al., 2015). Both centralisation and decentralisation trends have advantages and disadvantages. 
Some policy pathways may perform better in a centralised scenario while others in a 
decentralised scenario. Hence, it is important to first identify the general implications of the 
EU governance in order to then evaluate properly the instrument packages. 
Firstly, the EU governance will affect the environmental effectiveness of the instrument 
package, that is, the likelihood of meeting the necessary emission reductions. From the 
effectiveness perspective, the EU governance should deal with the risk of carbon leakage. 
Similarly to the arguments applied to the international scenarios, the decentralisation of the 
EU climate policy may lead to different stringency levels of national climate instruments. This 
would affect the relative costs of energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries across 
Member States, which could eventually lead to the reallocation of production factors. In 
addition to the risk of carbon leakage, free-riders can arise. In the absence of legally binding 
agreement, some Member States may not address the challenge of climate change. On the 
other hand, a strong centralisation may prevent the adoption of ambitious targets. There is 
usually a trade-off between convergence and ambition and, therefore, higher centralisation 
may be at the expense of laxer mitigation targets. For example, the EU ETS is a centralised 
instrument; however the EU and its Member States were not able to find a sufficiently 
ambitious solution to solve the problem of the surplus of allowances (Bausch et al., 2015). 
Moreover, strong centralisation may discourage front-runners which could facilitate meeting 
mitigation emission targets.     
Secondly, the cost-effectiveness of the EU climate policy will be affected by the centralisation 
or decentralisation of EU governance. Several studies have analysed the economic 
consequences of coordinating climate instruments such as carbon taxes and the promotion of 
renewables. ECP (2013), for instance, analyses the benefits from siting renewable generation 
where the resource availability is highest. They find that a non-coordinated deployment of 
renewables could require 20% more investments in the period 2020-2030. An internal 
electricity market may also generate economic benefits given that it would increase 
competition, optimize transmission investment, interconnect national markets and allow 
increasing the capacity of renewables (Zachmann, 2013). In a study for the European 
Commission, Booz & Co. (2013) estimate that market integration would generate benefits of 
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up to €30 billion per year for the EU27. The economic benefit would come from price effects 
and from increased security of supply. A common market for renewables, which locates 
renewable generation capacity in locations that are most effective for it, would generate extra 
gains in the range of €15 billion to €30 billion per year by 2030. The centralization of the EU 
climate policy may also have negative effects on the cost-effectiveness, particularly in the long-
term. Bausch et al. (2015) state that too much harmonisation may increase the risk of losing 
room for learning and innovation, given that it could impede some Member States serve as 
policy laboratories.                            
Finally, as mentioned above, EU governance will be a key aspect for the feasibility of the 
instrument packages. Some instrument packages require a very specific framework and, 
therefore, their feasibility will depend on the EU governance. As mentioned in section 2.2, the 
EU governance will determine the structural reform of the EU ETS, the harmonisation of 
renewable support schemes, the Energy Union, etc. When some of these conditions are not 
met, the feasibility of some instrument packages would very low.     
 
3.3.1 Climate instrumentation under a EU centralised scenario 
Based on the analysis in section 2.2.2, there exist key aspects to consider when analysing the 
EU climate instrumentation under an EU centralised scenario: 
 A centralized EU creates the institutional capacity to reform the EU ETS.     
 An internal energy market is created. 
 A European body is created for infrastructure planning and financing. 
 The EU can set legally binding national targets   
A centralised scenario increases the feasibility of most instrument packages; however it will 
also deal with important challenges. As mentioned above, higher convergence may lead to 
lower ambition. A centralised scenario would involve higher competences for the EU and a loss 
of sovereignty of Member States. The transfer of competence should not result in less 
ambitious climate instruments. In other words, there is a risk of adopting the smallest common 
denominator (Bausch et al., 2015). 
The centralisation of the EU climate policy may increase the rigidity of the instruments. It could 
increase the bureaucracy and make policy processes less dynamic. This is an important 
challenge because given the huge uncertainty associated to the technological development, 
flexible mechanisms are necessary. The challenge is to create a flexible enough instrument 
package to react as new information emerges.    
Too much centralisation can discourage national initiatives. In this scenario, an optimal 
instrument package should leave room for front-runners. Some Member States may want 
more ambitious emission reduction targets than those imposed at the EU level. They should 
have the freedom to implement additional measures and make them effective.      
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A centralised instrument package may not take into account national idiosyncrasies. While 
some measures perform very well in some countries, they might have a negative impact on 
others. This has consequences on the acceptability of climate instruments. In the long-term 
conflicts may arise between the EU and some Member States.       
We have already enumerated some of the opportunities stemming from more EU 
centralisation: EU ETS reform, Energy Union, etc. The harmonization of renewable energy 
support schemes is another opportunity in this scenario. In recent years, the promotion of 
renewables has been driven by national instruments. The development of new electricity grid 
infrastructure with more interconnections would facilitate the expansion of renewables. 
Moreover, the centralisation of renewable support schemes would increase efficiency, locating 
renewable generation capacity in locations that are most effective for it.  
R&D policy can also take advantage of a centralised scenario. The EU could facilitate 
cooperation and coordination of national research programmes. Moreover, the development 
of some technologies will require abundant investment, which may not be raised at national 
level. In a centralised scenario, a supranational body could finance projects for capital intensive 
technologies such as CCS.              
Challenges: 
 Higher convergence should not lead to lower ambition. 
 Avoid bureaucracy to make instrument package more flexible.  
 Allow front-runners implement additional and ambitious instruments.  
 Adapt instrument package to national idiosyncrasies.  
Opportunities: 
 Harmonise national policy instruments such as taxes and renewables support schemes.   
 Facilitate cooperation and coordination of R&D policies. 
 
Technology-specific pathway  
In this section we will assess the performance of a technology-specific pathway under an EU 
centralised scenario which is characterized by high centralisation of EU climate policy. 
 A priori, the design of this instrument package includes both EU instruments and national 
instruments (Huppes, 2015). However, the centralisation of the climate policy would lead to a 
greater weight of EU instruments. Emissions standards and subsidies would be designed and 
implemented at EU level. For instance, in order to promote renewables in the electricity sector, 
feed-in-premiums would be implemented at EU level. The Energy Union would facilitate the 
centralisation of the climate policy.  Current standards on vehicles and buildings would be 
strengthened and a subsidy scheme designed at EU level would be implemented to promote 
low carbon technologies. 
High stringency levels on emission standards should guarantee the environmental 
effectiveness of this policy pathway. In principle, the likelihood of meeting EU targets should 
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be high. Nevertheless the absence of a price signal may lead to rebound effects. The EU 
centralisation would facilitate the control and verification of national emissions. There are 
binding national targets and the EU has the competence to monitor the compliance of this 
targets. Moreover, a common climate policy would avoid comparative disadvantages between 
countries due to laxer regulation in some Member States. On the other hand, a high 
centralisation of the climate policy may hinder national initiatives to reduce emissions. This 
may prevent front-runners implement additional and more ambitious instruments. Hence, EU 
instruments should be flexible enough to allow national initiatives. Emission standards, for 
instance, should set minimum requirements to enable tougher stringency levels. Similarly, EU 
subsidies should be coordinated with national initiatives to allow Member States to 
complement these subsidies with national funds.                  
The centralisation of those instruments in the promotion of renewables would have some 
positive economic consequences. Current national schemes would phase out and a unique EU-
wide instrument (e.g. feed-in-premiums) would be implemented. Thus, renewable generation 
would take place where it is cheaper. Investors in solar panels, for instance, would be 
encouraged to place their production in South Europe where the resource availability is 
highest. This could generate gains between €15 billion to €30 billion per year by 2030 (Booz & 
Co., 2013). The centralisation of technology-specific instruments may also have negative 
economic impact. Too much centralisation may disincentives national initiatives which could 
work as laboratories to enhance innovation and learning potential (Bausch et al., 2015). As 
mention above, the EU could set minimum requirement which should be complemented with 
national measures. This could increase not only the effectiveness but also the efficiency of the 
instrument package.        
In comparison with other instrument packages, a technology-specific pathway may increase 
the cost of mitigation in some sectors. The most common argument states that governments 
have limited information and its intervention can increase mitigation costs (Helm, 2010). An 
inappropriate design of energy standards, for instance, may not lead to find the cheapest ways 
of reducing emissions. This could particularly important in a centralised scenario, where 
climate instruments are implemented at EU level. While some subsidies and/or standards may 
be appropriate for a country, the same measure can have negative effects on others. There 
are, however, some positive economic impacts of technology-specific instruments. In the 
buildings and transport sector, there is evidence that energy efficiency policies (e.g. appliance 
standards and fuel economy standards) have negative private costs (IPCC, 2014). Efficiency 
standards have been proved to be efficient in presence of information asymmetry and other 
market failures.  
A technology-specific pathway requires high public intervention and public spending. Although 
this governance scenario assumes high EU centralisation, some Member States may be 
reluctant to increase the budget of the EU. This can be a disadvantage of a technology-specific 
pathway compared to a market-based pathway, where investment funds stem mainly from the 
private sector. Centralisation may also lead to higher bureaucracy, which reduces the capacity 
for modification as new information emerges.          
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Summary:         
 More centralization should not hinder the implementation of this policy pathway.  
 High stringency levels on emission standards should guarantee the environmental 
effectiveness of this policy pathway.     
 In the absence of a price signal, the risk of rebound effects increases. 
 EU instruments should be flexible enough to facilitate national initiatives. This could 
increase not only the effectiveness but also the efficiency of the instrument package.  
 This policy pathway would require a considerable increase in the EU budget, which 
could face opposition from some Member States.     
 Centralisation could increase bureaucracy and reduce the capacity for modification as 
new information emerges.  
ETS pure-cap pathway  
In this section we will assess the performance of an ETS pure-cap pathway under an EU 
centralised scenario which is characterized by high centralisation of EU climate policy. 
This policy pathway is in line with current instrument mix. More centralisation would allow 
increasing the coverage of the EU ETS, including the transport and the buildings sector. The 
administrative implementation is moved upstream. The cap includes all primary production 
and imports of fossil fuels. The environmental effectiveness of this pathway would depend on 
the stringency level of the emission cap. According to Huppes (2015), a substantial increase in 
yearly emission reduction rate would be required. From 2030 emissions cap should be reduced 
by 8.5% per year, which would lead to very substantial price rises.  
Expanding the coverage of the EU ETS, the cost-effectiveness of the scheme should increase. 
Marginal abatement costs would become equal across sectors and, thus, emission cuts would 
take place where it is cheapest. Apart from that, the EU ETS should face the same weaknesses 
shown in the first trading periods. One of the most important is the limited price predictability 
which makes long-term investment decisions very difficult. The price of allowances depends 
on several external factors such as the economic situation; an economic downturn as in 2008 
could lead the carbon price to collapse. The expansion of the EU ETS should help to reduce 
volatility. As pointed out by Ranson and Stavins (2015), larger trading markets reduce volatility. 
However, substantial price fluctuations could remain. In order to promote investment in low 
carbon technologies, a higher carbon price should compensate for the higher uncertainty 
(Huppes, 2015). This could face high opposition from emitters. 
The performance of an ETS pure-cap could be improved implementing additional climate 
instruments. This should be addressed carefully because the first trading periods of the EU ETS 
shown that the interactions with other climate instruments may affect the price signal. When 
other instruments performance is above expectations, the price of the EU ETS declines. In 
recent years the effectiveness of national policies in promoting renewable energy is a main 
cause of the low carbon price of the EU ETS (Point Carbon, 2013). Hence, when implementing 
additional instruments, the impact of other instruments on the EU ETS should be considered. 
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An EU centralised scenario could facilitate the coordination between instruments. Most of the 
measures would be designed and implemented at the EU level, which would make 
coordination easier. These additional instruments should focus on reducing uncertainty for 
investors and overcoming market failures. An EU-wide feed-in-premiums scheme could be 
implemented in the electricity sector to make investment revenues in renewables more 
predictable. Subsidies and BAT specifications as an information instrument could help industry 
sector to deal with high uncertainty. In the buildings and the transport sector, energy 
sufficiency standards would complement the EU ETS, as it has been proved that they reduce 
information asymmetries and other market failures (IPCC, 2014).  
As argued above, too much centralisation discourages front-runners and national initiatives 
which could improve efficiency in the long-term. However, uncoordinated national measures 
may affect the functioning of the EU ETS. Thus, this pathway may face a trade-off between the 
benefits of national initiatives and a proper functioning of the EU ETS. Given the poor 
performance of the EU ETS in recent years, it seems more appropriate to limit national 
initiatives. Additional measures could be implemented when they are designed at EU at level 
and their impact on the EU ETS is assessed.  
The proposed instrument package is not very different from the existing package and, 
therefore, its feasibility should be high. This pathway implies a loss of national sovereignty but, 
given that we assume the centralisation of the EU governance, this should not be an obstacle. 
To be effective, emission cap should be reduced considerably, which could be rejected by 
emitters and reduce its social feasibility. Additional instruments may help to reduce the carbon 
price.                                 
Summary:         
 Expanding the coverage of the EU ETS, the cost-effectiveness of the scheme should 
increase.    
 The EU ETS should face the same weaknesses shown in the first trading periods. 
 This pathway may face a trade-off between the benefits of national initiatives and a 
proper functioning of the EU ETS. 
 Additional measures could be implemented when they are designed at EU at level and 
their impact on the EU ETS is assessed. 
 The proposed instrument package is not very different from the current one and, 
therefore, its feasibility should be high. 
 
ETS price stabilized pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an ETS price stabilized pathway under an EU 
centralised scenario which is characterized by high centralisation of EU climate policy. 
The centralisation of the EU climate policy would allow a structural reform of the EU ETS. In 
this pathway, a price floor and ceiling would be set, so that, the cap volume would be adjusted 
to keep the carbon price of the EU ETS between these two values. The coverage of the EU ETS 
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is expanded to include the transport and the buildings sector. The administrative 
implementation is moved upstream. The cap includes all primary production and imports of 
fossil fuels. The environmental effectiveness of this pathway would depend on the stringency 
level of the emission cap. According to Huppes (2015), in order to achieve the same emission 
cuts, the carbon price would be lower than that in an ETS pure-cap scheme, given the higher 
predictability of the carbon price. 
Although setting a floor and a ceiling may alter the nature of the current EU ETS (i.e. a quantity-
based market instrument), there are several arguments in the literature in favour for having a 
price management mechanism. Price floors may have advantages for technological innovation, 
price volatility and management of cost uncertainty (Wood and Jotzo, 2011). In recent years, 
the EU ETS has been characterized for delivering low carbon prices. Knopf and Edenhofer 
(2014) argue that the EU ETS has not incentivised optimally mitigation efforts and innovation 
over time. According to them, the problem is the low credibility of the long-term scarcity. A 
price stabilization mechanism would deliver a stable and sufficiently high carbon price, which 
could improve the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS. In a quantitative analysis, Philibert (2009) 
confirms that price floors and ceiling can reduce uncertainty caused by unpredictable 
economic growth and energy prices. As a consequence, a price stabilization mechanism 
improves welfare and the performance of an emission trading system (Burtrow et al. 2009). 
But not only the effectiveness and the efficiency would increase but also the political feasibility 
(Knopf and Edenhofer, 2014). A price ceiling would prevent unsustainable economic costs, 
raising the acceptance by private companies. 
One of the challenges in this governance scenario is to take into account national interests in 
a centralised framework. Unlike an ETS pure-cap, this pathway could make the EU ETS 
compatible with national initiatives, without affecting the price signal. Even if the EU ETS would 
cover most of the emissions, adding other instruments may improve the performance of the 
instrument package. A stable price pathway should make private investment decisions easier 
and, therefore, additional measures should focus on overcoming market failures, particularly 
for households. Information asymmetries could be alleviated with energy efficiency standards 
in the transport and the buildings sector. Member States should have the possibility to set 
more stringent standard levels and/or include other measures which mean additional emission 
cuts. 
 As argued above, a stabilized carbon price path may increase the acceptability of the climate 
instrument mix by private companies. Higher predictability would facilitate their investment 
decisions. Besides, a price ceiling would prevent unbearable economic costs. The main 
weakness could be the administrative feasibility. A well-functioning EU ETS may require huge 
and complex administrative task. Too much bureaucracy may reduce the flexibility of the 
instrument package and reduce the capacity for modification as new information emerges.           
Summary:         
 The centralisation of the EU climate policy would allow a structural reform of the EU 
ETS, setting a price floor and ceiling.     
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 Price floors may have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility and 
management of cost uncertainty. 
 Not only the effectiveness and the efficiency would increase but also the political 
feasibility. 
 Unlike an ETS pure-cap, this pathway could make the EU ETS compatible with national 
initiatives, without affecting the price signal. 
 A well-functioning EU ETS may require huge and complex administrative task.     
 
Emission tax pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an emission tax pathway under an EU centralised 
scenario which is characterized by high centralisation of EU climate policy. 
In this pathway, there is a structural reform of the EU ETS, which is facilitated by the 
centralisation of the EU climate policy. Initially a price stabilization mechanism is introduced to 
fix the allowance price between a floor and a ceiling. The EU ETS would eventually evolve into 
an emission tax. The price path set by the emission tax would rise linearly, and could reach 
€400 per tonne in 2050. According to Huppes (2015), the higher long term predictability of an 
emission tax would reduce the carbon price level compared to the price path set by the EU 
ETS. In addition to an emission tax, this pathway requires the development of a single European 
electricity market. Electricity will become more central in primary energy production and 
throughout the use chain.   
The effectiveness of the instrument mix will depend on the stringency level of the emission tax 
rate. This pathway does not consider implementing technology-specific instruments. Thus, 
emission reduction would be driven by the emission tax. In presence of market failures or 
barriers, a single emission tax may not lead to the expected emission reduction. Information 
asymmetry, for instance, may result in underinvestment in energy efficiency (Gillingham et al., 
2009). Goulder and Parry (2008) also point out that consumers may underestimate future gains 
from purchasing more energy efficient automobiles and appliances. Due to the principal-agent 
problem, Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) find that energy use is above the social optimum. All 
this cases show that a single emission tax may not be as effective in reducing emissions as 
theoretical models predict.     
Not only the environmental effectiveness but also the cost-effectiveness could be negatively 
affected by market failures. The cost of reducing emissions is minimized equating marginal 
abatement costs across sectors and emitters. In principle, this is achieved when all emitters 
face a common price, for example, through an emission tax. Hence, in presence of rational 
consumers, firms, and complete markets, tax emissions are generally considered the most 
cost-effective way of reducing emissions (IPCC, 2014). In reality, there are market failures and 
barriers which reduce the efficiency of emission taxes. Energy efficiency measures, for 
instance, are generally considered as the most cost-effective ones. However, the level of 
investment on these measures is below the levels which would correspond to such benefits 
(Linares and Labandeira, 2010). In this context, the interaction of emission taxes with other 
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instruments may be beneficial for reducing mitigation costs. The combination of an emission 
tax and an energy efficiency standard may overcome the market failure associated with 
consumer purchases of more energy efficient durables (e.g. vehicles and appliances) and, thus, 
promote cost-effectiveness (IPCC, 2014). Dynamic efficiency could also be improved 
addressing the innovation market failure15. Combining an emission tax and R&D subsidies can 
promote innovation of low-carbon technologies (IPCC, 2014), which would reduce mitigation 
costs in the future.        
From the feasibility perspective, administrative costs are reduced given that they are moved 
upstream. The emission tax covers all primary production and imports of fossil fuels. The 
administrative implementation is at member state level and existing revenue collection 
systems could be used. New administrative machinery would not be required.  Compared to 
an emission trading system, an emission tax may meet more opposition from industry (IPCC, 
2014). Besides, the 1990s attempt to establish an emission tax at EU level shows the difficulties 
of implementing. However, in this governance scenario with high centralisation, the political 
feasibility of implementing an emission tax should be high.      
Summary:         
 The EU ETS would eventually evolve into an emission tax. Given the higher 
predictability, the price path of an emission tax would be lower than that in the EU ETS. 
 The effectiveness of the instrument mix will depend on the stringency level of the 
emission tax rate. However, in presence of market failures, a single emission tax may 
not lead to the expected emission reduction. 
 Market failures and barriers could also affect the static and dynamic efficiency of an 
emission tax. The implementation of additional measures should be considered.  
 The centralisation of the EU climate policy should facilitate the administrative and 
political feasibility of the policy pathway.     
 
3.3.2 Climate instrumentation under a EU decentralised scenario 
Based on the analysis in section 2.2.3, there exist key aspects to consider when analysing the 
EU climate instrumentation under an EU decentralised scenario: 
 National interests dominate the development of the EU ETS, which cannot be 
reformed. 
 There are no major changes from current energy market which is ruled at national level. 
 Infrastructures and main investment projects are planned and financed at national 
level. 
                                                     
15 When innovators cannot capture all social benefits from their new clean technologies, the level of investment 
in innovation might be below the optimum.   
 Assessment of EU Instrumentation Options under Different Supranational Governance Scenarios PART 3 Page 56 
 The EU cannot set binding technology standards. 
 There are not specific targets for Member States.     
In the absence of a centralised authority, climate policy is stablished at national level. This 
scenario presents many challenges for the feasibility of instrument packages. Most of the 
initiatives are implemented without a formal status in European law and the main challenge 
for the EU would be the coordination of national instruments. Both market-based instruments 
and technology support measures are implemented at national level. Thus, the EU can 
establish the mechanism to facilitate agreements on coordination between national pricing 
systems. Technology standards could be implemented but for guidance only.     
Uncoordinated national policies may increase the risk of carbon leakage between Member 
States. The EU would face the challenge of keeping the EU single market without affecting the 
effectiveness of national climate policies. The coordination of those instruments affecting 
energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries would be essential for the effectiveness of the 
climate policy. 
In this scenario, the regulatory framework is more uncertain given that national government 
have the competence to implement climate instruments. Political change in a country can lead 
to amend existing climate regulation and loss of credibility. 
A decentralised scenario also presents some opportunities. Instruments are designed at 
national level which allows policy-makers to adapt them to national circumstances. More local 
regulation can increase the acceptability of the instrument package. This could also facilitate 
the implantation of more ambitious targets.  
Decentralisation will also increase the variety of instruments. There will be different mitigation 
schemes across countries. This can serve to learn from good practices. Thus, successful national 
initiatives can be emulated in other countries.   
Challenges: 
 Coordinate national climate instruments. 
 Keep the EU single market without affecting the effectiveness of national climate 
policies 
 Policy uncertainty and regulatory instability. National policies tend to be more unstable 
because of government changes. 
Opportunities: 
 Climate instruments could be adapted to national circumstances.  
 Higher acceptability may allow for more ambitious targets.   
 Successful national initiatives can be emulated in other countries.   
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Technology-specific pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of a technology-specific pathway under an EU 
decentralised scenario which is characterized by high decentralisation of EU climate policy. 
The basis of this policy pathway is on national climate instruments and thereby the 
decentralisation of the EU governance should not be a problem for its feasibility. The role play 
by market-based instruments is irrelevant and emissions reduction is driven by technology-
specific instruments. The higher decentralisation and the predominance of technology-specific 
instruments would hasten the phase out of the EU ETS. The development of an Energy Union 
would not be possible and, therefore, there are no major changes from current energy market. 
Each Member State would have its own regulatory framework and the energy mix would be 
determined at national level.  
In the absence of binding emission reduction targets, the environmental effectiveness of this 
policy pathway would depend on the national efforts to reduce emissions. The role of the EU 
would focus on coordinating national policies and recommending effective pathways in 
emission reduction. An emission standards system is proposed by the EU to cover all sectors. 
Member States would be free to implement emission standards and set the stringency level. 
The EU should harmonise emission standards in some sector, particularly energy-intensive and 
trade-exposed industries, to avoid comparative disadvantages between Member States. 
Otherwise, the different regulations between Member States may lead some companies to 
move production capacities to those countries with laxer regulation (i.e. carbon leakage).   
This governance scenario allows Member States to implement their own instruments. Thus, 
more ambitious countries could serve as role models for the rest of the countries. The EU 
should facilitate a forum to share national practices. The most successful measures could be 
imitated by other countries. This could encourage investment and innovation in low carbon 
technologies. On the other hand, in a fragmented EU the risk of free riders is very high. In the 
absence of binding targets, some Member States may not address the challenge of climate 
change. They could implement measures with very lax stringency levels. In general, Member 
States could be focused on maximizing non-climate benefits of emission reductions. This would 
eventually reduce the effectiveness in mitigation actions. 
In a decentralised scenario, the coordination of national climate policies would be important 
to promote cost-effectiveness. Even if there is not an Energy Union, bilateral agreements to 
connect national electricity market may reduce mitigation costs. In order to deal with the 
intermittency in most renewables, the role of the EU could be focused on reducing barriers to 
international trade in electricity. National instruments in the promotion of renewables would 
be benefited from EU coordination.  
The decentralisation of the climate policy could help to increase its acceptability by the general 
public. Climate instruments would be more flexible to take into account national 
characteristics. The design of instruments would be made according to national circumstances. 
In contrast to market-based pathways, the political and administrative feasibility of this policy 
pathway should not be reduced by the decentralisation of the climate policy.   
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Summary:         
 The higher EU decentralisation and the predominance of technology-specific 
instruments would hasten the phase out of the EU ETS. 
 The EU should facilitate a forum to share national practices. The most successful 
measures could be imitated by other countries. 
 The EU should harmonise emission standards in energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries to avoid comparative disadvantages between Member States. 
 In contrast to market-based pathways, the political and administrative feasibility of this 
policy pathway should not be reduced by the decentralisation of the climate policy.     
 In order to deal with the intermittency in most renewables, the role of the EU could be 
focused on reducing barriers to international trade in electricity. 
 
ETS pure-cap pathway  
In this section we assess the performance of an ETS pure-cap pathway under an EU 
decentralised scenario which is characterized by high decentralisation of EU climate policy. 
In a decentralised scenario, it looks unrealistic that the EU ETS could play a leading role. When 
a stringent cap is set to keep high the price of allowances, national measures would lose their 
influence. It makes no sense to implement national measures because their environmental 
effectiveness would be very limited. On the other hand, when national instruments are 
successful, they would reduce the price of allowances and make the EU ETS irrelevant.  Thus, 
without a centralised coordination, the combination of a pure cap scheme and national 
instruments would be ineffective.  
A structural reform of the EU ETS would be very unlikely. It would not be possible to include 
other sectors or make the emission cap level more stringent. In this governance scenario the 
EU ETS could remain to keep an emission reduction track, but it would be irrelevant. Emission 
reduction would be driven by national instruments. A carbon price floor, such as the one 
introduced by the UK in the power sector (UK Parliament, 2013), could be implemented to 
keep the price signal of the EU ETS meaningful. However, these initiatives would be promoted 
at national level.      
Summary:         
 Without a centralised coordination, the combination of a pure cap scheme and national 
instruments would be ineffective. 
 The EU ETS could remain to keep an emission reduction track, but it would be irrelevant. 
 Member States could introduce a carbon price floor to maintain the price signal of the 
EU ETS meaningful. 
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ETS price stabilized pathway  
This policy pathway would be infeasible in a decentralised scenario.    
Emission tax pathway  
This policy pathway would be infeasible in a decentralised scenario.    
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Table 3 Key results for each supranational governance scenario 
 International Governance EU Governance 
Non-Global-deal scenario  Middle-of-the-road 
scenario 
EU centralized scenario EU decentralized scenario 
Features 
 The degree of global ambition is 
high. 
 There are not binding international 
agreements and convergence is low. 
High international uncertainty. 
 High risk of carbon leakage, through 
the competitiveness and the 
investment channel. 
 The higher demand of low carbon 
technologies would create business 
opportunities for many industries. 
 The degree of global ambition is low. 
 The compliance of the targets is 
guaranteed by binding agreements. 
 Climate instruments are 
harmonized across borders. 
 Risk of carbon leakage through the 
price channel. 
 Low feasibility of ambitious climate 
instruments because of the laxer 
regulation abroad.  
 Institutional capacity to reform the 
EU ETS. 
 An internal energy market is 
created.  
 Infrastructure are planned and 
financed at the EU level. 
 The EU can set legally binding 
national targets. 
 
 
 The EU ETS cannot be reformed. 
 Energy markets are ruled at national 
level. 
 Infrastructures are planned and 
financed at national level. 
 The EU cannot set binding 
technology standards, it should 
limited to recommendations. 
 There are not specific targets for 
Member States.     
P
o
lic
y 
P
at
h
w
ay
s 
Technology-
specific 
 Inappropriate stringency levels may 
reduce the EU competitiveness. 
 Additional anti-leakage measures 
such as exemptions are required. 
 The risk caused of picking up 
winners may lead to high economic 
costs. 
 A stable regulatory framework may 
encourage low-carbon investment. 
 The lack of a price signal may reduce 
the feasibility 
 With technology-specific 
instruments, international 
harmonization may be more 
difficult. 
 The promotion of CCS technology 
could reduce the risk of carbon 
leakage through the price channel. 
 Technology regulation should focus 
on the transport sector to increase 
the non-climate benefits of 
emissions reduction.  
 High stringency levels on emission 
standards should guarantee the 
environmental effectiveness. 
 EU instruments should be flexible 
enough to facilitate national 
initiatives. 
 Technology-specific instrument and 
higher centralisation could increase 
bureaucracy and reduce the 
capacity for modification as new 
information emerges. 
 Higher nationalization and the 
predominance of technology-
specific instruments would hasten 
the phase out of the EU ETS. 
 The EU should harmonise emission 
standards to avoid comparative 
disadvantages between Member 
States. 
 The EU should facilitate a forum to 
share national practices. 
 The EU could reduce barriers to link 
national electricity markets. 
ETS pure-cap 
 The risk of carbon leakage is very 
high; free allocation of allowances 
should be implemented. 
 The EU ETS could be linked to 
compatible emission trading 
systems and, thus, reduce the risk of 
carbon leakage. 
 Expanding the EU ETS the cost-
effectiveness should increase.  
 The combination of a pure cap 
scheme and national instruments 
would be ineffective. 
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 The high uncertainty could 
discourage investment and reduce 
the cost-effectiveness. 
 Additional technology-support 
instruments could improve the 
performance of the instrument 
package. 
 Complementing the EU ETS with 
additional instruments could 
increase the acceptability. 
 A larger emission trading market 
could reduce the high volatility 
associated to a pure-cap system. 
 It might not be desirable to expand 
the EU ETS and cover all sectors.   
 The transport sector could face 
relatively a higher stringent 
regulation to take advantage of the 
non-climate benefits.   
 Technology-specific measure may 
be required to encourage 
investment. 
 Additional measures could be 
implemented when they are 
designed at EU at level and their 
impact on the EU ETS is assessed. 
 The instrument package is not very 
different from the current one and, 
therefore, its feasibility should be 
high. 
 The EU ETS could remain to keep an 
emission reduction track, but it 
would be irrelevant. 
 Member States could introduce a 
carbon price floor to maintain the 
price signal of the EU ETS 
meaningful. 
ETS price 
stabilized 
 The risk of carbon leakage would be 
reduced with predictable carbon 
prices. 
 Lower uncertainty would increase 
the dynamic efficiency of the EU 
ETS. 
 The EU ETS would be compatible 
with technology-support 
instruments, which could incentivize 
innovation and increase the 
international competitiveness of EU 
industries. 
 The political feasibility is limited. 
 A price collar may be incompatible 
with linking the EU ETS to other 
trading systems abroad. 
 It may be best to use the CDM to 
reduce emissions abroad and 
increase the efficiency of the 
scheme. 
 Additional measures could be 
implemented to maximize non-
climate benefits of emission 
reductions.  
 
 The centralisation of the EU climate 
policy would allow setting a price 
collar. 
 With a price collar, not only the 
effectiveness and the efficiency 
would increase but also the political 
feasibility. 
 The EU ETS would be compatible 
with national initiatives, without 
affecting the price signal. 
 A well-functioning EU ETS may 
require huge and complex 
administrative task. 
 This policy pathway would be 
infeasible in a decentralised 
scenario.    
 
Emission tax 
 Predictable carbon price would 
reduce the risk of carbon leakage. 
 Although the feasibility is low, a 
border carbon adjustment would be 
beneficial to reduce the risk of 
carbon leakage. 
 Public subsidies on low-carbon 
technologies may convenient. 
 The political feasibility of emission 
tax is very limited. 
 The different ambition levels 
between the EU and the rest of the 
world could make emission tax 
harmonization difficult. 
 The international harmonization 
should focus on some sectors. 
 Additional measures should be 
implemented to meet the more 
ambitious EU targets and maximize 
non-climate benefits. 
 The higher predictability of an 
emission tax would reduce the 
carbon price level. 
 In presence of market failures, a 
single emission tax may not lead to 
the expected emission reduction. 
 The implementation of additional 
measures should be considered to 
increase the efficiency and 
feasibility 
 This policy pathway would be 
infeasible in a decentralised 
scenario.    
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4 Conclusions  
The aim of this document is to investigate different options for EU climate policy in four 
supranational governance scenarios. We analyse climate instrumentation in two international 
governance scenarios:  
i. No-global-deal scenario, which assumes very ambitious international commitments but 
without legally binding agreements and a low degree of convergence and 
harmonization of climate instruments, and  
ii. A middle-of-the-road scenario, which assumes a high degree of policy convergence but 
a lack of ambition in emission reduction.  
We also analyse climate instrumentation in two EU governance scenarios:  
i. An EU centralised scenario, which assumes most of the climate decisions are 
established at the EU level and, therefore, where there is a centralisation of EU 
governance structure, and  
ii. An EU decentralised scenario, which assumes a re-nationalisation of climate policy and 
thereby climate instruments that are designed and implemented at national level. 
 
These are the key results of the report: 
 
Non-global-deal scenario 
 In a non-global-deal scenario, carbon leakage remains as a big challenge for EU climate 
policy. The lack of international coordination and harmonization of climate instruments 
may create divergences between countries.  
 A technology-specific pathway may not be superior to market-based pathways in order 
to avoid carbon leakage. Inappropriate stringency levels of standards may reduce the 
EU competitiveness. The volatility and uncertainty associated to a pure cap ETS system 
is also an obstacle to reduce carbon leakage. 
 Regardless of the policy pathway, additional anti-leakage measures should be 
implemented in the energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. The free allocation 
of allowances is the most effective and feasible option to avoid carbon leakage in those 
sectors covered by the EU ETS. Exemptions could be applied to those sectors subject to 
standards. When an emission tax is implemented, border carbon adjustment is the best 
option, but its feasibility may be low.      
 In presence of market failures (e.g. principal agent problem), market-based pathways 
could be benefited from technology-specific instruments, which could promote 
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investment and innovation in low carbon technologies. This is particularly important in 
the ETS pure-cap pathway, where the price signal may be very uncertain and volatile. 
 A price stabilization reform of the EU ETS would decrease price uncertainty. Moreover, 
the reform would allow implementing additional instruments without affecting the 
price signal. However, a price collar is outside the structural reform proposed by the 
European Commission and its political feasibility may be low. Likewise, an emission tax 
could also face feasibility problems.  
 
Middle-the-road scenario 
 The low international ambition may reduce the political feasibility of EU climate policy. 
In this international context, EU climate policy should focus on maximizing non-climate 
benefits of emissions reduction.  
 The static efficiency of market-based pathways is generally high because marginal 
abatement cost is equal across sectors and emitters. However, emission price may not 
internalise non-climate benefits. Emissions are reduced regardless of the co-benefits. 
Hence, a technology-specific pathway may be superior to market-based pathways in 
this international context. Market-based pathways could be improved adding 
technologic-specific instruments to those sectors which can deliver high non-climate 
benefits. 
 Although International coordination offers the opportunity to harmonize climate 
instruments across borders, some pathways may have difficulties to take advantage of 
this international context. For instance, there is a trade-off between stabilizing 
allowances price and linking the EU ETS with other trading systems.       
 Regardless of the specific policy pathway taken, non-climate benefits of emission 
reductions should be highlighted to increase the public acceptability of instrument 
mixes. 
EU centralised scenario 
 This scenario would increase the political feasibility of all pathways. The centralisation 
of the EU climate policy would allow a structural reform of the EU ETS and expand the 
coverage of the EU ETS, including the transport and the buildings sector. 
 The effectiveness of the instrument packages will depend on the stringency levels. 
However, in the absence of a price signal, a technology-specific pathway may subject 
to rebound effects. Likewise, market failures (e.g. principal agent problem) may reduce 
the effectiveness of market-based pathways.  
 A price stabilization reform may be beneficial to reduce price uncertainty and 
encourage investment and innovation in those sectors covered by the EU ETS. Besides, 
the EU ETS could compatible with national initiatives, without affecting the price signal. 
Although this scenario assumes a centralisation of climate policy, national and/or sub-
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national measures could be useful to take into account national idiosyncrasies. 
Moreover, they could encourage front-runners and increase the feasibility of the 
instrument package.   
 In a technology-specific pathway, higher centralisation could increase bureaucracy and 
reduce the capacity for modification as new information emerges. 
EU decentralised scenario 
 This scenario would limit the number of pathways that the EU climate policy could take. 
The most feasible pathway would be the technologic-specific pathway.  
 The role of the EU would focus on coordinating national policies and recommending 
effective pathways in emission reduction. The EU should harmonise emission standards 
in some sector, particularly energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries, to avoid 
comparative disadvantages between Member States. 
 In order to deal with the intermittency in most renewables, the role of the EU could be 
focused on reducing barriers to link national electricity markets. 
 In a decentralised scenario, it looks unrealistic that the EU ETS could play a leading role. 
The EU ETS could remain to keep an emission reduction track. Member States could 
introduce a carbon price floor to maintain the price signal meaningful. 
 A price stabilization reform and emission tax pathway would require a high 
centralisation of EU climate policy and, therefore, they are infeasible in this scenario.  
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Philippe Quirion 
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Non-CO2 Emissions, particularly from Agriculture 
Onno Kuik & Agni Kalfagianni 
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Paul Drummond 
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Massimiliano Mazzanti 
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